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ABSTRACT  
State practice and literature suggest that devolution of power can address the main challenges 
of underdevelopment, internal conflict and abuse of centralised power in developing states. 
However, this thesis advances the argument that the design features of devolved government 
for these purposes are not always compatible. Accordingly, while there are complementary and 
neutral design features in the three designs, trade-offs have to be made between the unique 
design features in order to ensure the effective pursuit of the three purposes through a single 
system of devolved government. Kenya, the case study for this inquiry, confirms the 
international trend as its major challenges over the last 50 years have been underdevelopment, 
internal conflict and abuse of central power. As such, development, ethnic harmony, and the 
limiting of central power featured prominently throughout the entire constitutional review process 
as purposes to be pursued by means of devolution of power. To this end, the devolution of state 
power is one of the central elements of the current constitutional dispensation in Kenya. There 
are trade-offs made in Kenya‟s devolution design in order to accommodate the three purposes 
of devolution. However, the overall result has been that the emphasis falls on development at 
the expense of conflict resolution and limiting central power.  Nevertheless, regardless of the 
trade-offs and nature of the final design, the design‟s effectiveness or lack thereof may depend 
very much on factors external to the design. Lack of political will to make devolution work can 
negate the effectiveness of even the most perfect design; by same token, political will could 
make an apparently bad design effective. In practice, therefore, effectiveness depends on an 
array of other context-specific factors. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The problem  
It is generally agreed that developing states face multiple challenges, including 
underdevelopment, conflict, poor governance and other all-too-familiar „third-world‟ problems. It 
is estimated that more than 1.2 billion people live in countries plagued by war and other 
disasters, with almost one-third of them in the developing world.1 Siegle and O‟Mahony observe 
that “poor countries have been more prone to intrastate conflict in the post-Cold War period”2 
than more developed countries. The developmental consequences of this situation are clear: 
countries affected by internal conflict are among those with the highest levels of socio-economic 
problems, and are the farthest from achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).3 The 
World Bank notes that “[n]o low-income fragile or other conflict-affected country has yet 
achieved a single MDG”.4  
These „third-world‟ challenges are historical, systemic and structural, displaying an identifiable 
pattern across almost all developing states. Underdevelopment and disparities are linked to 
poor governance policies that are frequently traceable to the colonial era. Colonial governance 
structures are often described as centralised, hierarchical and meant for control rather than 
democratic governance; indeed, the centralised state has been termed “the last, and perhaps, 
the most serious, vestige of Western Colonialism”.5 At independence, most post-colonial leaders 
rejected the semi-federal structures which their departing colonial masters attempted to 
bequeath to them, dismissing these as colonial projects. Instead, centralised systems of 
government were promoted as necessary for the purposes of unity and development.  
                                               
1
 World Bank World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development (2011) 2; Overseas Development 
Institute „Fragile states: Beyond the quick wins‟ ODI Policy paper (2010) 1, cited in United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) „Local Governance, peace building and state building in post-conflict settings: A UNDP 
discussion paper‟ (2010) 5.  
2
 Siegle J & O‟Mahony P („Assessing the merits of decentralization as a conflict mitigation strategy‟ (2006) 4) state 
that “specifically, countries with per capita incomes below $2000 have been eight times as likely to engage in 
intrastate conflict in the post-Cold War period as countries with per capita incomes above $ 4000”.  
3
 UNDP (2010) 5.  
4
 World Bank (2011) 5.  
5
 Olowu D & Wunsch J The Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and Self-Governance in Africa (1990) 18.  
 
 
 
 
2 
 
A few decades later, however, it became evident that centralised systems of government were 
neither a panacea for development nor unity. Post-independence leaders found colonial control 
structures a convenient tool for entrenching themselves in power and cracking down on political 
opposition; under this strategy, other arms of government and critical public institutions were 
subordinated to the ruler,6 resulting in the „big-man syndrome‟.7 Personal rule created ruling 
elites and patronage networks, with these networks typically drawn from the ruler‟s own 
community and maintained by “cannibalising” state resources.8  
Predictably, then, the centralisation of power and plunder of state resources led to inefficiency, a 
decline in the provision of basic services, and the growth of both regional and interpersonal 
economic disparities. A lack of essential services contributed to the increase in poverty levels 
and the emergence of other developmental concerns. The centralisation of power and political 
patronage created perceptions of political and economic marginalisation among communities at 
the periphery of power, perceptions that were deepened by policies of exclusion in which state 
resources were diverted to the „home regions‟ of the rulers to the detriment of other areas.  
The consequence of this exclusion is that it engendered a belief that control of the presidency is 
the ultimate way to access state resources and opportunities. This belief in turn has made 
presidential elections a „do or die‟ affair in which each subnational group seeks to control the 
presidency. Many states have witnessed deadly internal conflict as the main subnational groups 
contending for the presidency engage in zero-sum competition for control of national political 
power. 
In what came to be known as the “the second wave of democratisation”,9 developing states in 
the 1970s resorted to decentralising powers and resources to new or existing subnational levels 
in a bid to address the challenges associated with the centralised state.10 In fact, the trend later 
became global, with developed states joining in the decentralisation fray.11 While the 
                                               
6
 Olowu & Wunsch (1990) 59.  
7
 Olowu & Wunsch (1990) 55.  
8
 Olowu & Wunsch (1990) 65; Bratton M & De Walle NV „Neopatrimonial regimes and political transition in Africa‟ 
(1994) 46 World Politics 301.  
9
 Fessha Y & Kirkby C „A critical survey of subnational autonomy in African states‟ (2008) 38 Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism 248-249. 
10
 Marks G & Hooghe L „Contrasting visions of multi-level governance‟ in Bache I & Flinders M (eds) Multi-level 
Governance (2004) 15.  
11
 Marks & Hooghe (2004) 2.  
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decentralisation trend is most common in developing states,12 a 2004 survey of developed 
states reveals that, since 1980, no European country has become more centralised and that half 
of the countries in the European Union (EU) have devolved authority to regional level 
governments.13 Developed countries with a strong tradition of centralisation, such as France, 
the United Kingdom and Spain, also transferred significant power to their respective subnational 
levels in the same period.14 A World Bank report indicates that at least 95 percent of the states 
in the world have some form of elected subnational government.15  
During the Cold War, most of the autocratic regimes established in the developing world after 
independence were shielded, and often even actively supported, by Western powers that 
wished in part to stem communist infiltration. However, the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
saw an unprecedented rise in internal conflict as aggrieved sub-state groups sought to 
challenge years of dominance by Western-backed dictatorial regimes. This in turn led to conflict 
as sub-state groups engaged in violent struggles to challenge political and economic exclusion 
by the politically dominant groups. 
In the post-Cold War period the devolution of power to subnational levels came increasingly to 
be seen as a means of enhancing political and economic inclusion and thus as a process with 
the potential to ameliorate internal conflict.16 However, the principle of devolving power to the 
subnational level as a means of keeping the peace is an old idea, one associated with federal 
systems such as Switzerland (1847), and Canada (1867).  The possibility that devolution could 
enhance sharing of power and resources, and thereby address internal conflict, makes it an 
attractive concept in the face of mounting internal turmoil and contestation. 
Whereas the centralised state is viewed as a tool of domination over smaller groups by the 
group politically dominant at the national level, the devolution of power to the subnational level 
is seen as a way of sharing powers and resources and hence as providing the basis for 
consolidating peace. Sharing power with subnational groups is meaningful only if it enables the 
aggrieved subnational groups to exercise political power and control resources through their 
subnational governments. Perceptions of domination can also be addressed if, through their 
                                               
12
 Marks & Hooghe (2004) 15.  
13
 Marks & Hooghe (2004) 2.  
14
 World Bank World Development Report 1997: The state in a Changing World (1997) 121.  
15
 World Bank World Development Report 1999/ 2000: Entering the 21
st
 Century (1999) 108.  
16
 See generally Crawford G & Hartmann C (eds) Decentralisation in Africa: A Pathway Out of Poverty and Conflict? 
(2008).  
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representative structures, subnational groups can influence important central decision-making 
processes such as the exercise of political power at the national level and the use of national 
resources.  
The end-result is that devolution of powers is increasingly expected to address numerous 
purposes, including development, political stability and limiting central power. Indeed, all 
developing countries transfer powers to the subnational level in the hope of enhancing access 
to services and development; conflict-ridden states, in particular, transfer power with the aim of 
consolidating political stability by enhancing a more equitable sharing of power and resources.17  
One clear factor is that these multiple challenges also confront a state concurrently. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the most conflict-ridden states are also the most underdeveloped. 
Centralising power to the exclusion of other groups lays the basis for underdevelopment in that 
it leads to bureaucratic inefficiencies which in turn deepen the perceptions of marginalisation 
that drive conflict. The only way that devolution can address these multiple and concurrent 
challenges is if it can ensure efficient service delivery and development, bring about effective 
economic and political accommodation for all groups, and meaningfully limit central power.  
2. Research question: How to design devolution to address underdevelopment, 
internal conflict and abuse of central power   
The multiplicity and concurrency of these challenges calls for an effective response. This thesis 
seeks to examine whether a state can, through the constitutional design of its devolved system 
of government, effectively respond to issues of underdevelopment, internal conflict, and 
limitations on central power. However, states have long been confronted by these three 
challenges and, in an attempt to address them, they have, consciously or unconsciously, 
designed systems which respond to these three challenges with varying degrees of 
effectiveness.   
Arguably, a system which effectively pursues the three purposes is one which accommodates 
the three purposes in its design and implementation. This could be achieved through making 
trade-offs between conflicting or potentially conflicting design features. In turn, an inquiry into 
how trade-offs in the design of devolution can be made to accommodate the three purposes 
should be preceded by understanding the distinct design features of devolution for each 
purpose. Through an examination of state practice, scholarship on devolution and other 
literature from institutions involved in devolved governance, one can determine the typical 
                                               
17
 Crawford & Hartmann (2008, 21) argue that a possible exception could be Mauritius.  
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devolution design-features for development, political stability, and limiting central power. 
Identifying the typical design features of each purpose is an important step towards 
understanding how a single system can balance the three issues in its design and 
implementation. The next important step is to understand the nature and relationship between 
the respective devolution designs, with a view to determining their compatibility. Three main 
questions inevitably underlie such an inquiry:  
 How have states designed, or proposed to design, devolution in order to address 
underdevelopment, internal conflict and centralisation of power?  
 Are there distinctive design features for each of these three purposes?  
 If so, are the design features for the three purposes harmonious? If not, can the 
conflicting aspects (if any) be “traded off” to create a single design that can effectively 
address underdevelopment and internal conflict as well as limit central power?  
3. Significance of the study  
Generally, the evidence of development through devolution is weak and unconvincing; the 
results are even more uncertain in the case of linkages between devolution, managing internal 
conflict, and limiting central power. Indeed, the very assumptions on which the concepts of 
devolution and decentralisation are erected are increasingly being questioned. Nevertheless, 
states continue to devolve power to suit varying purposes and objectives. This unsurprising 
trend may be explained by the persistence of the challenges identified above and the apparent 
lack of a visible alternative to devolution of power or decentralisation at this point in time.  
In the above circumstances, it would seem that the right question to ask is not whether 
devolution of power or decentralisation effectively achieves the intended purpose, but rather 
how devolution can be designed in order to pursue effectively the three main and persistent 
challenges. This inquiry is undertaken with reference to Kenya, which is in the process of 
devolving powers to devolved units with an explicit objective of pursuing development, resolving 
conflict, and limiting central power. As such, this study seeks to facilitate deeper understanding 
of Kenya‟s devolved system of government; in addition, it has potential relevance to other 
developing states that struggle with underdevelopment, internal conflict, and abuse of central 
power and which may wish to address these challenges by devolving power. 
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4. Devolution design in Kenya: the study scope   
This thesis uses the Kenyan devolution design to answer the three research questions identified 
above. Kenya is a typical developing country, and the three purposes that are the subject of 
inquiry in this thesis are relevant to it in that it has experienced years of abuse of central power, 
a problem traceable to the colonial centralised state inherited by successive post-colonial 
regimes. Centralisation of power was a major contributor to underdevelopment and poverty as a 
result of a centralised and inefficient bureaucracy. Real or perceived grievances stemming from 
political and economic exclusion along ethnic lines form the basis of ongoing ethnic and political 
conflict, with the country having suffered its worst conflict after the disputed 2007 presidential 
elections. 
Kenya adopted a new Constitution in 2010 in what was a clear attempt to address the root 
causes of its conflict. Through the Constitution, Kenya hopes to address development, facilitate 
ethnic accommodation, and limit central power. Indeed, the objectives of devolved government 
in the Constitution are clear that the devolved system of government must pursue development, 
ethnic accommodation and the limitation of central power. While the three issues are relevant to 
developing states in general, Kenya is an important reference point for this study because its 
recently adopted devolution design engages with them explicitly and deliberately. 
The Kenyan devolution design is assessed in three main stages. Through an analysis of the 
country‟s history of devolved governance, the first stage ascertains the relevance of 
underdevelopment, internal conflict, and central power abuse to Kenya; as is typical of post-
colonial developing African states, the three issues present themselves as both historical and 
systemic challenges. Second, the analysis turns to the constitutional review process to ascertain 
whether the three issues informed the deliberations as well as the final devolution design 
features adopted in the 2010 Constitution. Next, the current Kenyan devolution design is 
evaluated against the typical institutional design features for pursuit of each of the three 
purposes. The last stage is an assessment of whether, and in what way, the Kenyan system of 
devolution accommodates the three purposes in its design in order to facilitate effective pursuit 
of them.  
5. Argument  
State practice and literature suggest that devolution of power can address the main challenges 
of underdevelopment, internal conflict and abuse of centralised power. However, this thesis 
advances the argument that the design features of devolved government for these purposes are 
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not always compatible. Accordingly, while there are complementary and neutral design features 
in the three designs, trade-offs have to be made between the unique design features in order to 
ensure the effective pursuit of the three purposes through a single system of devolved 
government.  
Kenya, the case study for this inquiry, confirms the international trend as its major challenges 
over the last 50 years have been underdevelopment, internal conflict and abuse of central 
power. As such, development, ethnic accommodation, and the limiting of central power featured 
prominently throughout the entire constitutional review process as purposes to be pursued by 
means of devolution of power. To this end, the devolution of state power is one of the central 
elements of the current constitutional dispensation in Kenya. There are trade-offs made in 
Kenya‟s devolution design in order to accommodate the three purposes of devolution. However, 
the overall result has been that the emphasis falls on development at the expense of conflict 
resolution and limiting central power.   
In the light of the Kenyan case study, the argument in the thesis is developed in the manner 
described below. 
Given that the three purposes are pursued through a common process, namely, the 
constitutional devolution of power, there is a general and common framework within which 
variations in design emerge. Indeed, inherent in the process of devolution is the creation of 
autonomous subnational units that can exercise and control powers independently from the 
centre. However, what may vary with each purpose are aspects of autonomy, such as the 
nature, level, and extent of autonomy. Other design aspects that may vary with the purpose of 
devolution include: the institutional and structural design, fiscal design, and the nature and 
design of central-local relations.  
Effective development through devolution, for instance, requires small but economically viable 
units for effective participation and accountability. Conflict resolution may require large or small 
units, depending on the context. Effectively limiting central power, on the other hand, requires 
large homogenous units with powers and resources. As a result, there is a potential for conflict 
between these different structural design features and trade-offs may be needed in order to 
accommodate the three purposes in a single design. Other design aspects that may vary with 
the purpose relate to the nature and extent of powers exercise by the devolved units, the nature 
and level of fiscal powers, the design of institutions, and even the nature of relations between 
the centre and the devolved units.  
 
 
 
 
8 
 
The distinctive design features of each of the three purposes of devolution reveal a potential for 
conflict if implemented in a single system. Accordingly, if the three purposes are to be pursued 
through a single system of devolved government, trade-offs have to be made between the 
conflicting features in order to accommodate the three purposes. The most significant of the 
design aspects and compromise thereof is the structure of the devolved units and specifically 
the size and number of such units. This is because the structure will determine the effectiveness 
in terms of exercise of powers, and may even determine the nature and effectiveness of 
relations with the centre. Arguably, the traditional devolution structure composed of the national, 
regional and local levels is a potential compromise between the three purposes of devolving 
power. This is because it has regional and local levels, and thus combines structures 
considered important for the three purposes.  
A country may either adopt the “national-regional-local” structure of devolution or choose a 
different structure. For instance, a country can eliminate the regional level and retain local units 
only. A country may also establish a new “hybrid level” which is neither regional nor local but a 
“compromise level” between them. Elimination of a regional level means that typical regional 
functions are either devolved to the local level or centralised at the national level. On the other 
hand, where a “hybrid level” is created, regional and local functions are merged in the new 
“compromise level”. Elimination of a level and the creation of a “hybrid level” can both cause 
complications, due to the fact that typical regional and local functions may not sit comfortably in 
another level. Accordingly, unless special circumstances so compel, a state may want to retain 
or adopt the traditional structure of national, regional and local levels, and make trade-offs within 
this basic structure.  
Nevertheless, regardless of the trade-offs and nature of the final design, the design‟s 
effectiveness or lack thereof may depend very much on factors external to the design. For 
instance, the lack of political will to make devolution work can negate the effectiveness of even 
the most perfect design; by same token, political will could make an apparently bad design 
effective. This means that even after potentially conflicting design features are accommodated 
in a single system through compromises, effectiveness is not always guaranteed. In practice, 
effectiveness depends on an array of other context-specific factors. 
6. Literature survey  
There is a large body of literature worldwide on the institutional design and implementation of 
devolution for the three purposes. The literature on decentralisation or devolution of power for 
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development is well developed, mainly by the World Bank, which is the undisputed leader in 
shaping the development discourse generally. The typical design features are highlighted in the 
World Development Report (WDR)18 of 1999/2000.19 Other WDRs, such as those of 2000,20 
200421 and 201122 have enhanced those initial design features in order to ensure accountability, 
local responsiveness and allocative efficiency. Additional relevant literature includes World 
Bank-commissioned studies such as Rethinking Decentralization in Developing Countries,23 
which formed the basis of the 1999/2000 WDR. Other scholars have also supplemented the 
basic design proposed by the Bank; these include De Visser24 and Prud‟homme,25 who critique 
the main assumptions of the World Bank Model. Further literature beyond World Bank material 
includes UNDP26 reports and other institutional reports on devolved governance.  
Separate, but equally voluminous, is the literature on devolving power for purposes of conflict 
resolution, a practice rooted in federalism. Accordingly, the works of leading federal theorists 
such as Watts27 and Elazar28 provide a basis for understanding the design features. However, 
given the ever-blurring unitary-federal dichotomy, there is, in addition, an emerging literature on 
devolution of power and conflict resolution which is general and not confined to federalism. The 
main texts include Siegle and O‟Mahony29 as well as the 2010 UNDP study30 on 
decentralisation and conflict management.  
Literature on devolution design for the explicit purpose of limiting central power is generally 
underdeveloped. Much of it is also tied to federalism since most federal features are inherently 
                                               
18
 Yusuf S et al Development Economics Through the Decades: A Critical Look at 30 Years of the World 
Development Report (2009) 2.  
19
World Bank (1999) 107-124.  
20
 World Bank World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty (2000).  
21
 World Bank World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People (2004).  
22
 World Bank World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development (2011).  
23
 Litvack J, Ahmad J & Bird R Rethinking Decentralisation in Developing Countries (1998).  
24
 De Visser J Developmental Local Government: A Case Study of South Africa (2005).  
25
 Prud‟homme R „The Dangers of Decentralization‟ (1995) 10 The World Bank Observer 201-220.  
26
 UNDP „Decentralised governance for gevelopment: A combined practice note on decentralization, Local 
governance and urban/ rural development‟ (2004).  
27
 Watts RL Comparing Federal Systems (2008).  
28
 Elazar JD Exploring Federalism (1987).  
29
 Siegle & O‟Mahony (2006).  
30
 UNDP (2010).  
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„centre-constraining‟.31 Accordingly, the works of federal theorists such as Saunders,32 Watts33 
and Baldi34 were relied on to identify the central devolution design features for limiting central 
power. However, there is an emerging literature which is not tied to classical federalism, and it 
includes works by Murray and Simeon,35 Jeffery36 and others.  
Almost entirely absent is literature addressing the way in which the three purposes are mutually 
reinforcing or incompatible in devolution design; similarly, there is almost no literature which 
explicitly examines tensions or conflicts in the respective designs. The literature has developed 
separately on the three purposes, despite the fact that usually they are intended to be 
implemented through a single system. This thesis therefore fills an identifiable gap in the 
literature. 
Literature on the Kenyan system of devolution is scarce, given the fairly recent adoption of the 
structure. While there is abundant literature on decentralisation in the previous dispensation,37 
as well as the constitutional review process,38 not much is available on devolution in the 2010 
Constitution. Ghai and Cottrell39 analyse the entire Constitution, but while the chapter they 
devote to the subject of devolution provides important insights, it does not go into adequate 
detail owing to its general focus. The World Bank report Devolution without disruption: A 
                                               
31
 Baldi B „Beyond the federal-unitary dichotomy‟ working paper, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of 
California, Berkeley (1999).  
32
 Saunders C „Legislative, executive and judicial institutions: A synthesis‟ in Le Roy K et al (eds) Legislative, 
Executive and Judicial Governance in Federal Countries (2006) 344-384.  
33
 Watts (2008).  
34
 Baldi (1999).  
35
 Murray C & Simeon R „Promises unmet: multi-level government in South Africa‟ in Saxena R (ed) Varieties of 
Federal Governance: Major Contemporary Models (2011) 232-260.  
36
 Jeffery C „The Union‟s place: Scottish-English relations after devolution‟ in Saxena (2011) 433-446.  
37
 Ghai YP & McAuslan JPWB Public law and Political Change in Kenya (1970); Oyugi WO „Local government in 
Kenya: a case of institutional decline‟ in Mawhood P (ed) Local Government in The Third World: The Experience of 
Tropical Africa (1993) 109-143; Oyugi WO Local Government and Development in Kenya (1978); Smoke P Local 
Government Finance in Developing Countries: The Case of Kenya (1994); Kibua TN & Mwabu G (eds) 
Decentralization and Devolution in Kenya: New Approaches (2008). 
38
 Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) „The final report of the Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission‟ (2005); Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review (CoE) „Final report of the Committee of Experts 
on Constitutional Review‟ (2010a); Oyugi WO „The search for an appropriate decentralisation design in Kenya: 
historical and comparative perspectives‟ in Kithure K & Ambani A (eds) The Anatomy of Bomas: Selected Analyses of 
the 2004 Draft Constitution of Kenya (2005) 57-106. 
39
 Ghai YP & Cottrell JG Kenya‟s Constitution: An Instrument for Change (2011).  
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pathway to a successful new Kenya,40 released in late 2012, is arguably the most detailed 
analysis yet of the Kenyan devolved system. However, in keeping with the World Bank‟s 
traditional approach, it focuses mainly on the practical aspects of effective implementation of 
fiscal issues and does not undertake an analysis of the design. This thesis will thus contribute to 
an understanding of Kenya‟s devolved system in general and how it accommodates the three 
purposes in particular. 
7. Methodology  
This study relies on available literature to identify the typical devolution design features for the 
three purposes. For development, the World Bank‟s World Development Report (WDR), an 
annual publication of the Bank,41 was the primary reference. The thesis relies specifically on the 
WDR of 1999/2000, which discusses the central design features of decentralisation for 
development42 and subsequent WDRs. Independent studies were also used as a secondary 
reference for the “World Bank Model”. The thesis is also informed by the works of individual 
scholars who have either elaborated upon the World Bank Model or critiqued the assumptions 
on which it rests. Other materials relied upon include literature generated by institutions that 
have a focus on decentralisation/devolution and development. For conflict resolution, there is no 
universal and coherent design as is the case with development. Accordingly, the thesis draws 
on literature by federal theorists and other literature on decentralisation/devolution and conflict 
resolution generally. Likewise, it examines federal theorists and other “non-federal” literature 
relevant to the question of limiting central power through devolution.  
For the Kenyan case study, the thesis relies on the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 to elicit the 
devolution design.  In addition, it draws on national laws, policy papers, government reports and 
other papers which interpreted or expanded on the constitutional design. The thesis also relies 
on the scholarly work and institutional reports which has analysed the devolved system of 
government. For the historical analysis and the Kenyan constitutional review process, the thesis 
draws on government reports as well as scholarly work analysing the history of decentralisation 
and the constitutional review process. 
                                               
40
 World Bank Devolution without Disruption: Pathways to a Successful New Kenya (2012).  
41
 Yusuf et al (2009) 2.  
42
World Bank (1999) 107-124.  
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8. Delineations and limitations of the study  
This thesis is focused on the primary constitutional design of devolution in Kenya, a focus which 
limits or delineates the research in three main ways. First, while a raft of legislation has been 
passed to implement the constitutional design, such laws are referred to in this thesis only 
insofar as they enhance or limit the basic constitutional design. Second, the research focuses 
on analysing of the constitutional design of devolution rather than exploring the practical aspects 
and efficacy of its implementation. Third, at the time of writing, the devolved system of 
government had not started full operations. Accordingly, the analysis and assessment of the 
constitutional design is not informed by the actual experience of county governments. 
While the thesis makes reference to conflict resolution generally, the discussion of Kenya 
concentrates on ethnic conflict only. Ethnicity is undoubtedly one of the main drivers of conflict 
in Kenya, even though it would be an oversimplification to attribute the Kenyan conflict in its 
entirety to ethnicity alone. Accordingly, while other factors such as religious identity, class, 
gender, race, and other forms of identity in Kenyan society may have relevance to the conflict, 
this thesis is limited to conflict in Kenya which is of an ethnic nature. 
9. Definition of key terms  
The concept of devolution is core to this thesis and the term “devolution” therefore features 
extensively in the entire thesis. Accordingly, its meaning and application is dealt with 
comprehensively in the next chapter. However, for purposes of introduction, the term may be 
defined as the transfer of powers from the centre to existing or new units, with an assured 
degree of permanence through constitutional entrenchment or framework legislation. The 
devolved units exercise the powers (normally political, administrative, and financial) with a 
reasonable degree of autonomy from the centre.  
While “devolution” and “decentralisation” both generally refer to the same process of transferring 
powers from the centre to the subnational level, the nature and degree of autonomy and powers 
differs. In devolved systems, autonomy and permanence may be secured through constitutional 
entrenchment. In decentralised systems, however, subnational powers are usually secured 
through ordinary legislation, executive decree, or other “non-permanent” avenues which make it 
easier for the centre to recentralise the powers if it so wishes.  
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10. Chapter outline  
This thesis is presented in nine chapters including the current introductory chapter. The first part 
of Chapter 2 examines design features considered essential for development, conflict 
resolution, and limiting central power, respectively. The second part analyses the relationship 
between the respective designs, and assesses their compatibility in a single devolved system.  
Chapter 3 analyses the relevance of the three purposes to Kenya by evaluating Kenya‟s history 
of devolved governance. The chapter traces the path that Kenya has followed from the early 
days of formal rule in Kenya with regard to devolved governance. The discussion in the chapter 
as a whole focuses on issues of underdevelopment, ethnic conflict and abuse of central power, 
issues that are shown to be historical, structural and systemic.  
Chapter 4 evaluates the constitutional reform process which led to adoption of the devolved 
system of government in the current Constitution. The chapter aims at understanding the 
choices and compromises that were made in arriving at the current devolution design.  
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 evaluate the structure and powers of the counties. Chapter 5 focuses on 
the structure of counties, a focus which includes the boundaries and number as well as the 
design of the institutions of county governments. Chapter 6 focuses on powers and functions of 
county governments. Chapter 7 evaluates the fiscal design of county governments. In each of 
these chapters, the focus is on the three purposes and the compatibility in design.  
Chapter 8 evaluates the design of national institutions relevant to devolved governance in 
Kenya. The chapter basically focuses on the structure and powers of the Senate which 
represents county governments at the centre. The structure and powers of the Senate are 
analysed and assessed in terms of the three purposes.  
Chapter 9 provides a concluding analysis that synthesises the respective chapter findings and 
sets them up as building blocks for the final argument. Accordingly, the chapter provides a 
closing analysis of the Kenyan system and presents overall conclusions about the topic of this 
research. 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE  PURPOSES AND DESIGN OF DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT  
1. Introduction  
This chapter examines the literature and state practice with regard to the design of devolution 
for development, conflict resolution and limiting central power.1 The concurrency of the 
challenges of underdevelopment, conflict, central power abuse compels states to integrate 
these three purposes into their devolved systems of governance. Thus, any inquiry into the 
effectiveness of a devolved system should go beyond institutional design for a particular 
purpose and instead examine how the entire devolved system of government balances the 
three purposes in its design.  
Accordingly, the objective of this chapter is twofold. First, the typical design features of each of 
the three purposes are discussed; second, the chapter examines how states accommodate the 
three purposes in a single design. In particular, after identifying the suggested design features 
for each purpose, the chapter examines the compromises that can be made in order to 
accommodate the three purposes in a single system.  
The chapter starts with development, which is often the pre-eminent purpose. This is followed 
by a discussion of the central features of devolution design for conflict resolution. Thereafter, the 
chapter examines the design features considered necessary to enable devolved units to limit 
central power. The last part of the chapter examines the compatibility of the three purposes in a 
single design. Specifically, the last part examines how trade-offs are made between the 
potentially conflicting design features of the three purposes in order to ensure effective pursuit 
of the three purposes.  
 
1.1 The problem of definitions  
Terms such as “devolution”, “federalism”, “decentralisation”, “deconcentration”, and “delegation” 
are used throughout this thesis. However, they do not have clear and watertight definitions. The 
fact that their usage varies across states and time makes it even more difficult to arrive at 
precise or universal definitions. For different reasons, states eschew terms such as “federalism” 
                                               
1
 Dickovic TJ & Riedl RB „Comparative assessment of decentralization in Africa: Final report and summary of 
findings‟ Report prepared for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2010) 3-5.  
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even when their systems of government are federal in everything but name. For instance, South 
Africa has all the essential features of a federal system and is generally regarded as such by 
scholars. However, the term “federalism” does not feature in the Constitution and is generally 
avoided by the government, which regards itself as unitary.2 South Africa‟s “federo-phobia” is 
traceable both to the widely discredited apartheid policy of creating independent “Bantustans” 
and to the tensions between groups that wanted federal and unitary government arrangements 
during negotiations for a democratic South Africa.3  
1.1.1 Federalism 
The term “federalism” has no precise meaning, as demonstrated by the scholarly debate on its 
meaning and usage. It may be used descriptively or normatively. As a descriptive term, 
“federalism” refers to “a certain category of political institutions”;4 in its normative use, it refers to 
the idea or concept (as opposed to a structure) that encompasses “advocacy of multi-tiered 
government combining elements of shared-rule and regional rule”.5 This thesis uses the term 
“federalism” descriptively to refer to “a constitutionally established system with at least two 
orders of government each of which has some genuine autonomy from each other. The 
governments at each level are primarily accountable to their respective electorates”.6 The term 
“federalism”, or “federation”, as Watts prefers, thus “represents a particular species in which 
neither the federal nor the constituent units of government are constitutionally subordinate to the 
other”.7 This means that all orders of government in a federal system draw their autonomy and 
powers from the constitution.  
More importantly, Watts offers a “federal checklist” of six essential elements that constitute a 
federal system. First, there must be at least two orders of government, one for the entire 
federation, another for the constituent units, and all directly accountable to their respective 
citizenry at the federal and constituent unit levels. Second, autonomy is guaranteed through 
constitutional allocation of powers, functions and resources. Third, there must be formal 
                                               
2
 Steytler N „Republic of South Africa‟ in Kincaid J & Tarr GA (eds) Constitutional Origins, Structure and Change in 
Federal Countries (2005) 316-319; Murray C „Republic of South Africa‟ in Le Roy K et al (2006) 261.  
3
 Steytler N & Mettler J „Federal arrangements as a peacemaking device during South Africa‟s transition to 
democracy‟ (2001) 31 Publius: The Journal of Federalism 93-96. 
4
 Watts RL Comparing Federal Systems (2008) 8.  
5
 Watts (2008) 8.  
6
 Anderson G Fiscal Federalism: A Comparative Introduction (2010) 1.   
7
 Watts (2008) 8.  
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structures for representation at the centre, normally through a second legislative chamber. 
Fourth, constitutional amendment, especially on issues affecting powers and functions of any of 
the orders, must involve a significant proportion of the units. Fifth, there must be a system for 
resolving disputes either by the judiciary or through the second legislative chamber. Finally, 
there must be institutions, principles and mechanisms to enhance collaboration between the 
federal government and the units, especially in respect of shared functions.8  
Inconsistent state practice in the use of terms such as “federalism” blurs their conceptual clarity 
especially in concrete and practical situations. For instance, Kenya‟s devolved structure is 
constitutionally based;9 there is a senate (second chamber) composed of directly elected 
representatives of counties who represent county interests,10 and the counties have some 
degree of political and functional autonomy. The Constitution generally delineates areas of 
exclusive and concurrent competence for each level, with principles of inter-governmental 
relations.11 A constitutional amendment that affects the structure and powers of counties is 
subject to a national referendum,12 and courts are empowered to adjudicate intergovernmental 
disputes.13 All these features are an essential part of a federal form of government, yet Kenya 
does not consider itself federal.14  
1.1.2 Decentralisation  
The term “decentralisation” is even less precise. Rondinelli et al posit that decentralisation “can 
vary, from simply adjusting workloads within central government organizations, to the divesting 
of all government responsibilities”.15 They go on to state that decentralisation can be 
categorised into four types: deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatisation.16 Such a 
wide definition makes it almost impossible to have even a general understanding of the term. 
For instance, Rondinelli et al consider deconcentration as a form of decentralisation, yet, in their 
                                               
8
 Watts (2008) 8. 
9
 Chapter 11, Constitution of Kenya, 2010.  
10
 Article 96(1). 
11
 Article 189.  
12
 Article 255 (2).  
13
 Article 191 (5).  
14
 The constitution avoids use of the term federalism. Furthermore, as Chapter 5 will reveal, Kenya opted out of 
regional federal-type units and this may be a further indication that it did not want to take the federal route.  
15
 Rondinelli DA et al Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience (1984) 9-10.  
16
 Rondinelli et al (1984) 10.  
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own words, it is the mere “shifting of the workload from centrally located officials to staff or 
offices outside of the national capital”.17  
The question which then arises is whether the mere establishment of field offices of a central 
government can be considered as decentralisation. Such a query in turn invites clarification as 
to whether “decentralisation” is merely a descriptive term which refers to certain institutional 
arrangements or is indeed a normative concept against which different systems can be tested. 
Elazar argues that decentralisation implies hierarchy and is thus a pyramid with “gradations of 
power flowing from the top”.18 De Visser adds that “if there was no centre, there would be no 
decentralisation but rather two or more completely separate entities”.19 Both De Visser and 
Elazar thus present decentralisation as a normative concept which involves the flow of power 
from the centre to a lower government or to another agency outside of the absolute control of 
central government. Using this standard, deconcentration means only the presence of the 
“centre” in the field as opposed to a flow of power from the centre. It is in this context that Oyugi 
cautions that the transfer of power, for instance to government parastatals, can hardly be 
described as decentralisation, especially where such parastatals are under direct central 
government management.20  
Delegation is considered a form of decentralisation and generally refers to “the transfer of 
responsibility for specifically defined functions to structures that exist outside central 
government ... delegation takes place if a power that originally resides with the central 
government is being transferred to a subnational government”.21 However, delegation has also 
been defined as the transfer of specific functions to semi-autonomous agencies in order that 
they perform certain public functions on behalf of the central government.22  
Is decentralisation, then, the same as “non-centralisation”? Elazar argues that they are different 
concepts: while a government which decentralises can recentralise if it so wishes, a non-
centralised system “cannot legitimately be centralized without breaking the structure and spirit of 
the constitution”.23 He adds that centralisation and decentralisation “are extremes in the same 
                                               
17
 Rondinelli et al (1984) 10.  
18
 Elazar DJ „Federalism vs decentralization: The drift from authenticity‟ in Kincaid J (ed) Federalism (2011) 83.  
19
 De Visser J Developmental Local Government: A Case Study of South Africa (2005) 14.  
20
 Oyugi WO Decentralised Development Planning and Management in Kenya: An Assessment (1990) 2-3.  
21
 De Visser (2005) 14. 
22
 De Visser (2005) 14.  
23
 Elazar (2011) 83.  
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continuum”, but non-centralisation “represents another continuum altogether”.24 In his 
discussion, he refers to the American federal structure as an example of a non-centralised 
system and criticises scholars who have, in his view, referred erroneously to the American 
system as an instance of “decentralisation”.25 While it is relatively easy to measure the flow of 
power from the centre to the periphery in decentralised systems, Elazar states that such 
measurement is not easy in non-centralised systems.26 The states in the American federation 
are not creatures of the federal government. Instead, both the states and the federal 
government emanate from the people, as opposed to one from the other. This feature, Elazar 
argues, makes the American system different from a decentralised system. 27  
Is non-centralisation, therefore, another term for federalism? Elazar describes “contractual non-
centralisation” which is characterised by “structured dispersion of power among many centers 
whose legitimate authority is constitutionally guaranteed” as the principle feature of federal 
democracy.28 Thus, federal systems easily fall within non-centralised systems of government. 
The question which inevitably follows is whether all non-centralised systems are federal. This 
issue is dealt with below under the definition of “devolution”.  
 
1.1.3 Devolution  
Rondinelli et al classify devolution as falling under the wide definition of decentralisation.29 De 
Visser, on the other hand, defines “devolution” as “the location of decision-making power with 
autonomous subnational governments.”30 De Visser explains that in devolution, subnational 
government power is a permanent power and “original”, as opposed to delegation where the 
same can be withdrawn by the national government. However, he adds that powers devolved 
need not be entrenched in the constitution because framework legislation can suffice.31 Some 
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 Elazar (2011) 83.  
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Elazar (2011) 82.  
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scholars equate devolution with “transfer of political power”32 while others describe devolution 
as “a more extensive form of decentralization”.33 Oloo equates “political decentralisation” with 
devolution.34  
While a precise and universally-agreed definition is neither possible nor useful, it appears that 
shared political powers with significant autonomy arrangements between the centre and local 
units are indeed the defining feature of devolution. Whether or not such a system is federal is a 
different question. From Watts” “federal checklist”, federalism or a federation is a “species” with 
very specific elements that can be tested against a system. For instance, a system where 
powers are devolved but not provided for in a written constitution does not meet the 
requirements of a federal system and is therefore not federal.  
1.1.3.1 Devolution as a process  
The phrase “devolution of powers” can find institutional expression in both federal and non-
federal systems. As a process, devolution refers to the creation of federations, especially where 
a federal system is being created out of an existing polity. It may also refer to the process of 
establishing decentralised systems of government, particularly where the subnational units 
enjoy some permanence of power and autonomy from the central government. 
1.1.3.2 Devolution as a structure: a weak form of federalism?  
States and even scholars have been blamed for the “terminological mess”35 that has 
accompanied the use of “devolution” and related terms. In Kenya, the term “devolution” is a 
political catchphrase.36 It was used consistently in the entire constitutional reform process and is 
the term used in the 2010 Constitution. There is no policy articulation on the use of the term, 
and its origin in Kenya‟s political discussions is not clear. However, as the next chapter will 
                                               
32
 Nibbering JW & Swart R „Giving local government a more central place in development: An examination of donor 
support for decentralisation‟ (2010) 258 (Atelier de capitalisation Efficacité de la décentralisation comme outil de 
développement local Ségou MALI, juin 2010).  
33
 Litvack et al Rethinking Decentralisation in Developing Countries (1998) 4-6.  
34
 Oloo A „Devolution and Democratic Governance: Options for Kenya‟ in Kibua TN & Mwambu G (eds) 2008 
Decentralization and Devolution in Kenya: New Approaches 109.  
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 Suksi M Sub-State Governance through Autonomy: A Comparative Study of Powers, Procedures and Institutions 
(2011) 82.  
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show, the term “federalism” is widely associated with the semi-federal structure in the 
Independence Constitution. Also known as Majimbo,37 the regional system of government at 
independence was widely portrayed as promoting ethnic balkanisation. Thus any “federal talk” 
in the review process was frowned upon. This may well be the reason why the politically neutral 
term “devolution” was adopted. Indeed, Kenya meets all the formal elements in Watts” checklist 
but prefers the term “devolution” to describe its multi-level government structure.  
Kenya is not the only country finding itself in a terminological muddle. The United Kingdom (UK) 
uses the same term to define its process of gradual transfer of functions to Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and Wales.38 However, unlike Kenya, the process in the UK is a gradual one with no 
clear end in terms of both process and structure.39 Furthermore, the absence of a formal, written 
constitution in the UK, through which such a process may be entrenched, further complicates 
the nomenclature. Many other states have adopted systems which look federal in character but 
do not meet all the elements of a federal system. These include countries like Italy and Spain. 
The situation has led to the rise of terms such as “quasi-federal”, “partially federal”, 
“regionalisation”, “hybrid structure” and “weak-federalism”, among others.  
A notable feature is that most of these states are strongly decentralised, to the extent that they 
may even be classifiable as non-centralised. Gamper points out that “strongly decentralized 
states, such as Spain and, more recently, Italy and the United Kingdom, nearly approach the – 
very vague and controversial – standard of what is called a federal system”.40 In some cases, 
autonomy is constitutionally guaranteed but constitutional overrides place the central 
government at a higher position. It is submitted that such systems can be referred to simply as 
“devolved”.  
 
2. Decentralisation for development  
As the central concern for most or all developing states, development is the basis and main 
objective of devolving power. Rising inequalities, uneven development and the promise of more 
                                               
37
 Ghai & McAuslan (Public law and Political Change in Kenya (1970, 178) explain that “Majimbo is a Swahili word 
which means an „administrative unit‟ or „region‟, and is generally used to refer to those provisions of the Constitution 
which established the [independence] regional structure”.  
38
 Jeffery C „The Union‟s place: Scottish-English relations after devolution‟ in Saxena R (ed) Varieties of Federal 
Governance: Major Contemporary Models (2011) 433-435.  
39
 Jeffery (2010) 433-435.  
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 Gamper A „Austrian federalism and the protection of minorities‟ in Tarr GA et al (eds) Federalism, Subnational 
Constitutions and minority rights (2004) 69, cited in Suksi (2011) 82.  
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equitable development through decentralisation inform the enthusiasm for decentralisation. This 
section discusses decentralisation design features considered essential for effective 
decentralised development, but, before doing so, the meaning and concept of development, and 
its link to decentralisation, is discussed. While the term “devolution” represents a broader 
scheme of distribution of power in multi-level governance, most of the developments in the 
pursuit of subnational development have taken place in the context of decentralisation as 
defined by Elazar. Thus, the discussion in this section will use the term “decentralisation”, while 
the term “devolution” will be used only in the appropriate context. 
2.1 Development: an evolved concept and meaning  
There is no universally accepted definition of the term “development”, partly because, 
throughout history, varying factors have been used to define and refine the concept. The 
Industrial Revolution in Europe between the second half of the 18th century and the early part of 
the 20th century,41 when the state played a dominant role in rapid industrialisation, marks the 
formal beginnings of the concept of “development”.42 The failure of banks during the Great 
Depression strengthened the resolve of states to lead development.43 However, the state-led 
development model which was introduced in post-colonial states from the early 1940s44 failed 
as a result of a weak industrial base.  
Despite growth in some developing states, rising poverty levels made institutions such as the 
World Bank start to focus in the mid-1970s on poverty alleviation in the development 
discourse.45 However, this approach imputed a paternalistic role to the state in which its peoples 
were seen as passive recipients of development.46 Further changes introduced in the 1980s 
through structural adjustment programmes – which were characterised by cuts in public 
expenditure and the “thinning” of government – did not yield any significant change.47 
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 Yusuf S et al Development Economics through the Decades: A Critical Look at 30 years of the World Development 
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 Yusuf et al (2009) 4.  
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Thus, from around 1995, the World Bank sought to influence the discourse on development. 
With civil society as a partner in the process,48 it encouraged states to work directly with citizens 
for sustainable development.49 It is during this period that financial and administrative 
decentralisation, urbanisation and localisation were seen as some of the major global forces 
shaping the concept of development.50 The World Bank‟s World Development Reports (WDRs) 
of the years 2004, 2006 and 2007 emphasised “pro-poor, services-led, redistributive and 
participatory development”.51 The concept of sustainable “human development”, promoted by 
the United Nations Development Programme‟s (UNDP) human development index (HDI),52 
sought to place people at the centre of the development process: people were increasingly seen 
as involved in a participatory and transformative process which not only focuses on material 
growth but also the sustainable well-being of all human beings.53  
The concept of “development” was thus expanded to include factors such as participatory and 
sustainable development. In this expanded sense, people are placed at the centre of the 
process, not only as beneficiaries but as active partakers who make real choices which in turn 
influence development.54 De Visser identifies three main features of the redefined concept of 
“development”: material element, choice and equity. “Material element” refers to the tangibles 
brought about by the process of development.55 “Choice” refers to the opportunity that people 
have to make decisions in order to satisfy their needs, and it recognises that inherent human 
dignity entitles one to make decisions on matters that concern one‟s personal and collective 
development.56 The third element, “equity”, addresses collective well-being; that is, development 
should enable everyone to benefit equally from a redistribution effect extending to the most 
vulnerable groups in the society, including future generations.57  
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2.2 Decentralisation: an institutional expression of the idea of development  
The White Paper on Local Government in South Africa defines a developmental local 
government as “a local government committed to working with citizens and groups within the 
community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and 
improve the quality of their lives”.58 This definition represents the refined concept of 
development and indicates the role that decentralisation can potentially play in the realisation of 
development.  
Decentralisation is said to offer an institutional and practical avenue through which the vital 
components of development can be achieved. First, it is argued that decentralisation enhances 
the “quality of representation” which enables people to participate more effectively in 
development;59 in essence, decentralisation is said to strengthen democracy by enhancing the 
government‟s institutional ability to determine and respond to people‟s choices.60 Through 
decentralised institutions, it is argued, minorities and vulnerable members who may otherwise 
have a weak or non-existent voice at the national level are more effectively represented, thereby 
enhancing participation in development.61  
Second, decentralisation is said to improve institutional efficiency. It is argued that 
decentralisation relieves the centre of the burden of planning, hence reducing the central 
bureaucracy that often leads to inefficiency. Decentralised units are seen as better able to 
respond to local needs than the centre.62 Furthermore, it has been argued that competition 
between the decentralised units enhances overall efficiency and contributes to overall 
development.63 If well designed, decentralisation can address inequalities and ensure equitable 
development.64 Decentralisation can thus be viewed as the institutional expression of the 
willingness of a state to work towards effective realisation of the refined concept of 
development. This is because decentralisation offers an avenue through which the concept of 
development can be institutionally pursued. 
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However, decentralisation has its critics, who attack the assumptions above on which 
decentralised development is based. Indeed, even proponents of decentralisation acknowledge 
that successful decentralisation depends very much on its design.65 The potential pitfalls of 
decentralisation are dealt with later.  
2.3 Designing decentralisation for development: the World Bank Model  
The idea of development through decentralisation is promoted by institutions such as the World 
Bank,66 the UNDP67 and regional organisations, such as, the European Union (EU)68 and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).69 While these organisations 
promote decentralisation, both developing and developed states are increasingly decentralising 
power.70 Indeed, Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema argue that “ultimately … decentralisation is an 
ideological principle, associated with objectives of self-reliance, democratic decision-making and 
popular participation in government, and accountability of public officials to citizens”.71 Thus, 
even the without benefits of development and growth, decentralisation is in itself a desirable 
political objective which is pursued by most states.  
Not surprisingly, the World Bank has taken a keen interest in decentralisation and 
development,72 and is arguably the leader in the thinking and shaping of the design of 
decentralisation for development.73 This section analyses the design features proposed by the 
World Bank to achieve decentralised development. The World Bank‟s keen interest is driven by 
the potential role that decentralisation can play with regard to matters such as fiscal and 
financial development, service delivery, poverty alleviation, institutional capacity-building, and 
infrastructure investment, all of which are major concerns for the World Bank in its work with its 
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client governments.74 How decentralisation influences or affects these factors is therefore of 
core interest to the Bank.  
On the basis of its extensive experience with governments, the World Bank proposes what can 
be termed a coherent design meant to facilitate development in the context of multi-level 
governance.75 First, the design deals with fiscal relations between levels of government.76 
Known as “the fiscal federalist model”, it basically entails allocation of separate fiscal and 
financial responsibilities between different spheres of government but is geared towards a 
common fiscal policy.77 Second, the World Bank proposes a political and institutional design 
with the objective of enabling different levels of government to facilitate local and overall 
development.78 The pursuit of a common objective within the differentiated institutions and 
functions is a key feature of the model. While political and institutional design is an essential 
part of the model, this came much later: the Bank initially concentrated on the analysis of 
economic factors, while political and institutional relations were at the periphery of its concerns 
with regard to development.79 
The period 1986-2001 saw the Bank support decentralisation programmes in 74 developing 
countries, mainly through direct funding and technical and strategic research support.80 The 
Bank‟s interventions also included support for sectoral decentralisation strategies81 as well as 
loans both to national and subnational governments to support decentralisation.82 However, due 
to the multifaceted nature of decentralisation, many other institutions have also been involved in 
various aspects of decentralisation.83 
The World Bank influences decentralisation and development policy mainly through84 the World 
Development Report, an annual publication of the Bank.85 From their first publication in 1978, 
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the reports have had, and continue to have, a significant impact on the way governments, 
institutions, scholars and practitioners approach development.86 Specifically, the WDR of 
1999/2000 laid down the basic principles of decentralisation for development, and these have 
been elaborated in subsequent WDRs such as those for 2004, 2006 and 2007.87 While the 
WDR is the primary source relied on for the model, this thesis also makes reference to other 
“secondary sources” of the model, such as the independent Bank-commissioned studies that 
influence the WDRs.88  
However, the Bank seems to be cautious in the way it presents the decentralised development 
model. For instance, while it promotes decentralisation, it categorically states that 
decentralisation “in itself is neither good nor bad” for development.89 Decentralisation is, in most 
cases, presented as a solution to underdevelopment, but the World Bank sees it not as a 
solution but an alternative to other approaches to development. As such, it cautions that 
effective decentralisation only happens where the local context is factored into its design and 
implementation.90 Thus, even as the Bank sets forth the essential features of decentralisation 
for development, it exonerates itself from “bad implementation” that fails to take into account the 
specific context of application. 
2.3.1 Fiscal design in multi-level governance: the „fiscal federalist‟ model  
While the Bank urges caution in decentralisation design,91 the most important aspect of the 
design seems to be the allocation functions and responsibilities. State experience with 
decentralisation reveals that poorly allocated functions may lead to a fiscal crisis, even the 
collapse of a country‟s financial system.92 As such, functions should be allocated optimally. 
Following this principle, the Bank lists functions that should ideally be performed by the centre 
and those that should be decentralised. 
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The 1999/2000 WDR outlines the general features and principles of the model,93 which relate to 
four main areas: expenditure responsibilities, assignment of revenue-raising functions, 
intergovernmental transfers, and subnational borrowing.94 Effective design and implementation 
of these four elements should, according to the Bank, result in redistribution of income and 
resources, equitable distribution, efficient service delivery, and promote macroeconomic 
stability.95  
2.3.1.1 Assignment of functions: principles and rationale  
The guiding principle in the allocation of functions, is that a function which is national in nature 
and cuts across decentralised units is best performed by the centre.96 This is because of the 
economies of scale attached to such an approach. By applying this standard, many services 
currently performed by decentralised units can also be performed by the centre due to 
economies of scale. However, despite the economic advantage of the centre providing services 
on a large scale, a balance has to be struck between providing public goods and services 
uniformly and economically, on the one hand, and ignoring or responding to local preferences, 
on the other.97 It is for this reason that the Bank proposes that functions whose utility is national 
and subject to low variability should be at the centre, while functions with variable local 
preferences should be decentralised.98  
Typical national functions identified by the Bank are “national defense, external relations, 
monetary policy, or the preservation of a unified national market”.99 The “costs of economic 
stabilization and redistribution” should also remain with the centre.100 The World Bank identifies 
functions such as “basic health and education, street lighting and cleaning, water, sewerage and 
power, public markets and refuse collection, major transport networks and land development for 
business and residential purposes” as ones commonly performed by local governments.101 The 
kind of functions performed by local governments can, according to the Bank, substantially 
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contribute to raising living standards and growth.102 Local services have the potential to improve 
people‟s lives, and if decentralised, the potential of such services to enhance people‟s lives 
forms a basis for the people to hold their local governments to account, thereby promoting 
democratic accountability – another key feature of the World Bank Model.103  
Citing the poor example of South Africa, the World Bank advises that clarity in allocation of roles 
is important. Vaguely defined joint functions may lead to neglect of essential services as there is 
no clear actor, and, in most cases, local governments ignore such functions in the hope that 
national government will take care of them.104 The Bank adds that “without clarity and an 
appropriate regulatory framework, there can be no accountability”.105 An effective design is thus 
one in which functions are well defined within a regulatory framework that enhances clarity and 
cohesiveness.106 
2.3.1.2 Assignment of taxes and other revenue raising powers and functions  
Such “local context” considerations are also reflected in the World Bank‟s proposals regarding 
the assignment of fiscal functions in multi-level governance. Thus, while the ideal situation is for 
each level of government to raise its own revenue,107 the broader context cannot allow such an 
approach. For instance, a local government‟s revenue is only as good as that government‟s tax 
base.108 Disparities within decentralised units, especially in developing states where the revenue 
base is “thin”, necessitate a differentiated approach taking these disparities into account.109 
Indeed, the World Bank model deliberately makes decentralised units dependent on the centre 
so as to enable the latter to address equity concerns.110  
Second, an argument equivalent to “local versus national functions” is made with regard to 
taxes. The World Bank proposes that services whose “tax burden” is local, such as local 
infrastructure or property taxes, should be allocated to decentralised units.111 Indirect taxes such 
as Value Added Tax (VAT), whose incidence or burden may be outside the local jurisdiction, 
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should be allocated to national government.112 Litvack et al simplify the “tax burden” concept by 
stating that tax on movable and immovable factors is appropriate for national and local taxation, 
respectively.113 Furthermore, “redistributive” taxes (such as those on wealth and personal 
income), taxes vulnerable to economic fluctuation or taxes imposed to achieve national 
objectives should also be national taxes.114  
However, the Bank cautions that this rule is not absolute. At all times, the central government 
should be in control of major taxes. Such control is a tool for fiscal management, and it also 
minimises an unnecessary increase in public debt as a result of national borrowing to finance 
functions.115 Apart from considerations of fiscal prudence, the World Bank observes that taxes 
raised locally form the basis for local communities to hold their respective local governments to 
account. It is for this reason that the Bank further advises that local taxes should be spent on 
local issues in order to strengthen local accountability.116 In South Africa, property ratepayers 
use the payment of such rates to demand services from their municipalities.117  
2.3.1.3 Intergovernmental transfers  
Decentralised units are mostly designed in such a way that not all of their revenue needs are 
met locally.118 This makes intergovernmental transfers a key factor in the effectiveness of 
subnational governments.119 Considering the fundamental role of transfers, the Bank proposes 
three factors relevant to the design of transfers: the amount to be transferred, the criteria for 
sharing funds, and the type or nature of conditions imposed on the use of intergovernmental 
transfers.120  
Bearing in mind the central role of local taxes with respect to accountability, the Bank advises 
that the size of the transfer should not be so large as to eliminate the need for local taxes.121 It is 
in this context that the Bank advises that local taxes should, as far as possible, fund exclusively 
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local functions.122 In practice, however, this rarely happens, and the Bank recommends that 
where transfers are made to replace local taxes, the amount should be equivalent to the “lost 
taxes” and, in the interests of local accountability, should not have centrally-imposed conditions 
attached to it.123  
Second, transfers are the main avenue for addressing equity concerns, and the design of 
central transfers should reflect this.124 Inequalities are, generally, as much a reality as they are a 
perception. Thus, efforts to address equity concerns and redistribution should deal with both the 
perception and the reality: the Bank states that “transfers should be determined as openly, 
transparently and objectively as possible”.125 In this regard, Litvack et al argue that transparency 
and objectivity can be enhanced by an independent body such as a Grants Commission 
dedicated to determining grants.126 Objectivity and transparency in transfers are enhanced by 
pre-determined and agreed-upon rules that minimise “uncertainty and bargaining”.127  
Apart from equity and redistribution concerns, national governments also use transfers to 
regulate local expenditure through “earmarking transfers or disbursing them as matching 
grants”.128 However, in all cases, transfers form the backbone of local government finances and 
the basis for the performance of functions. The World Bank thus cautions that transfers should 
be stable and predictable to allow stability in local planning and budgeting processes.129  
2.3.1.4 Subnational borrowing 
Ideally, decentralised units should freely seek loans from financial institutions. However, the 
impact on a country‟s fiscal and macro-economic policy of such a laissez-faire approach to local 
government calls for regulation.130 The World Bank experience with states shows that local 
governments may borrow in the hope that central government will pay in case of default.131 In 
other cases, the Bank observes that reckless local borrowing and spending increases public 
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debt, as illustrated by the experience of Mexican and Argentine provinces.132 States have 
reacted differently: some have chosen to control borrowing, while some are indifferent.133 For its 
part, the Bank proposes control but with a further caveat: administrative authorisation, borrowing 
limits and direct controls not only stand to aggravate a highly politicised process in which 
decentralised units are pitted against the centre, but, in addition, do not sit well with the idea of 
decentralisation.134 Accordingly, the Bank advises that, first, there must be “a credible “no 
bailout” pledge by the central government”,135 and that, second, central government should curb 
expenditure by local governments with what are called “hard budget constraints” in order to 
avoid the identified consequences of uncontrolled spending.136 
2.3.2 Political and institutional design for decentralised development   
The design features regarding fiscal and financial functions discussed above can be described 
as simple, objective, and straightforward. In practice, however, fiscal and financial functions are 
carried out in politically charged environments pitting national and local political and institutional 
actors against each other. In some cases, the effect of this political and institutional interaction 
negates the very basis and rationale for the fiscal federalist model. It is in cognisance of this fact 
that the World Bank later developed proposals on how political and institutional relations can 
enhance realisation of the objectives behind the model.  
Accordingly, the first concern of the Bank is a “coherent” set of rules to guide political and 
institutional relations.137 Citing the experience of China, the Bank remarks that “informal, 
negotiation-based decentralization is difficult to manage”.138 The Bank ties the need for rules to 
a broader culture of constitutionalism.139 Due to the unpredictable way in which institutional and 
political relations unfold, it is sometimes in order to let rules develop naturally. However, the 
Bank sees the position of local governments vis-a-vis the centre as a potentially weak one, often 
to the disadvantage of the former. In this regard, the Bank concludes that explicit rules can 
enable “subnational governments to coordinate a defense against an overassertive central 
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government”.140 The rules should be “explicit, stable and self-reinforcing” in nature and 
character.141 
Of course, the goals of the design of political and institutional relations are to improve 
institutional efficiency,142 accountability, local responsiveness,143 and competitiveness,144 all of 
which resonate with the objectives of the fiscal federalist model. Indeed, and as observed 
earlier, institutional relations are meant to augment the objects of fiscal design. The design 
proposals put forth by the Bank can be summarised into three broad areas: division of political 
powers, the design of the institutions and functions, and electoral rules and other institutional 
and political arrangements that enhance citizen interaction with democratic representatives.145   
2.3.2.1 Levels, number and size, and structure of decentralised units  
A number of factors influence the size and number of decentralised units as well as the number 
of levels in a decentralised system. These include ethnicity, religion or other identity factors 
(which the Bank refers to as the “political make-up”), and even factors such as geographical 
features.146 However, while the “political make-up” varies, the World Bank identifies cost as an 
overriding factor147 even in developed countries.148 Decentralised units which are too large may 
lose important features such as responsiveness and overall efficiency.149 On the other hand, tiny 
units, especially in developing states, may exhaust the limited resources through administrative 
costs.150 Despite this, the Bank notes a trend to increase local governments even in very poor 
countries, a trend the Bank attributes to “block grants” which provide incentives for creating 
more units.151  
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While the Bank does not state the ideal number of levels in a decentralised system, its 
extensive literature emphasises the importance of decentralisation to “the local level”. The Bank 
justifies the existence of the local level as necessary for effective participation, responsiveness, 
poverty alleviation and local development.152 Thus, the local level, as opposed to higher levels in 
decentralisation, is a more appropriate avenue to realise the benefits of decentralised 
development as espoused by the Bank. Indeed, a critical part of the Bank‟s literature is 
dedicated to making the local level (as opposed to the regional level) effective for development. 
While the Bank makes brisk reference to the role of the “meso-level” of government (states, 
provinces or regions), this has almost always been in relation to the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the local level.  
2.3.2.2 Powers and functions of decentralised units  
The kind of powers and functions decentralised to devolved units should, if properly exercised, 
lead ideally to the achievement of the objectives discussed above and serve the broader 
purpose of decentralisation. According to the Bank, the clear delineation of decentralised 
powers and functions is again key; the lack thereof can lead to inefficiency due to the absence 
of a clear actor.153 Moreover, the powers and functions should be relevant to the developmental 
needs of the local community.154 In complementing this essential feature, De Visser aptly states 
that “if local governments would be empowered only in areas that have little or no impact in 
development such as for example, dog licences or animal burial places, the developmental 
potential for local governments is negated”.155 Furthermore, even where local developmental 
functions are generally agreed upon, the powers should still be sensitive to the local context, for 
instance, its rural/urban nature.156  
While the same kinds of services, for instance, are needed in urban areas and rural areas, the 
manner or conditions of delivery may differ. For instance, refuse removal, piped-water supply 
and urban-type housing projects may not be appropriate for far-flung rural-based communities. 
Indeed, Prud‟homme terms as “absurd” a system that treats “decentralization to cities just like 
decentralization to villages”.157 Litvack et al also observe that large metropolitan areas can have 
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the advantage of economies of scale if they manage large regional services such as transport 
and rail infrastructure.158  
These observations may point to some form of asymmetry with regard to powers and functions. 
However, the defining goal of the asymmetry is not to depict some devolved units as less 
important or less autonomous. Instead, this is an exercise which takes into account differences 
in reality while building a coherent decentralised system.159  
Lastly, while clearly defined powers and functions are important, equally important is the final 
authority to make decisions in the exercise of those powers.160 De Visser describes this as the 
“final decision-making power”, one which entails having “the final say” and “the absence of 
undue interference”.161 The final authority is normally exercised through laws, resolutions and 
regulations meant to ensure performance of functions.162 The powers should be vested in the 
respective organs and include executive decision-making with regard to the functions so 
allocated.163  
During transition to decentralised governance, appropriate powers, staff and resources should 
be concurrently deployed to local units in order to build an effective decentralised system.164 
However, the Bank advises that, during transition, the full decentralisation of functions may be 
delayed until the centre has the necessary and effective controls and the units have developed 
sufficient capacity.165 This is because an incompetent administration may pose a challenge to 
“even a well-meaning political team”.166 The central government should offer technical support 
to enable local units to develop the necessary capacity.167  
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2.3.2.3 Fiscal autonomy  
The World Bank states that, apart from having a power to decide on what priorities to address, 
“local authorities need to have enough fiscal control to plan their activities”.168 In essence, this 
power completes or actualises the “final say” highlighted above. Granted, fiscal autonomy and 
the final decision-making power form an effective tool to match local needs and preferences 
with available resources, and enhance allocative efficiency.169 As a critical part of the local 
government finance depends on central government transfers, local financial autonomy is 
secured mainly through guaranteed transfers but also through powers to raise revenue locally or 
other means.170 However, fiscal autonomy is equally subject to limits, such as regulations 
considered necessary to enhance and maintain fiscal discipline.171  
2.3.2.4 Political accountability  
While final decision-making powers and fiscal autonomy enable local governments to act, 
political accountability completes the chain by allowing local communities to determine how the 
powers and resources are used.172 As a yardstick for measuring accountability, the Bank uses 
the ability of poor and vulnerable sections of the local community to hold the local administrative 
and political representatives accountable.173 Furthermore, the Bank calls for more than one 
channel of political accountability to achieve effective accountability.174 The main channels of 
accountability include local elections175 as well as other public participation avenues.176  
Ideally, the Bank argues, periodic elections give people an opportunity to choose between 
different options as to how they want the local political and development agenda pursued.177 In 
this regard, the World Bank states that “the principle of one person, one vote is fundamental to 
the representative purpose of elections”.178 However, elections can easily become a ritual with 
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little to no connection to the accountability argument presented by the Bank. The Bank thus 
proposes a number of steps for ensuring that elections remain as far as possible an exercise in 
accountability. The Bank advises against large electoral units which diminish the significance of 
the voting exercise, the rationale being that a unit should be small enough to make voters feel 
they are making a difference by casting a vote.179 Furthermore, local political leadership should 
be elected rather than appointed (the Bank specifically discourages appointment of mayors).180  
The Bank endorses electoral systems that ensure as much societal representativeness as 
possible, as opposed to “winner-take-all” systems. In particular, it endorses the proportional 
representation system as one with the potential to “attract higher voter turn-outs and enhance 
political accountability.181 This is, of course, accompanied by the broader caveat that elections 
should be properly managed, because flawed elections negate the relevance of the process as 
a tool for political accountability.182  
However, even factors such as levels of public awareness and access to information through 
voter education can influence the degree of political accountability; in some instances they may 
make all the difference.183 It is for this reason that the Bank calls for an active civil society to 
complement electoral accountability mechanisms. It cautions, though, that the local 
administration must be ready to engage and “tap into” civil society.184 The Bank specifically 
identifies civil society organisations as an effective avenue for channelling the “voice” of the 
weak and marginalised and enhancing their participation in the development process.185  
2.3.3 Supervision  
While the World Bank promotes local political and fiscal autonomy, it refers to a paradox in 
which effective decentralisation occurs in practice only if “a certain level of centralization” has 
been achieved in terms of fiscal control and effective central policies.186 The Bank also 
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underlines the importance of the role that national ministries play by supporting local units and 
ensuring that national standards are implemented.187  
Two significant implications emerge from this observation as well as the rest of the discussion 
above. First, central government has a direct interest to ensure that the local implementation of 
its functions, for instance redistribution, is carried out effectively; the same extends to all other 
functions of the central government.188 Second, there is no guarantee that, in exercising its local 
powers, the local government will do so for the benefit of the local community; according to the 
Bank, decentralisation of power “may simply mean that power is transferred from national to 
local elites”.189 Mechanisms for the central government to supervise or intervene in a local unit 
should thus be in place to ensure overall effectiveness.190  
2.3.4 Cooperation  
The World Bank advises that, despite the fact that national and political leaders have their 
respective spheres of power, effective decentralisation happens only if political leaders at all 
levels realise that “it is in their best interest to cooperate”.191 Indeed, factors such as joint 
functions, national policy, common national decentralisation objectives and broader 
governmental objectives call for unity of action at all levels. The Bank observes that common 
interests can create an incentive to cooperate.192 In this regard, it proposes joint national and 
local government elections in order to foster pursuit of the same political agenda.193 However, 
the Bank negates this proposal by cautioning that the distinctiveness of the local political 
agenda may be “drowned” by the national political campaigns.194 Indeed, many an author has 
cautioned against joint local and national elections for the same reason.195  
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De Visser observes that cooperation “is not presented as an element that requires inclusion in 
an institutional design” or even a legal framework for decentralisation.196 He argues that 
intergovernmental dialogue can indeed be a substantive institutional design feature in 
decentralisation.197 This, he argues, can be achieved through a normative framework for 
cooperation, institutionalisation of both vertical and horizontal relations, and other mechanisms 
of intergovernmental relations.198  
In this regard, De Visser proposes that there should be a normative and agreed framework to 
facilitate intergovernmental cooperation. Vertical integration should ensure that local 
governments participate in development as an equal partner with other spheres of government. 
While local government units are “equals” among themselves, horizontal integration facilitates 
cooperation which will ensure that development activities cutting across local government 
boundaries are jointly implemented. Lastly, mechanisms of intergovernmental relations will 
provide rules within which cooperation can be nurtured between national and subnational 
units.199    
2.3.5 Competing models for decentralised development? 
The World Bank is easily “the towering oak in the forest”200 in the development discourse. 
However, there are other institutions also involved in decentralisation and development. The 
United Nations – through agencies such as the UNDP and the United Nations Capital 
Development Fund (UNCDF) – as well as regional organisations like the EU201 and OECD,202 
are but a few of the main organisations that also promote decentralised development. For 
instance, the UNDP203 is present in 166 countries where it carries out different engagements 
related to decentralisation and development.204 The UNDP started a programme called 
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Decentralised Governance for Development (DGD) that focuses on four issues it collectively 
terms its “signature approach”: human development,205 human rights,206 a holistic approach,207 
and “a participatory dialogue and consulting approach”.208 A 2004 UNDP report states that DGD 
was increased six times and supported programmes in 100 countries, several strategic regional 
programmes in all regions, and five global programmes.209 The UNCDF has an approach similar 
to the UNDP but one focused on Less Developed Countries (LDCs).210  
However, the basic model for decentralisation and development advocated by the UNDP and 
UNCDF is similar to the structural and design features promoted by the World Bank.211 For 
instance, a 2005 UNDP report on decentralisation and poverty alleviation provides the same 
features as those of the fiscal federalist model discussed earlier above.212 The value added by 
the UNDP is emphasis on concepts such as human development and human rights, which are 
core to the UNDP‟s work.213 Like the UNDP, the UNCDF supports different aspects of 
decentralised governance, such as participatory budgetary planning and ensuring proper 
integration of subnational governments into the fiscal system.214 All the other institutions follow 
the basic concepts and model of decentralisation proposed by the World Bank, but emphasise 
specific aspects of the model that are core to their respective institutional foci.  
2.3.6 Decentralised development and its critics   
While the World Bank holds that effective decentralisation depends on its design and 
implementation, this argument is weakened by the fact that, across states and time, there 
already exist varied decentralised systems designed to fit the local context.215 The evidence of 
development traceable to decentralisation is weak. The World Bank‟s answer to this is that 
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sometimes decentralisation brings with it changes that are hard to measure in economically 
quantifiable terms.216 Even where there is improved efficiency, it is difficult to attribute it to 
decentralisation, because improved efficiency may arise as a result of a variety of factors, not all 
of which are necessarily connected to decentralisation.217 Other sceptics assert that 
decentralisation is not useful and may lead to harmful effects,218 singling out developing 
countries whose relatively fragile economies and weak central governments are ill-prepared to 
manage the vicissitudes of decentralisation. The link between decentralisation and economic 
growth is also contested terrain with no clear answers.219  
Critics attack the fundamental assumptions upon which the concept of decentralisation is 
founded. Prud‟homme, one of the foremost critics, argues that, contrary to popular thought, 
decentralisation can exacerbate disparities between regions, or at the least, make redistribution, 
a function best performed by the central government, even harder.220 Prud‟homme argues that 
central government, through its national budget and macro-allocation, has a better chance of 
addressing disparities than local institutions.221 He argues that addressing disparities through 
decentralisation is based on the assumption that inequalities can be reduced by the movement 
of capital, goods and labour, an assumption which the experience of industrialised countries has 
proved faulty. He asserts, furthermore, that even raising the income levels of a region will have 
no effect if basic economic opportunities are lacking.222  
In addition, Prud‟homme attacks the allocative-efficiency argument which assumes that the local 
voter is rational and will vote according to local developmental needs. In reality, people vote on 
the basis of group loyalties such as tribal, religious and party-political affiliations as well as other 
interests unrelated to the allocative-efficiency argument.223 Even though the Bank proposes 
measures such as voter education and access to information, these have little effect especially 
in rural areas, which comprise a large part of the electorate in developing states.224 Prud‟homme 
maintains that this logic is irrelevant in the context of developing states, where needs are basic, 
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common and known; even if such reasoning holds water, resource and capacity constraints on 
their own will ultimately negate the argument.225 Furthermore, the assumption that if services do 
not work, people will vote with their feet by moving to a more responsive local authority,226 
ignores the reality that it is highly impractical for the rural poor to uproot and move to other 
areas for service-delivery reasons. 
Even the World Bank‟s confidence in decentralisation and state transformation has declined 
over time. While it was upbeat about the role of decentralisation in state restructuring and 
transformation in its earlier WDRs, such as those of 1997 and 1999/ 2000,227 the Bank has 
gradually adopted a more cautious approach or even neglected decentralisation arguments in 
relevant discussions. For instance, the 2011 WDR focuses on state institutions and 
transformation for security, development and welfare of citizens,228 but decentralisation is given 
peripheral treatment throughout the discussion.229  
Despite the apparent decline of interest in decentralisation by the World Bank, there is still no 
alternative thereto that has so far been proposed. This alone makes decentralisation, despite its 
risks, a desirable if not the only option for developing states. Furthermore, recent trends indicate 
a growing interest in decentralising power and resources to the local level as a means of 
managing internal conflict. Thus, the design and implementation of decentralisation as a means 
of achieving peace should also be investigated.  
However, and more importantly for this discussion, decentralisation is happening and is a reality 
with which states have to live. What is more, centralisation, the extreme in the continuum, has 
been long associated with underdevelopment, inefficiency and institutional failure in developing 
states; it is, most certainly, not the way to go. Thus, the appropriate and practically beneficial 
inquiry here is not whether decentralisation works but how best to design it in order to avoid its 
potential pitfalls and reap its potential benefits.  
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A 2010 study by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) which 
assessed decentralisation in 10 African countries230 came to the conclusion that there was 
evidence of “slight improvements in service delivery”. 231 The study also observed that “there 
have been no major declines in public services after decentralization,” which dispels the notion 
that local incapacity is not worse than central incapacity.232 The research concluded that “there 
has been little damage as result of decentralization”.233 The findings from this study thus 
assuage some of the main fears about decentralisation highlighted above.234 
2.3.7 Summary of the key design features of the „World Bank Model‟ 
The proposals by the Bank on decentralised development are, as described above, coherent 
and simple. First, with regard to finances, a country‟s major taxes should remain with the central 
government, while taxes whose incidence is local should be decentralised in order to enhance 
efficiency. Local taxes are important as they form the basis for local accountability, and central 
transfers should take cognisance of this. Central transfers should be determined by an 
independent institution, using pre-determined, agreed rules and an objective formula aimed at 
equitable sharing. Furthermore, centrally enforced fiscal discipline, especially with regard to 
local borrowing, is essential. However, this does not include central administrative approvals, 
authorisation, or central government guarantees of loans for local governments.  
Second, with regard to their size and number, decentralised units should not be so numerous as 
to become a burden in terms of administrative costs, nor should they be so large as to stifle 
participation and responsiveness. Additionally, fewer levels of decentralised government are 
preferred, as multiple levels make the division of functions complex and confusing, resulting in 
overall inefficiency.  
Third, the powers of devolved units should be relevant to the local developmental needs and 
appropriate to the local context. The powers should clearly define the power and the actor, 
especially with regard to joint powers that have more than one actor. Local units should have 
the final authority in the exercise of these powers without any undue limitations or interference. 
However, the local community should, through periodic elections or other accountability 
channels, hold local units accountable for their decisions.  
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Lastly, central government should supervise or, where necessary, intervene in local matters to 
ensure that national policies, standards and regulations are implemented. Furthermore, 
intergovernmental cooperation between the national and local governments is important, and 
this can be achieved by conducting joint national and local elections.  
  
3. Devolution of powers for conflict resolution  
Despite the waning confidence in decentralisation as a tool for development, devolving power 
for the purpose of addressing internal conflict is gaining currency. The post-Cold War period has 
seen an unprecedented rise in internal state conflict, especially in Africa, and this has led to the 
growing interest in the local level as an avenue for building state peace and political stability.235 
A 2010 UNDP report states:  
Strengthening local governance structures has emerged as a key instrument for both national and 
international partners in managing the implementation and the long term consolidation of peace 
and stability. Local governments are now increasingly considered to have a key role in 
responding to the socio-economic needs of affected populations in both the immediate post-
conflict humanitarian/early recovery phase and in the long term, as part of the consolidation of 
peace and state-building.
236
  
The World Bank also sees the value of decentralisation in maintaining political stability “in the 
face of pressures for localisation”.237 The Bank states that “when a country finds itself deeply 
divided, especially along geographic and ethnic lines, decentralisation provides an institutional 
mechanism for bringing opposition groups into a formal, rule-bound bargaining process”.238 
Litvack et al add that in some situations, “the very preservation of a national political system has 
required the decentralization of power”.239  
However, the concept of devolution of powers as a means of holding a state together is an old 
one. Indeed, as it will later emerge in the discussions below, some of the oldest modern 
federations like Switzerland (1848) and Canada (1867) were formed along general “conflict 
resolution” lines. In Africa, devolution of power was also attempted from the early days of 
colonial rule and even at the end of colonialism, with varying degrees of success. The next 
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section will focus on the assumptions and institutional design features that underlie this renewed 
enthusiasm in devolving powers to secure peace.  
3.1 The meaning of conflict  
Fisher defines “conflict” as “an incompatibility of goals or values between two or more parties in 
a relationship, combined with attempts to control each other and antagonistic feelings toward 
each other”.240 The incompatibilities may be real or perceived by conflicting parties; in addition, 
emotional hostility and “opposing actions” by the parties are defining features of conflict.241 Due 
to differences in ideals, aspirations and other aspects of life, conflict is an inevitable part of 
human interaction. Indeed, Fisher notes that “the absence of conflict usually signals the 
absence of meaningful interaction”; conflict becomes constructive or destructive depending on 
how it is managed.242  
Conflict can take place within an individual or between individuals; it can assume an inter-group, 
multi-group or international dimension.243 Group conflict occurs as a result of “incompatibility in 
ways of life – preferences, principles and practices that people believe in”.244 These include 
identity factors such as race, ideology, religion, culture and ethnicity, among others. Two other 
points need mentioning as well. First, a conflict may take the form of a sub-state group imposing 
its identity on other unwilling groups, thereby creating a conflict of values. Second, group 
identity may be used as the basis of denying or accessing resources, leading to identity-based 
grievances over resources. Daniel Katz developed a third category of conflict known as power 
conflict.245 In this type of conflict, “each party wishes to maintain or maximise the amount of 
influence that it exerts in the relationship and the social setting,”246 and may in the process use 
resources to exert such influence.  
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In most developing states, internal state conflict is mainly identity-based, involves resources and 
is essentially a power struggle between the conflicting groups. This has led to the use of terms 
such as “intractable conflict”247 and “deep-rooted conflict”, which Houlihan describes as “conflict 
that occurs in “divided societies” where identity-based factors overlap with the grievances about 
economic, social and/or cultural injustice”.248 This thesis focuses on the extreme dimensions 
where conflict has become destructive, as opposed to normal human or group interaction. 
Accordingly, the phrase “conflict resolution” refers to the management of human interaction in a 
manner that prevents violent and disruptive conflict between identifiable sub-state groups.  
3.2 Designing devolution for conflict resolution: an evasive and incoherent model  
Unlike the near universal model of decentralisation for development, there is no such equivalent 
for conflict resolution. The UNDP admits that “there is no conceptual framework to evaluate this 
dimension of local governance interventions in post-conflict situations”.249 Different reasons 
have been advanced to explain this. Litvack et al argue that due to the nature of its clients 
(governments), the World Bank may have shied away from directly addressing internal political 
issues to ensure stability.250 In the state of Bihar in India, for instance, a development strategy 
prepared under the aegis of the Bank avoided caste discrimination issues largely responsible for 
poverty and violent conflict in the state.251 The Bank chose neutral language, such as “fighting 
poverty” and “the rural poor”, and ignored the politicised identities responsible for the problems 
in Bihar. The study engaged in a “dry” economic analysis focused on diversification of the 
economy and “improved service delivery” targeting “the rural poor”.252  
While governments readily acknowledge development as a goal of decentralisation, only a few 
readily admit the existence of internal conflict. Such denial forecloses opportunities to deliberate 
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and design a coherent and appropriate decentralisation structure to address internal conflict.253 
The attitude of governments towards internal conflict has relegated the subject of 
decentralisation design for conflict resolution to international organisations and other non-state 
actors only,254 thereby missing a critical stakeholder in the process of defining appropriate 
structures and institutions of devolution to address internal conflict.    
However, it is also important to note that conflicts vary in terms of their nature, duration, stage, 
and underlying causes. This makes it difficult to draw comparative lessons for purposes of a 
coherent or universal framework.255 Nevertheless, internal conflict remains a reality for many 
developing countries. Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),256 
Ethiopia,257 Sudan and Uganda258 have at some point attempted to devolve power as a means 
of addressing internal conflict. There are also proposals to manage internal conflict in Somalia 
through the devolution of powers.259   
3.2.1 The „federal solution‟: an evolving and dynamic concept  
Devolution of powers as a means of resolving conflict is firmly rooted in classical federalism.260 
The fact that some of the older federations, such as the USA (1787), Switzerland (1848), and 
Canada (1867),261 have remained stable despite the diversity of their populations is a 
demonstration of the inherent ability of federalism to hold a state together.  
However, attempts to duplicate the same structures in other states have ended disastrously, in 
some cases leading to the break-up of states. In Africa, classical examples of federal failures 
include the Mali federation,262 which was formed in 1958 and dissolved shortly after in 1960,263 
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and the secession of Southern Sudan from the former Sudan.264 Departing colonial regimes also 
attempted to bequeath federal and semi-federal structures to their former colonies such as 
Uganda and Kenya, all of which were later dismantled and abandoned.265 The collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia also show the weakness 
inherent in federal arrangements as a peacemaking device.266 Watts observes that between 
1960 and the late 1980s “it became increasingly clear that federal systems were not the 
panacea that many had imagined them to be”.267   
Despite the failures noted above, Watts acknowledges the resurgence of interest in federal 
political solutions from the early 1990s, citing Belgium, South Africa, Spain, Argentina and Brazil 
as more recently established federal systems.268 Federalism as a conflict-resolution tool has 
also been applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sudan, Iraq269 and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and is being considered in Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Philippines270 and even Somalia.271  
3.2.2 Designing subnational units for conflict resolution  
3.2.2.1 The danger of regions or large units  
A number of studies and experiences of states point to the inherent danger of regions or large 
units. Siegle and O‟Mahony observe that “systems where federalism was formalized or 
provincial governments granted some degree of autonomy were consistently linked to higher 
probabilities and magnitude of conflict”.272 They add that the “the greatest threat of ethnic 
conflict comes from societies where there is a dominant group comprising between 45-90 per 
cent of the population”.273 This is because other minority groups are in constant fear of 
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economic, political and social exclusion by the dominant group. Roeder calls this dominant 
ethnic group the “core-nationality” in the ethno-federal set-up.274 He proposes the splitting of the 
core ethnic group in order to minimise consolidation of a regional political identity that can 
endanger the nation-state.275  
In Africa, Barkan observes, Nigeria and Uganda have used this approach, which he calls 
“fractionalisation” of the bigger ethnic groups.276 He argues that initially many African 
independence leaders ignored ethnic identities and perpetuated the failed myth of “national 
unity”.277 Nigeria began with three big regional units carved out along three ethnic and religious 
fault-lines. In the words of one of the military rulers, the three regions “were so large and 
powerful as to consider themselves self-sufficient and almost entirely independent. The Federal 
Government which ought to give lead to the whole country was relegated to the background.”278 
The regions were subsequently divided into the current 36 states in order to curb centrifugal 
forces.279 Barkan asserts that where two to four ethnic groups account for one-third to two-thirds 
of the population, there is a prospect of conflict, and this can only be managed if the large 
groups are “fractionalised”. However, fractionalisation has to be accompanied by additional 
measures that will ensure equitable access to resources and development.280 He concludes that 
Nigeria is a relative success in this approach. While it is still a “polarised and fractious society”, 
it is not a “deeply divided situation”.281  
The risk of conflict posed by large regions is further enhanced or reduced by the nature of their 
composition. Tierney observes that the heterogeneous nature of Northern Ireland has slowed 
down the consolidation of Northern Irish nationalism. However, Scotland‟s282 relatively 
homogeneous composition has ensured consolidation of political pressure, making the UK 
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devolve substantial powers to Edinburgh.283 Similarly, the homogeneity of the French-speaking 
province of Quebec in Canada has led to its recognition as a separate nation within the state of 
Canada.284  
However, while large regions may pose a danger to the unity of the state, in some cases it is a 
matter of necessity rather than choice. The very recognition of the Quebecois as a separate 
nation within Canada “blunted the force of secession”,285 as confirmed by Quebec nationalists 
who demanded: “Recognise our right to national self-determination so that we won‟t use it”.286 
Thus, depending on the local context, some states have no choice but to have such large 
regions for the sake of political stability. It is the same case with Spain‟s regionalisation process, 
which was initiated as a response to agitation for autonomy by Catalonia and the Basque 
Country.287 Indeed, it may not be possible to split such units through democratic means. In 
Nigeria only military rulers were gradually able to fragment regions by largely undemocratic 
means.288  
In Africa, the break-up of the Mali Federation in 1960, which consisted of the present-day Mali 
and Senegal,289 and the break-up of Sudan generally illustrate the danger of two large regions 
within a state.290 The rising secessionist demand in English-speaking South Western Cameroon 
is a further illustration of the same peril.291 Siegle and O‟Mahony warn that, for the sake of 
national unity, Uganda should not accede to the asymmetrical federal demands of the Baganda 
through the “Buganda Kingdom”. They argue that “the central government should be cautious in 
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responding to pressures for creating autonomous regions or federalism”,292 as the Buganda 
Kingdom may end up creating a competing political identity with a secessionist agenda.293  
3.2.2.2 The third/ local level as a „brake‟ on regional conflict  
After examining the risk to national unity of creating large or regional units, Siegle and 
O‟Mahony conclude that rather than encouraging provincial autonomy, there is “relatively 
greater importance of decentralization initiatives that enhance legitimacy, spending discretion, 
and capacity of local authority – expenditures, employment, and elected leaders”.294 They 
recommend the use of the local level as a brake on the secessionist agenda associated with 
regions. The UNDP and Siegle and O‟Mahony conclude that effective local government can 
assist in addressing poor or deficient local capacity and services where the same is a reliable 
indicator of internal conflict, as is the case in the Philippines and Uganda.295 As institutions 
focused on local service delivery, local governments are in the best position to address 
development-related issues that underlie conflict.  
However, the experience in Indonesia seems to reveal another equally, if not more, significant 
role of the local level. Suharto‟s rule in Indonesia eliminated the autonomy that regions enjoyed 
since the days of Dutch colonial rule.296 However, after the demise of his rule in 1998, demands 
for regional autonomy threatened to disintegrate the country. The country had three options: to 
extend autonomy to the regional level, eliminate the provincial governments altogether, or retain 
provinces but with limited autonomy.297 The new president favoured the elimination of provinces 
in order to do away with secession claims. The reform team, however, advised against such a 
move on the grounds that the abolition of regions might generate centrifugal forces the country 
could not contain. The final structure was “the compromise option” consisting of regions with 
limited autonomy and a strong system of local districts. Bennet explains the significance of the 
final structure:  
By effectively skipping over the provincial level of governance, the drafters were able to limit the 
strength of those provinces that might seek separatism in the future. They assumed that any form 
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of collective action on the part of potential separatists would be far more difficult to coordinate if 
power was diffused among approximately 300 mayors and regents at the district level rather than 
28 provincial governors.
298
 
Similarly, at end of apartheid-rule South Africa was faced with demands for a strong federal 
system of government.299 The demands were led by Zulu nationalists and right-wing Afrikaners 
who wanted a self-governing territory in Kwazulu-Natal province and an Afrikaner Volkstaat, 
respectively.300 Their demands were based on the fear of a strong centralised government 
under the ANC, which was consolidating its political power in a democratic South Africa.301 
However, underdevelopment, poverty and lack of basic services – all traceable to the apartheid 
era – also necessitated a strong system of local government to enhance access to services and 
development. The final system that was adopted is commonly referred to as an “hour-glass 
structure”. Composed of relatively “weak” provinces created as a response to demands for 
autonomy, it is a structure in which powers and resources are devolved to local governments, 
the site of intensive service delivery.302  
It is clear that Indonesian and South African local governments are not mere service-delivery 
agents but, indeed, offer a systemic equilibrium to the vertical power balance. The local level 
thus plays a critical role in maintaining the broader political integrity in Indonesia and South 
Africa. While the developmental role of local government is critical in addressing the underlying 
causes of conflict, their place in the entire political system can assist in preventing the break-up 
of a state.  
Furthermore, the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) averted regional 
secessionist conflict pitting the dominant ethnic Macedonians against the minority ethnic 
Albanians, by devolving power to local units and eliminating regions totally.303 The General 
Framework Agreement of August 2001 (the Ohrid Agreement), which saved the country from 
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civil war, explicitly excluded federal arrangements.304 Thus, regionalisation or creation of mono-
ethnic regions was not an option.305 Instead, 80 municipalities were created across the country 
without an intervening regional level.306 Factors such as the independence of Kosovo and the 
possibility of Albanian regions in Macedonia breaking away to join the Albanian-dominated 
Kosovo informed Macedonia‟s “federo-phobia”.307 The 80 units that were created denied ethnic 
Albanians a “mother region” from which to foment secession and join the greater Albanian state 
of Kosovo. 
South Africa, Macedonia and Indonesia illustrate the importance of the local level in addressing 
the inherent risks associated with large units. A state can opt for the local level only, as was the 
case with Macedonia, or maintain the region but push to the local level, resources and powers 
that could facilitate regional conflict and secessionism.  
3.2.2.3 Boundaries of units: exclusive enclaves or mixed units?  
A state may opt to have mixed units or homogenous units. In the former, the state chooses not 
to have units whose boundaries coincide with identity factors such as language, ethnic, religious 
or other identity. In the latter, the state creates homogenous units where the majority of the 
people in a unit have a common identity. Both approaches have their origins in the practice of 
federal states. Watts observes that in federal states where there is a dominant language and 
ethnic, religious or other divisions are not as dominant – for instance, the USA, Austria, 
Australia and Brazil – the trend has been to establish mixed units; regional differences mainly 
turn around historical and economic as opposed to identity-based issues.308 In other federal 
states where identity differences such as ethnicity, religion and language are sharp – for 
example, Switzerland, India, 309 Canada, Belgium, Spain,310 and Ethiopia311 – the trend has been 
to establish exclusive units.  
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Both approaches are argued to have value in terms of dealing with conflict through devolution of 
power. The mixed-units approach, or “territorial or administrative federalism”, as it is termed by 
some scholars,312 is lauded for “weakening the potentially divisive ethno-nationalism by 
designing the constituent units to prevent ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities from becoming 
majorities within constituent units”.313 Watts adds that the mixed-units approach seeks to deal 
with the sharp divisions that lead to secessionism and nationalism among groups.314 Mixed units 
attempt to establish each unit as “a demographic microcosm of the state as a whole”.315  
The exclusive-units316 approach is also said to have distinctive benefits. Fessha argues that an 
exclusive territorial unit may be created to protect an ethnic group from cultural, linguistic, 
economic and political domination.317 This approach is seen as “reducing interethnic tension by 
giving each group a sense of security in protecting its distinctiveness”.318   
Whether any of the two approaches (exclusive and mixed units) can actually resolve conflict, is 
a contested matter. Ironically, experience shows that both of the strategies can be used to 
dominate or isolate certain groups. Kymlicka writes that in the USA “it was decided that no 
territory would be accepted as a state unless national minorities were outnumbered within that 
state”.319 For instance, in Florida boundaries were drawn in such a way that Indian tribes and 
Hispanic groups were outnumbered;320 in Hawaii, statehood was delayed until Anglo-Saxons 
“swamped” the indigenous inhabitants.321 On the other hand, while exclusive regional and local 
units are seen as the way out of conflict in Ethiopia, Watts sees this approach as dangerous. He 
argues that “the territorial segmentation of a society has been sharpest where the territorial 
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distribution of the different factors causing conflict – religious, linguistic, ethnic, economic, 
historical and ideological – have tended to coincide, mutually reinforcing each other”.322  
Both exclusive and mixed constituent units can be used to achieve significantly different results 
in different contexts. It thus seems that the most important factor here is the legitimacy, or lack 
thereof, of the pursuit of an exclusive or mixed territorial unit. It is for this reason that Watts 
warns against the plain importation of models, because “even where similar institutions are 
adopted, different circumstances may make them operate differently”.323 Leonardy argues that 
while ethnic and other identity factors should play a role in the demarcation of boundaries, they 
should certainly not play the dominating role.324 
Whichever option is chosen, every state has to contend with the issue of boundary demarcation, 
typically a highly fraught exercise that mobilises competing political interests. In most federal 
systems, adjustment of boundaries is constitutionally protected. Watts identifies two principles in 
respect of boundary demarcation: first, there must be transparency and objective criteria, and, 
second, there must be participation by the affected population through referenda or other means 
of making the views of the affected persons heard.325 In an ethno-federal arrangement, where 
ethnicity is amplified, ethnic identity will be a major factor in determining boundaries.326 In other 
cases, factors such as economic viability and non-identity issues will determine boundary 
demarcation. In Uganda, boundary demarcation is based on effective administration, capacity 
considerations in service delivery and other factors not related to identity.327 Boundary 
demarcation may be entrusted to an independent body dedicated to that issue only, for 
instance, the Municipal Demarcation Board in South Africa. In other cases, such as that in 
Uganda, the process of creating new local government districts is entrusted to the unicameral 
national legislature.328  
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3.2.3 Powers and functions of devolved units  
Actual or perceived political and socio-economic exclusion of a sub-state group by a centre that 
is dominated or seen to be dominated by another sub-state group forms a basis for “narratives 
to social injustice”.329 It thus appears that a possible solution is devolving powers and functions 
that can facilitate political inclusion.330 Devolving power may also divert political attention the 
subnational level, thereby eliminating or minimising conflict in a bid to capture central power.331 
Where grievances are related to resources and development, effective local service delivery 
and development may, in the long run, address development-related grievances.332 
 
3.2.3.1 Political powers and functions  
Political and economic exclusion, often tied to identity, is the most common element defining 
conflict in developing states. Accordingly, the powers devolved to subnational units should 
facilitate effective political inclusion. In the Philippines, “the poorest 10 provinces ... in almost 
every aspect of human development, are also the most conflict-ridden”.333 (Incidentally, these 
are also the regions with religious minorities.334 In Uganda, ethnic-identity issues are often tied 
to grievances about poor services and underdevelopment.335 Siegle and O‟Mahony conclude 
that, at least in the case of Uganda, decentralisation for conflict resolution has much to do with 
local delivery and access to basic services.336  
Devolving powers and functions that facilitate access to local services and development may 
thus have the ability to address conflict. This is because identity-conflict is tied to 
underdevelopment and lack of services. It is in such a context that empowering decentralised 
institutions to provide access to basic services such as education, health, and local 
infrastructure may enhance political inclusion. In some cases, grievances revolve around 
identity issues such as language. In these cases, conflict may be averted if powers over 
language use are devolved to the local level. In Macedonia, conflict eased when the 2001 
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Peace Agreement337 recognised the use of Albanian and other minority languages in 
municipalities where Albanians and other minorities are present.338 Accordingly, the powers 
devolved should be relevant to addressing the narratives that support conflict, narratives which 
commonly relate to resources but which, in addition, may include identity issues.  
3.2.3.2 Finances: enhancing equity for peace  
The link between fiscal design and conflict resolution is rarely explored, mainly because the 
latter “is well outside the normal field of expertise of economists”.339 Nevertheless, fiscal design 
plays an important role since most conflicts arise from real or perceived economic exclusion. 
Indeed, few, if any, countries are economically homogeneous; such heterogeneity provides the 
basis for conflict, especially where inequalities coincide – whether in perception or actuality – 
with differences in identity. In these cases, inequalities “can become a powerful mobilising agent 
that can lead to a range of political disturbances”.340 In this regard, Prud‟homme suggests that 
economic disparities should be seen not as “merely statistical artefacts” but sociological factors 
influencing perceptions of collective inclusion and exclusion.341  
Fiscal asymmetry has the potential to address inequalities that form the basis of conflict.342 
While such asymmetry in fiscal design is more defined and formal in federal systems, it also 
exists, albeit subtly, in unitary systems.343 Bird et al single out conditional grants for funding 
projects with a “regional significance” as important for addressing perceptions.344 Projects of 
“regional significance” may, in this context, be regarded as those which address perceptions or 
realties of economic exclusion. Tranchant adds that fiscal decentralisation can promote stability 
only if resources are devolved to sub-state groups that are national minorities.345 However, he 
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cautions that the interests of local minorities must also be catered for in order to avert local 
minority conflict.346 
It thus appears that in order to address conflict, fiscal design should facilitate economic inclusion 
by addressing economically-based grievances. The nature and level of economic grievances 
may vary from one context to another. Ultimately, though, there must be some asymmetry in the 
fiscal design which responds to the prevailing economic inequalities that form the basis for 
conflict. This may come about in the form of conditional funding, as proposed by Bird and 
Ebel,347 or through other special measures responding to the disparities as well as the 
perceptions surrounding them. Siegle and O‟Mahony maintain that fiscal design should 
emphasise local spending of revenue raised centrally rather than locally, on the grounds that the 
latter is frequently associated with conflict348 whereas the former has a lower propensity for 
ethnic conflict.349  
The centre plays an important role and should be factored in the fiscal design for peace. In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dayton Agreement of October 1995, which created two Majority-
Croats and Majority-Bosniac regions, denied the centre major revenues and taxes.350 As a 
result, the centre could not address regional inequalities, some of which were the cause of 
conflict.351 Indeed, as argued earlier, with the correct political will, macro-allocations from the 
centre are better able to address disparities than when done by subnational governments.352 It 
is thus clear that the main design features of the “fiscal federalist” model discussed earlier bear 
considerable relevance to conflict resolution, insofar as the model aims at equitable distribution 
of resources and balanced development.  
3.2.3.3  „Economic self-determination‟: control of „home‟ resources  
Natural resource-rich developing countries are ten times more likely to experience conflict353 
than other developing countries, mainly because of the disparate sharing of benefits from the 
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natural resources.354 While devolving control of such resources to the local level may address 
common grievances, resource-rich developing states rely heavily on such resources and are 
thus less likely to devolve control.355 For instance, while the federal government of Nigeria has 
rejected demands to devolve control over oil revenues to oil-producing states,356 Canada has 
managed, due to its developed economy, to devolve natural resources to its provinces, making 
Alberta the richest in GDP per capita largely thanks to its natural resource endowment.357  
Nevertheless, even within developing states special measures have been put in place to 
address demands for local “economic self-determination”. In Nigeria, 13 percent of federal 
revenue is reserved for the oil-producing states where the revenue is earned.358 In the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, 40 percent of national revenue allocated to provinces is to be 
“retained at source”.359 In Indonesia, legislation passed in 1999360 facilitates the sharing of 
revenue from natural resources (mainly gas and oil), through intergovernmental transfers, with 
62 districts in 5 provinces where the resources are located.361  
 
3.2.4 Designing the national level: inclusiveness through shared-rule  
Central institutions provide the glue that holds a state together.362 However, this can only 
happen if the central institutions reflect diversity and effectively enhance political inclusion.363 
Effective inclusion of previously excluded sub-state groups in “federal decision-making” can 
address conflict. Indeed, the lack of formal central structures of representation of devolved units 
in the UK has weakened the representation of regional interests in the UK.364 In federal 
systems, shared-rule is, almost universally, effected through a second chamber in the national 
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legislature.365 With the legislature being an institution of horizontal power-sharing, the second 
chamber may enhance the inclusion of sub-state groups represented therein.366 Depending on 
its structure, powers, and functions, the second chamber has a potential to enhance political 
inclusion at the centre. 
3.2.4.1 The structure and powers of the second chamber  
Being a forum for central decision-making, the structures and powers of the second chamber 
should enhance the representation and participation of sub-state groups in determining 
important matters of state. The mode of representation, however, varies. In some federations, 
notably the USA,367 Switzerland, and Australia, members of the second chamber are directly 
elected by voters from their respective units.368 In Austria and India, members are elected by 
their respective regional legislatures. In South Africa, a portion of the members are elected by 
their respective regional assemblies while others are representatives of the provincial 
executives.369 In Germany, members of the executives of Lander governments are the 
representatives in the Federal Council (Bundesrat).370 In Canada, members of the Senate are 
appointed by the ruling party.371  
All systems have their benefits and risks in terms of “federal decision-making”. For instance, 
while Watts argues that party interests tend to prevail over regional interests in directly elected 
second chambers,372 the same trend is observable even in second chambers indirectly elected 
by the regional legislatures. Furthermore, while central appointment of members to the second 
chamber, as is the case in Canada, has the least credibility in terms of representing regional 
interests,373 with political will it may be an avenue to enhance central representation of 
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minorities.374 Furthermore, equal representation of devolved units, however large or small, 
ensures the protection of interests of minority groups at the national level, thereby minimising 
minority conflict.375  
Being part of the national legislature, the second chamber‟s legislative power becomes the most 
important tool for promoting the interests of devolved units.376 Watts observes that the main role 
of the federal chamber is “reviewing federal legislation with a view to bringing to bear upon it 
regional and minority interests and concerns”.377 In this regard, some federal chambers have a 
special veto or power with regard to laws concerning the constituent units.378 While the roles 
played by second chambers vary with federal systems, the federal chambers are mainly 
equipped with powers relevant to the protection of the interests of constituent units.379 
3.2.5 Designing inclusive national and local rule: „complex power-sharing‟  
Beyond self-rule and shared-rule arrangements, there are other vital structures and processes 
which have the potential to enhance inclusiveness in both local and national decision-making.380 
These include the design of the electoral system, composition of the administration, and even 
the local and national executive and legislative structures. Wolff argues that self-rule and 
shared-rule arrangements should be complemented by these processes in what he terms 
“complex power-sharing”.381 While the executive and legislature are institutions of horizontal 
rather than vertical power-sharing, federal governance is influenced by their respective 
structures and powers.382  
3.2.5.1 An inclusive electoral system  
The electoral system is described as “the most powerful lever of constitutional engineering for 
accommodation and harmony in severely divided societies”.383 The electoral system can be 
designed to enhance cross-communal cooperation, bargaining and interdependence between 
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groups in a divided society.384 Electoral systems vary and are mainly classified according to the 
variation between the votes cast and the outcome in terms of numbers of the elected 
representatives. There are three main categories of electoral systems, each with several 
variants: plurality-majority systems, semi-proportional systems and proportional representation 
systems.385  
Under plurality-majority systems, the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system is the simplest form 
thereof. The FPTP system uses single-member districts and is “candidate-centred”. Voters 
choose candidates, and the one with the most votes, though not necessarily the majority 
wins.386 Oloo observes that the FPTP system is preferred largely because of its simplicity and 
the geographical connectedness of winning candidates.387 Voters also get to choose between 
individuals and not parties,388 and can thus assess the individual merits and performance of 
candidates.389 The most common majoritarian system is the run-off or “two-round” system. In 
this system, the first round is carried out according to normal FPTP principles. If a candidate 
receives an absolute majority, he or she is elected. If, however, there is no majority winner, 
another election is held between the two candidates with the highest number of votes; the one 
receiving the most votes, regardless of margin, wins.390 
There are two main types of Proportional Representation (PR) electoral systems relevant to this 
discussion.391 The first and most common PR system is the Party List PR system, where parties 
present lists of candidates in the order of priority for election. Votes are cast for parties rather 
than candidates, and each party is allocated elective seats from their lists in accordance with 
the proportion of votes won.392 The second variant is the Mixed Member PR system (MMP), 
which combines FPTP and PR features. Some seats are elected through the FPTP system, 
whereas others are allocated to parties.393 
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Compared with plurality-majority electoral systems, the PR system “faithfully translates votes 
cast into seats won” and thus avoids “wasted votes”, a common occurrence in plurality-majority 
systems where a candidate may win with a minority vote as a result of split votes between 
candidates.394 Because of this, the Party List PR system is seen more able to produce a more 
representative structure than the FPTP system395 and is indeed recommended for effective 
representation of both minorities and majorities in a divided society.396  
It has also been argued that the PR system encourages politicians to make appeals beyond 
their own groups.397 In Nigeria, for instance, the President must win at least one-quarter of the 
votes cast in at least two-thirds of the 36 states.398 The instant run-off system also encourages 
“moderate politicians who are willing to compromise with politicians from the other side” to 
cooperate and therefore foster integration.399 Because the PR system can prevent a clear 
majority from emerging, it may thus ensure the formation of coalition governments and facilitate 
inclusive decision-making.400 In practice, however, the choice of electoral systems is due to 
“accidental factors” such as colonialism and the effects of “influential neighbours”. Furthermore, 
once a particular design has been chosen, states tend to maintain these systems and 
emphasise their benefits rather than seek to change them.401 
 
3.2.5.2 Inclusive executive and administration  
The executive and administrative structures can be used to enhance inclusiveness by ensuring 
that the structures reflect the local and national diversity. This can be achieved through a 
coalition government, minority vetoes and proportional public sector employment.402 The UNDP 
argues that decentralisation should, if it is to address conflict, enhance inclusiveness as 
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opposed to reinforcing “social patterns of exclusion and inequity”.403 The UNDP adds that since 
local governments perform most of the local services, they become a “point of contestation” on 
issues of political or economic exclusion404 and should thus be the starting point in structuring 
inclusion.405 In this regard, the “son of the soil” practice in Uganda, which “allows districts to give 
hiring preferences to individuals who are indigenous native to that district”, has been criticised 
for encouraging exclusion.406  
The World Bank, too, encourages the formation of “inclusive-enough coalitions”407 that ensure 
representation of diversity at the local and national levels.408 Inclusive institutions have the 
potential to “mediate contests between different classes or ethnic, religious or regional groups 
peacefully”.409 In the South African Province of KwaZulu-Natal, local governments adopted in 
1995 an executive committee system which drew members from rival parties (the African 
National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party).410 This created mutual dependency in local 
decision-making and thus facilitated accommodation.411 In Ghana, a deliberate policy of 
inclusiveness has been Ghana‟s decentralisation success: the government passed a law412 to 
enhance ethnic harmony and introduced affirmative action programmes in marginalised 
areas.413 Ethnic diversity is reflected in the composition of public institutions, including the 
military. Inclusiveness is provided for at both the national and local levels.  
In addition, special measures can be used to enhance representation of minorities. In Ghana, 
70 percent of members of District Assemblies are elected while 30 percent are appointed by the 
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president, thereby affording the president an opportunity to appoint minority representatives who 
may not make it through the ballot.414 However, a similar provision in Zimbabwe has been used 
to swamp local councils in opposition areas with cronies of the ruling party.415 It thus appears 
that while local and national structures can be built to reflect and enhance diversity, their 
effectiveness depends on whether leaders have the vision and maturity to make appropriate use 
of the laid-down structures.416  
3.2.6 Devolution as a tool for conflict resolution: the scepticism 
A basic assumption is that devolution of power will lead to equitable development and thus 
address the perceptions that drive conflict.417 However, the UNDP notes that “development itself 
is change and de-stabilises.”418 Development raises expectations but also highlights disparities, 
and this may trigger further conflict.419 Where conflict is seen as deep and interwoven with 
identity issues and resources, such factors are “transformed into proximate causes of violence 
when they are mobilised politically”.420 In the absence of public institutions sufficiently resilient to 
manage the pressure and challenge political opportunism, a resurgence of conflict is likely, even 
after development has taken off. 
3.2.6.1 The paradox of devolution and conflict resolution  
Acceptance of self-rule and shared-rule arrangements may be an indication of the willingness of 
the dominant group to compromise and accommodate.421 However, smaller parties may treat 
devolution of powers not as a solution to a conflict but a ground for more radicalised demands 
such as secession and fragmentation of a state.422 In such cases, devolution may indeed create 
the impetus for further conflict. Nonetheless, a 2010 study on 10 African countries by the USAID 
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indicates that devolution of power “has helped consolidate stability in some cases and does not 
appear to have compromised stability in any cases.”423 This is an important finding that supports 
devolution of power as a tool for political stability, especially in Africa where the post-colonial 
period has witnessed a number of civil conflicts.424 
3.2.6.2 The fragility of developing states 
Siegle and O‟Mahony note “the relative ease with which small bands of rebels can destabilize 
weak states”.425 Conflict may restart where a state lacks capacity to address the issues that 
underlie the conflict.426 Building the capacity and resilience of state institutions takes a long time 
and needs patience; there are no “easy-fix” solutions,427 and it may take between 15-30 years 
before institutions have developed sufficient capacity and resilience.428 Devolution of powers 
involves creating new institutions at the local level and pumping in resources and capacity to 
make the local units effective; however, most developing states are challenged in terms of 
resources and capacity. This reality militates against the argument that devolution of power and 
resources constitutes an effective strategy for resolving conflict.429  
3.2.7 Summary of the devolution design features for conflict resolution  
For various reasons, there is no universal devolution design for conflict resolution. Even so, 
institutional features can still be extracted from the literature and state practice discussed in the 
preceding sections. First, large or regional units are generally not appropriate as they can form 
the basis for political mobilisation and potential destabilisation. However, the context may 
actually require the creation or retention of large units for purposes of addressing conflict. Local 
units also have a potential to ameliorate the risks associated with large regions; in addition, they 
may serve to address other root causes of conflict by facilitating service delivery and 
development. With regard to boundary demarcation, the units can either be mixed or exclusive, 
and the choice of one over the other is informed by consideration of the local context and the 
legitimacy of a particular approach.  
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Second, the powers and functions should be relevant to the conflict; the powers should enhance 
identity where this is a source of contestation, and should also facilitate political inclusion. 
Further inclusivity can be achieved by an electoral design that promotes diversity, preferably 
through proportional representation. Inclusion can also be enhanced through executive and 
administration structures which reflect local and national diversity. Likewise, special measures 
can be adopted to ensure the representation of minorities in local and central decision-making.  
Fiscal and financial powers should enhance economic inclusion. Devolved units should exercise 
control over finances which they can use to address their priorities. Where conflict revolves 
around demands for “economic self-determination” over local resources, this can be addressed 
through measures which ensure local benefit. Furthermore, with regard to financing devolved 
units, emphasis should be placed on local spending of central revenue as opposed to raising 
revenue locally, especially in poor and conflict-prone areas.  
Central representation of devolved units enhances inclusiveness in central decision-making, 
which is important for addressing real or perceived exclusion. In federal systems, this is 
achieved through a second chamber of the national legislature composed of representatives of 
devolved units. Devolved units may be represented equally or proportionally (taking into account 
the size, population, and other factors) in the second chamber. However, equal representation 
enhances the voice of the smaller units or minorities. Representatives can be directly elected 
voters, indirectly elected from the regional legislatures; they can be representatives of the unit 
governments or centrally appointed. Each mode of representation has its benefits and risks. The 
second chamber reviews national legislation to ensure that unit interests are protected, and may 
also perform other functions necessary to enhance “federal governance”. 
 
4. Limiting central power through devolution 
The centralised state traces its origins to colonial rule which was centralised, hierarchical and 
meant for control. The colonial structures were appropriated by the independence leaders who 
found them convenient control-mechanisms for crushing political opposition and entrenching 
political power.430 The semi-federal structures left by departing colonial masters were dismissed 
as extensions of colonialism431 and replaced with centralised systems for purposes of enhancing 
unity and development.432 However, none of these goals was achieved, and instead the 
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centralised state has been the main cause of underdevelopment, alienation of the people from 
government, and conflict.433  
Under the centralised state, political plurality was rejected and replaced by a policy of “fixed 
homogeneity” through a one-party system or, in the worst cases, no party at all.434 Repressive 
laws were put in place to quell political opposition.435 The leaders engaged in what has been 
described as “deinstitutionalisation and personalisation of political rule”,436 which entailed 
stripping security of tenure for serving heads of public institutions in order to enhance personal 
control.437 Exercise of public power, including judicial, executive and legislative power, tended to 
collapse into a single person, the ruler.438 Personal rule created a ruling elite and networks 
based on “patron-clientship”; state resources were in turn used to maintain these patronage 
networks439 and “buy” political support from the opposition.440  
Decentralised institutions were controlled through “close bureaucratic supervision” due to the 
suspicion that they could be breeding grounds for political dissent.441 Vital aspects such as 
finances, appointments of key staff, and other operations, were controlled by the central 
ministry.442 In some cases, the mandate to provide basic services was transferred to central 
government departments, leaving local governments irrelevant and without revenue.443 In the 
1970s, many states began decentralising power to address the ills of the centralised state.444 
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While the success of decentralisation varies, enhancing accountability in the exercise of central 
power remains a constant objective for many post-colonial states.445  
4.1 Devolution design features to limit central power  
Devolution of power has the potential to limit central power in two ways. First, the concept of 
devolution in itself limits central power as it means that the central government does not have 
absolute control over all agenda.446 In other words, devolution of power limits central power by 
“denying” it absolute control of powers. The nature and extent of the limitation may vary, 
however, depending on such factors as whether a country is unitary or federal in structure. In 
federal systems, neither the units nor the federal government have absolute control of power, 447 
and their respective powers can be varied only by mutual consent.448 In unitary systems, the 
government can recentralise powers.449 Thus, the “limiting ability” afforded by devolution may be 
comparatively weaker in unitary or decentralised systems than in federal systems; nevertheless, 
even decentralised systems can provide the basis for “reduc[ing] the concentration of power at 
the centre and thus hinder[ing] its arbitrary exercise”.450 
Second, in federal systems or devolved systems generally, the direct or indirect participation of 
devolved units in central decision-making can enable devolved units to influence decisions at 
the centre and thus enhance overall accountability at the centre. The sections below discuss the 
local and national design features that have a potential to limit central power. Limiting central 
power implies that the process of devolution curbs central power by denying the centre control 
over some of the state power or by influencing the exercise of power at the centre.  
4.2 The structure of the constituent units 
4.2.1 Size and number  
The size and number of constituent units should facilitate the effective limiting of central power. 
Roeder argues that “ethnofederal provinces, when large and powerful enough, can protect 
individual liberties by acting as „bulwarks‟ that check the central state by creating a „separation 
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of loyalty‟ that checks any „unhealthy veneration‟ of the common-state.”451 Leonardy also 
recommends fewer and larger units; arguing that the current 16 units of the German federation 
are on the higher extreme, he writes:  
It would seem to be obvious that there is a vital danger of federalism having too many constituent 
parts and inviting by this fact not only the temptation, but also the power to divide and rule on the 
level of the federation. American observers of their own constitutional scene would probably admit 
that their system is at least under permanent strain of such trends, owing to the fact that it comprises 
no fewer than 50 states.
452
 
In South Africa, there were calls for strong regional governments as a brake on a strong central 
government, among other measures that were intended to tame the ANC‟s political might.453 
Emphasising the importance of provinces in South Africa, Simeon and Murray argue that the 
nine provinces are better able to check a politically dominant centre than would 283 
municipalities.454 Similarly, the 2005 Constitution of Iraq gives smaller units an option to come 
together and form a region for purposes of enjoying “significantly greater powers independently 
of the centre”.455 Regarding Nigeria, Elaigwu argues that the fragmentation of the constituent 
units from the original three to the current 36 has had the effect of weakening the resource base 
of states and making the units reliant on the central government.456 From the above, it is clear 
that large units possess an inherent ability to limit central power. Smaller or tiny units, on the 
other hand, are perceived as too fragmented to facilitate the consolidation of political authority 
necessary to limit central power.457  
4.2.2 The composition of the constituent units  
The composition of constituent units can also enhance or limit their ability to claim powers and 
autonomy from the national government. Generally, federations with highly diverse units tend to 
have more resources and powers devolved to them, while in relatively homogeneous 
federations, powers and resources tend to be more centralised.458 In Switzerland, the diversity 
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between cantons has helped to nurture a political culture that is “consensual rather than 
majoritarian”.459 In India, too, state boundaries have gradually been defined along linguistic 
lines, thus highlighting the diversity of the federation. This has had the effect of transforming 
India from a highly centralised federation into one “negotiatory” in character.460 It can thus be 
concluded that, generally, homogenous units tend, for various reasons, to be more assertive 
than mixed units.  
4.2.3 The powers of devolved units: the „political significance‟ of units  
The ability to limit central power implies that constituent units have substantial powers which 
can enhance their autonomy and overall political significance. The World Bank observes that 
the ability of a subnational unit to influence central government depends on “the division of 
national political power between national and subnational governments” and “the structure, 
functions and resources assigned to subnational governments”.461 The powers of constituent 
units should be substantial and clearly defined to protect the space of devolved units.462 
Administrative autonomy enhances self-reliance by sealing gaps of central intrusion through 
administrative centralisation.463 In South Africa, for instance, a single public service under 
national legislation has encouraged the centre to prescribe even matters such as terms and 
conditions of provincial administrations.464 
The involvement of constituent units in constitutional amendment also increases, since the 
Constitution is the source of power for both orders of government and actually divides the 
vertical powers and defines their respective structures.465 Constituent units in the main 
federations, including Australia, Canada, and the USA, all play a role in constitutional 
amendments.466 Most regional units in major federations such as Canada,467 Austria468 and 
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Germany469 have exclusive control of the local government level. This enhances the power of 
the regional units as the centre cannot undercut regional powers by circumventing regional units 
and dealing directly with the local level.  
4.3 Enhancing „federal decision-making‟ through national design  
Effective limitation of central power means that devolved units can, through institutions of 
central representation, influence central decision-making and thus participate in the exercise of 
central power. Baldi argues that territorial representation at the centre is an important “centre-
constraining” feature in federalism.470 Participation in national legislation and constitutional 
amendment also further limits central power as the units participate in central decisions that 
affect them.471 As in the case of conflict resolution, the central representation of devolved units 
is effected through a second chamber of the national legislature.472 Accordingly, the features of 
shared-rule discussed in relation to conflict resolution are all relevant for the purposes of limiting 
central power.  
There is no universally agreed mode of central representation of devolved units that can 
facilitate effective „federal decision-making‟ in the second chamber.473 While some authors 
endorse the German style of “governmental representation”,474 other systems prefer direct and 
indirect elections.475 However, as discussed earlier above, the effectiveness varies and the local 
context plays an important role in determining the effectiveness of any form of structure 
adopted. Nevertheless, there is a general trend towards directly elected representatives.476 The 
powers of the second chamber should also enable it to protect the interests of units, such 
powers including special vetoes on matters (for instance, legislation) that are important to the 
interests of the devolved units.477  
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4.3.1 „Design versus effectiveness‟ in the limiting of central power  
While federal features offer effective limits on the exercise of central power, the experience of 
even some of the more established federal systems shows that such features can be blurred by 
a politically over-assertive national executive. For instance, Watts observes that this was the 
case in the Russian Federation during Putin‟s rule478 and in the USA during George W. Bush‟s 
rule, where the executive enhanced its control over federal matters.479 Party dominance in 
South Africa480 and Ethiopia481 also blurs the lines of federal governance. Saunders makes 
similar observations about Argentina and Nigeria, where “concentration of power in the 
presidency” has dominated the legislature and the constituent units.482 Saunders483 and Majeed 
observe that federal systems formed out of an existing polity are more prone to centralisation 
tendencies than those formed from units that were previously sovereign.484  
4.3.2 Summary of the devolution design features to limit central power  
The central design features of devolution for constraining central power can be identified from 
the preceding discussions. Constituent units should be large, few and homogenous in 
composition. The constituent units should have powers that can enhance their “political 
significance”. These include participation in constitutional amendment and control of the lower 
levels and other powers that can enhance overall autonomy.  
Central representation of units enhances the ability of devolved units to influence central 
decision-making, something which is achieved through a federal chamber. Equal representation 
of all devolved units is emphasised for an effective limitation of central power. Representatives 
can be either be directly or indirectly elected, or be governmental representatives of devolved 
units. The powers of the second chamber should be relevant to the interests of constituent units, 
for example, by means of special powers to review national laws concerning devolved units.  
 
                                               
478
 Watts (2008) 141. 
479
 Watts (2008)141.  
480
 Steytler (2004) 159-169.  
481
 Dickovic & Riedl (2010) 37; see also Zemelak A „Local government in Ethiopia: Still an apparatus of control?‟ 
(2011) 15 Law Democracy and Development 1.  
482
 Saunders (2006) 353.  
483
 Saunders (2006) 347.  
484
 Majeed A „Republic of India‟ in Kincaid J & Tarr GA (eds) Constitutional Origins, Structure and Change in Federal 
Countries (2005) 187. 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
5. Compatibility of purposes of devolution: making “trade-offs”   
The preceding sections have highlighted devolution design features considered necessary for 
the pursuit of development, conflict resolution and limiting central power. A careful review of the 
respective design reveals common, neutral and potentially conflicting design features. Design 
features that are common across the three purposes, or which have a neutral effect on other 
designs, need no balancing. However, trade-offs or compromises have to be made between 
conflicting or potentially conflicting design features. Due to the fact that underdevelopment, 
internal conflict, and central power abuse are persistent and concurrent challenges, states have, 
over time, consciously or unconsciously, made compromises and created balances in their 
devolved structures. Indeed, the varying designs across states are evidence of attempts to 
balance the purposes of devolution through design. However, before analysing state practice, it 
is necessary to understand the neutral, complementary and conflicting aspects of the three 
categories of principles and design.  
This section examines the relationship between the central design features for the three 
purposes. The analysis starts with the compatibility of the structures, which relates to size, the 
number of levels, number of units, and institutional structures. In the second place, it attends to 
the political, financial and administrative powers and functions of the decentralised units. Third, 
national design and central institutions are examined, and, lastly, the analysis turns to the 
design of centre-unit relations for each of the three purposes.  
In practice, one purpose seems to dominate, with modifications being made to accommodate 
design features of the other less prominent purposes; the more dominant purpose is, in turn, 
influenced by factors specific to a local context. In developing countries, the developmental 
purpose is likely to be the most prominent reason for devolving power. This is especially true of 
devolution systems adopted in the early 1990s and thereafter, a period which can be described 
as the “devolution renaissance”. 
5.1 Compatibility in structures and institutions of devolution   
5.1.1 Size, levels, and number of units 
Development requires economically viable small units for effective participatory development.485 
Indeed, the World Bank seldom focuses on the regional level. Conflict resolution may require 
large or small units depending on the context. Limiting central power emphasises larger and 
                                               
485
 World Bank (1999) 115.  
 
 
 
 
74 
 
fewer units in order to facilitate consolidation of regional power that can be used to limit central 
power. The traditional structure which encompasses the national, regional, and local levels is a 
potential compromise between the three purposes.  
In Indonesia, for instance, the 36 autonomous regions and 434 districts are a balance between 
the three purposes.486 As Bennet observes, the framers of Indonesia‟s decentralised system 
had to “walk a thin line between enhancing the capacity of subnational governments to offer 
services suited to local needs, on the one hand, and empowering and enabling those leaders 
who might seek independence on the other”.487 Accordingly, district governments concentrate 
on service provision while the regions manage secessionist demands. Even then, the regions 
coordinate important activities between districts which contribute to efficient provision of local 
services.488 There is thus a structural and functional balance between the regional and local 
units in order to complement the pursuit of the three purposes.  
In South Africa, Murray and Simeon have cautioned against the ruling party‟s proposal to 
abolish the provincial level. Arguing that abolishing provinces will “weaken rather than 
strengthen democracy in South Africa”,489 they note that while local governments can absorb the 
“democratic deficit” occasioned by scrapping provinces, the 283 local units are “unlikely to 
develop any real challenge to central dominance”490 and will be subordinated to the dominant 
centre. Thus, while the 283 local governments are appropriate for local service delivery, they 
are too “fragmented” to limit central government – a role better served by the nine provinces. 
These provinces may be politically and fiscally weak, but they can certainly play a better role in 
checking the centre than the 283 municipalities. Indeed, while party dominance has undermined 
the role of provinces in checking national government, the main opposition party controls one of 
the provinces, and this has granted the party an impetus to check the national government.491  
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In the case of Macedonia, the elimination of the regional level means that the more than 80 
units are too numerous to limit central power.492 Thus, while the local governments engage in 
service delivery and have recognised minority languages, the exclusion of federal arrangements 
meant that bicameralism or territorial representation could not be pursued. However, the 
Constitution provides for double majority votes for groups considered minorities at both the 
national and local levels (locally known as the Badinter principle).493 Thus, in Macedonia‟s case, 
other avenues (outside of the decentralised structure) are used to limit central power.  
There is also a potential conflict in the design with regard to the number of levels. It is argued 
that the higher the number, the greater the powers devolved from the centre, and the stronger 
the prospects for checking the exercise of central power.494 However, in the case of 
development, it is argued, multiple levels complicate the division of powers and lead to 
inefficiency.495 Thus, in this design aspect there is a potential conflict between serving a 
developmental purpose and limiting central power. In practice, though, the existence of many 
levels does not necessarily result in a “weakened” centre and, in fact, it may have the opposite 
effect. 
5.1.2 Institutional structures  
There is no doubt that institutional autonomy is an element common to the three purposes. 
Indeed, autonomy is implied in the very concept of devolution of power as its aim is to transfer 
power to the subnational units. Accordingly, institutional structures aimed at facilitating the 
autonomy of the devolved units are common to the three purposes. However, there are slight 
variations in the approach to the design of these structures, variations that are due to the 
differences between the purposes. For instance, for development, wide participation is sought in 
order to ensure effective participation and accountability, whereas, in the case of conflict 
resolution, it is done so for the purpose of enhancing inclusiveness, given that a lack of 
inclusivity can foment conflict. Accordingly, in order to achieve wide participation, the PR system 
is recommended for the pursuit of both purposes,496 if for slightly different reasons in each 
instance.  
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Development emphasises clear lines of local accountability. In regard to elections, the World 
Bank calls for direct election of mayors in order to enhance the visibility of elections as a tool for 
accountability.497 A directly elected head with an effective majority is seen as being able to make 
decisions for which he or she can then be held to account by the local community.498 Conflict 
resolution, on the other hand, calls for a PR system that prevents an effective majority and 
instead encourages the formation of local coalitions in the interests of collective decision-making 
and hence unity and cohesion.499 However, the World Bank regards coalitions as “inherently 
less stable” – because they are more susceptible to group and sectarian interests – than a 
majoritarian government;500 by contrast, a directly elected mayor is seen as better able to stand 
up to centralisation and thereby limit central power.501 
Accordingly, there are common as well as potentially conflicting features in the design of 
institutional structures. The developmental purpose leans towards majority electoral systems for 
purposes of clear lines of accountability. Limiting central power leans, too, towards majority 
electoral systems for the purposes having a powerful subnational leader who can stand up to 
the central government. Conflict resolution, on the other hand, calls for a PR system which 
avoids an effective majority and paves the way for a coalition that can enhance collective 
decision-making across the different groups.  
In regard to administrative structures, overall administrative autonomy facilitates pursuit of the 
three purposes. However, there may be slight variations between the three purposes. While 
development emphasises competence for overall efficiency in service delivery, conflict 
resolution emphasises diversity in administrative structures in order to promote inclusiveness. 
There may be potential conflict, particularly in cases where not all groups have the requisite 
skills for service delivery. This is especially so among minorities who have low literacy levels 
and formal skills; in such instances, administrative structures may end up being filled by persons 
from the dominant group to the exclusion of other groups. 
5.2 Compatibility in the design of powers and functions  
Functional autonomy is also common to the three purposes. For development, the relevant 
powers seek to enable devolved units to provide local services and address local preferences. 
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In regard to conflict, the relevant powers seek to enable devolved units to address the root 
causes of conflict. Vertical division of power also enhances the autonomy of counties, augments 
their political significance in the entire system, and thereby supports their ability to limit central 
power. Overall functional autonomy thus plays an important role across the three purposes.  
However, the level or nature of powers required may vary between the three purposes. 
Development requires powers relevant to the provision of local services and local development, 
such provision including local infrastructure development, education, health, refuse removal and 
other typical local government functions. However, conflict resolution may require more powers, 
especially where the conflict is about the control of national power. In order to address the 
conflict, the amount or level of powers devolved to the subnational level must be significant 
enough to enable political inclusion of the aggrieved groups. Limiting central power also implies 
that the devolved units have powers that can operate as an effective limit to central powers. 
Processes such as constitutional amendments define and determine the structures and powers 
at the national and subnational level.  
5.3 Compatibility in the design of fiscal powers and finances  
Fiscal autonomy and control over finances enhances the overall autonomy of devolved units 
and is therefore essential for the three purposes. For development, fiscal autonomy is 
necessary for devolved units to address local preferences. This means that there should be 
enough resources and accompanying discretion to enable devolved units to address 
democratically agreed local preferences. In regard to conflict resolution, fiscal autonomy and the 
amount of finances devolved to, or controlled by, devolved units should enable effective 
economic inclusion. In regard to limiting central power, fiscal autonomy reifies the overall 
autonomy of devolved units from the centre.  
However, the nature, extent and amount of resources controlled by devolved units may vary 
among the three purposes. For development, devolved units need resources to facilitate the 
performance of service delivery and local development. In cases of conflict over local resources, 
effective “self-economic determination”, such as that in the Nigerian derivation principle,502 can 
assist in conflict resolution. In other cases of economic exclusion, devolved units should control 
resources that will address perceptions of economic exclusion. In regard to limiting central 
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power, the amount of resources and fiscal power exercised by the devolved units should be 
sufficient to constitute an effective economic counterweigh to the centre.  
Undeniably, the fiscal federalist model, which aims at enhancing equitable sharing of resources, 
is relevant to conflict resolution inasmuch as it addresses perceptions of economic exclusion. 
However, effective economic inclusion may require more than the resources necessary for local 
service delivery. Where sub-state groups are in conflict over control of national resources, 
resources for local service delivery will be grossly insufficient to facilitate effective economic 
inclusion. Furthermore, resources that are adequate only for financing local services and local 
development are insufficient to limit the economic might of the centre. Devolved units that are 
allocated resources which are adequate to facilitate economic inclusion and limiting of central 
power can obviously manage local service delivery; accordingly, there is no conflict in design, 
only variance in the amount of powers and resources that are required. 
5.4 Compatibility in central government design features  
The national level plays an important role for the three purposes. Effective devolved 
development requires supervision of devolved units and cooperation with the national 
government. In regard to conflict resolution, appropriate national design facilitates inclusive 
national decision-making processes which are critical for inclusion. National design also 
enhances the ability of devolved units to influence central-decision making, thus facilitating the 
limiting of central power. However, the respective designs may differ between the three 
purposes.  
For instance, the central territorial representation of decentralised units in terms of territorial 
shared-rule arrangements is not essential for development. Indeed, the World Bank proposes 
that, due to the limited powers of most second chambers, the lower chamber is generally more 
appropriate for representation of local government interests at the national level.503 In federal 
systems, the local level is generally not directly represented in “federal decision-making”. Even 
in South Africa, where the local level is provided for in the “federal chamber”, representation is 
by organised local government, and the representatives have no right to vote on decisions taken 
in the NCOP.504 Indeed, the bulk of local government functions are coordinated with the sectoral 
ministries, which are part of the executive, while “federal decision-making” is normally “hooked” 
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in the legislature. Nevertheless, the federal chamber may exercise powers that can protect and 
safeguard the autonomy of local government units to pursue development.  
Central representation of devolved units is essential for conflict resolution and limiting central 
power. It is only through “federal decision-making” that devolved units can be included in central 
decision-making to enhance the inclusive and collective decision-making so crucial for 
addressing conflict. The representation and participation of devolved units in central decision-
making also offers an opportunity for influencing central decision-making and hence potentially 
limiting central power. The powers exercised by the federal chamber should be relevant to the 
political and economic inclusion of devolved units and other matters that are relevant and of 
mutual concern to the centre and the constituent units.  
5.5 Compatibility in the design of centre-unit relations  
Interaction between the centre and devolved units is important for the three purposes. However, 
the emphasis in the structures and process of interactions creates a potential conflict. While 
supervision of devolved units is important for effective devolved development, the same is not 
encouraged for the other two purposes. Supervision of devolved units can easily be interpreted 
as – or actually be – an avenue for domination by the nationally dominant group in control of 
national government. In regard to limiting central power, supervision may facilitate central 
intrusion in local units and thereby weaken their autonomy. Cooperation, which emphasises 
equality of levels, is, however, complementary to the three purposes. It enhances the autonomy 
and equality of levels, which can form a basis for effective political inclusion, and also enhances 
the political significance of devolved units, which is important for purposes of limiting central 
power. Table 1 provides a summary of the discussions on the design features of development, 
conflict resolution, and limitation of central power. The last column indicates the potential trade-
off for the conflicting design aspects in each of the design features listed in first column.  
 
Table 1: Summary of the design features and trade-offs  
Design 
element 
 
Development Conflict 
resolution 
Limiting central 
power 
The trade-off 
size and 
number of 
units  
 Development 
requires small (but 
economically viable) 
units for effective 
participation and 
responsiveness  
 
 Traditionally 
focuses on 
classical 
federal 
features that 
emphasise few 
and large 
 Effected by 
larger and 
fewer units that 
can stand up to 
the centre  
 
 The “hour-glass” 
structure: large 
but “weak” 
regions and 
strong local 
governments 
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Design 
element 
 
Development Conflict 
resolution 
Limiting central 
power 
The trade-off 
 Development 
cautions against too 
many units, which will 
lead to high 
administrative costs  
regions  
 
 The local level 
plays an 
important role, 
too  
 
(South Africa and 
Indonesia)  
 Eliminating the 
regional level to 
remain with the 
central and local 
level 
(Macedonia)  
 “Hybrid level”: 
creating a new 
level between 
the regional and 
local levels 
(Kenya) 
 
Number of 
levels 
 Avoids multiple levels 
because they often 
lead to lack of clarity 
on functions, 
resulting in 
ineffectiveness 
  
 Emphasises local 
level for enhanced 
service delivery  
 
 Regional level 
addresses 
autonomy 
concerns (in 
some cases) 
 
  Local level for 
service delivery 
to address 
development-
related conflict  
 
 
 A strong 
regional level 
only and local 
government as 
a competence 
of the region  
 A hybrid level 
that performs 
both regional 
and local 
functions 
(Kenya)  
 
 The “hour-glass 
structure” 
(South Africa, 
Indonesia) 
Boundary 
demarcation 
criteria  
 
 Wall-to-wall 
boundary 
demarcation 
focusing on rural/ 
urban divide 
 
 Focuses on 
economic 
functionality  
 
 
 Can either be 
mixed or 
exclusive 
ethnic units  
 
 Asymmetry 
creating 
“special units”  
 
 Exclusive / 
homogenous 
units generally 
tend to be 
more assertive 
against the 
centre than 
mixed ones  
 
 Economic 
viability and 
identity factors 
mixed, e.g. the 
special local 
governments/ 
regions  
Financial 
powers and 
resources  
 Emphasises 
financial powers for 
local 
responsiveness  
 
 Emphasises local 
tax powers in order 
to enhance political 
accountability  
 
 Emphasises 
control of local 
resources for 
“economic self-
determination” 
 
 Emphasises 
spending powers 
as opposed to 
revenue-raising 
power  
 
 Emphasises 
financial power 
for self-
reliance and 
reduced 
dependency 
on the centre  
 Complementary 
“fiscal federalist” 
structure that 
straddles the 
three purposes  
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Design 
element 
 
Development Conflict 
resolution 
Limiting central 
power 
The trade-off 
  
 
Distribution of 
powers and 
functions  
 
 Emphasises 
asymmetry for 
purposes of 
addressing regional 
economic disparities 
and efficiency, e.g. 
urban and rural local 
government 
 Emphasises 
equality of 
powers and 
functions for 
inclusiveness  
 
 Emphasises 
asymmetry in 
some cases 
(Spain – 
Catalonia and 
Basque country/ 
Canada - 
Quebec/UK – 
Scotland)  
 
 Equality of all 
units essential 
in order to 
enhance 
individual and 
collective 
ability to limit 
central power  
Asymmetry of 
powers and 
functions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Central 
structures for 
unit 
representation  
 
 Not essential  Bicameralism  
 
 Inclusive 
national 
executive 
 
  
 Inclusive 
national 
institutions  
 
 Upper chamber 
with legislative 
and review 
power to 
influence 
central 
decisions  
 
 Governmental 
representation 
of units in 
central 
structures 
 
Complementary 
design features  
Unit 
representation 
in central 
decision-
making 
(shared rule) 
 
 Not emphasised 
because focus is on 
local praxis  
 Essential for 
purposes of 
inclusion  
 
 Essential for 
purposes of 
influencing 
central decision-
making  
 
 Complementary 
design feature for 
conflict resolution 
and limiting 
central power but 
neutral for 
development  
 
6. Conclusion  
This chapter examined how different states integrate development, conflict resolution and the 
limitation of central power in the design and implementation of devolved government. An 
analysis of the relationship between the design features and principles of the three purposes 
reveals aspects that are common and complementary, aspects that are neutral, and aspects 
that are potentially or actually in conflict. Thus, states have had to adopt varying structures in an 
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attempt to balance the conflicting design features. In most cases, the most prominent purpose 
determines the main structure, which is modified to provide or serve other purposes. For 
instance, in conflict situations, conflict-resolution design features will lay the basis for devolved 
government while the other purposes will be accommodated as “off-shoots” to the primary 
design of conflict resolution.  
Kenya adopted a new Constitution in 2010 with a devolved system of government composed of 
the national level and 47 county governments as the next and only constitutionally entrenched 
level of government. The 47 county governments can be classified as neither regional nor local 
but as a “hybrid level” between the regional and local levels. The next chapter seeks to establish 
the relevance of the three purposes to the Kenyan design by analysing the country‟s history of 
devolved governance. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
CENTRALISATION, UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 
IN KENYA: A COLONIAL LEGACY  
1. Introduction  
Kenya‟s first contact with formal governance and administrative structures occurred in the 
colonial era when the area forming the territory of present-day Kenya was consolidated and 
brought under British administration. The rules, institutions and structures that were put in place 
have changed through the colonial, independence and post-independence phases. A commonly 
held view is that most of the challenges facing Kenya in terms of governance, development, 
political stability and peace are traceable to colonial policies that were condoned and even 
encouraged in the post-independence period. This chapter analyses the various phases Kenya 
has undergone from its early days of formal administration until the adoption of the current 
Constitution in 2010. At each stage, the chapter evaluates the different laws, policies and 
practices that have shaped Kenya‟s devolved governance.  
The colonial administration is described as centralist, hierarchical and designed for control as 
opposed to participatory and democratic governance. The economic policy pursued by the 
colonial establishment was one of exclusion on the basis of race. This resulted in segregated 
economic development in favour of areas set aside for European settlement. Thus, at 
independence, Kenya inherited a segregated economic structure and administrative and 
government structures meant for centralised control. While the African nationalist movement 
campaigned and agitated for independence on a reform platform, this chapter demonstrates that 
colonial governance and economic structures were left intact, with far-reaching consequences 
for development, ethnic harmony and accountability in the exercise of central powers.  
Areas that were most heavily influence by colonial development, advanced, while others 
untouched by colonial development lagged behind. These economic disparities have led to real 
or perceived economic marginalisation along ethnic lines. Later ethnic conflicts in the post-
colonial era are traceable to perceptions about economic disparities created during the colonial 
period. Colonial government policy, which pursued an ethnic “divide-and-rule” strategy, was also 
left unaddressed after independence. As a result, underdevelopment and poverty, and ethnic 
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and political conflict – along with other factors that continue to pose challenges to post-colonial 
Kenya – have their origins firmly rooted in the colonial era. This chapter seeks to trace these 
issues from the pre-colonial, colonial, independence and post-independence phases. Within 
these four epochs, the issues that defined and shaped Kenya‟s decentralised governance 
policies will be discussed.  
2. The pre-colonial and colonial phase  
2.1 Consolidating the Kenyan territory: the early days  
Before the advent of British rule, the area comprising the territory of present-day Kenya was 
occupied by various ethnic communities in exclusive territories or homelands with “cultural and 
economic significance” to them.1 On the basis of a somewhat arbitrary system of classification 
that leaves certain groups claiming different ethnic identities for themselves, Kenya is said to 
have 42 different ethnic groups.2 The largest of the main groups include the Kikuyu (17.2%), 
who largely occupy the central region of Kenya, the Luhya (13.8%) in the western part of the 
country, the Kalenjin (12.9%) in the Rift Valley region, and the Luo (10.4%), who are also 
located in the western part. Other ethnic communities include the Kamba (Eastern region), 
Somali (North Eastern region), Kisii (Western region), Mijikenda (coastal part), Meru (Lower 
Eastern region), Turkana (North Western part), Maasai (Rift Valley region) and the Teso 
(Western part).3 
Although no political framework existed to bring together these communities, there is evidence 
of barter trade between them4 as well as other economic activities.5 Leadership was simple and 
community-based: “local councils of elders were responsible for the administration of settled 
areas and ensuring that the communal rights of the society were protected”.6 Ojwang adds that 
most communities had “a simple and relatively informal governmental system, localized and 
apparently not designed for a modern state”.7 Arrangements for future British control over the 
                                               
1
 Juma L „Ethnic politics and the constitutional review process in Kenya‟ (2001-2002) 9 Tulsa Journal of Comparative 
and International Law 474.  
2
 Juma (2001-2002) 474.  
3
 Republic of Kenya „2009 Population and housing census results‟ Ministry of State for Planning, National 
Development and Vision 2030 (31 August 2010).  
4
 Ndege PN „Colonialism and its legacies in Kenya‟ (Lecture delivered during Fulbright – Hay Group Project abroad 
programme: 5 July to 6 August 2009 at the Moi University, Main Campus).  
5
 Rogers P „The British and the Kikuyu 1890-1905‟ (1979) 20 (2) The Journal of African History 255.  
6
 Bubba N & Lamba D „Urban management in Kenya‟ (1991) 3 Environment and Urbanization 37; Oyugi (1983) 110.  
7
 Ojwang JB Constitutional Development in Kenya: Institutional Adoption and Social Change (1990) 21.  
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region were secured as early as 1886 through agreements with other colonial powers, but 
“without any reference to the desires or views of the people most likely to be affected”.8  
The British East Africa Association (which later changed into the Imperial British East African 
Company (IBEAC)) was given a royal charter to administer the territory.9 The Charter gave the 
Company powers to appoint commissioners to administer districts, promulgate laws, and 
establish and operate courts of justice.10 As the British Association/Company expanded the 
territory to the hinterland, the chiefs of ethnic communities signed agreements the significance 
of which they and their people seldom understood.11 In June 1895, the British government 
declared protectorate status over the region and took over administration from IBEAC.12 The 
entry of the British government saw fairly rapid steps towards consolidating the territory of 
present-day Kenya.13  
Ogot writes that the British employed violence on a locally unprecedented scale,14 “and with 
unprecedented singleness of mind, to usher Kenya into the twentieth century”.15 Juma adds that 
“the process of acquiring territory through conquests benefited a great deal from the British 
tactics of playing one African group against another and rewarding their supporters with loot, 
mainly cattle, taken from conquered groups”.16 For instance, the Maasai benefited from cattle 
confiscated from neighbouring tribes after joining the British in “punitive expeditions” against 
neighbouring tribes.17  
                                               
8
 Ghai YP & McAuslan JPWB Public law and Political Change in Kenya (1970) 5.  
9
 Ghai & McAuslan (1970) 5.  
10
 Ghai & McAuslan (1970) 8.  
11
 Ghai & McAuslan (1970) 5-6.  
12
 Ghai & McAuslan (1970) 12.  
13
 Ghai & McAuslan (1970)14.  
14
 Ellis D „The Nandi Protest of 1923 in the context of African resistance to colonial rule in Kenya‟ (1976) 17 (4) The 
Journal of African History 558.  
15
 Atieno-Odhiambo ES „The formative years 1945-55‟ in Ogot BA & Ochieng WR (eds) Decolonization and 
Independence in Kenya (1940-93) (1995) xiv.  
16
 Juma (2001-2002) 477.  
17
 Mungeam GH „Masai and Kikuyu responses to the establishment of British Administration in the East Africa 
Protectorate‟ (1970) 11 (1) The Journal of African History 131-132, 136.  
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Map 1: Ethnic distribution in Kenya   
 
  
 
Source: From Roddy Fox, “Bleak Future for Multi-Party Elections in Kenya”, Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 1996 Vol. 34 No. 4 at page 598.  
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2.2 Colonial rule: sowing the seeds of centralisation, underdevelopment and conflict  
2.2.1 Colonial administration policy  
The initial period of colonial rule was used to establish administrative structures and take control 
inland. Completion of the railway from the coast to Lake Victoria in 1902 played a major role in 
opening up the territory.18 In the same year (1902), a new “Order in Council” was passed that 
empowered the Commissioner (the representative of the Crown in a protectorate) “to divide the 
country into provinces and districts for the purpose of administration”.19 The Commissioner 
could also exercise executive, judicial and legislative powers. In addition, regulations were 
passed which gave Provincial Commissioners power to appoint headmen, later referred to as 
chiefs.20 Oyugi explains that the headmen/chiefs “became the major link between the colonial 
authorities and the people”.21 Colonial administrators also carried out judicial and executive 
functions on behalf of the Commissioner. Prior to the formal appointment of individuals as 
headmen/chiefs, leadership in most communities in the territory of Kenya was communal and 
vested in a council of elders who made collective decisions.22 Thus, colonial administrative 
structures replaced a system based on collective decision-making with one in which individuals 
who were appointed to head communities were accountable to colonial authorities.23 
A number of policies were put in place to entrench colonial policy. Fertile areas of the colony 
were set aside for supposedly permanent European settlement.24 While alienation of land 
started from the Central region well before 1900,25 the same applied to other regions of the 
colony, most notably the Rift Valley and Eastern regions.26 Africans were displaced and 
                                               
18
 Ghai & McAuslan (1970) 41. 
19
 Ghai & McAuslan (1970) 41.  
20
 Regulations No. 22 of 1902 (Village Headmen) cited in Ghai & McAuslan (1970) 40; Akivaga et al Local Authorities 
in Kenya (1981) 24-25; Oyugi (1983) 110.  
21
 Oyugi (1983) 110.  
22
 Republic of Kenya „Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Local Authorities in Kenya: A strategy for local 
government reform in Kenya‟ (1995) 5-6.  
23
 Odinga O Not yet Uhuru (1976) 15. 
24
 Kanyinga K „The legacy of the White Highlands: Land rights, ethnicity and the post-2007 elections violence in 
Kenya‟ (2009) 3 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 327. 
25
 Overton J „The origins of the Kikuyu land problem: Land alienation and land use in Kiambu, Kenya, 1895-1920‟ 
(1988) 31 (2) African Studies Review 109-110. He states that “the earliest land alienation in the Kenya Highlands 
began in Kiambu”.  
26
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exclusive ethnic reserves created around the European-settled areas.27 The colonial 
government imposed taxes on Africans, which in turn forced them to come out of their reserves 
and work in white areas.28 Other measures of economic control included prohibition from 
growing cash crops in African areas. 29  
African pressure against colonial rule started building, especially with the return of “enlightened 
Africans” who served in World War I.30 As a response to the rising pressure, the colonial 
government amended the 1912 Native Authority Ordinance to create Local Native Councils in 
(LNCs) in 1924 and encouraged Africans to conduct their political activities through these 
councils.31 As the then Chief Native Commissioner stated, “[I]t was hoped that the [Local Native] 
councils would provide an avenue of expression for the educated natives, a safety-valve to 
check disloyal organizations.”32  
LNCs were not created to give an independent voice to the Africans. Members were appointed 
by the Provincial Commissioners (PCs) and under the control of the District Commissioner 
(DC).33 A new Ordinance was passed in 1937 which retained the LNCs structure but, for the first 
time, introduced elected representatives to the LNCs.34 However, the DC, exercising the powers 
of the PC, could still get rid of “errant” members or bar individuals from seeking elective office to 
the LNCs.35 Administrative units were generally drawn along ethnic boundaries that created 
exclusive ethnic units in the African areas. As Ghai and McAuslan note, “while there was no 
                                               
27
 Leys C „Politics in Kenya: The development of peasant society‟ (1971) 1 (3) British Journal of Political Science 307.   
28
 Kanyinga (2009) 327-328.  
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 Maloba WO „Decolonization: A theoretical perspective‟ in Ogot BA & Ochieng WR (eds) Decolonization and 
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Okoth-Ogendo HWO „The Politics of Constitutional Change in Kenya since Independence, 1963-69‟ (Revised 
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thoroughgoing system of indirect rule, the tribe was generally the unit of administration, and 
inter-tribal contacts were minimal”.36  
Not unexpectedly, the LNCs did not quell rising pressure and political agitation among the 
Africans. As a result, many political parties were formed in the late 1930s and early 1940s 
outside the LNCs. Most of the parties were ethnic-based, with these including the Kikuyu 
Central Association, the Kavirondo Tax Payers Association and others. The ethnic-based 
African representative structures and the colonial policy of pure and exclusive ethnic reserves 
played a major part in the formation of ethnic-based political movements. Indeed, as Karuti 
observes, “[T]hese native reserves laid a firm framework for solidifying ethnicisation of Kenyan 
society. The administration placed solid socio-political boundaries between the various units of 
the native reserves, and thus prevented inter-ethnic political relationships.”37  
The first political party with colony-wide impact was the Kenya African Union (KAU).38 Formed in 
1944, it lasted until 1953 when it was banned for allegedly being a cover for Mau Mau activities, 
a movement that mainly drew its membership from the Kikuyu in the central region and parts of 
Eastern region and which had launched an armed struggle against colonial rule.39 Mau Mau 
activity led to declaration of a state of emergency in 1952, and all political activity was banned in 
the colony. The ban was lifted in 1958, and though political activity was again allowed, it was 
restricted to the “district” level only. The colonial government‟s experience with KAU‟s activities 
played a big role in the decision to ban all national political movements and restrict political 
activity to the district.40  
While the rest of the country was allowed to carry out political activities at the end of the 
emergency rule, Central Kenya, the hotbed for Mau Mau activity, was excluded.41 Ogot 
comments that the exclusion of the Central Province from politics denied “an articulate section 
of the Kenyan population” from participating in politics at a crucial time when African leaders 
were politically organising for independence; this may have slowed down the consolidation of 
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 Ghai & McAuslan (1970) 182.  
37
 Kanyinga (2009) 328.  
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African national political leadership.42 It has been observed that while communities such as the 
Kikuyu may have gained from colonial rule, they also suffered the heaviest under the colonial 
rule through loss of land, forced labour and other negative effects of colonial rule. This may 
have informed the community‟s agitation for independence.43  
Indeed, when colony-wide political activity was allowed, the major political parties at the time 
manifested a fragmented political front. Okoth-Ogendo observes that by 1957 there were “at 
least seven major „district‟ parties in existence, each of which was tribal and led by a tribal 
personality”.44 Many of the African independence leaders served in the LNCs before rising to 
national politics, and some scholars argue that the ethnic-based political structures of the LNCs 
may have influenced the ethno-political style of leadership at independence.45 Thus, as the 
different political leaders geared towards negotiations for independence, they emerged from a 
system based on ethnic mobilisation. Tom Mboya, one of the African nationalists, recalls the 
effect of ethnic-based district parties:  
It was clear that from the outset that these district organizations would be a threat to national 
unity, because we could see district loyalties (since district and tribal boundaries were often 
the same). District chairmen became kings in their own right in their own areas, and this has 
been the major part of our problem of disunity both between KANU and KADU, and 
sometimes inside KANU itself. We have never been able to escape completely from the 
district consciousness which developed during that period.46  
The restriction of political parties to the district level denied the African leaders an opportunity 
for creating a unified national political movement. African leaders arrived at negotiations for 
independence while ethnically fragmented, this by virtue of policies that helped to sustain the 
colonial project. 
2.2.2 Colonial local government  
For a variety of reasons, colonial local government in Kenya did not start out as an independent 
and distinct tier of government. This, as Oyugi argues, is traceable to the absence of a cohesive 
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policy by the British government regarding local government in its colonies.47 The development 
of local government institutions varied from one colony to another and was largely influenced by 
local circumstances.48 In some areas, such as Uganda and Northern Nigeria, the British 
government used indirect rule, while in Kenya the councils of elders were bypassed as the 
colonial administration set up its own structures. 49  
Moreover, colonial local government in Kenya followed the wider colonial policy of separate 
development in which a colony was divided into European-settled areas and African reserves.50 
It is within this setting and colonial administrative structure that local government in Kenya was 
born and developed.51 The first urban areas, Mombasa and Nairobi, grew as a result of the 
railway construction which opened the interior of the country up to Lake Victoria in the Western 
part.52 Town councils were informally established in Mombasa and Nairobi by early 1900. The 
Townships Ordinance was passed in 1903, placing larger urban areas (by then Mombasa and 
Nairobi only) under the Provincial Commissioner.53 As the colonial government structures 
became more elaborate, Nairobi and Mombasa were in 1919 formally declared as town 
councils; in the same year, local committees in other European settled areas were transformed 
into District Advisory Committees.54 In 1928 the Local Government (Municipalities Ordinance) 
was passed, promoting Nairobi, Mombasa and a number of other towns into Municipal Boards. 
However, despite these developments, it was not until the 1950s that councils had African 
representation, given that membership was reserved for Europeans mainly and a minority Asian 
representation.55  
European settlement had occurred in the fertile areas of the colony, and by 1905 European 
districts had been delimited and district associations formed. In the early days of colonial rule, 
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local interests were facilitated mainly through informal associations among the settlers.56 Oyugi 
traces the formal beginnings of local government to 1915, when the Registration of Persons 
Ordinance was passed.57 Parallel advisory committees known as District Committees were 
formed for European areas. These committees were only advisory and were consulted by the 
colonial government on local matters. After 1920, the committees in the European areas “were 
charged ... with the maintenance of access roads in the settled areas”.58  
In African areas, the LNCs were the first formal local government institutions to provide local 
services.59 Before the LNCs were created in 1924, tribal chiefs and headmen appointed under 
the 1902 Ordinance were the only contact between colonial authorities and the communities. 
The colonial administration also created native tribunals which solved disputes using customary 
law.60 The amendment of the 1912 Native Authority Ordinance ushered in the LNCs which, by 
1926, were fully established throughout the country, with the exception of the nomadic areas in 
the northern part of Kenya. 61  
2.2.2.1 European District Councils 1928-1963  
In 1926 a commission appointed by the Governor to look into the extension and establishment 
of local government in the settled areas and upcoming urban areas recommended a racially 
segregated system of local government for European and urban areas.62 It was on the basis of 
this report that the district committees in European areas were made district councils in 1928 
under the District Council Ordinance passed in the same year.63 The Local District Councils 
replaced the 1919 District Advisory Committees. Persons elected were all Europeans, except in 
the Nyanza District Council where an Asian was elected by a community of Asians.64  
The local government system in settled areas remained the same until 1952 when a two-tier 
system based on the English model was adopted for settled areas. County councils were 
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created out of the former district councils. Within these counties, townships urban areas and 
rural (European) districts were to be established. At the upper tier would be the county council, 
with the lower tier being urban or rural councils depending on the area (rural/urban). The 
councils were to exercise separate functions independently.65 This structure remained until 
independence in 1963 when the local government system was unified.  
2.2.2.2 The Local Native Councils 1924 – 1950  
The 1912 Native Authority Ordinance that was amended in 1924 provided for the basic structure 
of the LNCs and their functions. The LNCs were headed by the DC, and the membership of the 
councils included the Assistant DC, headmen who were normally chiefs, and a few other 
persons appointed at the discretion of the PC. While people could elect persons to the LNCs, 
the DC had a final say on who became an LNC member. 66  
Another amendment in 1937 introduced elections to the LNCs, thus making them composed of 
elected and nominated members. However, the PC and DC retained their powers to determine 
who remained in the LNC structures. While the 1937 ordinance brought some clarity to the 
functions of the LNCs, features such as the basic structures of the LNCs and control by the 
Provincial Administration and the colonial Governor were left intact. 67  
The original idea behind LNCs was to give the DC a forum for community consultation in order 
to make his own decisions.68 However, the LNCs were later granted developmental functions 
which they were expected to perform. Developmental functions were first allocated under the 
1937 Amendment Ordinance (Local Native Ordinance 1937); these included public health; 
education; land use; establishment and regulation of markets; provision, regulation and 
maintenance of food and water supplies; and matters such as agriculture and livestock.69 
Despite the varying local conditions and capacities, all LNCs were allocated uniform functions 
which they were expected to perform.70 However, these functions were merely permissive in 
that they could be performed only when the LNCs could afford, or had capacity, to carry out 
such functions and with the authority of the DC.71 Another challenge was the lack of clear 
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separation of functions between the central government and the LNCs, since both performed 
essentially the same functions.72 The central government performed most of the functions, in the 
process paying more attention to European areas, which received the bulk of resources for 
development.73  
Oyugi argues that the colonial attitude towards the development of African areas played a key 
role in determining the actual functions performed by LNCs. He states that “African areas were 
meant to develop as appendages of the white settler economy”.74 LNCs did not develop 
capacity to ensure effective local development in African areas. While there were full councils in 
LNCs which voted on budgets and expenditure, the bulk of expenditure for African areas was 
incurred by central government officials.75 Many expenditure proposals were disallowed by the 
DCs, as the colonial government imposed a policy of conserving surpluses. Colonial records 
show that balances of many LNCs more than doubled between 1929 and 1945.76 
This can be contrasted with the European councils, which not only enjoyed a relatively higher 
autonomy but received, even as late as 1957, 75 percent of national revenue from central 
government grants.77 Oyugi observes that “only one council (Nairobi District Council) by 1946 
had introduced a land rate of 10 percent per acre. The rest refused to do so until 1952.” 78 The 
councils used their autonomy to refuse to raise local revenue, and, with their network of informal 
relationships with the central government, displayed “spoilt child” behaviour in the conduct of 
their affairs.79 The central government carried out most of the development functions and built 
infrastructure in the European settled areas, which led to the councils being “regarded as little 
more than the agents for expenditure of government funds”.80  
Despite the challenges faced by LNCs, Oyugi observes that most of the social services 
infrastructure established in African areas between the years 1925 and 1950 was set up by 
LNCs.81 In areas such as Nyanza, the LNCs established health facilities and also financed many 
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mission schools. In drier areas, dams were built and wells dug.82 With regard to funding, Oyugi 
observes that in the years 1925-1945 local authorities received no direct financial support from 
Central government. This policy was uniform regardless of the financial situation or local context 
of any LNC. The LNCs mainly derived their revenue from poll rates and other fees and 
charges.83 As a result, services such as education and health were more developed in stronger 
LNCs, while areas served by weaker LNCs deteriorated. Some of these historical disparities are 
still visible.84  
2.2.2.3 African District Councils 1950-1963  
Attempts to strengthen the LNCs led to the passing of the 1950 African District Councils 
Ordinance. Apart from the change of name from LNCs to African District Councils (ADCs), the 
Ordinance also introduced significant structural changes. The 1950 Ordinance established the 
ADCs as corporate bodies with separate legal existence, which gave them powers to enter into 
contracts for the performance of functions. Locational Councils formed in some areas as lower 
decentralised levels from 1946 were recognised in the Ordinance. ADCs were legally authorised 
to hire their own staff and set up committees for specific functions. ADCs were also allowed 
under the 1950 Ordinance to form joint committees with neighbouring councils and work in 
areas of common interest. In addition, the ADCs could elect an African deputy chairman, but the 
DC remained an ex officio member and chair of the council.85  
The 1950 Ordinance made a clearer separation of central and local government functions. The 
functions of ADCs included building and maintaining health centres and dispensaries, markets, 
cattle dips, maintaining small roads and primary education. As with the LNCs, the main source 
of revenue for ADCs was the poll rate, a local tax charged on personal income.86 However, in 
1950 “the government agreed to contribute 2 Kenyan shillings for every local rate collected (i.e. 
for every head [that] paid the rate)”.87 The ADCs were able to perform the mandatory services 
using the local and central revenue, although the DC could still disallow any expenditure. A 
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growing demand for services of the ADCs necessitated more funding from the central 
government.88  
Demand for more funds led to the establishment of the Local Government Loans Authority in 
1953 to lend money to local authorities for performance of services.89 Oyugi writes that the fund 
generally benefited ADCs with capacity to repay loans and urban-oriented projects, thus 
excluding many ADCs that were mainly rural-based.90 Indeed, the development plan of 1957-
1960 stated the role of the LGLA as thus:  
In view of the general capital shortage the authorities should adhere to the general priorities 
which are now being followed by the government and only make loans for the undertaking of 
essential economic projects such as water supplies, sewers, drains and roads in urban areas.
91
 
As a result of the above policy, large municipalities and European councils benefited more than 
the ADCs, which served mainly rural areas and a handful townships.92 Without additional 
assistance from central government, it became clear that ADCs could do little in terms of local 
development. By 1958, some ADCs were spending more than 70 percent of council revenue on 
recurrent expenditure on education, much of it going to teachers‟ salaries and equipment.93 
Many ADCs struggled to provide even very basic services such as health and education. Most 
annual reports of the ADCs at the time cited lack of resources as a challenge to effectiveness.94 
While the transformation of local authorities from LNCs to ADCs led to a clearer separation of 
functions and increased local autonomy, resource constraints prevented ADCs from functioning 
effectively. Oyugi concludes that “because the majority of the Councils lacked a sound revenue 
base in the absence of central government assistance, they could not play a meaningful role in 
development”.95 This remained the situation of ADCs until Kenya became independent in 1963.  
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2.3 The failed colonial reforms and the inevitable march to independence  
The colonial policy of exclusion of Africans from political, economic and development matters 
led to wide resentment of the colonial system by Africans. The LNCs that were created to “blunt” 
the rising political pressure from Africans proved inadequate to contain the rising pressure. 
Economic restrictions placed on Africans, such as the ban on growing cash crops, and the 
socio-economic problems created by displacements, racial segregation and poor services in 
African areas, contributed to the anti-colonial feelings among Africans. Loss of land to European 
settlement created a major sense of loss among Africans, whose population was steadily 
rising.96 Colonial policy had ensured that even access to basic services such as housing and 
health, pensions and education were highly unequal and segregated on a racial basis.97 It is in 
this economic and socio-political context that African political parties started being formed. The 
resentment with colonial rule also led to increasing support for activities of the Mau Mau.98  
In a bid to stem growing support for anti-colonial activity, the colonial government made a series 
of attempts to address certain of the challenges facing Africans. The policy of creating 
communal areas of settlement such as native reserves was halted in 1957.99 The colonial 
government also repealed all laws that prohibited the growing of cash crops in African areas.100 
The colonial ministry of agriculture commenced a land consolidation exercise in African areas 
that sought to improve agricultural productivity and ensure economic development of African 
farmers.101 Constitutions adopted in 1954 and 1958 created more African representation within 
the colonial executive and legislative structures. The objective of these reforms, Ogot argues, 
was to “broaden the basis of collaboration at the national level to include Africans within the 
political and economic structures of the colonial society”.102 Ultimately, “these colonial reforms 
were to create a base upon which a collaborative African leadership could emerge and to 
undermine the support of Mau Mau freedom fighters”.103  
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The first African was appointed to the Legislative Council in 1944.104 However, it was not until 
1954 that the Lyttleton Constitution,105 introduced at the height of Mau Mau activity and during a 
state of emergency, formally introduced the principle of multi-racial government.106 Initially, the 
Constitution provided for minority African representation, but this was subsequently increased to 
equal, and then majority, African representation.107 Despite these reforms, African nationalists 
pressed for further reforms, leading to the first constitutional conference and independence talks 
in London in 1960. While the problems faced by Africans contributed to ending colonial rule, 
others have argued that scarcity of land, a paucity of settlers, an unfavourable climate pattern 
and a growing African population were among the real reasons why the British beat a retreat 
from their colonial project in Kenya.108 
3. Ethnic and political tensions at independence  
By as late as 1958, political activity was still restricted to the district level. Regional disparities in 
social and economic development were evident as a result of the colonial development policy. 
The presence of a large number of landless peasants from the Kikuyu ethnic community in the 
Rift Valley, arising from forced displacement109 and crackdown on Mau Mau activities in their 
home region, was a source of tension. Anderson observes that the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic 
communities had “taken earlier and lasting advantage of the opportunities of colonialism.”110 
These opportunities provided by “colonial settlement and investment” relative to other areas 
untouched by the colonial economy.111 Official anti-Mau Mau propaganda had also served to 
demonise the Kikuyu and further fuel fear and hatred by other communities.112 Other regions 
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were less developed, and their leaders “were much smaller and more vulnerable at the national 
level”.113  
Ethnic polarisation was manifest as the larger, and economically and politically dominant, ethnic 
groups came together under the Kenya African National Union (KANU) while smaller 
communities coalesced under the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU).114 As Africans 
prepared for independence, the opposing views of the two political parties came to represent 
ethnic tensions in wider society, tensions which originated in part in the colonial government‟s 
“divide-and-rule” strategy. Yet, while the main political tension lay between, on the one hand, 
the larger and more dominant tribes and, on the other, the smaller and vulnerable ones, there 
were other sources of tension, too.  
The Somalis in the North Eastern part of the country wanted to secede and join Somalia, which 
had just gained independence in 1960. The region boycotted the 1963 independence elections 
to demonstrate the seriousness of its bid to secede.115 Indeed, a participant in the independence 
talks argued that holding on to the region would provoke a war involving Somalia and 
Ethiopia.116 It would later take military intervention to quell secessionist activity in the NFD.  
Similarly, Arabs in the coastal region wished to have no part in an independent Kenyan republic, 
basing their claim to secession on an agreement formed between the Sultan of Zanzibar and 
the British government. Through their political party,117 representatives argued that if the Sultan 
were to relinquish his claims over the region, the latter should be a self-governing territory and 
that any arrangements involving it falling under the control of an independent Kenya should be 
concluded only through consultation with the coastal peoples.118 However, African groups in the 
region opposed this stance out of fear of Arab dominance;119 by the same token, the coastal 
Arabs were driven by “fears of economic domination by the „up-country peoples‟, who had 
already formed the bulk of the labour force in the colonial period.”120  
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3.1 The land question: „the elephant in the room‟  
Of all the issues underlying the political tension at independence, the most explosive was the 
land issue. Indeed, it has been noted that “land and land shortage lie at the centre of Kenyan 
political history throughout the colonial period and beyond”.121 Land alienation created “a keen 
sense of loss” among Africans that not even the colonial reforms could assuage.122 At 
independence, the land issue was a source of tension as different leaders sought to assure the 
interests of their respective ethnic communities. Kalenjin leaders in the Rift Valley feared that a 
Luo-Kikuyu-dominated government would settle the Kikuyu in the Rift Valley and disregard the 
Kalenjin‟s ethno-territorial claims to the region. Thus, Kalenjin leaders called for resolution of the 
land question.123 The leaders from the Rift Valley called for the restoration of their original land 
rights; in essence, they argued for ethnically exclusive pre-colonial spheres124 and even made a 
declaration to evict “foreigners” from their home district.125  
 
3.2 The centralisation versus regionalism debate  
The political debate about the structure of government pitted the two main parties, KANU and 
KADU, against each other, which reflected the group and ethnic tensions described above. 
KADU, which drew the majority of its members from the Rift Valley, coastal region and the 
Western parts, argued for strong regional governments. During the second talks at the 
Lancaster House constitutional conference, KADU explained its reason for supporting regional 
governments:  
 Because of regional and group differences and imbalances, there was a genuine danger of 
discrimination and conflict between the different regions and groups. „Domination by a political party, 
or personality, group or tribe must be prevented in order to protect the political rights of and 
fundamental freedoms of the individual and to insure the independence of the judiciary‟. To achieve 
these aims, it was necessary to decentralize state power. They therefore proposed the creation of six 
regional authorities with legislative and administrative powers. They also proposed the establishment 
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of a bicameral system, with the federal parliament consisting of a lower house elected on a national 
basis and an upper house elected by the regional assemblies voting as electoral colleges, both 
houses having substantially equal powers.
126
  
Probed further on their submissions, the KADU leader explained: “[T]here should be 
decentralization of power. Such decentralization must be to authorities which can implement 
and execute their responsibilities without depending on Central government aid, either 
financially or in any other way.”127 The regional system of government advocated by KADU 
became known as Majimbo,128 a name later associated with the regional governments created 
by the independence constitution.  
While fear of dominance by majority ethnic groups was the driving force for the demand for 
regionalism, other reasons have been advanced to explain KADU‟s position. Sanger and 
Nottingham trace regionalism to 1954 when the Federal Independence Party, a settler party, 
was formed to champion Kenyan independence with an exclusive white region129 and an older 
aspiration to establish a white island the size of Wales.130 Another explanation is that KADU had 
hoped, with the support of European and Asian communities, to form the independence 
government.131 It has also been argued that fears of expropriation of property by the KANU 
government led European and Asian communities to support KADU‟s regionalist agenda.132 
Maxon however dismisses these claims saying that while there were marginal links between 
KADU and the settler political parties during the discussions on majimbo, KADU‟s agenda was 
mainly driven by minority fears of political domination by the larger ethnic groups, as opposed to 
settler interests.133 
Contrary to KADU‟s position, KANU supported a strong centralist state with a system of strong 
individual rights protection.134 This was so because regionalism would jeopardise the Kikuyu 
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who had moved to and settled in other regions of the country; it would also affect the Luo, who 
dominated the skilled labour market in various sectors across of the country.135  
Although not all of its proposals were adopted, the KADU side won, seeing as the 
Independence Constitution adopted regional governments with extensive powers and 
functions.136 The independence elections held in 1963 were largely interpreted as a policy 
contest between KADU regionalists versus KANU unitarists. Okoth-Ogendo observes that 
KANU “treated the May election of 1963 as a referendum on regionalism” and KADU‟s defeat as 
a defeat of regionalism.137 During the campaigns, KANU leaders did not hide their views, saying 
openly that KANU had no intention of implementing the regional system and had only agreed to 
the structure in order to attain independence.138 KANU‟s victory in the 1963 elections was, as 
Anderson writes, “a victory for nation over region and for nation over tribe”.139  
However, while KANU recorded a landslide win in the May 1963 elections,140 KADU won in 
regions that supported the calls for regionalism, notably the Rift Valley and the Coastal regions. 
The elections were held under the Constitution agreed to in 1962 Lancaster Conference. It 
provided for a bicameral national legislature and regional legislatures, and in the House of 
Representatives, KANU won 72 seats and KADU, 32.141 The Senate was divided equally: 20 for 
KANU and 21 for KADU. The six regions were also equally divided, with KADU controlling the 
Western, Rift Valley and Coast regions while KANU won majorities in Nyanza, Rift Valley and 
Eastern Regions.142 The defeat of KADU in the 1963 elections symbolically marked the end of 
regionalism in Kenya‟s political and constitutional future.143 
3.3 The „Majimbo‟ system  
Kenya attained independence with a Constitution that provided for a regional system of 
government (majimbo).144 With the regional government system, Ghai and McAuslan note, “the 
unitary character of Kenya‟s government, which had persisted throughout its colonial history, 
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was discarded towards its end”.145 The Independence Constitution divided the country into 
seven regions, including Nairobi.146 The regional boundaries were similar to the provincial 
boundaries of the colonial PA (that is, drawn along ethnic lines), albeit with minor alterations.147 
Regional boundaries could be altered only with the consent of the affected regional government 
and upon a resolution of both chambers of the national legislature.148  
The regional governments were composed of elected members empowered to elect a regional 
president and vice-president.149 The regional executive powers rested in the Finance and 
Establishments Committee, which was empowered to create administrative structures to deal 
with an array of functions and responsibilities, including taxing powers.150 Committees elected 
by the regional assemblies could assist the Finance and Establishments Committee to carry out 
various executive functions.151 Regional assemblies had wide and exclusive legislative functions 
and some shared legislative competences.152 Former PCs in the colonial administration were 
renamed Civil Secretaries and were to operate as chief executive officers at the regional level. 
They were to be in charge of the regional public service and were not under the control of the 
national public service.153  
3.3.1 Allocation of powers and functions between the centre and regions  
Ghai and McAuslan argue that distrust between KADU and KANU led to a detailed scheme of 
division of power between the centre and the regions.154 However, this also made the division of 
powers “complex, elaborate and confusing”.155 The powers and functions were listed in the 
schedules and divided into three main parts: matters of exclusive legislative competence of 
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regions,156 matters of concurrent competence for the regions and the national parliament157 and 
matters to which executive authority of regions extended but which were not within the 
legislative competence of the regional assemblies.158 Validly passed national legislation could 
prevail over regional legislation and residual legislative power was vested in the national 
parliament.159  
Ghai and McAuslan argue that some of the matters listed as concurrent between the two levels 
overlapped with the exclusive regional powers and this had a potential to negate the allocation 
of separate functions.160 Indeed, functions in key areas such as education, agriculture and 
planning were divided between the regions and the centre.161 Furthermore, the scheduled 
functions were not specially entrenched in the Constitution162 and could thus be easily 
amended. Indeed, the scheduled functions were the first to be “assaulted” by the KANU 
government, leaving the regions as empty shells with no substantive functions.163  
Local government was within the competence of regions, with a basic structure provided for in 
the Constitution.164 Regional assemblies had extensive powers over local government, which 
included powers to constitute Local Authorities (LAs), divide LAs and create new local electoral 
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areas.165 The regions had powers to dissolve LAs or remove councillors for maladministration.166 
The regional assemblies also had powers to legislate on revenue functions and transfers to 
local governments within their respective regions.167  
While Ghai and McAuslan argue that the regional executive powers were fluidly designed, 
dispersed, and could not lead to strong regional governments,168 Maxon differs with this view 
and says that they “fail to prove the alleged unworkability of the majimbo Constitution”.169 He 
adds that Ghai and McAuslan‟s criticism of the regional system creates a perception that the 
drafters170 of the majimbo Constitution were “incompetent or sloppy in their work” and he says 
that such a view is “hardly credible”.171 Maxon does not counter Ghai and McAuslan‟s 
assessment of the regional system with a detailed analysis of the majimbo system to show its 
particular strengths. However, the fact that the regional system was dismantled shortly after 
being adopted means that its practical effectiveness will remain a mystery. Furthermore, the 
lack of political will by the KANU government to implement the system also meant that 
regardless of the solidness of the framework, the regional system could still have become 
ineffective as a result of frustration by a hostile central government.  
3.3.2 Central-regional relations: supervision and intervention in regions  
A number of controls, subject to the necessary safeguards, were put in place through which the 
central government could intervene in regional governments. Parliament could decide, with a 65 
percent vote in both the Senate and the National Assembly that the executive authority of a 
region was being used to impede or prejudice the exercise of executive authority of the 
government of Kenya, or was being used in contravention of an applicable national law.172 
Parliament could take up the legislative powers of that region and make laws for it on any 
matter.173  
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The national government could issue directions to a regional assembly as it deemed necessary 
in order to ensure that regions did not contravene applicable national laws or impede exercise of 
executive authority of the central government. The central government could bypass the 
Regional Assemblies and directly address regional administrators or regional departments if 
“reasonably satisfied that such a course was necessary to avert a serious threat to the public 
welfare caused by an outbreak of a disease or other calamity”.174 Furthermore, during 
emergencies, the central government could assume all regional functions.  
3.3.3 Powers of the Senate in the Independence Constitution  
A second chamber was created for the national legislature. KADU had initially demanded a 
senate with five members from each region nominated by the regional assemblies as well as 
equal legislative powers for both the senate and the national assembly, with a joint committee to 
mediate differences. KADU had also demanded that the cabinet be elected by both houses 
through a joint sitting, and the Senate was to play a crucial role in all constitutional 
amendments. Most of these proposals were rejected.175  
The Constitution provided for direct election of senators from 40 districts and Nairobi area, 41 in 
total.176 The 40 Senate constituencies were based on the colonial administrative districts, with 
slight boundary alterations which ensured that no district crossed a regional boundary in 
accordance with recommendations of a 1962 regional boundaries commission report.177 Ghai 
and McAuslan argue that the revision of the district boundaries made the “Senate constituencies 
more tribally homogeneous” and essentially provided for (though not perfectly) the 
representation of tribes in the Senate.178 The Senate constituencies are further noted to have 
given an electoral advantage to KADU by “giving greater representation to less populated rural 
and pastoral areas where regionalism was supported”. KANU‟s areas of support, mainly the 
Kikuyu and Luo, “were in smaller, densely populated areas around Mt. Kenya and Lake 
Victoria”.179 Proctor adds that this composition in essence enabled stronger representation of 
minority ethnic communities in the Senate.180  
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The Senate had limited powers compared to the House of Representatives (lower house). A 
money Bill could not originate in the Senate.181 Furthermore, if a money Bill was not passed by 
the Senate without amendment, the Governor General (the representative of the Queen, who 
was head of State in Kenya under the Independence Constitution) could still assent it into law 
after one month.182 The Senate could only delay the passing of such a Bill for two months, 
pending determination by the courts as to whether the Bill qualifies as a financial Bill or not. In 
the case of Bills other than financial legislation, the Senate could delay their passing for up to 
one year.183  
The Senate had considerable power with regard to declaration of emergency. Such a 
declaration could hold only after garnering 65 percent support in both chambers. Ghai and 
McAuslan identify this as an important function, given that the declaration of emergency had an 
effect of suspending regional governments.184 Indeed, the Senate used its power to delay 
approval of the use of emergency power to quell secessionist conflict in the NFD Somali 
region,185 much to the chagrin of the Kenyatta government.186 Furthermore, a constitutional 
amendment could go through only if the Senate approved it with a 65 percent vote.187 The 
constitution also provided for specially entrenched powers for the Senate with regard to 
amendments on Senate elections, powers of Senate, regional government structure and 
financial powers of regions and alteration of regional boundaries.188 Others included 
fundamental rights, citizenship, the judiciary and transactions on tribal lands.189 
The brief period of the Senate‟s existence was characterised by suspicion and mistrust about its 
role.190 No ministers were appointed from the Senate, and at the national level this weakened its 
political and institutional significance relative to the House of Representatives.191 Furthermore, 
all senior politicians opted to vie for seats in the House of Representatives, leaving “low-calibre” 
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candidates for the Senate.192 While KADU maintained that the Senate should protect regional 
interests, KANU Senators argued that “it was altogether improper for Senators to act as regional 
representatives”.193 Furthermore, party loyalty and party interests prevailed over other issues 
and was indeed the main basis of Senate decisions.194 The non-entrenchment of the functions 
of the regions made it difficult for the Senate to safeguard regional autonomy195 as “the 
substance of the regional system itself was severely reduced”.196 Proctor concludes that the 
ability of the Senate to curb executive power was generally limited and that the Senate played 
an insignificant role in this respect.197 
3.4 „Caught in the cross-fire‟: local government at independence  
Inevitably the local government system found itself at the centre of the tussle between KANU 
and KADU. This manifested itself in the competition between regions and the central 
government for the control of LAs. However, the conflict over local authorities was preceded by 
unanimous calls to do away with the racially segregated system of local government from the 
colonial period. Thus, immediately after the second Lancaster conference constitutional talks, 
the transitional government (composed of both KANU and KADU) formed a commission in 1962 
to study the local government system and recommend changes. The commission‟s 
recommendations resulted in the Local Government Regulations of 1963, which later formed the 
basis of the Local Government Act enacted in 1977.198  
The colonial segregated system of local government was unified and reorganised to create two 
major types of local government; county councils and municipal councils. The former European 
District councils were dissolved and county councils created, which coincided with 
administrative district boundaries.199 In the African areas, the ADCs were similarly dissolved and 
replaced with county councils, which likewise coincided with administrative district 
boundaries.200 Municipal councils were also created for urban areas: 39 county councils and 
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seven municipal councils were formed at independence.201 In addition, the 1963 Regulations 
provided for the creation of urban councils to operate in small towns under county councils and 
local councils to operate in rural areas. Local councils were a collection of administrative 
locations, the unit below administrative districts. The county councils essentially continued the 
same functions that were carried out by the African District Councils during the colonial era.202 
These included primary education, health services, road construction and maintenance, 
maintenance of market places and slaughter houses. Among the other functions were water 
supply and sanitation services, mainly in urban centres within county council areas.203  
In terms of the regulation of local authorities, the Independence Constitution devolved 
substantial powers over local authorities to the regions. The regions were empowered to 
establish local authorities and demarcate local government boundaries.204 Regional authorities 
could determine the revenue sources for local governments.205 The regional governments could 
also allocate functions to local governments. Additionally, the regional governments could 
dissolve local governments.206 However, most of these powers and functions never got to be 
exercised due to political differences between KADU and KANU about the role of regions in 
local governance.  
After the KANU and KADU coalition government was dissolved in 1963 and KANU took over 
control of central government, “the central government behaved as if regions did not exist”.207 
Thus, instead of letting regions take over their regulatory role over local governments, the 
central government opted to use the PA to undermine the authority of regions over local 
governments. The District Commissioners (DCs), who were supposed to be agents of regional 
governments under the independence constitution, were deployed as central government 
nominees in the county councils.208 While the stated role of the DCs was to act as points of 
liaison between the Ministry of Local Government and the LAs, the DCs were actually meant to 
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keep the local authorities in check on behalf of the central government. The KANU government 
feared that KADU could use local authorities to advance the regional-government agenda.209 
The central government refused to abolish the national ministry of local government and transfer 
the regulatory functions to regions, as recommended by the preparatory commission which had 
completed the unification of the segregated local government system.210 The Ministry instead 
issued circulars and legal notices that required local governments to be accountable to the 
Ministry instead of their respective regional governments. The legal notices directed councils to 
submit budgetary estimates to the ministry, instead of regions, for approval. Regions were only 
to be served copies and had no role in approval of expenditure. The local government ministry 
officials posted to local authorities monitored the expenditure of local authorities and ensured 
strict adherence to central government financial guidelines.211  
Furthermore, local councils were run during the transitional period as “winding-up commissions” 
headed by the DCs. This, Oyugi argues, denied local governments “political spokesmen who 
could have joined the regional political leaders in urging the centre to surrender to them what 
was „lawfully‟ theirs according to the then-existing constitution”.212 However, even under the 
colonial era, local governments never really achieved any political significance beyond delivery 
of basic services. A report observes that “even where a strong system of local government was 
established, its functions were mostly administrative and regulatory”.213 It is thus not a surprise 
that local government remained politically invisible in the period of political contestation between 
the regions and the centre.  
Local authorities were a subject of political contestation between the regions (through KADU) 
and the centre (through KANU), with the latter winning the contest. The local government 
system found itself once again under strong control by central government powers as it had in 
the colonial order. Writing in 1993, Oyugi concluded that “the structures and patterns of 
relationships emerging after the struggles of 1962-4 have, by and large, remained in 
operation.”214  
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4. (Re) centralisation and personalisation of power after independence  
The KANU victory at the independence elections in June 1963 dealt a major blow to KADU and 
the regional system. True to its word, KANU frustrated all efforts to establish viable regional 
governments. This was first done by denying them resources and secretariats.215 Branch writes 
that “by July 1964, the bank accounts of the regional assemblies were empty”.216 Totally 
weakened by defections to KANU, which was consolidating its power, KADU was formally 
dissolved in November 1964, thereby making Kenya a de facto one party state.217 The British 
government, through its new Kenyan Governor, Malcolm MacDonald, made it clear that the 
regional system of government would be implemented as agreed in the Lancaster talks but that 
the entire process was now in the hands of the KANU government.218  
With KADU out of the way and there being no strong or visible opposition to centralisation, the 
KANU government commenced a process of dismantling the regional system of government. 
After frustrating the “young” regions, quick and carefully crafted constitutional amendments were 
made which gradually weakened and, in 1968, finally abolished the regional governments.219 
However, the constitutional amendments not only recentralised powers but also had the effect 
of consolidating powers in the President. Under the powerful presidency, the PA, with which the 
central government had maintained a close relationship throughout the transitional period, was 
expanded in the post-independence period at the expense of local authorities. 
4.1 Dismantling of „majimbo‟ and the entrenchment of personal rule  
President Jomo Kenyatta, in a speech to the House of Representatives in August 1964, 
announced proposed constitutional amendments that affected regions. He stated that regions 
should not have exclusive powers in respect of matters requiring national planning, such as 
health, education and agriculture. Regional public services, police and other regional 
departments were to be transferred back to the centre. A Bill was drafted to effect the proposed 
changes.220 Substantive powers of the regions not constitutionally entrenched were deleted 
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through the amendment; regional police and public service were abolished. The amendment 
also removed provisions that guaranteed financial and fiscal independence of regional units.221  
An amendment Act of 1965 changed the names of the regions and assemblies to Provinces and 
Councils, a move seen as emphasising their inferior status.222 The amendment also removed 
the constitutional protection of regional boundaries.223 Another amendment abolished the 
bicameral national legislature, establishing a unicameral house.224 Parliamentary constituency 
boundaries were revised, which created constituencies for senators who became members of 
the unicameral house.225 The last amendment that abolished the regional system was made in 
1968.226 The amendment, Muigai notes, “abolished the Provincial Councils and deleted from the 
Constitution all references to the provincial and district boundaries and alteration thereof, 
thereby removing the last vestiges of regionalism”.227 The dismantling of regions in essence 
removed centres for political competition that could challenge the president‟s power and rule.  
The Independence Constitution had created a dominion state with a prime minister as head of 
government and the Queen, represented by the Governor General, as head of state.228 
However, these two positions were merged by the 1964 amendments and vested in the 
President.229 As a result, the President became the head of state and head of government, and 
a full member of the National Assembly. The President had no legal obligation to consult any 
person or institution in the exercise of both sovereign powers and duties as head of 
government.230 For instance, while it was intended that the Queen could dissolve Parliament at 
the advice of the prime minister, the new amendment provided that the president could dissolve 
parliament at any time.231  
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The dismantling of regions and consolidation of powers in the President created a powerful 
presidential system. Indeed, Ogot argues, there were two transfers of power in this period: the 
first from the British government to the African nationalists in 1963, and the second from the 
nationalists, via Parliament, to Kenyatta.232 He writes that “right from 1964 Kenya‟s nationalists 
in parliament, for whatever reasons, would concede considerable political power to the 
president in a quick succession of constitutional amendments” with no serious discussion or 
challenge.233 Constitutional provisions that barred the Senate from introducing money Bills were 
retained in the Constitution but applied against the unicameral legislature.234 Money Bills or 
amendments thereto could be introduced only at the recommendation of the president.235  
One may wonder how it was that the ethnic-based grievances about land and the secessionist 
demands threatening the foundations of the Kenyan state during independence negotiations 
came to fizzle out; indeed, these grievances were not (re)awakened by the dismantling of 
regions and centralisation of political powers. Sanger and Nottingham observe that “there were 
still several thousands of Mau Mau fighters from the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru communities in 
the forests, who had sworn to remain there until all chances of a KADU victory had vanished 
and the claims of the true fighters for freedom had been recognised”.236 A number of reasons 
have been advanced to explain this situation.  
The land issue was one of the most sensitive factors that the independence government had to 
deal with immediately upon assuming office. Indeed, the land question infiltrated the debate on 
regionalism versus centralisation. Decolonisation had triggered debates on majimboism and a 
return to pre-colonial settlement patterns.237 While the ethnic tensions in the Rift Valley were 
due to the presence of a large number of landless Kikuyus among landless Kalenjin 
communities, the government had to reassure settler farmers, in whose hands the economy 
lay,238 that there would be no invasions. Of all the affected ethnic groups, the Kikuyu were the 
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most militant, with groups such as Mau Mau and Kenya Land Freedom Army threatening to 
regroup and forcefully take over white-owned farms.239 Keen to forestall an economic crisis, the 
Kenyatta government prioritised resettlement of Kikuyus to gain the confidence of settlers.240  
In order to appease the Kikuyu and deal with the anxiety of the white farmers, the government 
decided to carve off a part of the Rift Valley Province (Kinangop area) and move it to the Central 
region, the home of the Kikuyu.241 However, regardless of the government‟s intentions, this 
action did not go down well with the Kalenjin community, who interpreted it as government 
preference of Kikuyu interests over theirs.242 Kanyinga notes that “the new administration under 
President Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, pushed aside demands for the „sanctity of tribal lands‟ or territorial 
spheres that KADU vehemently argued for”.243 Indeed, Kalenjin communities, specifically the 
Nandi, suffered the greatest loss of their communal territories through gradual and systematic 
alienation to create areas for European settlement.244  
With the dissolution of KADU in 1964, its key members, representing the ethnic communities in 
the Rift Valley, were incorporated into the KANU government and given cabinet posts.245 This 
included Daniel Moi, the influential Kalenjin leader who would later succeed Jomo Kenyatta as 
president in 1978. KANU rule saw more of the people, mainly from the Central Province, 
resettled in the Rift Valley. Anderson and Lochery comment that “many Kalenjin came to believe 
that Kikuyu immigration to the Rift Valley was the price Moi paid for being made vice-president 
under Kenyatta”.246 Competing claims among the Kalenjin sub-tribes also prevented the Kalenjin 
land claims from solidifying any further.247  
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More importantly, KANU had, in its pursuit of “Africanisation policy” in the white highlands and 
overall economic stability of the largely agricultural independence economy, allocated huge 
tracts of land to the upcoming African elite, one which cut across ethnic groups.248 Top KADU 
leaders were beneficiaries of these allocations, and were thus unable to articulate the position of 
their ethnic communities in the Rift Valley as they did before independence. A few of the former 
KADU leaders who dared to speak for the land interests of their communities in the Rift Valley 
were arrested and charged with incitement.249  
While the Kalenjin leaders softened their stance on ancestral claims for land in the Rift Valley, 
the land issue did not vanish but reappeared during elections in subsequent years. Specifically, 
and as will be seen in the next chapter, the introduction of multi-party politics in the country in 
1992 coincided with the rise of politically-instigated ethnic land-clashes in the Rift Valley.250 The 
issue of land kept resurfacing during political activities and events such as the constitutional 
review process, elections, national referenda and other political processes. The worst violence 
in the region was experienced in the 2007 presidential elections: while the presidential election 
results were the immediate trigger for it, the central issue in the 2007/2008 violence was land.251 
With regard to the issue of coastal secession, Jomo Kenyatta signed an agreement on behalf of 
the Kenya government with the Sultan of Zanzibar and the British government that the coastal 
region would be under the new Kenya Republic. However, the government was to guarantee 
the continuity of practices such as Islamic courts on issues of personal law.252 Furthermore, the 
region was faced with “party factionalism” and, as opposition by African groups to the secession 
agenda weakened, the self-determination claim died out.253 In the case of the NFD Somali 
region, Parliament approved the use of emergency rules and regulations allowing security 
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forces to enter the region and violently suppress the secessionist movement.254 However, it has 
also been claimed that Kenya remained peaceful because it maintained high military discipline 
inherited from the colonial days. Indeed, events such as military takeovers – rampant elsewhere 
in the region – were unheard of in Kenya.255  
It has also been noted that, apart from these issues, the Majimbo Constitution was 
“embarrassingly complicated”256 and proved difficult to implement even for those who were 
promoting it. This made it easy for the newly independent government to dismantle the regional 
system of government without much resistance.257 However, Maxon has criticised those who 
attribute the dismantling of the majimbo to its purported complexity.258 He argues that they 
ignore the KANU government‟s main concern which was that “the constitution gave more power 
to the regional assemblies than the party controlling the central government would 
countenance”.259 However, what is clear is that the real autonomy of the regions or 
effectiveness of the framework was never tested and there was no political will by the 
independence government to facilitate it.     
4.1.1 The strengthening of the Provincial Administration and the weakening of local 
authorities  
After the dismantling of regions and consolidation of powers, the KANU government still had the 
task of delivering on its campaign promises. These included addressing socio-economic 
problems and economic disparities created by the colonial regime: proper education, health-
care systems and equitable development in order to combat “ignorance, poverty and disease”. 
The state had to organise its state machinery for service delivery and development. The 
Provincial Administration (PA) was the preferred institution in terms of development planning 
and implementation. Local authorities were subordinated to the bureaucracy of the PA, denied 
resources, stripped of essential functions, and rendered irrelevant.260  
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Gertzel writes that “the Central Government was able throughout 1964 to maintain sufficient 
overall control to prevent any real disintegration of the administrative machine”.261 Indeed, the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, in whose docket the PA was as at independence, had earlier written a 
circular to Provincial Commissioners (PCs), the regional administrators (renamed as Civil 
Secretaries in the regional governments), to maintain more direct communication with the 
Ministry in the interest of better coordination.262 Another circular directed that lower 
administrators would be under the administration of the Ministry and only seconded to 
regions.263 These directives went against the Independence Constitution, which provided that 
regional administrators were to be heads of the regional public service and under their 
respective regional governments.264 However, the Kenyatta government had shown clear 
preference for the PA over the regional governments and sought to entrench the PA system in 
the state‟s organisational machinery for development.  
In yet another clear demonstration of the government‟s intention with regard to the PA, the 
coordination of the PA was transferred to the Office of the President. This step was welcomed 
by the administrators as it gave them personal access to the President.265 It was also a welcome 
relief to the PA officials as the regional governments, under which they were to serve, were 
struggling after being denied resources and capacity by the centre.266 Furthermore, the 
administrators had dealt directly with the centre during the colonial era and were relieved that 
the arrangement had been restored. 267  
The transfer of the PA to the Office of the President also made the administrators 
representatives of the President in their areas.268 However, this role was not well received by 
politicians, who believed that elected representatives, and not administrators, were the 
appropriate link between the people and the president, himself a politician.269 The role of the PA 
would expand even further to include matters such as coordinating development, security and 
essentially all government functions at the regional and local levels. The PA had clearly become 
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the link between the executive and the people.270 Motions were introduced in both houses of 
parliament at different times to curb the growing political role of the PA, a role that was 
undermining politicians.271 
However, while the President sidestepped politicians in favour of the PA, it later became 
apparent to the administrators that they would not enjoy the same discretion to exercise powers 
as their colonial counterparts once had. Instead, they got their instructions from the President.272 
Gertzel observes that “it was possible during 1965 to detect a sense of frustration among many 
administrators who felt that they ought indeed to be consulted more often before policies that 
they would be required to implement were decided upon”.273 This shift in the power balance 
between the top leadership of the PA vis-a-vis the national executive in the colonial and post-
independence periods was an indication of creeping personal rule. Kenyatta‟s preference of the 
PA over the party was unique arrangement since the political party was used in other states to 
entrench personal rule.274 Gertzel attributes this to organisational problems within KANU, the 
strong relationship between the PA and the national executive in the short period of existence of 
regional governments, and the general lack of a constitutional basis for a one-party state.275  
4.1.2 Provincial Administration as a planning and development agency  
Before delving into the developmental functions of the PA, it is important to understand the 
origins and functions of the PA. Established in the early days of colonial rule, the PA was the 
main institution was used for control and administration of the colony.276 From its early days the 
PA reflected a centralised and hierarchical structure. In the early days of colonial rule, when 
there were no elaborate state structures, the duties and functions of the British government at 
the local level were lumped together and placed on the shoulders of administrators. Thus, 
colonial administrative officers administered tax collection, acted as magistrates, supervised 
local authorities and presided over security matters of the colonial government.277 Gertzel 
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describes the colonial PA as “a powerful, sophisticated, and centralised machine through which 
the Governor administered by direct rule.”278 The PA was significantly expanded during the 
emergency period (1952-57) when the colonial government used the PA to rout the Mau Mau 
rebellion. While some adjustments were made to the structure, role and functions of the PA in 
the post-independence period, the structure has basically remained the same.  
The structure of the PA is fairly simple. It was composed of Provinces, Districts, Divisions, 
Locations and Sub-locations. A uniform structure is maintained throughout the country, although 
with varying conditions.279 The PA was used for organising government activities, especially in 
the rural areas, and core ministries such as Agriculture were organised in accordance with the 
PA structures.280 The PA was under the Office of the President, specifically under the 
Permanent Secretary, Provincial Administration and National Security.281 The President 
appointed the Provincial Commissioners (PCs), District Commissioners (DCs) and other senior 
PA staff. The DCs in turn supervised government work, including that of ministries at the district 
level. Below the district level, the District Officers, chiefs and sub-chiefs represent the PA and 
supervised government work at that level.282 There was an informal arrangement under which 
village headmen were either appointed or elected to assist the sub-chief and chief in organising 
and coordinating government work at the village level.283 
The developmental role that the PA took up after independence can be understood only in the 
context of the economic and development policies and plans that the independence government 
pursued. Despite early reforms in the early stages of independence, such as deracialisation of 
the white highlands and halting the policies of segregation of the economy, inequalities and 
socio-economic challenges persisted. In order to address this challenge, the Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Development came up with a policy dubbed “African Socialism and its 
Application to planning in Kenya”.284 
In the policy, the government laid out its development agenda and the way in which it intended 
to address the challenges at independence. Noting huge inequalities and the need to ensure 
that more Africans participated in the economy, the policy committed the government to an 
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“Africanisation” policy that would ensure more Africans participated in economic development 
and government service.285 Although the policy did not expressly provide so, all subsequent 
development plans were aligned with the PA system.286 The PA was thus institutionalised as the 
agent for national and local development.287  
The Planning Ministry issued institutional plans in March 1966 to implement the development 
agenda and proposed to have “Provincial Planning Officers” based at the Provincial 
Headquarters.288 The plans also included Provincial Development Committees with Provincial 
Commissioners as chairmen of these committees and Provincial Heads of departments of 
relevant ministries as members.289 These committees were mandated with coordinating the 
development agenda in the province and ensure that the national development plans were 
achieved. The Ministry also proposed the same structure for all districts, with the DC as 
chairman of the District Development Committee and responsible for supervising development 
functions at the district level.290 While administrators were recognised as “leaders in 
development”, the Ministry retained overall coordination and authority on development.291 
 
In addition, the Ministry proposed the formation of advisory committees, also headed by PCs 
and DCs but composed of area elected representatives such as MPs and members of local 
authorities.292 Gertzel argues that advisory committees were an attempt to end the earlier 
differences that had emerged between politicians and administrators.293 The Special Rural 
Development Programme (SRDP), run from 1971 to 1975, was among the first PA-based 
decentralised development strategies and a precursor to later development programmes 
(discussed below).294   
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5. Local government in post-independence Kenya: Subordination, neglect and 
decline in local service delivery  
Before assessing the PA-based development strategy, it is important to examine the fate of 
local government after independence. Long suspected as avenues through which local political 
dissent could emerge, (local authorities) LAs were subjected to central controls through a 
number of means. The PA system was used to subordinate and undermine LAs. Gradual 
abolition of their main sources of revenue left them without resources to carry out functions. 
With local authorities unable to meet the growing demand for local services and development, 
the government responded by transferring the essential services to national government. 
Furthermore, the multiple channels of development planning through the PA, sector-led 
development through line ministries and the local authorities resulted in uncoordinated 
development that impacted negatively on the effectiveness of local authorities.  
5.1 The structure, organisation and functions of local authorities  
The basic structure of post-independence local government was provided for under the Local 
Government Act (LGA).295 Enacted in 1977, the LGA borrowed Local Government Regulations 
that were adopted in 1963 and which unified the racially segregated system of local 
government. The LGA created four types of LAs: county, municipal, town and urban councils. 
County councils basically had the same geographical divisions as administrative districts, and 
thus covered majority of the country‟s rural areas. Municipal councils were established in larger 
urban areas. Town councils were established for smaller urban areas, while urban councils 
(also referred to as County Divisions in the LGA) were established under county councils “in 
emerging urban centres being prepared for transition to town and ultimately municipal 
councils”.296 However, urban councils were not independent and relied on county councils for 
their operation. County councils covered all areas of administrative districts, except areas 
separately designed as town or municipal councils.297  
In essence, the former African District Councils (ADCs) of the colonial era were the ones 
established as county councils.298 The colonial system of differentiating urban and rural LAs was 
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also maintained through municipalities, town councils and urban councils.299 The LGA 
established LAs as corporate entities with separate legal existence.300 However, while the Act 
created the different types of LAs, there was no clear and substantial distinction between 
municipal, county, town and urban councils.301 The LGA also empowered LAs to issue by-laws 
which could enable them perform their functions.302  
The LGA used phrases such as “may” and “shall have power to”, and most of the functions 
required the consent or approval of the Minister of Local Government or the sector-specific 
minister before performance.303 A directive from the ministry could make any of the permissive 
functions mandatory to a particular LA.304 Accordingly, except for the mandatory duty and power 
to make arrangements for the burial or cremation of destitute persons within their areas,305 the 
rest of essential local services such as provision of health,306 education307 road maintenance, 
markets, slaughterhouses, water and sanitation, street lighting were all permissive as opposed 
to mandatory.308  
While the LGA provided for a distinction between urban-based local authorities with regard to 
service provision, the World Bank observes that the distinction was basically a “carry-over” from 
the colonial system.309 In practice, most LAs tended to carry out the same functions, for 
example, garbage collection, maintenance of markets, maintenance of local roads, etc.310 
However, larger municipalities were responsible for primary education and health services while 
county councils and newer municipalities never exercised such functions.311  
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Local authorities were established as local councils, with councillors elected, at the same time 
as presidential and parliamentary elections, for a term of five years.312 One third of the 
councillors were nominated to allow representation and participation of professionals and 
stakeholders in council matters. Previously the Minister for Local Government had the sole 
discretion to nominate councillors. This power was used to “swamp” opposition councils with 
nominees of the ruling party.313 However, after introduction of multi-party elections, nomination 
was based on party strength in the councils.314 Nominated seats were allocated according to the 
proportion of seats won by a party in a respective council. The DC was also an ex officio 
member of the council and meant to provide a coordinating link between the LAs and district 
level activities of the PA.315  
Chairpersons (for county and town councils) and mayors (municipalities) were elected for a term 
of two years by councillors from among the council members, and they could be re-elected.316 
The Act also provided for formation of joint committees with other LAs for purposes of local 
service delivery.317  
5.2 The financial situation of local authorities after independence  
Local authorities inherited the financial woes that faced ADCs on the eve of independence. 
Functions remained the same, and most of the revenue was spent on the main services that 
included education, roads and health.318 The primary source of revenue for local authorities 
immediately after independence was school fees, poll rates and central government grants. 
However, as Oyugi observes, the revenue realised from the three major sources at the time was 
not enough even to cover recurrent costs.319 Revenue collection by the LAs was also poor, and 
poll rates were opposed by politicians. School enrolment was unpredictable, with LAs in poorer 
areas receiving little or no revenue from school fees. Government grants took longer to arrive 
and when they did, it was not the expected amount.320 
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Poor management of the little revenue collected also proved to be a challenge to the councils.321 
There were no proper measures to monitor revenue collection; many of the councils were 
overstaffed, with many of the staff being overpaid; and there were breaches of financial 
guidelines with respect to tenders and other corrupt practices.322 While municipal councils could 
raise considerable local revenue to support some of their services, county councils (mainly 
based in rural areas) were the worst hit.323 
In order to address the financial situation of LAs, the government in 1964 introduced the 
Graduated Personal Tax (GPT), a surcharge on specified personal incomes, which was 
recommended by the Fiscal Commission in 1963.324 However, the GPT did not yield much, and 
collection of the same in rural areas, where most county councils operated, proved a challenge. 
The DCs were empowered in 1965 to collect GPT and often their effectiveness hinged on the 
enthusiasm of a particular DC.325 The government had also introduced in 1964 general grants 
that replaced the colonial era specific grants and which were calculated on the basis of ability to 
pay.326 
Despite the measures taken to strengthen the financial position of councils, growing demand for 
services and the expansion of the education sector placed a strain on the LAs. The period 
between 1965 and 1969 saw a rise in deficits of LAs, but despite this negative trend government 
grants were uncertain and in a steady decline.327 By 1969, most LAs spent 66 percent of their 
budgets on recurrent expenditure, with the bulk going to teachers‟ salaries.328 Initially LAs turned 
to banks for overdrafts, but the latter later refused to offer them such facilities owing to the 
uncertainty of central government grants.329  
In March 1966 the government appointed a commission of inquiry “to look into and advise on 
the reforms necessary to make the local government system in Kenya a more efficient 
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instrument for the provision of the local services and development”.330 The report released in 
1967 confirmed that LAs needed assistance in the delivery of services. The government 
adopted the recommendations as Sessional Paper No. 12 of 1967 (on Local Government 
Commission). However, instead of implementing the recommendations, the government passed 
the Local Government Transfer of Functions Act of 1969, which transferred major services such 
as primary education, roads and public health to the central government with effect from 1 
January 1970.331 While the central government interpreted this as a relief to the LAs, the 
services transferred accounted for 80 percent of the total revenue of LAs.332 No new sources of 
revenue were given to replace the revenue lost after the transfer of the functions;333 other 
revenue sources which remained were “weak and undependable”.334  
The resources available to LAs were used to cover ever-increasing recurrent expenditure such 
as salaries. Most LAs accumulated debt and some went for years without paying staff salaries. 
In 1973 the government abolished GPT and then further withdrew general and specific grants to 
LAs in 1974.335 For a long time, the Local Government Loans Fund, sectoral ministry budget 
financing and the District Development Fund remained the only source of development funding 
for LAs. Central government grants were only granted in “special circumstances” where 
“salvage operations” were done “to rescue councils which could otherwise collapse entirely”.336  
While LA expenditure accounted for about 25 percent of central government recurrent 
expenditure in the past, this figure fell to an average of 8-10 percent between 1975 and 1990 as 
a result of the deprivation of revenue through the centralisation of functions. This, a report 
notes, showed the insignificant fiscal role that the LAs played during the period.337 Indeed, local 
government share of the GDP fell from 3.26 percent in 1969/70 to 1.22 percent in 1999/2000.338 
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This is even after the government introduced the Local Government Service Charge (LASC) in 
1989 to “boost the revenue base of local authorities so as to enhance service delivery”.339  
5.3 Central-local government relations: central control and inefficiency  
Most of the post-independence challenges of LAs are traceable to central government policy. A 
number of reasons have been advanced to explain this. First, the central government wanted to 
hold on to and control LAs for political reasons. Second, the colonial-era challenge of the lack of 
clear distinction of functions persisted in the post-independence era. Furthermore, a number of 
decisions made at the centre, often without consultation with LAs, had adverse effects on the 
financial capacity of LAs. Indeed, Oyugi observes that “historically, the institution of local 
government has been treated by the centre as though it were just another government 
department”.340  
In 1964 the central government entered into an agreement with trade unions that it would 
increase the workforce in public institutions by 10 percent. This agreement resulted in LAs hiring 
more staff without a needs-assessment and stretching the LAs even further. In 1966, the central 
government abolished charges for out-patient services in public health institutions without 
consulting LAs, further denying LAs revenue for services that they offered.341  
The LGA bestowed upon the Minister immense power and control over LAs. The minister could 
establish new LAs, define and alter boundaries, amalgamate LAs or promote an LA from one 
kind to another.342 The powers to alter boundaries have often been used arbitrarily for political 
reasons and to the detriment of the affected LAs. A 1995 report states:  
There has been a tendency for the Minister and by the local authorities to include large expanse 
of rural land under municipal, town and urban councils mainly for political reasons, but also to 
provide a revenue base for these councils from surrounding rural areas under county councils. 
This has only helped to frustrate the county councils whose areas have been transferred, such 
areas also happen to be the centres of economic activities from where the county councils derive 
their revenue.
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The Minister could issue guidelines on performance of LA obligations,344 issue directives to 
LAs,345 remove council members,346 appoint special commissions to run affairs of local 
authorities that he wound up; he could also require LAs to furnish him with council minutes and 
deliberations.347 The minister had power to approve expenditure and new sources of revenues 
for LAs.348 A 1995 report stated that the lack of a limited period within which a minister should 
approve or reject LA budgets “normally brings to a standstill most local authorities [most 
important business]”.349 Furthermore, section 249 of the LGA gave the minister powers to 
reduce or cancel a central government grant to any LA.350 The LGA also empowered the 
minister in charge of local government to control the hiring of senior staff in LAs,351 a power 
vested in the Public Service Commission and the Ministry in 1984.352 As a result, senior staff in 
LAs felt more accountable to the ministry than to the local councils.353 
The Ministry of Local Government was organised into different departments for the purpose of 
effective supervision of LAs. Communication with LAs took place mainly through ministry 
circulars which, in practice, carried the force of law within LAs.354 Sometimes the directives and 
circulars could overlook or contravene the LGA under which the directives were purportedly 
made.355 A report identified 216 areas of intervention in the activities and life of LAs; these 
ranged from approval of expenditures and general regulation to simple matters such as granting 
a mayor permission to host a dignitary at a luncheon or approving a bicycle loan to a council 
messenger.356 Such interventions not only made LAs inefficient but also diverted the ministry 
from broader policy issues that it could have addressed appropriately.357 
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In each province there was a representative of the Ministry called the Provincial Local 
Government Officer (PLGO). Closely supervising the LAs in the respective provinces,358 the 
PLGO was the secretary to a provincial committee that approved LA budgets in the province.359 
The modifications of the budgets of the LAs by the provincial committee were final. The PLGO 
also approved loan facilities, proposals for local revenue and other local investments. However, 
while the PLGO could grant prior authorisation on the proposals, the formal and final authority 
was given by the minister.360 
Moreover, the central government had the power to dissolve any local authority suspected of 
mismanagement.361 As such, 12 LAs were dissolved between 1970 and 1982,362 but it was a 
power used mainly to stem political opposition at the local level and pursue ministerial 
vendettas:363 the central government had an extensive array of means at its disposal for 
exerting control over LAs and did not hesitate to use it. Furthermore, holding joint civic, 
parliamentary and presidential elections meant that local issues were subordinated to national 
political campaigns;364 as a result, aspiring councillors were perceived as “fighting for the scraps 
left over by bigger politicians”.365 Southall and Wood conclude that authority was centralised to 
such an extent that local government in actuality was “neither local nor government”.366 
5.4 „Neither local nor government‟: decay and near collapse of local authorities  
The central government did not pay any serious attention to LAs after stripping them of essential 
functions and revenue sources in 1970. It was not until 1989 that it again attempted to introduce 
another revenue source for LAs. The Local Authority Service Charge (LASC), a tax rate on 
employees and businesses, was to be deducted at source and remitted to LAs by employers.367 
However, despite high expectations that the LASC would improve the revenue base of the LAs, 
it did not yield much (it only came to an average of 10-30 percent of LA revenues).368 
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Furthermore, administering the tax was cumbersome for LAs that lacked facilities such as 
printing stamps, fraud prevention, record-keeping and so on. The Minister also imposed 
restrictions on how the resultant funds were to be spent.369 
Despite the numerous problems faced by LAs right from independence, successive local 
government ministers established more and more LAs without any objective criteria.370 Some 
LAs were promoted from Urban and Town Councils to Municipal Councils without regard to 
issues such as population, size, revenue base, and capacity for service delivery or peoples‟ 
views.371 In 1963, there were 39 county councils and seven municipalities, but by 1995 the 
number had risen to 50 and 35, respectively.372 By 2010, there were 175 local authorities, (one 
city council, 45 municipal councils, 67 county councils and 62 town councils), most of which 
were established mainly for illegitimate reasons.373 
While the ministry of local government was charged with supervision of LAs, there was serious 
incapacity at the ministry. A 1995 report stated that only 170 of the 485 vacant posts at the 
ministry were filled.374 This deficit weakened the capacity of the ministry to regulate and 
supervise LAs efficiently. The LAs themselves were no different; most of them lacked adequate 
managerial staff. The World Bank reports that in the 2000/01 budget estimates, around 10 
percent of management positions in LAs were vacant; more than one-third of top-level staff 
positions of Nairobi City Council and Mombasa Municipal Council were vacant.375 Furthermore, 
while there was a staff deficit at the top level, LAs were overstaffed at the operational level. This 
led to lack of commitment and accountability by the lower staff.376 LAs had also accumulated 
debts, and many properties of various LAs were attached for debt recovery.377 A World Bank 
report in 1992 pointed out that most LAs in Kenya were actually insolvent, as expenditure had 
outstripped income.378  
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The transfer of functions in 1969 to central government ministries did not in any way enhance 
the effectiveness of the services. A report states that “ministries that took over the functions did 
not have the capacity to undertake all that was required of them”.379 Township roads and rural 
access roads were neglected. The gap left by the transfer of services prompted the government 
to develop a strategy to fill it, but by the early 1970s it was clear that this PA-led development 
strategy was facing challenges. The government sought to further streamline the PA system by 
using different strategies.  
6. Post-independence decentralisation reforms  
6.1 „Lipstick on a pig‟: Streamlining the Provincial Administration development 
strategy  
Reports from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1972 and the World Bank in 1975 
were the first to give an early indication that the post-independence development policies were 
not working due to growing disparities.380 Clearly, the PA-led development strategy was not 
bearing fruits. The first official assessment of the role of the PA in development was made in a 
report released in May 1971 (Ndegwa report),381 which observed that links between the PA and 
technical ministries were weak.382 While the PA was given responsibility to drive the local 
development agenda, it had no power to carry out the same. On the other hand, line ministries 
had powers but no responsibilities.383 The provincial and district teams that had been formed to 
make plans and supervise implementation proved to be ineffective. The PCs and DCs had 
many other tasks and were thus unable to fulfil what is required of them under the government‟s 
development plans.  
Importantly, the report noted that the fundamental failure of the PA system is mainly “because 
the system of field administration was never designed around the concept of planned 
development and project management”.384 The PA was grossly inadequate to the task of 
exercising the functions bestowed on it, functions that were bestowed without provision having 
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been being made for adequate capacity. For instance, the PA lost staff to line ministries and yet 
was supposed to coordinate field functions.385 The report continued:  
Members of the Administration often refer to themselves, with justice, as jacks of all trade and 
maids of all work. This may have been adequate in the days of colonial administration, at least in 
the early days when the emphasis was still heavily on political control and maintenance of order, 
but it is not compatible with the needs of professionalized development administration today. 
There must be some division of labour at the key levels of the Administration.
386
  
In order to overcome the challenge above, the report recommended that the PCs and DCs be 
provided with technical staff to assist with the developmental nature of tasks given to the PA. 
Thus, a key recommendation was the growing of the technical capacity of the PA and especially 
the district level, where most of the developmental activities should take place. These 
recommendations were taken into account when, under Moi in 1983, a programme known as 
District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) was adopted. However, the plans to improve the 
PA system which was fundamentally unsuitable as an agency for national development is 
comparable to „lipstick on a pig‟.    
6.1.1 The District Focus for Rural Development strategy (DFRD) 
The District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD), which was announced during a presidential 
speech in 1982, basically adopted the key recommendation in the Ndegwa Report with regard 
to districts.387 Under the DFRD, districts were to be the basic operational units equipped with 
planning, design and management capacities in order to enhance rural development. 388 Under 
the DFRD strategy, the existing District Development Committee (DDC) retained their 
supervisory role of district development, but the District Executive Committee (DEC) and District 
Planning Units (DPU) were added at the district level.389 The PCs and DCs, however, retained 
their say over the development matters at provincial and district levels.                                                     
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The DEC was to “plan district-specific projects for approval by the DDC, coordinate and monitor 
implementation of the projects, and prepare the draft district plan and its annual annexes for 
approval by the DDC”.390 The DPU, on the other hand, had the District Development Officer 
(DDO), an office recommended by the Ndegwa report, as chairperson and the Assistant DDO 
as secretary. Other members were the district statistical officer, district population officer, district 
physical planning officer, district quantity surveyor, district valuer and district architect. The DPU 
was to “serve as a secretariat to the DEC and was aimed at strengthening planning and 
implementation work in the district”.391 Similar arrangements were repeated at the levels below 
the district (namely, the division, location and sub-location levels).392 LAs were also required to 
submit their plans to the DDC for scrutiny and alignment to “district priorities”, as well as attend 
district planning meetings.393  
In terms of monitoring and evaluation of the DFRD projects, the strategy provided for formation 
of Provincial Monitoring and Evaluation Committees (PMECs) composed of a wide range of 
members.394 The PMEC was charged with facilitating inter-district co-ordination of rural 
development; it was also to monitor the work of DDCs and ensure sectoral integration in 
development.395  
At the national level, the strategy was coordinated by the Development Coordination and 
Cabinet Office section of the Office of the President (OP). The Rural Planning Department of the 
Ministry of National Planning and Development worked closely with the OP. At the district level, 
the DCs, through the DDCs, had enhanced control over development activities, and DCs started 
controlling funds allocated by national ministries to the districts. 396  
6.1.2 Assessment of the Provincial Administration development strategy  
While the DFRD was meant to devolve planning, implementation and management of local 
development, the structure described above shows that community representation was starkly 
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missing at the district level. More government officers were deployed to the district level 
supposedly to facilitate community participation, but this served only to “crowd out” communities 
from the development process.397 Committees formed at lower levels (divisional, locational and 
village levels) initially participated and presented their development plans, but their priorities 
were not taken seriously at higher levels of implementation.398 At the same time, national and 
local plans were produced, which was in itself evidence of the lack of local input in national 
planning.399 Less than half of the projects implemented by the DDC emanated from lower 
committees.400 As a result, local committees stopped taking project formulation committees 
seriously.401 Furthermore, only locally influential individuals – such as chiefs and traders, rather 
than ordinary members of the community – attended meetings at the divisional, location and 
village levels.402  
While reforms were carried out to promote community participation, about 75 percent of the 
persons in the full implementation of the DFRD were civil servants. Chitere and Ireri argue that 
this fact effectively eliminated the space for local communities to participate in development.403 
Civil servants normally came from other regions and were thus not familiar with the local areas 
where they were deployed to work.404 Divisional planning was to be done by the District Officer 
and the Community Development Assistant facilitated by the DDO without an explicit 
requirement of community participation and input.405  
Another challenge stemmed from the source of funds for development. Most projects under the 
DFRD were donor-funded, while the bulk of government money went into the salary bill and 
other operational expenditure.406 Planning for donor funds took place at ministry headquarters 
with donors and thus undermined the purported objectives of the DFRD of local planning 
processes.407 Furthermore, projects and requested funds came from sector budgeting and 
funding based on ministry budgets. Local plans and budgets, on the other hand, were not 
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considered and in any case did not have a detailed budget analysis.408 Thus, even with effective 
community participation, there were systemic factors that negated any possible community 
input. Furthermore, cases of corruption were rampant at the district level and featured the DC, 
who was in charge of the tendering process together with the District Supplies Officer and 
contractors.409 
In terms of monitoring and evaluation, the DDCs410 and PMECs involved large numbers of 
people that rendered the whole exercise ineffective. Composed of persons such as politicians 
and civil servants, they did not have the appropriate mix for a team to carry out the technical 
work of evaluating local development.411 Furthermore, the PCs and DCs who spearheaded the 
projects for development were presidential appointees; thus, there was no accountability to the 
communities concerned where development projects were taking place, because the 
administrators were accountable instead to the president. 412 The technical officers in the field 
were answerable to the DCs on the manner they carried out their work.413 In their assessment of 
the DFRD, Tostensen and Scott conclude:  
 
It is difficult to see how in principle a political system, based on ... patronage and rapidly shifting 
factional alliances can provide ... an ... adequate foundation for a decentralized system of 
authority which pre-supposes rational decision making, grounded on universalistic principles of 
administrative management.
414
 
 
The early 1990s saw a change in the development approach by states in which there was a shift 
from central government development planning to processes such as cuts in public spending, 
removal of government subsidies, privatisation and movement away from social programmes. 
The approach emphasised a reduced role of the state in development, and embraced market-
led strategies for development. No training for the DFRD was held between 1988 and 1995, but 
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289 government officials were trained between 1996 and 1997. The strategy was gradually 
abandoned as the state shifted to other emerging approaches to development.415  
 
6.2 Local government reforms: The Kenya Local Government Reform Programme  
The growing demand for local services that the LAs were unable to provide led to discussions 
on improvements of the LA system. Studies done by the Ministry of Local Government with the 
assistance of World Bank identified the need to strengthen the LAs to meet the demand for local 
services, which has been in steady decline over the years.416 The reforms led to formation of the 
Kenya Local Government Reform programme (KLGRP) under the Ministry of Local Government 
in 1995 to assist the ministry in the transformation of the LAs.  
Formed in 1995, the KLGRP was to assist in transforming LAs into “viable autonomous, 
accountable and responsive local authorities” and support the ministry in facilitating “good 
governance and improved service delivery for enhanced social economic development”.417 The 
reforms saw the enactment of the Local Authority Transfer Fund Act (LATF Act),418 the main role 
of which was to provide for the setting aside of 5 percent of the national income tax for Local 
Authorities.419 The LATF replaced the LASC, and its primary role was to facilitate the LAs to 
perform such functions and services as required of them by the Local Government Act.420 The 
Act established an advisory committee that would support the Ministry of Local Government to 
perform the functions listed under the Act.421 While disbursements under the LATF were 
unconditional grants,422 the Local Authorities Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP), a policy 
that was developed, spelt out the conditions that LAs were to fulfil before getting allocations 
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under the LATF Act.423 LASDAP had the following objectives: ensuring that LAs facilitate 
community and public participation in project identification and prioritisation;424 ensuring 
transparency in the use of funds; ensuring that funds were appropriately allocated between 
recurrent and development expenditure; and increasing efficiency in revenue collection as well 
as service delivery.425  
The LASDAP guidelines provided a detailed outline of how LAs prepared budget plans and 
consultation up to approval and submission of the plans to the LASDAP secretariat.426 The 
process involved both administrators and local politicians (councillors), although decisions were 
made by the full council meetings of the respective local authority.427 After compliance, the 
funds were released in three phases, each with different conditions as provided in the LASDAP. 
The government released funds as was provided for under the LATF Act, which started with 2 
percent and later increased it to 5 percent of ordinary government revenue. The government 
disbursed substantial amounts of money to LAs through the LATF Act and the LASDAP, which 
became the main revenue source for most of the LAs in Kenya.428 
Studies by the World Bank, Ministry of Local Government and individual scholars all 
acknowledge that there was some progress under the KLGRP programme, especially through 
LATF/ LASDAP.429 The World Bank hailed it as representing “a new direction in mobilizing 
citizen input in the local level planning process”.430 Some of the key benefits included: increased 
community participation in local development;431 improvement in financial management systems 
of local authorities; and improvement in revenue collection.432 However, the results varied from 
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one local authority to another. While there was some improvement in the performance of local 
authorities, this was only marginal as LAs still faced massive challenges in the performance of 
their duties and responsibilities.433  
One challenge of the LATF/ LASDAP process, as identified by Muia, was “the over-centralized 
manner in which decision making about local authorities was made as ultimately everything had 
to be cleared with Ministry of Local Government headquarters. This introduced bureaucratic 
delays in rolling out plans.”434 Other challenges included inadequate administrative capacity of 
LAs for performance as well as capacity for supervision and monitoring of local performance at 
the national level.435 Lack of coordination between councils and the Provincial Administration 
was also cited as a challenge.436 A study on the impact of the LATF/                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
LASDAP commissioned by the Ministry of Local Government in 2007 confirmed many of the 
challenges identified above.437 Thus, even as the LATF/LASDAP process became the backbone 
of the operation of the LAs, there was only marginal progress with regard to effectiveness of 
LAs in Kenya. The bulk of the challenges facing LAs remained largely unchanged.  
The systemic challenges faced by the LAs persisted despite the reforms; the LGA was silent on 
public participation as the same was not considered critical in 1977 when the Act was passed. 
While the LGA provided that LAs could publish budget estimates, the Act never made it 
mandatory.438 The Ministry of Local Government and the Local Authorities lacked institutional 
capacity for supervision and regulation and service delivery, respectively.439 Before the 
LATF/LASDAP reforms, some LAs had not submitted Abstract Accounts (financial statements) 
for more than 20 years.440 Financial guidelines provided in the LGA were never followed. 
Producing realistic budgets and proper record keeping remained a challenge for LAs.441  
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6.3 Other decentralisation reforms  
Apart from the KLGRP, other decentralised programmes were initiated to devolve resources for 
local development. Numerous devolved funds were established. These included the 
Constituency Development Fund (CDF), The Free Primary Education Fund (FPE), the 
Constituency Education Bursary Fund (CEBF), the Rural Electrification Programme Levy Fund 
(REPLF) and the Roads Maintenance Levy Fund (RMLF). While some of the funds are statute-
based, some are established by executive decree without any legislative backing.  
6.3.1 The Constituency Development Fund (CDF) 
This was a statutory fund established in 2003 by the Constituency Development Fund Act.442 It 
provided for 2.5 percent of national revenue to be set aside for the fund.443 The funds were then 
distributed to parliamentary constituencies according to a formula that considered the 
constituency poverty index.444 The funds were sent to the constituencies “for purposes of 
development, and fighting poverty at the constituency level”.445 Regulation and management of 
the fund was vested in a CDF board created under the Act.446 The functions of the CDF Board 
included approving constituency funding proposals and other administrative duties of the fund. 
Funding proposals were submitted by Members of Parliament (MPs) to the board and 
scrutinised for consistency with the Act.447 However, the final decision on the funds to 
constituencies and decisions on any unspent monies in the hands of the CDF Board were made 
by the Constituencies Development Fund Committee (CDF Committee) composed of MPs 
only.448  
At the local level, the CDF Act provided for a District Projects Committee which coordinated 
implementation of development projects in the constituency.449 The Projects Committee was 
composed of the DC, DDO, District Accountant, MPs representing constituencies in the district 
and representatives from the LAs in the district. Actual implementation was done by the projects 
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committee, assisted by the respective government department under which an approved project 
belonged. General government regulations applied to the project. A CDF Board officer in the 
constituency was the accounting officer and maintained records of all disbursements from the 
CDF Account.450 The MP was in charge of participatory planning and ensured that communities 
were consulted to the lowest level. The MP was charged with preparation of proposals which 
the MP then submitted to a District Projects Committee meeting convened for that purpose. The 
Projects Committee scrutinised the proposals and made recommendations to the CDF Board, 
which made the final decision. The Projects Committee was required, at the beginning of each 
financial year, to make a list of projects approved for funding.  
There is consensus that the CDF attracted more public participation to local development than 
any other decentralised programme and that its legislative backing has ensured a solid 
regulatory framework.451 The fund assisted other government agencies in the provision of basic 
services such as health, education and water, especially in poor areas.452 One challenge, 
however, is that the fund, which is basically placed in the hands of the legislator, leads 
legislators to engage in the business of local service delivery, a task that conventionally belongs 
to the local authorities.453 Indeed, it has been observed that the CDF had the effect of 
weakening local authorities because the CDF Act created “a new local bureaucracy that then 
entered into competition with the LAs”.454 
Specific challenges included poor coordination of local development projects455 and lack of long-
term planning, as plans recognised under the Act were basically fashioned along a serving 
politician‟s five-year term.456 This led to wastage due to the abandonment of projects in cases 
where an incumbent MP lost elections.457 While the District Project Committees was to ensure 
that development projects were in line with sectoral plans, numerous CDF projects such as 
health institutions, roads and schools ended up with no public staff to run the facilities.458 The 
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CDF also inevitably became a tool for political and resource patronage by MPs, with numerous 
reported cases of wastage, theft and misuse of funds.459  
6.3.2 Other decentralised funds  
Apart from the CDF, other funds have been decentralised to the local level for various functions. 
The Free Primary Education Fund was established in 2003 under the Ministry of Education as 
one measure towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).460 The fund was calculated 
on the basis of the cost per pupil, and funds decentralised to primary schools through the 
Ministry‟s decentralised offices. However, unlike the CDF, the fund was not anchored on a legal 
framework and allocations could be varied by the executive.461 The Constituency Education 
Bursary Fund (CEBF) was established via a presidential decree in the 1993/4 fiscal year.462 The 
fund was managed by a constituency-based committee and disburses funds and reports to the 
Ministry of Education. Like the FPE fund, it is not established by legislation, and the amount of 
the fund depends of ministry allocations which vary from year to year.  
Another decentralised fund is the Rural Electrification Programme Levy Fund (REPLF), which 
was established under the Energy Act of 2006 463 and meant to finance electrification projects in 
poor and marginalised areas.464 While the institutional framework for management of the fund 
made use of local processes established under the DFRD, CDF and LATF, there was no 
participation of the public in identifying target areas. Wachira notes that crucial decisions on the 
use of the fund are made by public agencies involved and “beneficiary communities usually 
come in at the implementation stage when the major decisions have already taken place”.465  
The RMLF was created by legislation and funds maintenance of public roads, including local 
authority unclassified roads.466 It is reported that a large portion of the fund, obtained from a levy 
on petroleum products, goes to maintenance of larger roads, and 16 percent is divided equally 
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among constituencies for maintenance of rural roads; there is participation of constituency- and 
district-based structures in identifying roads that benefit from this fund.467  
7. Assessment of decentralised service delivery in post-independence era 
It is clear from the discussion above that systemic challenges have slowed down and, in several 
instances, totally derailed delivery of public services at the local level. While some of the 
reforms that were undertaken were undoubtedly necessary for purposes of addressing 
questions of efficiency, the critical question of comprehensive political and institutional reforms 
was not addressed. As a result, the longstanding systemic challenges remained.  
7.1 The „fruits of centralisation‟: control, inefficiency, and poor delivery of services  
A key theme in the various decentralisation programmes in post-independence Kenya is the 
centralised control of local development and service delivery. Both the DFRD strategy and the 
LA system of service delivery had strong elements of central government control. While 
centralised control of LAs managed to prevent them from posing a political threat to the centre, 
this was achieved at a great cost to efficiency in local service provision. 
At the local level, LAs were controlled by administrators from the PA. For instance, in 1986 the 
government called for amendment of the Local Government Act in order to legally place LAs 
under the control of District Development Committees.468 The irony is that while the LAs at least 
had a legal mandate for service delivery, the DFRD strategy had no legislative basis.469 At the 
local level, LAs were required to attend planning meetings at the district and lower levels of the 
PA, adding a further strain on an already-stretched LA workforce.470 The World Bank noted in a 
2002 report that DDCs, dominated by central government bureaucrats, could hold up proposed 
LA projects for years even where the latter had capacity to undertake the projects. Line 
ministries in sectors such as health, water and education also placed additional restrictions on 
the respective sector functions performed by LAs.471 A 1995 government report noted that 
councillors were worried about “the domineering role of the provincial administration at the local 
level”.472 The PA could at times deny councillors permits to hold local meetings, deny the LAs 
                                               
467
 Wachira (2010) 97.  
468
 Republic of Kenya „Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 on economic management and renewed growth‟ (1986) 53.  
469
 Chitere & Ireri (2008) 23.  
470
 Oyugi (1990) 43-44.  
471
 World Bank (2002) 19.  
472
 Republic of Kenya (1995) 57.  
 
 
 
 
142 
 
access to development funds from the district treasury, or simply refuse to recognise them as 
elected leaders during important local decision-making.473  
Lack of a clear separation of functions between the centre and local institutions of service 
delivery provided another challenge. It will be recalled this was also a challenge in the colonial 
era, one which was carried over to the post-independence period. A World Bank report written 
in 2002 observes that “functional allocations across institutions do not appear to be based on 
any clear governing principles and seem to be guided by the historical context and independent 
developments in each sector”.474  
The lack of clear separation of powers in law, policy or practice was further complicated by a 
dual system of service delivery through the PA and line ministries, on the one hand, and local 
governments, on the other. This is yet another element inherited from the colonial system, 
where the PA and local government systems existed side-by-side at the local level and all dealt 
with local development. In the post-independence setting, sectoral ministries and the private 
sector/NGOs also joined the system.475 In addition, in 2003 the CDF Act introduced the 
parliamentary constituency as another avenue for pursuing local development. The multiplicity 
of such systems led to a weakening of the individual channels and produced inefficiencies, with 
few resources being available for actual service delivery.476  
Coordination of the multiple channels of service delivery, especially at the local level, proved a 
major challenge in which practical service delivery emerged a casualty. For instance, an 
independent study commissioned by the Ministry of Local Government on the impact of 
LASDAP singles out an instance where a road in the Nandi area of the Rift Valley region was 
targeted by both LATF funds and the Roads funds; both teams met in the field, but could not 
agree on who should proceed.477 There are also numerous cases where development projects 
were double-listed as funded by the CDF and LATF funds.478  
                                               
473
 Republic of Kenya (1995) 57.  
474
 World Bank (2002) 20; Smoke (1993) 907.  
475
 World Bank (2002) viii, 41.  
476
 World Bank (2002) viii, 41.  
477
 Republic of Kenya (2007) 16.  
478
 Republic of Kenya (2007) 61 
 
 
 
 
143 
 
7.2 Failed decentralisation reforms: „new wine in old skins‟  
A 2002 World Bank report evaluating the local service delivery process observed that it was 
possible, even within the parallel systems of service delivery, to differentiate national and local 
functions. In essence, what the World Bank suggested is that while a cohesive institutional 
framework for decentralised service delivery was the ideal option, the division of functions into 
national and local ones within the multiple avenues could have assisted in streamlining local 
service delivery.479 The World Bank argued that even within the multiple avenues of service 
delivery, regional and national agencies could perform major functions such as regional and 
national trunk roads and policy-making while LAs maintained smaller roads and carried out local 
services and local planning.480  
However, the World Bank‟s proposal focused only on efficiency in allocation of functions while 
avoiding the broader systemic institutional and political issues that hampered service delivery. 
Ideally, reforms should have begun with the admission that political problems lay at the centre of 
the failure of the DFRD and LAs. Thus, the first priority for reforms in decentralised service 
delivery was inevitably a comprehensive legal and constitutional reform that would overhaul the 
then existing political structure. 
Litvack et al argue note that the World Bank in practice avoids politically sensitive reform issues 
when dealing with its clients (governments)481 and that this may be the case in the Bank‟s 
engagement with Kenya‟s decentralisation reform process. In its analysis of the role of the 
KLGRP (which it initiated), the World Bank identified three phases of the programme: the 
“conceptualizing phase”, “take-off phase” and “consolidation phase”.482 In the conceptualisation 
phase, the Ministry of Local Government, with the Bank‟s assistance, carried out studies and 
identified the problem for reform. The take-off phase included gains such as the LATF/LASDAP 
process, improved financial management systems in the Las, and reduced debt repayment 
plans of the LAs483 along with technical assistance to the government and the LAs.484 The third 
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phase was to consolidate the two previous phases through a new local government law and 
broader constitutional reforms.485   
However, the Bank‟s proposal approached the reform process from the wrong end. Broader 
political and legal reforms would have offered a basis upon which institutional efficiency could 
be pursued. Thus, the correct order would have been to start from the consolidation phase with 
broader legal reforms, which the World Bank placed as the last phase. Instead of addressing 
systemic issues through broad reform, among the main issues that the World Bank picked up as 
important for strengthening LAs included building capacity for monitoring and evaluation, 
improving budgeting and financial management, and improving responsiveness, in addition to 
other efficiency arrangements.486 However, the uncertainty of the constitutional reform process, 
as well as the controversy surrounding it, may have informed the World Bank‟s cautious and 
pragmatic approach to the then decentralisation reform process.  
8. Conclusion  
In 2002 the World Bank observed that deterioration of local services had its heaviest impact on 
the poor in Kenya. Given the socio-political history of the country, the deterioration of basic 
services and the rising poverty levels inevitably deepen perceptions of ethnic exclusion.487 This 
is worsened by a deliberate policy of (re)directing state resources to other regions. Indeed, it 
has been noted by numerous analysts that the real intention of the Moi government in starting 
the DFRD programme was to economically marginalise the Kikuyu and thereby weaken the 
relatively strong economic and political base they had built since the Kenyatta era.488 Indeed, 
statistics reveal that while increased funds under the DFRD strategy were channelled to Moi‟s 
home region of the Rift Valley, allocations to other regions declined over time.489 Nevertheless, 
even during Kenyatta‟s rule, state resources were disproportionately channelled to the Central 
region to enhance services and buy political support.490 Government appointments and top civil 
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service positions were also given to individuals from the successive presidents‟ respective 
ethnic communities.491 
This trend created a perception that an ethnic community could access better services and 
development only if one of their own controlled the presidency. This in turn made the presidency 
a highly sought-after position and pitted ethnic communities against one another. The conflict 
witnessed in 2007/2008 in Kenya arose partly as a result of the perception that poor service 
delivery and underdevelopment worked along ethnic lines. Centralisation of state power gave 
the president absolute power to redirect state resources to his community at the expense of 
national unity and equitable development. 
The purposes served by a devolved system are dictated by the issues that confront a state. In 
the case of Kenya, the state struggles with centralisation, underdevelopment and ethnic conflict. 
This chapter has examined how the governance systems inherited from the colonial era were 
retained and even expanded in post-colonial Kenya. Socio-economic disparities created by 
colonial rule were also left intact. The centralisation of power and regional disparities created a 
perception of economic and political marginalisation along ethnic lines, leading to deadly ethnic 
conflict. While the clamour for change began soon after independence when Kenyans realised 
that things were no different from the colonial era, the formal quest for a new constitutional 
dispensation began in 1982 after Kenya became a de jure one-party state. Sustained pressure 
for comprehensive constitutional reforms led to the adoption of a new constitution in August 
2010 after the constitutional review process. The next chapter evaluates the deliberations in that 
process with respect to devolution. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ROCKY ROAD TO DEVOLUTION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVIEW PROCESS 
1. Introduction  
This chapter evaluates the deliberations on devolution that took place during the constitutional 
review process. The centralisation and personalisation of powers reached a climax with a 1982 
constitutional amendment that made Kenya a one-party state under KANU. Paradoxically, it 
marked the beginning of sustained pressure for constitutional and political reforms. Led by 
human rights groups, political dissidents, churches and the public in general, the struggle 
resulted in the introduction of multi-party politics in 1992 and the subsequent constitutional 
review processes that led in 2010 to the adoption of the current Constitution.  
While the search for a new constitution in Kenya went on for more than two decades, there were 
many intervening events and issues that defined the process until the adoption of the new 
constitution. The constitutional process can be divided into two broad phases. The first is the 
period from the enactment of the Constitution of Kenya Review Act (CKRC Act) in 1998 until 
November 2005, when the proposed draft constitution was rejected in a national referendum. 
The second phase began in 2008 when constitutional reforms were identified as one of the 
long-term solutions to the electoral violence witnessed in 2007/2008 and terminated in August 
2010 with the promulgation of the current constitution; in short, a law enacted in early 2008 led 
to this second phase of the constitutional review process.  
Seen in its entirety, the process confronted issues that have always stood in the path to Kenya‟s 
unity and nationhood. The ever-controversial issue of land infiltrated the constitutional review 
debate on devolution, and the calls for a majimbo system, one entailing strong regional systems 
of government, followed a pattern similar to that of the debates at independence. While public 
views and proposals on devolution were not always coherent and detailed, there was 
discernible, unambiguous public support for devolution of power. Accordingly, one constant 
challenge for the constitutional drafters was to translate these views on devolution into a 
coherent and detailed devolution design that reflected the people‟s aspirations.  
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The three issues of centralisation of power, underdevelopment and ethnic conflict emerged and 
indeed dominated the deliberations on devolution during the review process. As such, this 
analysis focuses on the weight that was placed on each of the three purposes in arriving at the 
final design. While the three purposes featured in the discussions, this chapter arrives at the 
conclusion that most of the major decisions with regard to devolution design were informed by 
the developmental purpose. Accordingly, while ethnic harmony and limiting of central power 
were clear objectives of devolution, development emerged in the entire review as the primary 
purpose of devolution. The chapter examines the first phase, which ends with the 2005 
referendum, and then proceeds to the second phase, which ended with adoption of the current 
constitution in 2010. In these two phases, the context of review process and other factors that 
shaped the debate on devolution are examined.  
1.1 The context of constitutional and political reforms in Kenya  
The clamour for political reform started in earnest after the 1982 constitutional amendment that 
made Kenya a de jure one-party state under KANU.1 Prior to 1982, the Moi regime had 
continued with the political centralisation and crackdown on political dissent that characterised 
Kenyatta‟s rule. Moi took over in 1978, with repression and intolerance of alternative political 
views intensifying after an unsuccessful military coup in August 1982.2 A report by the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission describes the effect of the 1982 amendment:  
As a result of this amendment, anyone aspiring to political participation or a political office had to 
become a member of KANU. All political opposition was banned (and leading politicians and 
others opposed to the government were detained without trial). In this way, crucial pillars of a 
democratic system – the right to form political parties or similar associations, to lobby for 
alternatives in law and policy, to mobilise public opinion, to scrutinise and criticise the acts of the 
administration, and seek change in government through a vote of no confidence or in a General 
election – were destroyed. The subordination of holders of constitutional office to the pleasure of 
the Executive was achieved by removing safeguards necessary for maintaining fair 
administration, neutrality of public institutions, accountability of government, and the protection of 
rights in general.
3
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Furthermore, between 1986 and 1988 the government pursued other tactics for entrenching 
personal rule and weakening institutions. These methods included the removal of security of 
tenure for judges,4 the Attorney-General,5 the Auditor-General6 and members of the Public 
Service Commission,7 a measure that severely weakened these critical public offices. Holders 
or members of these offices served purely at the pleasure of the President.8 The amendments, 
which in most cases were rushed through parliament with “special motions” to shorten the 
periods required for parliamentary debate,9 attracted wide public outcry.10 The CKRC observes 
that during this era, ““the constitution was not treated as an important document which 
established either a contract or formed the fundamental character of government. 
Constitutionalism was not valued”.11 Under the one-party regime, the president controlled the 
national treasury and other critical institutions of government, while “parliament‟s role was 
further reduced to one of ritual approval” with practically no oversight on the executive.12  
Some sections of the media critical of the government‟s manoeuvres raised concerns about the 
rapid amendments that made drastic changes to the constitution. One newspaper pointed out 
that while constitutions need to be revised to respond to changes, there was no time to discuss 
changes; this meant the constitution loses value as a contract between the governed and 
government.13 The newspaper added that the trend could lead to loss of public confidence in the 
institution of parliament.14 Indeed, as the CKRC observes, Kenyans gradually lost confidence in 
the Constitution and public institutions, and slowly started demanding for accountability and rule 
of law.15 
Events in Africa and the world at large formed the wider context for the pressure for reform. The 
collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War saw the replacement of despotic regimes 
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which had thrived in this period, in addition to which there were widespread calls in many 
African states for internal political reform16 as growing civil society movements began 
challenging regimes across the continent.17 In Kenya, the CKRC observes, talks about reforms 
similar to those then taking place in the Soviet Union (Perestroika) were commonplace.18 
Public concerns about constitutional change were raised at a KANU Review Committee formed 
in 1990 to hear public opinion on party matters.19 The Committee “was stunned at how the 
KANU government enjoyed very little support”.20 Instead of addressing party issues, the public 
expressed dissatisfaction with the recent constitutional changes that had weakened the 
separation of powers and independence of critical public institutions. However, the KANU 
Review Committee did not attend to these concerns as it considered them outside its 
mandate.21 More pressure from churches, civil society organisations and opposition politicians 
in the early 1990s for constitutional review22 led to the repeal of the then section 2A of the 
Constitution which had established a one-party state. The repeal paved way for the first multi-
party elections in Kenya since independence.23  
But not only was the opposition divided along ethnic lines,24 it was hampered by the old 
constitutional system, one inimical to political pluralism; this ensured that no substantial change 
in governance was realised through multiparty politics.25 On the contrary, the (re)introduction of 
multi-partyism coincided with the start of politically-instigated ethnic violence, especially at 
election times, with the violence reaching its peak in 2007/2008.26 While, thanks to an ethnically 
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divided opposition, KANU won the first multi-party elections in 1992 with a minority 36 percent, 
opposition parties won substantial seats with the local authorities in opposition areas.27 
However, as Southall and Wood argue, opposition parties never saw this as an opportunity to 
start advocating for political change from the local level.28 Instead, political parties turned their 
attention to national politics at the expense of creating viable local democratic polities on the 
basis of the local authorities won by opposition parties.29 Nevertheless, given the central 
government‟s hold over the LAs, it is also clear that there was no chance the LAs could have 
become an avenue for vibrant opposition politics.  
Consequently, as Mutunga argues: “Constitution-making became the sole vehicle through which 
democratization, promotion and protection of human rights and social justice were robustly 
agitated.”30  
1.2 The devolution „niche‟ in the review process  
A cardinal theme in the entire constitutional review process is the role that devolution was to 
play in the new constitutional dispensation. Years of political centralisation and intolerance 
made Kenyans yearn to take control of their affairs. Thus, in the constitutional review process, 
devolution of powers was expected to “tame the interfering tendency on the part of the Central 
Government on the activities of sub-national government units”.31 This, according to Oyugi, 
“would be the first concern of the decentralisation/devolution project in Kenya”.32 Juma adds that 
the main aim of the review exercise was to restructure centralised state structures by “redefining 
the extent of executive power and widening the parameters for the exercise of individual rights 
and freedoms”.33 Indeed, Kenyans would accept any system of government other than a 
centralised state structure.34  
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Hence, a key assumption underlying the quest for devolution of power was that the final 
framework of devolved government should bring government closer to the people. This would 
enable people to influence government decisions impacting on them and thus participate 
effectively in governance.35 Indeed, while Kenyans could participate in regular elections, there 
was no substantial participation, seeing as elections had turned into a periodic ritual and 
people‟s sovereignty and rights had been circumvented.36 The majority of the people, excluding 
the ruling class and political elite, and including the marginalised and vulnerable, had been 
locked out of the political process. 37 
Moreover, after the 2007/2008 election violence, the quest for devolved government 
increasingly focused on the need to cultivate inter-ethnic harmony; this would entail addressing 
the issues of underdevelopment, inequality and socio-economic contestation that continue to 
define ethno-political conflict in Kenya. As the CKRC report notes, “The political establishment 
has since independence sought to pronounce ethnic identity as a constant threat to national 
unity while using the same to cause conflict, tension and even civil wars (ethnic clashes).”38 
Ethnic and political tensions are defined by real or perceived feelings that access to national 
resources and development are based on ethnicity, with ethnic communities at the “periphery” 
feeling excluded on these grounds.39 Devolution was increasingly seen as a means of 
enhancing equitable access to resources and development.  
The call for devolution of powers through constitutional reforms was also informed by global and 
regional trends wherein decentralisation was adopted as a means of state transformation. The 
end of the Cold War heralded a process of internal democratic processes in Eastern Europe, 
where centralised communist rule was gradually being abandoned.40 In Africa, there was 
continued enhancement of the “third wave of democratisation” that started in the 1970s.41 Oyugi 
observes that around this time, “in a survey of 75 developing countries with populations greater 
than 5 million, all but twelve claimed to have embarked on some form of transfer of political 
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power to local units of government”.42 Indeed, during the entire review process, no single view 
or person opposed the principle of devolving power.  
1.3 Resistance, stalemate and negotiations during the review process  
The process leading to the formation of the CKRC was not without controversy. The process 
became highly politicised, pitting together the KANU government, opposition politicians, civil 
society organisations and church groups. After the 1992 elections, opposition groups wanted 
reforms before the elections in 1997, calls to which church and civil society groups added their 
support. As a result, a caucus of political parties named the Inter-parliamentary Parties Group 
(IPPG) was formed. IPPG talks initially led to some minimal reforms,43 but more importantly an 
agreement was reached to have a constitutional review law enacted. The law was passed by 
parliament in November 1997 as the country went into elections.44  
In early 1998, after the elections, the government commenced the review process again, but 
church groups opposed the process, saying that the CKRC Act which had been passed in 
December 1997 vested control of the process within government. In support of their claim, the 
groups cited section 5 of the law, which gave the president power to appoint a chairman of the 
Review Commission. The government agreed to renegotiate the law, and several meetings 
were held in 1998 that involved the government, opposition parties, church groups and civil 
society organisations. Consensus was reached at a meeting held in October 1998 in which it 
was agreed that the Review Commission would be composed of 25 commissioners nominated 
by political parties, religious groups and civil society.45 A Bill reflecting the consensus was 
presented in parliament on 2 December 1998 and passed on that same day.  
While all other organisations nominated the number of persons required to the proposed 
commission, KANU sought to nominate two extra persons to the Review Commission, a move 
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which was vehemently opposed by political parties and led to an impasse. KANU announced its 
intention to take the matter back to parliament, a move that was opposed by the opposition and 
all other groups involved in the negotiations.46 Demonstrations were organised by opposition 
politicians, civil society and church groups in protest at the KANU proposal, with most of them 
ending up in violent confrontation with the police.47 
In February 1999 calls were made by opposition politicians, church groups and civil society 
organisations to start a parallel review process as a result of KANU‟s obstinacy.48 The parallel 
process commenced in December 1999 and was dubbed the Ufungamano Initiative.49 
Desperate to recapture the process, KANU restarted negotiations which led to an agreement to 
merge the parliamentary process and the Ufungamano Initiative.  
Meanwhile, Parliament appointed a select committee to collect views on the contentious issues 
and provide a way forward on the review process. The committee was established on 15 
December 199950 and finished its work in March 2000. The Committee recommended that 
Parliament should have power to appoint members of the commission that would collect and 
collate views as well as write a draft constitution. The chairman of the commission was to be 
appointed by the President from a list presented by parliament. The report was tabled in 
Parliament in April 2000 and adopted. A Bill was prepared which incorporated the committee 
recommendations. The final Act empowered parliament to set up the Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission comprised of 23 members. The government advertised positions, 
interviewed applicants and shortlisted 23 nominees. The president was to choose 15 
commissioners and a secretary from the list. On 10 November 2010, the final list of 
commissioners was released, and Yash Pal Ghai, an internationally recognised constitutional 
law professor, was appointed by the president to lead the Commission.51  
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Upon being formed, the CKRC Commissioners insisted on unification with the Ufungamano 
Initiative, which had already started collecting public views. After negotiations between the 
newly-formed CKRC, the Ufungamano Initiative and the Parliamentary Select Committee on 
Constitutional Review, it was agreed in December 2000 that the two processes should be 
merged. This necessitated an amendment of the CKRC Act to accommodate the 12 
Commissioners from the Ufungamano Initiative. The new CKRC composed of the 15 original 
commissioners, 10 new commissioners from the Ufungamano Initiative, and two nominees from 
the Parliamentary Select Committee, making a total of 27 Commissioners.52 
2. The first phase of constitutional review (April 2001 – November 2005) 
The first phase of the constitutional review process formally commenced in April 2001 after the 
final CKRC team was constituted. The review process was to be guided by the CKRC Act which 
reflected the consensus. With the legal framework in place to guide the process and the team, 
the process of collecting public views commenced. 
2.1 The legal obligations of the CKRC regarding devolution: the CKRC Act 1998  
While the main mandate of the CKRC was to collect and collate the views from Kenyans into a 
draft Constitution,53 the CKRC Act54 spelt out specific obligations with regard to devolution. The 
Act specifically required the CKRC to ensure that the people were able to “examine the various 
structures and systems of government including the federal and unitary systems and 
recommend an appropriate system for Kenya”.55 The CKRC was also required to ensure that 
Kenyans adequately “examine and review the place of local government in the constitutional 
organisation of the Republic of Kenya and the degree of devolution of powers to local 
authorities”. 56  
In carrying out these specific functions, the CKRC was to ensure that the constitutional review 
process as well as the new constitutional dispensation will “guarantee peace, national unity and 
integrity”.57 Furthermore, the objective of the review exercise was “to respect ethnic and regional 
diversity and community rights”, including “the right of communities to organise and participate 
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in cultural activities and express their identities”.58 In addition, the Act expressly recognised that 
“promoting the people‟s participation in the governance of the country”59 includes “the devolution 
and exercise of power”.60 The CKRC was also to facilitate public discussion on appropriate 
governmental and institutional structures to enable “constitutional governance and the respect 
of human rights and gender equity” as well as economic, social, religious, political and cultural 
development.61  
The CKRC Act contained extensive requirements for public participation in order realise the 
above objectives. The Act provided that the CKRC must establish constituency constitutional 
forums in all the then 210 parliamentary constituencies in order to facilitate public participation 
and consultation.62 The Act further required the CKRC to convene a National Constitutional 
Conference to discuss and debate any amendments, and adopt the report and draft constitution 
Bill that were to come out of the CKRC process.63 This would be followed by discussions in 
parliament, which was to approve the draft Bill adopted by the National Constitutional 
Conference. The Act also provided for a referendum vote on the draft constitution adopted by 
Parliament.64 Most of these provisions were incorporated through amendments to the original 
Act that was enacted in 1998. The amendments underpinned the participatory nature of the 
review process under the CKRC.65  
2.2 Public views presented to the CKRC on devolution  
Various views were presented to the CKRC through forums organised by the CKRC. However, 
with regard to devolution, there was little detail from the public on what institutional structures 
were to be adopted. Thus, while there was overwhelming public support for the principle of 
devolution,66 the principles, design features and other detailed issues concerning devolution did 
not emerge clearly. Consequently, the challenge facing the CKRC was, as stated earlier, to 
come up with a detailed and coherent devolution system that reflected the will of the people.  
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2.2.1 Organisation of the state structure: a federal or a unitary system?  
The CKRC had a specific legal obligation to facilitate public discussion and consultation on the 
suitability of a federal or unitary state structure in Kenya. While some sections of the country 
proposed a federal-like structure of government with a strong regional system of government 
akin to the independence regional governments, the majority of Kenyans called for a devolved 
system of government within a unitary state framework. The CKRC summarised public views on 
the structure of the state as thus:  
 
Although there was a general agreement among Kenyans that devolution is necessary, there was 
less agreement on its form and levels. While many people in provinces such as Coast and parts 
of the North Eastern and Rift Valley, proposed a federal form of devolution (majimbo), many 
people in Central, Nairobi, Eastern, Western and parts of Nyanza Provinces proposed devolution 
within a unitary system. In either case, few submissions of the Commission provided details. 
67
  
 
The support and opposition to a regional system of government was divided, with substantial 
support on both sides.68 However, in all cases, people supported a strong system of local 
government to offer services at the local level.69 People unequivocally called for “strengthened 
local government to support the state in local administrative, management and development 
activities”.70 Indeed, the CKRC concluded that there was no way that people would be content 
with a deconcentrated system of government or mere administrative decentralisation.71  
 
2.2.2 Levels, structures and functions of devolved government  
There was no public consensus on the levels or tiers of the devolved government structure. 
Some people supported the regional level of government while others called regions to be 
scrapped.72 Those in support of regions or provinces pointed that out that this level was 
important for purposes of coordination and supervision of local government and other lower 
levels. However, the local level, as opposed to the regional level, was preferred as the principal 
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unit of devolution.73 No direct views were received on technical and specific issues such as the 
division of powers and competences, intergovernmental relations, shared powers, and so on. 
Nonetheless, it is clear from the views briefly presented above that while regional and local 
levels received support, there was a clear support for a local level of government in the 
devolved government structure.  
2.2.3 The role of the local level in the devolved structure  
As the CKRC collected views around the country, it noted a feeling of widespread alienation 
from government due to concentration of powers at the centre.74 There were wide perceptions 
of “marginalisation and victimization due to political affiliation” and “unjust deprivation of 
resources”.75 The public was emphatic that central government functions should be 
decentralised,76 feeling that “there should be an end to the colonial and post-colonial history of 
excluding communities at the grassroots from participating in local governance”.77 As a result, 
there were strong direct and indirect calls for the strengthening of the local level in the devolved 
government structure to ensure that communities at level were in charge of government and 
public processes. There were also views that, whatever the system or levels of devolution and 
democratic representation chosen, it should result in greater control of resources, especially 
land, by local communities.78  
With regard to the then existing local government structures, there were strong calls for all 
offices of councillors to be elective and for the nomination of councillors to LAs by the minister 
for local government to cease.79 Furthermore, the public felt that mayors and chairs of LAs 
should be directly elected by the people as opposed to being nominated or elected at the 
council level.80 Moreover, people believed that local elections should not be based on party 
labels but focus on individuals.81 People specifically recommended that representatives of the 
Provincial Administration at the local level such as DCs, District Officers (DOs), chiefs and 
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assistant chiefs should be elected in order to enhance accountability.82 Furthermore, calls were 
made for local budgeting and participatory development processes at the local level.83 There 
were also strong views calling for local communities to control/regulate land.84 People told the 
CKRC as well that there should be mechanisms for local community involvement in land and 
other community resource management.85 The people called, too, for formal recognition of 
traditional leadership structures in the devolved system of government.86  
2.2.4 The Provincial Administration  
According to the CKRC, there was a very specific message from the public regarding the PA: 
the PA needed either to be scrapped altogether or made accountable to the public. Specific 
complaints about the system included the fact that apart from the chiefs and sub-chiefs, the 
administrators of the PA were appointed from outside and would thus not necessarily have 
knowledge of local issues and concerns.87 Complaints were also presented of nepotism, 
tribalism and political patronage through the appointment of PA officials.  
The PA structures for local development, such as the District Development Committees (DDCs), 
were said to be unrepresentative of the local community as “most members are civil servants 
who do not come from the area and often stay there for only a short while”.88 The PA seems to 
have infiltrated every single area of public life at the local level with a view of controlling local 
processes in a manner less than accountable to the people. For instance, people told the CKRC 
that the PA‟s “close association with the ruling party was felt to be an obstacle to fair voting – 
because it keeps order at polling stations and essentially conducts elections and the Electoral 
Commission heavily relies on it”.89 
The CKRC was also told that the PA refused to co-operate with the local authorities, ignoring 
their views and denying them licences as well as central government funds.90 Furthermore, the 
CKRC was told that the PA‟s “overall structure of decision–making bodies at the local level was 
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under-funded, bureaucratic, and excessively centralised”,91 thus making it inefficient in respect 
of the purposes it purportedly served.  
Accordingly, the public proposed “a gradual process of abolition of the PA and transfer [of] its 
functions to a new local government system”.92 At the very least, the CKRC recommended, “if 
the provincial system is retained, it must be more accountable to the people or be replaced with 
a strengthened elected local authority administration answerable to the people”.93 The public 
specifically called for replacement of the PA with strengthened local authority administrations, or 
with elected bodies, to enhance local accountability.94 The CKRC was thus clear on the public‟s 
position with regard to the PA: the system had to be scrapped or reined in by being made 
accountable to the public.  
2.2.5 Assessment of the public views to the CKRC  
First, it is clear that people were deeply dissatisfied with the centralisation policy of government 
traceable to the colonial period. This is evidenced by the overwhelming support for the 
devolution of powers and resources to the local level to facilitate participation in governance. 
The radical public proposals against the PA are evidence of deep-seated grievances with the 
post-independence government policies and structures of centralisation.  
Second, while the idea of devolution was supported universally with no single view opposing it, 
there was less agreement on the form that the structure should take. Of particular interest here 
is the fact that views on the role of regions differed significantly. The CKRC observed that areas 
such as the Rift Valley and Coast supported stronger regional governments while other areas 
opted for the local level. It is important to note that these same areas supported calls for 
majimbo at independence. Calls for the devolution of powers of control and regulation of land 
were also widely supported during hearings in the Rift Valley.95  
In one of the CKRC hearings held at in Nandi Hills town for Tinderet Constituency, local 
politicians and elders strongly supported a federal system as strong regions would ensure 
socio-economic development.96 The elders and leaders expressly clarified that federalism did 
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not mean the eviction of some communities from one region to another.97 The land question 
remained emotive throughout the meeting, with most speakers saying that the Nandi sub-tribe 
of the Kalenjin community lost heavily under colonial rule as well as post-independence 
government and should be compensated.98 In addition, speakers called for devolution of the 
management of land use and land resources to regions and local councils when the new 
constitution was passed.99  
The centrality of the land question to the review process and indeed to the broader question of 
transformation of the Kenyan state emerged clearly from public views. In one CKRC hearing, a 
member of the public stated:  
We know the constitution made a mistake; let us correct the mistakes. The first Kenyatta 
government should have returned the land to others first. Replacement has been from white 
settlers to black settlers, so that system should not be there. Let the government again politely in 
a good way redistribute the land again to the owner for the sake of justice and for survival. I have 
heard some people say no, we do not have to talk about that, it is tribalism no, we are tribes that 
is a fact. There is nothing we can do about it so it is there and we decide we are talking about it, 
we put it aside it will never die and people continue living miserably. We do not want to reach a 
state of hopelessness, we do not want to reach a state of ready to die and die with many innocent 
people, we want things to work comfortably and smoothly. I am saying this, because I know I am 
a Sabaot, I know it. Bwana Commissioners, the question of how we govern ourselves will come 
later on, let us solve the land issue first. Then we shall go to others. How we govern ourselves is 
later on, this is a question of willing seller, willing buyer is not a very good thing for the minority 
who have low economic power. I wish we go into the federal system and we have different tribes, 
we become one in diverse communities in Kenya, and let live each other, we do not want hatred; 
for sure Sabaots in Kitale or Bungoma look at us in a very funny way because they know it is their 
land but they would like to extinguish us if possible so that they can take everything, in court we 
will refuse, and God has refused. Israels are back in Jerusalem, so nothing will stop that kind of 
thing ...
100
  
It is clear from the above statement that addressing the land question remains emotive and will 
form a critical part of a solution to ethnic conflict and development in some parts of the country. 
Loss of land was tied to ethnic identity; it was not an individual loss but group or tribal loss. 
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Inevitably, land issues entered the debate on devolution in the form of a call for stronger regions 
and devolution of control over land to regional units. Not unexpectedly, the CKRC made a 
specific recommendation for investigation and resolution of historical claims in the Rift Valley, 
Coast and parts of North Eastern.101 One author argues that unresolved land issues in areas 
such as the Rift Valley have always infiltrated national issues such as elections, referenda and 
the review exercise,102 a claim demonstrated in the CKRC exercise.103  
Rather than propose that the management of land be devolved to regions, the CKRC 
recommended only that the matter be investigated separately and appropriate measures taken. 
This recommendation, it is submitted, stems from recognition that while conflict resolution can 
be managed through devolution, there is a need for mechanisms complementary to it. In this 
case, land reform and historical grievances over land can be addressed, as recommended by 
the CKRC, only through appropriate land laws and land administrative policies. In most cases, 
land administration and policy has been a national function, and while devolved governments 
play a role in respect of regional and local land planning and development, it is almost always a 
peripheral role. Thus, other measures outside the devolved government framework need to be 
instituted.  
2.2.6 The proposed devolution structure in the CKRC Draft Bill (the „Ghai Draft‟)  
In late 2001 the CKRC developed a draft constitution, popularly known as the “Ghai Draft” after 
the first Chairman of the CKRC, Prof. Yash Pal Ghai.104 The CKRC draft was to form the basis 
for discussions at the National Constitutional Conference convened and managed by the CKRC.  
The CKRC draft provided for five levels of government: national, provincial, district, locational 
and village government.105 The draft proposed creating eight provincial governments and 70 
district governments (including Nairobi).106 Communities at the village level were to decide the 
leadership structure of the village government, that is, whether it was to be a council of elders or 
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local elected persons.107 Representatives from the village government would constitute 
locational governments. The district government was to be the principal unit of devolution,108 
and administrators were to be elected by registered voters in the district. The executive power of 
provinces would be exercised by the Provincial Executive Council composed of all district 
administrators in a province.109 Legislative powers were to be exercised by a provincial council 
composed of persons nominated into the council by the district councils of a province. 
With regard to functions, the CKRC draft was vague on the role of provinces, which included: 
building the capacity of districts; enhancing cooperation between district councils; and 
formulating plans for exploitation of provincial resources (which were not specified).110 As the 
principal unit of devolution, the district government had its functions listed in a schedule. These 
included local service delivery, development planning and typically local services.111 The 
seventh schedule shared functions between the national government and district governments 
only. Further sharing of functions between the other levels of government was to be done 
through enabling legislation.112 The draft provided that cities and municipalities had the status of 
a district, and smaller urban areas, that of a location.113 Relations between the different 
governments were to be defined further in enabling legislation. 
At the national level, the CKRC draft proposed an upper house, named the National Council and 
composed of elected members from the 70 districts to represent the devolved units.114 While the 
Draft Bill also contained provisions for vertical and horizontal intergovernmental relations,115 as 
well as for the division of revenue between national government and devolved governments,116 
most of the issues were left to an Act of parliament including matters concerning taxes.117 The 
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CKRC thus chose a unitary structure with powers devolved to 70 sub-regional units. The draft 
also expressly abolished the Provincial Administration.118  
2.3 Deliberations on devolution at the National Constitutional Conference  
In accordance with its mandate, the CKRC convened the National Constitutional Conference 
(NCC) to discuss the draft discussed above. The NCC (popularly known as Bomas, named after 
the venue of the Conference, “Bomas of Kenya”) was held from 28 October 2002119 to 12 
January 2004 when the “Bomas Draft” was adopted.120 However, the conference did not run 
consecutively as it was interrupted by a number of activities, among them the national elections 
in December 2002. As a result, the conference was held in three sessions entitled Bomas I, 
Bomas II and Bomas III, all of which took place after the 2002 elections.121  
While the devolution structure proposed in the CKRC Draft proved inadequate in the Bomas I 
discussions, the structure was gradually improved upon as deliberations progressed. It was 
clear from Bomas I that technical details of devolution could not be ironed out and agreed at the 
plenary.122 A proposal was thus made that the plenary build a general consensus on issues and 
leave the technical details to a smaller taskforce or working committee composed of CKRC 
Commissioners and a section of the NCC delegates.123  
2.3.1 Bomas I deliberations  
At the start of the Bomas I discussions, the Chairman stated that the CKRC was not comfortable 
with the chapter on devolution in the CKRC draft.124 He asked delegates to discuss a separate 
document which had been circulated to them, saying it was an improved version. However, this 
proposal was rejected by the plenary,125 and discussions were held on the original CKRC 
                                               
118
 Article 223.  
119
 This was the date gazetted for the conference to begin formally; pre-conference activities had begun from 21 
October 2002. See CKRC (2005) 349.  
120
 CKRC (2005) 349.  
121
 CKRC (2005) 349.  
122
 CKRC/National Constitutional Conference (NCC) „Verbatim report of plenary proceedings: Presentation of the 
Draft Bill - Chapter Ten, Devolution of Powers - held at the Bomas of Kenya on 22, 23 and 26 March 2003‟ (2003a) 
278.  
123
 CKRC/NCC (2003a) 278. 
124
 CKRC/NCC (2003a) 7.  
125
 CKRC/NCC (2003a) 23-28.  
 
 
 
 
164 
 
draft.126 In his presentation, the Chairman stated that the CKRC, based on the simple views 
received from Kenyans, took the liberty to choose the kind of design needed. The CKRC chose 
neither a federal nor unitary system, due to the former‟s complex nature and disconnection from 
the centre, and the latter‟s tendency to (re)centralise, a fact all too familiar from Kenya‟s 
history.127 The CKRC also chose the district over the province as the preferred level of 
devolution, because provinces, especially the larger ones,128 were far removed from the villager 
at the rural local level.129  
The proposal to devolve to the local level was supported by representatives of marginalised and 
minority groups as a means of bringing about effective participation in government.130 Other 
delegates even called for the scrapping of the regional level and retention of only the national 
and local levels.131 However, among some delegates there was confusion between the 
proposed devolved structure and the PA system, which the CKRC draft had actually expressly 
proposed to abolish.132 Many gaps were also pointed out in the CKRC draft chapter on 
devolution, with some participants maintaining that no clear design of the structure emerged 
from the draft.133 However, it also emerged that delegates needed documents and materials to 
guide them on technical areas of devolution.134 This prompted the chairman to suggest a 
general discussion and leave the technical details to a committee. 
2.3.2 Preparations for Bomas II: further research and consultation on devolution  
The discussions on devolution were led by the NCC technical committee comprised of 60 
members drawn from the NCC delegates, and included two members of the CKRC who served 
as rapporteurs.135 The technical committee organised consultative forums, study tours and other 
research activities to do with devolution. A smaller group proved sufficient to address gaps that 
had emerged during the conference and which clearly needed more time and research. 
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Increasing numbers of issues were raised at consultative forums about the proposed devolved 
government structure.  
A special working document prepared by the CKRC was distributed to delegates after the 
Bomas I. The document included the issues that came up during Bomas I and was used at the 
NCC and other forums organised by the CKRC to discuss devolution.136 The special working 
document recognised the strong support for devolution by delegates during Bomas I, but noted 
concerns about the economic viability of the devolved structure. Specifically, delegates had 
called for a reduction of district governments, 77 in total.137 The special working document also 
suggested that, among the principles of devolution in the Act, one of them should provide that 
“in appropriate cases, the higher levels of government exercise restraint in favour of the lower 
levels of devolved government”.138  
The special working document also reminded the NCC of the role that devolution should play in 
term of: resolving conflict and accommodating ethnic and other diversity;139 acting as a check 
and balance on the exercise of national power;140 enhancing participatory democracy; and 
improving efficiency and effectiveness in developmental functions.141 In arriving at these views, 
the document acknowledged the recorded public views to the CKRC on devolution.142 
Furthermore, the document noted that the majority of the delegates in Bomas I supported the 
local level as opposed to the regional level as the principal level of devolving power.143  
The document suggested some changes to the CKRC Draft discussed in Bomas I. It called for 
the allocation of functions to be more clearly defined.144 It also emphasised that revised 
functions should enable devolved levels to the check on exercise of powers,145 ensure efficiency 
and equity in management of resources, and promote political accommodation, including 
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minorities and marginalised groups.146 The document suggested that devolution should be 
incorporated into general but vital constitutional provisions such as the preamble, sovereignty 
and supremacy of the constitution, the republic, national goals, values and principles as well as 
bill of rights.147 At the national level, the special document called for enhanced legislative 
functions and powers for the upper chamber of the national legislature.148  
Based on the special working document and the revised Chapter that was rejected by the 
plenary during Bomas I,149 the levels of government were reduced from the initial five to four by 
excluding the village level. The four levels were national, zonal, local government and locational 
levels; the zonal level had 18 units.150  
In a workshop organised by the technical committee,151 the issue of drawing of boundaries and 
accommodation of diversity emerged.152 It was reported that there was uneasiness in zoning 
certain districts such as Mt Elgon and Trans-Nzoia,153 and that “there was fear of possible ethnic 
hostilities in the wake of zoning”.154 The two districts were generally considered as ethnically 
distinct from other districts in the former province and were thus “special minorities”. Drawing on 
the German experience, an expert invited to the workshop noted that the zones seemed to be 
drawn along ethnic lines, which might heighten ethnic tension between the different zonal 
governments.155 He also noted that, for purposes of viability, there was a need to reduce the 
number of zones to 9 or 10 from the 18 zones provided for in the revised chapter. 156 However, 
redrawing boundaries on natural or non-ethnic had to be undertaken with caution as it held the 
potential for opening “old wounds” and renewing boundary conflict.157  
The parallel systems of service delivery through “local authorities, the PA and the emerging 
constituency forum”, also surfaced during the workshop. It was pointed out that these parallel 
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systems should be fused through the reform process in order to enhance efficiency in service 
delivery.158  
2.3.3 Bomas II deliberations   
A lot of discussions and consultation had taken place during the break between Bomas I and II, 
and by the time plenary discussions on devolution resumed, the technical committee on 
devolution had a firmer grip of the issues. The rapporteur of the technical committee presented 
three options of how zones, being the larger devolution units, could be demarcated in the new 
constitution.159 The first option had 10 zones as devolution units, the second had 13, and the 
last, 19.160 A close examination of the clustering of the three options reveals that option one had 
mixed and bigger ethnic enclaves, 161 option two also had bigger but both mixed and ethnically 
exclusive zones,162 while option three had smaller and ethnically exclusive units.163  
The majority of the delegates who responded to the three options supported the third option.164 
Oyugi comments that the “third option is the recommended one and indeed the one which 
received greater support on the floor of the conference”.165 The third option had 19 units and 
smaller and exclusive ethnic enclaves, unlike the first two options which had some mixed units.  
There were other calls for the constituency level, then composed of 210 units, to form part of the 
local devolved structures.166 Many delegates who spoke also called for specification of a definite 
proportion of national revenue that should be devolved to regional and local units.167 After 
Bomas II, the technical committee prepared a report which was presented in Bomas III and 
incorporated the discussions in Bomas II. The final report noted that many delegates still wanted 
the districts as the principal point of devolution and that delegates had proposed that the then 
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existing administrative districts under the PA should form that level.168 However, the report 
noted that the NCC wanted the administrative district boundaries only as an interim measure 
until a permanent independent boundary review mechanism was established to review the 
boundaries using objective criteria.169 
2.3.4 Bomas III deliberations  
The final NCC plenary on devolution was held in November 2005, and the technical committee 
presented its report incorporating the discussions from the last plenary and the committee 
deliberations. The rapporteur stated that public views, and deliberations by the plenary and the 
committee, revealed three main objectives of devolution: enhancing local people‟s participation 
in governance within the Kenya state; efficient and accessible service delivery; and the 
equitable distribution of access to resources. 170  
The technical committee agreed on four levels of government: national, regional, district and 
location governments.171 District governments were to be the principal devolution units and 
vested with local government powers and functions.172 Constituencies were rejected as points of 
devolution on two points. First, the constituencies were demarcated on the basis of national 
electoral representation which followed different criteria. Second, it was thought that MPs should 
concentrate on legislative business, and using the parliamentary constituencies could have 
formed a basis for their direct involvement in matters of local development. It was also pointed 
out that using the constituency as a unit for local development would infringe on the principle of 
separation of powers and functions.173  
While the revised CKRC chapter had provided for 19 units, the devolution committee later 
unanimously agreed to reduce the regions to 14. The regions were reduced from the 19 
proposed in the third option, which received a nod during Bomas II, to 14 regions, largely due to 
considerations of cost and economic viability.174 The committee called for the formation of an 
independent commission to determine vertical and horizontal division of revenue. The technical 
committee also recognised the need for harmonisation of its findings with those of the finance 
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committee which dealt with allocation of fiscal and financial functions.175 While the committee 
agreed to have four levels of government, it was recommended that only the district level have 
revenue-raising powers.176  
The report of the technical committee was well received during Bomas III; however, controversy 
about other parts of the constitutional review process – and specifically the structure of the 
national executive – nearly derailed the conference.177 There was a mass walk-out from the 
conference by ministers and MPs allied to the then ruling arm of the coalition government.178 
This was followed by a public announcement by the then Vice-president that that the national 
executive had formally withdrawn from the NCC, citing political interference that had 
compromised the process.179 The chairman and the rest of the delegates resolved to go ahead 
with the conference without the participation of the national executive. However, the latter‟s 
withdrawal is said to have obviated consideration of further models of devolved governance.180 
2.3.5 Proposed devolution structure in the „Bomas Draft‟  
The “Bomas Draft” was adopted on 15 March 2004.181 The devolution chapter incorporated the 
input and consensus of the NCC on devolution. The main features of devolved government 
under the “Bomas Draft” were that it provided for four levels – national, regional, district, and 
location government182 – and thus excluded the village government level in the CKRC draft.  
The district was retained as the principal unit of devolution.183 The district governor (changed 
from district administrator in the CKRC draft) and district councillors were to be directly elected 
by voters. Executive authority of the district governments would be exercised by a district 
council whose members were appointed by the district governor with approval of the district 
council.184 The Regional Assembly was to be composed of persons nominated from district 
councils. Executive powers at the regional level were to be exercised by a regional executive 
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committee headed by a regional chief executive. The latter and the deputy were to be elected 
by regional assemblies. The chief executive was then to appoint a regional executive committee 
with the approval of the regional assembly.185 Location government, the last level, was to be 
composed of elected representatives in the locational council and an elected location 
administrator.186 Nairobi was made a “special region”, with the mayor as the chief executive and 
deputy mayor as the deputy chief executive.187 The draft created 14 regions, including Nairobi, 
and 68 district governments, including four boroughs crafted out of the Nairobi region.188  
The Fourth Schedule distributed functions between the four levels of government.189 However, 
while functions were distributed to the four levels, the principal and substantial functions were 
allocated to the national and district levels. Taxation powers and functions were only divided 
between the districts and the national government in a separate schedule.190 Regional 
government functions included inter-district coordination, regional planning and formulation of 
regional policy and standards, monitoring and evaluation, delivery of “regional services” (not 
defined in the schedules) and capacity assistance to districts. Location governments were 
primarily supposed to facilitate community participation and coordination at community level.  
The Bomas Draft‟s provisions on intergovernmental relations were an improvement upon those 
in the CKRC Draft. Provisions that required cooperation between the different levels of 
government in performance of functions were introduced for the first time,191 and a requirement 
for amicable settlement of intergovernmental disputes was also introduced.192 Elaborate 
provisions dealing with conflict of laws between the different levels of government were 
introduced, and criteria were stipulated as to when national law would prevail over sub-national 
legislation and vice-versa.193 
At the national level, the Bomas Draft established a senate as the second chamber of the 
national legislature, with legislative powers and representatives elected by the district councils 
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through college votes.194 The role of the senate as a representative of devolved units was 
recognised in the chapter on devolution, which stated:  
The principal role of the senate is to provide for an institution through which the devolved levels of 
government share and participate in the formulation and enactment of national legislation and to 
protect the interests of the Regional, District and Locational governments
195
  
Furthermore, the Bomas Draft provided for special voting procedures; senators were to cast 
bloc votes as regions on matters affecting regions and districts (regional votes) and individual 
votes on other matters not affecting regions and districts.196   
2.3.6 Assessment of the Bomas deliberations and the „Bomas Draft‟  
A review of the devolved government structure provided in the Bomas Draft reveals several 
improvements on the initial CKRC draft. Indeed, the CKRC had itself unsuccessfully attempted 
to introduce an improved version during Bomas I discussions. The improvements can be 
attributed to the more detailed and technical work done by the NCC technical committee on 
devolution. The break between Bomas I and II provided ample time for the committee members 
to carry out more research, organise consultative forums with experts, and conduct study visits 
in order to assess comparative experiences on devolution that would be useful to Kenya.  
Clear themes for devolution started emerging as the technical committee carried on its 
deliberations. First, it was clear that people‟s views collected by the CKRC and NCC plenary 
deliberations were in support of a stronger local level. This was captured through the devolution 
of power to districts as opposed to the regions or provinces. The technical committee realised 
the importance of ensuring effective representation of devolved units at the centre in order to 
guard against (re)centralisation. Thus, the role of the second chamber, as a representative of 
interests of regions and districts, was greatly enhanced in the Bomas Draft. Furthermore, 
location governments were given the primary function of ensuring “local self-determination” at 
the community level, which implies a strong participatory element in governance at the local 
level.   
Second, accommodation of diversity and protection of minorities also started emerging strongly. 
During the NCC deliberations, representatives of minorities and marginalised groups supported 
devolution to the local level. The issue of accommodation of ethnic diversity through 
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demarcation of local units was also discussed during consultative forums. Option three on 
devolved units (19 ethnically exclusive regional units), which was widely supported, seemed to 
grant most of the areas considered as minorities their own regional enclaves. At the national 
level, the Bomas Draft provided for representation of minorities and marginalised groups in the 
senate.197  
Third, the economic viability and development potential of devolved units was also a major 
factor in the deliberations, influencing some of the major decisions taken in the course of the 
entire NCC process. For instance, the shift from 19 regions, supported during Bomas II, to 12 
regions in the Bomas Draft was explained as thus:  
Firstly, fewer regions were more economically viable. Secondly, since regions would be mainly 
coordinative units, there was merit in having fewer regions. The general public mood also 
favoured fewer regions. Finally, the committee took the view that the fewer regions there were, 
the lesser the cost of running the proposed devolution structure would be.
198
  
It cannot be argued conclusively that public views were exclusively in favour of a definite 
number of levels or devolved units. Therefore, the CKRC and the NCC had to make certain 
decisions, and it is the factors which influenced such decisions that show what purpose was 
pursued by a particular design. For instance, the 19 regions presented to Bomas II placed 
districts with ethnic minorities such as Teso, Mt. Elgon and Kuria in smaller regions where they 
could have substantial representation within the region. However, the decision to reduce the 
regions to 14 “diluted” the arrangements and made the minority districts smaller within larger 
regions. It can be concluded that while the accommodation of diversity issues as taken into 
consideration, economic viability and development arguments were overriding. 
Oyugi argues that while there was clear support by delegates for the 19 regions during Bomas 
II, no sound reasons for the choices were advanced in the debates.199 Oyugi also criticises the 
technical committee for deciding on three devolved levels based on the experience of 
developed countries whose context is different from that of Kenya.200 This was in reference to a 
statement in which the Committee noted “that comparative studies indicate that most developed 
countries have three levels of government. Taking into account the need to bring government 
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closer to the people we propose a reduction of the number of levels of government from five to 
four.”201  
Oyugi also raises concerns about the removal of the village government, arguing that it was vital 
for fulfilment of the objective of giving power for self-governance to the people at all levels and 
enhancing participatory governance.202 Indeed, the Chairman of the CKRC/NCC had opposed 
the deletion of village governments from the CKRC draft, but was prevailed upon by the 
committee.203 While the main reason advanced for deleting the village government was its cost, 
especially in setting administrative structures, Oyugi argues that village government did not 
necessarily need to have the same institutional and administrative structures as the other 
levels.204 A 1995 government report had also recommended formation of village forums in order 
to enhance participation in governance and development at the local level.205 
Lastly, while the chapter on devolution improved significantly in the Bomas Draft, it is important 
to trace the basis of these improvements and new provisions. The Bomas Draft borrowed 
heavily from the South African system of devolution. The key features introduced from the South 
African system include the specialised voting procedures of South Africa‟s National Council of 
Provinces (NCOP). Provincial delegates to the NCOP cast provincial votes through their 
respective heads of delegations on matters concerning provinces, and cast individual votes on 
all other matters not concerning provinces.206  
Furthermore, Article 210 of the Bomas Draft was a replica of section 146 of the South African 
constitution, which provides for how conflict between provincial and national laws should be 
addressed. Thus the same criteria were applied to conflict between national and regional/district 
laws in the case of Kenya. Moreover, the Bomas Draft also borrowed the concept of 
“cooperative government” from the South African constitution, which has a whole chapter 
dedicated to the subject.207 Although Kenya did not borrow the entire chapter, Article 208 
contains provisions that call for fostering cooperation between the different levels of 
government, encourage amicable settlement of disputes and expressly discourage judicial 
adjudication – provisions akin to the South African ones. 
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It is important to note that South Africa was among the few countries in Africa, including Uganda 
and Ethiopia that had recently adopted new constitutions with elaborate provisions on 
decentralisation. Thus, South Africa was bound to have a major influence on Kenya and indeed 
other African countries pursuing decentralisation through constitutional reforms. The breaks 
between sessions during the NCC deliberations enabled CKRC commissioners and members of 
the technical committee to carry out more research, with South Africa being one of the countries 
whose devolved system was studied. Three CKRC commissioners visited South Africa and held 
discussions with key departments and institutions dealing with provincial and local government 
matters. Furthermore, some of the commissioners had studied constitutional law in South Africa, 
and were thus influenced by the provisions of the South African constitution on devolution.  
Kokott recognises the heavy influence that comparative scholars can have in transplanting, and 
borrowing from, systems. Commenting on the influence of the German system on South Africa, 
Kokott argues thus on the influence of scholars:  
In those times, the reception and transplantation of constitutional models and ideas depended 
much more upon individual scholars having a particular interest in a specific foreign constitutional 
order or upon scholars who had spent some time abroad studying a foreign system whose 
concepts they brought home. ... Thus, the fact that many South African constitutionalists have 
been visiting scholars in Germany considerably contributed to the German system‟s influence 
upon the new South African constitutional order.
208
  
The devolution chapter in the current Kenyan constitution (discussed extensively in the next 
chapter) borrowed many provisions from the South African system. Kokott‟s observation about 
the German system‟s influence in South Africa also holds true of South Africa‟s in Kenya.  
2.4 After Bomas: mutilation of the „Bomas Draft‟ and the 2005 referendum  
The CKRC Act 1998 required the CKRC to hand over the “Bomas Draft” to Parliament for 
debate and approval.209 The National Assembly was thereafter required to debate the Draft and, 
with the assistance of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitutional Reform,210 propose 
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changes to the draft and make recommendations to the Attorney General.211 The Attorney 
General was in turn supposed to receive the proposals, make the suggested changes and 
publish it as the proposed new constitution which was to be subjected to a national 
referendum.212  
However, Parliament became a site for political wrangles that extended from the NCC period 
when the government withdrew from the NCC deliberations. Politicians developed “consensus 
documents” in purported bids to strike a deal on the controversial matter of the structure of the 
national executive, a matter which had led the executive to withdraw from the NCC process.213 
One group of politicians wanted a parliamentary system with a powerful prime minister, while 
the other wanted a presidential system of government with parliamentary checks and balances. 
In the same period, civil society activists who had actively supported the review process moved 
to court to block the referendum by challenging its legality. The petitioners did so by invoking 
section 47 of the former constitution, which allowed “alteration” only through amendment rather 
than comprehensive review.214 However, the court rejected this argument, ruling that “alteration 
of the constitution” should, unlike ordinary legislation, be construed widely in order to allow 
comprehensive reforms.215 The court ordered that the referendum vote should proceed as per 
the CKRC Act.  
Meanwhile, parliament presented the constitutional draft to the Attorney General for drafting, 
along with other statements on parliamentary consensus regarding the contentious issues. 
However, when the “Proposed New Constitution 2005” was finally published by the Attorney 
General, drastic changes had been made to the “Bomas Draft”, especially the provisions on 
devolved government. The release of the Proposed New Constitution 2005”, named the “Wako 
Draft” (after the then Attorney General Amos Wako), sparked an immediate outcry by a number 
of politicians, civil society groups and even CKRC commissioners.  
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2.4.1 Devolution structure in the Proposed New Constitution 2005 (the „Wako Draft‟)   
The “Wako Draft” introduced far-reaching changes to the provisions on devolved government in 
the “Bomas Draft”. First, the draft removed the three levels of government provided for in 
“Bomas Draft” and created districts as the next and only level of devolved government after the 
national level.216 The national government and district government functions listed in the 
schedules remained more or less the same. With regard to conflict of national and district 
legislation, the “Wako Draft” removed the “Bomas provision”, which provided instances where 
sub-national laws prevail, and introduced a new provision which expressly provided that in case 
of conflict, national legislation was to prevail over all district legislation.217 Furthermore, the 
provisions in the Bomas Draft promoting amicable settlement of disputes were deleted. The 
Wako Draft simply provided that dispute resolution mechanisms will be provided for through 
enabling legislation.218  
At the national level, the “Wako Draft” established a unicameral parliament and deleted the 
provisions on the Senate (second chamber) in the Bomas Draft.219 To cater for interests of the 
districts at the national level, the “Wako Draft” established a “loose” structure named “National 
Forum for District Governments and Other Fora”.220 The functions listed for the structure were: 
coordinating of inter-district matters;221 advising government on affairs of district governments;222 
and nominating district government representatives to the Commission on Revenue 
Allocation.223 Enabling legislation was to provide for composition and membership of the 
National Forum as well as procedures of conducting business.224  
2.4.2 Assessment of the devolution structure in the „Wako Draft‟  
There is no doubt that the Attorney General went beyond his mandate in the CKRC Act by 
making material alterations to the Bomas Draft. The Attorney General was required only to 
“redraft” the “Bomas Draft” into a Constitution Bill for the referendum vote. The Attorney General 
destroyed what the public, the CKRC and NCC delegates had painstakingly built. The national 
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executive, which had withdrawn from the process during the Bomas III discussions, found the 
Attorney General‟s office a convenient point to push its agenda. For instance, powers of the 
Prime Minister as provided for in the Bomas Draft were substantially weakened in the Wako 
Draft.225  
There were no stated reasons from the Office of the Attorney General for the radical changes to 
the devolved government structure in the Bomas Draft, making it difficult to understand the 
intention underlying them. Deeper analysis is hence required of the context within which the 
devolved structure – developed through participation and consensus – was literally torn apart. 
Ideally, what the devolved government attempted to do was to dismantle a system of centralised 
and personal rule that had alienated the same people it was meant to serve.226 The immediate 
former constitution, for instance, gave the president unfettered powers over parliament, and a 
powerful senate may have been perceived as a threat to an incumbent who was then preparing 
for another term in office. Centralisation allowed the elite, mainly drawn from the president‟s 
community, to benefit unfairly from state resources, as witnessed in all the three regimes since 
independence. Devolution was thus a direct threat to entrenched interests. Indeed, Kanyinga 
argues that the Wako Draft was defeated at the referendum “because the Kikuyu political elite, 
who were in central positions in government, were not keen to share political power with other 
tribes”.227  
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The Office of the Attorney General has been used in several other ways, all too familiar even to 
ordinary Kenyans, to subvert the people‟s will, entrench personal rule, plunder national 
resources, and further political impunity.228 The Bomas Draft landed in an office whose holder 
played a key role in furthering political impunity, and it is very unlikely that the devolution design 
– which sought to deconstruct the centralised state – could leave the Attorney General‟s office 
unscathed. Phrases such as “the national government” were replaced with “the Government” in 
the Wako Draft in a bid to emphasise the pre-eminence of the central government over the 
districts. This shows the extent to which the idea of devolution based on autonomy and equality 
of national and sub-national spheres of government was detested by persons entrenched in the 
centralised system of government.  
The Wako Draft was defeated by a 58 percent vote in the national referendum held in 
November 2005. It has been noted that Kenyans rejected the Wako Daft specifically because 
the devolution structure that was negotiated and agreed upon was interfered with by forces 
resisting change.229  
2.5 Ethnic conflict and politicisation of the constitutional review: the 2005 referendum 
and 2007 elections  
2.5.1 Build-up to the 2007 violence: referendum and election campaigns  
While Kenya experienced politically-instigated ethnic clashes in the 1992 and 1997 elections in 
parts of the Rift Valley and the Coastal region, no such violence was witnessed in the 2002 
elections or during the 2005 referendum.230 However, the 2007 elections saw violence that 
almost degenerated into civil war.231 The build-up to the 2007 violence can be traced to the 
collapse of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), a coalition of parties that brought Mwai 
Kibaki to power in 2002.232 Moi had completed his final term and proposed a KANU presidential 
                                               
228
 Indeed, in his statement after conducting a visit to Kenya in February 2009, Phillip Alston, the former UN Special 
Rapporteur stated: „Mr Wako is the embodiment in Kenya of the phenomenon of impunity‟ (UN Special Rapporteur on 
extra-judicial, arbitrary or summary executions Mission to Kenya available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/52DF4BE7194A7598C125756800539D79?opendocument) 
(accessed 1 March 2012).  
229
 Ghai (2008) 212.  
230
 Lochery E & Anderson D „Violence and exodus in Kenya‟s  Rift Valley, 2008: Predictable and preventable? (2008) 
2 (2) Journal of Eastern African Studies 329; Kanyinga (2009) 326.  
231
 Lochery & Anderson (2008) 328.  
232
 Chege M „Kenya: Back from the brink?‟ (2008) 19 (4) Journal of Democracy 129-130.  
 
 
 
 
179 
 
candidate to stand for elections in 2002. His action led to a stream of defections from KANU to 
the opposition. The two main opposition groupings, the National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) led by 
Mwai Kibaki and the Rainbow Alliance led by Raila Odinga, united to field a single candidate 
against Uhuru Kenyatta, Moi‟s preferred candidate of KANU.  
However, after NARC emerged victorious and formed the government in 2003, Kibaki reneged 
on a pre-election Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on sharing of cabinet positions and key 
government positions.233 The political differences percolated into the constitutional review which 
started soon after the elections in 2003. While the NAK allied to Kibaki proposed a strong 
presidential system, Rainbow Alliance members proposed a parliamentary system with a 
ceremonial president and a Prime Minister who is head of government. These differences 
heightened with the publication of the Wako Draft, which was to be put to a vote in the 
referendum.  
The NAK wing of the coalition campaigned for a “Yes” vote while most of the Rainbow Alliance 
members campaigned for a “No” vote. There were clear ethnic undertones in the campaigns, 
with the Proposed Constitution being interpreted as determination by the ruling Kikuyu elite to 
preserve their entrenched interests in the centralised system of government. The results of the 
referendum reflected the political divisions among the political leaders. The “No” vote won in 
regions such as Nyanza, Western Province and Coastal regions where the Rainbow Alliance 
had a huge support base. The “Yes” vote won in Central Province and Eastern Provinces, 
considered strong NAK zones. The Nairobi region voted “No” with the vote being almost equally 
split.234  
Following the referendum victory, the “No” side transformed itself into a political party, the 
Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).235 The President dissolved the Cabinet and reconstituted 
a fresh one without the Ministers who were in the “No” campaign. This set the stage for further 
political divisions as the country prepared for the 2007 presidential elections. The ODM party 
was split into two parties: ODM and ODM-Kenya. However, Raila Odinga of ODM and Kibaki, 
who had joined the Party of National Unity (PNU), emerged as the major contenders for the 
presidential seat. Political campaigns were emotive, and the old but ever-present issues of land 
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and “majimbo” emerged during the referendum campaign. Karuti explains how the debate over 
regions was reflected in the party policies of ODM and PNU:  
From a policy point of view, the main opposition, the Orange Democratic Movement, supported 
the majimbo system and argued that devolution would be pursued as a policy to enable people to 
make decisions on matters around their regions. The governmental Party of National Unity, 
however, argued against Majimbo, describing it as a bad policy for the country because it would 
undermine national cohesion. The party argued that majimbo would lead to eviction of people 
from certain regions on the basis of historical claims to territories.
236
  
Lochery and Anderson add that “the key element in the campaign for the Rift Valley vote was 
Odinga‟s support for constitutional change and majimboism”.237 The PNU side saw devolution 
as a “constitutional cover for ethnic cleansing”.238 ODM did not at any point advocate for 
expulsion of communities; however, ODM leaders remained “persistently vague” on what 
devolution would entail.239 
Incidentally, the majimbo debate became commonly understood in areas like the Rift Valley as 
implying that communities that settled outside their “home regions” would be evicted and pre-
colonial ethnic spheres restored.240 Even at independence, there were reports of “foreigners” 
being evicted in April 1964 from places such as Timau in the Central/Eastern region, South 
Baringo in the Rift Valley, and Bungoma and Kitale in the Western region in the brief period of 
existence of the majimbo constitution.241 The final report of the CoE recalls that the 2005 
referendum campaigns were marked by “distortion and incitement based on ethnicity and tribal 
affiliation”.242 Ethnic appeals led to ethnic polarisation as voting day approached.  
2.5.2 On the brink of civil war: violence after the 2007/2008 elections  
While the announcement of the presidential election results on 30 December 2007 was the 
immediate trigger of the widespread violence, the delay in releasing the results had already 
caused unrest in areas such as Kisumu, the home-town of the opposition candidate, Raila 
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Odinga. The announcement of Kibaki as the winner saw violence in Nairobi, the Rift Valley, 
Coast region, Nyanza, and Western provinces – the regions where ODM drew its largest 
support.243  
Kanyinga identifies four patterns in the violence. First, there were riots and looting as people 
protested at the results, claiming that the elections were rigged and a “denial of justice”. 
Second, this was followed by police descending on protesters and sometimes using excessive 
force as they tried to quell the riots and restore calm. Third, there were coordinated attacks in 
which politicians, businessmen and other influential persons used the youth to attack other 
communities in the Rift Valley. Members of the Kikuyu and Kisii communities were attacked, 
and their businesses looted and properties burnt down. The last pattern of violence took the 
form of revenge attacks in which the Kikuyu arranged attacks and evictions of the Kalenjin, Luo 
and Luhyas from areas in the Rift Valley where the Kikuyu are a majority. These areas include 
Naivasha, Nakuru and parts of Nairobi. It was during this phase that politicians allied to both the 
ODM and PNU were alleged to have organised and funded illegal ethnic militias to carry out 
attacks on other communities.244 In total, more than 1 300 persons were killed and 500 000 
forcefully displaced.245  
2.5.3 Forging ahead: constitutional reforms as a long-term solution  
The violence attracted the attention of the international community, which intervened with a view 
to restoring order. The African Union appointed a panel led by former UN Secretary General, 
Kofi Annan; to assist in mediation between the ODM and PNU.246 The violence halted after the 
two parties signed a peace deal on 28 February 2008 brokered by the “Annan Panel.”247 Issues 
for immediate attention included cessation of violence and addressing the plight of internally 
displaced persons. The constitutional review process, which had stalled after the “Wako Draft” 
was rejected in the November 2005 referendum, 248 was identified as one of the long-term 
issues to address the root causes of the conflict and political instability.249 Other long-term 
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issues included the formation of a commission of inquiry into the causes of the violence, a truth 
and reconciliation commission, and addressing other issues such as land reforms, poverty and 
unemployment.250 
The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) released its report in late 2008, 
concluding that the announcement of presidential elections results was only a trigger, whereas 
some of the underlying causes of the violence were traceable to colonialism and the 
independence government. The CIPEV identified personal rule and the weakening of public 
institutions since independence as one of the root causes.251 Land was also identified as 
another root cause – more specifically, the inequalities in land ownership perceived along 
ethno-geographic lines.252 In addition, the CIPEV observed that economic disparities and 
unequal access to state resources and development, also perceived along ethnic lines, were 
another cause of the violence.253 Moreover, the use of economically deprived and unemployed 
youth by political leaders for political violence – a longstanding and unsanctioned practice that 
had created a culture of impunity – was identified as a further root cause.254 
2.5.4 Devolution as a „long-term solution‟   
Indeed, while the immediate trigger of the violence was the disputed elections results, the root 
causes of the violence, as identified by the CIPEV, show how fragile the Kenyan state was as 
result of the failure of successive post-independence governments to address several core 
issues. Until 2007 Kenya had managed to exist in relative political stability, unlike most of its 
neighbours and despite the issues challenging its nationhood. However, the 2007/2008 violence 
revealed a fragile nation easily capable of sliding into civil war.255 Thus, an inescapable long-
term measure for addressing the root causes of conflict in Kenya is fundamentally to restructure 
the state. However, this raises the question: What does restructuring entail, and what is the 
nature of the role that devolution can play?  
The centralised system has been repeatedly cited as one of the main sources of the problems 
facing post-independence Kenya. With regard to development, centralisation has led to 
inefficiency in local service delivery, rising poverty and skewed allocation of resources to elites 
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from the incumbent president‟s ethnic community. This inevitably undermines socio-political 
stability, especially where communities outside government perceive themselves as outsiders. 
Corruption, resource patronage and entrenched interests have also thrived as a result of the 
centralised system.  
Thus, as Kenyans restarted the constitutional review process after the violence, devolution was 
increasingly seen as a means through which Kenya could restructure the state and move past 
the challenges brought about by centralisation. It is thus necessary that for devolution to assist 
in defining the future path of the Kenyan state, it must be designed and implemented in a way 
that responds to the key issues identified by CIPEV. Devolution must promote development and 
facilitate equitable access to resources and development if it is to play a relevant role in 
transforming Kenya. Devolution must also ensure that political powers are devolved from the 
centre to the devolved units. This would in turn ensure that devolved units limit the exercise of 
power by the national level and thus enhance political inclusion and overall accountability.  
However, it has been argued that devolution was supported by the Kalenjin because it has the 
potential to “protect the demands of self-proclaimed indigenous groups for land over those 
consistently described as outsiders”.256 Indeed, as far back as 1996 when Moi was still in power, 
Southall and Wood noted that the KANU government‟s hold on power had become “increasingly 
tenuous”.257 They opined that “Kalenjin politicians‟ fears for the post-Moi future could lead them 
in the direction of support for a genuine devolution of power”.258 Indeed, this could be the very 
basis upon which Rift Valley supported the ODM and its calls for a strong regional system of 
government. The ODM rose to the occasion by promising that 60 percent of resources would be 
controlled by sub-national governments as opposed to the centre.259  
3. Enter the Committee of Experts (CoE): the second phase of constitutional review 
process (2008 - 2010)  
The CKRC Act 2008, enacted in early 2008 to facilitate the review process, established the 
Committee of Experts (CoE) which managed the second phase of the review process.260 Other 
organs created by the CKRC Act 2008 were the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC), the 
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National Assembly and the Referendum.261 The CKRC Act 2008 was to “facilitate the 
completion of the review of the constitution of Kenya” meaning that the process was not to start 
from a “clean slate”. Indeed, sections 29 and 30 of the CKRC Act 2008 obligated the CoE to 
take into consideration the views of the people of Kenya as presented to the CKRC as well as 
the CKRC Draft, the draft adopted by the delegates and the 2005 referendum draft. 262 The 
CKRC Act 2008 retained all objectives from the 1998 CKRC Act.263 However, an objective of 
“committing Kenyans to peaceful resolution of national issues through dialogue and 
consensus”264 was added in the light of the events in 2007/2008.  
The Act set out extremely tight deadlines which, as will emerge below, affected the quality of 
discussions and the final structure of devolved government. However, the enactment of a new 
law also provided an opportunity to address some of the legal challenges that the constitutional 
review under the CKRC had faced in that section 47 of the former constitution was amended to 
provide expressly for comprehensive constitutional reforms.265 Other changes included the tight 
deadlines,266 a high threshold for Parliament to make changes to the final draft from the CoE,267 
and a generally well-coordinated process that borrowed vital lessons from the challenges in the 
first phase. 
3.1 The social and political context of the post-2008 constitutional review process 
The second phase of the constitutional review process commenced as part of a long-term 
solution to the violence that rocked the country after the 2007 presidential elections. 
Furthermore, this was after a failed referendum in 2005. Thus, as stated by the CoE, the reform 
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context was characterised by “deepened suspicion, cynicism and apathy”.268 There were real 
fears that the review process would merely polarise the country politically without serving any 
useful purpose. Furthermore, the public was conscious of the mutilation of the Bomas Draft in 
2005, and there was no assurance that the political elite would not repeat the same 
shenanigans.269 With the 2012 elections approaching, the concern was that if the constitutional 
review process dragged on, it would become muddled with the elections and disrupted. It was 
thus important that the review exercise be completed before the end of 2010.270 
3.2 The limited mandate of the Committee of Experts  
The CoE was obligated to build on previous work done by the CKRC and the Bomas 
discussions, but it had neither the time nor mandate to conduct extensive public hearings akin to 
the CKRC hearings. It was required to review past documents and other sources, carry out 
thematic consultations, and identify in a report the contentious and non-contentious issues.271 
This was to be followed by a harmonised draft constitution, to which the public had 30 days only 
to make input.272 After receiving public comments, the CoE had just 21 days to revise the draft 
based on public input and publish a Revised Harmonised Draft (RHDC). The RHDC was to be 
submitted to the Parliamentary Select Committee on constitutional review (PSC) for consensus-
building on the contentious issues.273  
The CoE was then required to consider changes suggested by the PSC and revise the RHDC 
accordingly.274 Thereafter, the CoE was required, within 21 days, to prepare a Proposed 
Constitution and return the document to the PSC. The PSC was in turn required to table a draft 
report, based on the RHDC, in Parliament within seven days of receipt.275 Parliament had 30 
days to debate the draft constitution, approve it, and pass it on to the Attorney General (AG) for 
publication. The AG had 30 days to publish the approved draft as the proposed new 
constitution,276 after which a national referendum was to be held within 60 days of publication.277 
All these deadlines were met.  
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In coming up with the contentious issues, sections 23 (a) and (b), 29 and 30 of the CKRC Act 
2008 required the CoE to review the people‟s views to CKRC, study the earlier drafts and 
identify areas where the drafts were not in agreement. Contentious issues were to be identified 
on the basis of discrepancies between the different drafts. Thus, while issues such as land and 
Islamic courts were hotly debated, provisions were consistent in all the past drafts and did not 
therefore qualify as “contentious” under the CKRC Act 2008.278 The CoE identified three issues 
as contentious: the system of government (the nature of executive and legislature), devolution, 
and the transitional clauses or bringing the constitution to effect.279 However, with regard to 
devolution and the national executive, the CoE noted that “accountability of the executive and 
legislature and the need for devolution were never in contention. The differences were over the 
form of government and the levels of devolution.”280 
 In order to manage the fairly wide consultation process, the CoE held thematic consultations 
and appointed different members of the CoE to be in charge of different themes; accordingly, a 
member of the CoE was appointed in charge of devolution.281 Consultative meetings were held, 
including one dedicated to devolution.282 Devolution matters were also discussed at several 
other consultative meetings held with sectors of society on the general process.283 The CoE 
developed 10 working principles to guide it in the review process; these included: to 
decentralise power; constrain executive power; embrace the separation of power, with checks 
and balances; deepen democracy; and ensure accountability and equity in distribution of 
resources as well as ethnic, regional and gender balance.284  
3.3 CoE deliberations on the structure of devolved government   
The CoE identified three important objectives of the review process that were to guide the 
deliberations and decisions regarding devolution of powers: promotion of participation in 
governance through democratic elections and the devolution and exercise of power;285 provision 
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of basic needs and equitable distribution access to national resources;286 respect and 
recognition of diversity, community and cultural rights and identities;287 and ensuring that the 
national interest prevails over regional or sectoral interests. Based on these objectives and the 
working principles mentioned above, the CoE identified three issues that were contentious with 
regard to devolution: first, whether there should be two or more levels of government; second, 
what the powers of each level should be; and third, allocation of national powers of supervision 
and ensuring national equity.288  
The CoE produced three constitutional drafts with varying designs that reflected the discussions 
which took place at each stage. The first was the Harmonised Draft Constitution (HDC), 
followed by the Revised Harmonised Draft Constitution (RHDC) and the Proposed Constitution, 
which was sent to the National Assembly and later the Attorney General for redrafting and 
publication as a Constitution Bill for a referendum vote.  
3.3.1 Devolution in the Harmonised Draft Constitution (HDC)  
After a review of past drafts, discussions and views submitted on levels of government, the CoE 
concluded that the views were divided mainly between having two or three levels of 
government. The CoE found that a “substantial minority” supporting the two levels of 
government wanted large geographical units of devolved units comparable to the eight regions 
at independence.289 The majority of those supporting two levels wanted a smaller unit “based on 
districts, counties or local council and constituencies”.290 However, in all cases, the CoE 
observed, the driving objective in the search for an appropriate structure was to have “a unit that 
would be viable demographically and have adequate resources for effective governance without 
endangering service delivery”.291  
The CoE further observed that majority of those who supported 3 levels of government 
(national, regional, and local) wanted the local level to be the principal point of devolution.292 
The middle or regional level of government was explained as a supplement to “building … 
national unity and … provid[ing] a basis for representation of local interests at the national 
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level”.293 Thus, the CoE settled for three levels after considering the following: “functions that a 
system of devolved government is intended to serve”, “the history of local government”, and “the 
cost of administration”.294 The HDC adopted three levels of government: national, regional and 
county,295 with county level as proposed as the principal point of devolving power.296  
There were various proposals regarding the number, size and boundaries of county 
governments. These included adopting the PA-based districts, which were over 250, or 
clustering them; adopting the 210 parliamentary constituencies or clustering them; converting 
the 14 regions in the Bomas Draft into the principal unit or using the 79 Bomas districts as the 
principal units.297 The districts were ruled out because 250 units would be too costly; 
furthermore, there was a High Court ruling which declared all districts created after 1992 
unconstitutional.298 The CoE noted that while the districts were created mainly as a response to 
demands by people and hence created a sense of belonging, “proper considerations in 
establishing devolved government” were not taken into accounting when the districts were being 
increased.299 The 210 parliamentary constituencies were ruled out, too, because they were just 
too many and using them as devolved units would confuse their role as units of national 
representation. The 14 regions in the Bomas Draft were also dismissed as principal units on 
account of their large size and population (in some of the regions), which were “likely to 
compromise service delivery”.300 
The CoE settled for the 74 districts that were proposed in the Bomas Draft as the principal units 
of devolution in the HDC, and it did so for two reasons. First, the 74 districts were the result of a 
careful deliberation “which balanced the communities‟ sense of belonging with the needs of 
service delivery”.301 Additionally, the cost of running 74 units was much lower than the other 
units (PA administrative districts and the parliamentary constituencies). The Bomas districts 
were named “counties” in the HDC in order to avoid confusion with the PA administrative 
districts. The CoE also noted that while the 74 districts were negotiated and a result of a 
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compromise, time had elapsed since Bomas and some factors had changed, which might 
necessitate boundary revision. The HDC thus provided for an ad hoc commission for boundary 
review when the need arises. Furthermore, while “Bomas districts” were 74 and formed the 
basis of HDC‟s counties, the HDC had 74 counties, a discrepancy that was not explained by the 
CoE.302  
The CoE gave three reasons for adopting regions in the HDC. First, the regions would be large, 
with substantial populations, and hence would be able to accommodate ethnic and cultural 
diversity and contribute to nation-building.303 Second, a regional level would coordinate cross-
county functions of county governments.304 Third, for purposes of equitable allocation of 
resources, regions would offer a vital link and representation of devolved units at the national 
level.305 However, the CoE rejected the 14 regions in the Bomas Draft. While the regions were 
carefully deliberated by NCC delegates,306 the CoE “was looking at larger and fewer units better 
placed to provide checks and balances on the exercise of power at the national level”.307 The 
HDC thus adopted the eight original provinces as the basis of the regional governments.308  
As principal units of devolution, the county governments were established with both legislative 
and executive institutions.309 County representatives and the county executive were to be 
directly elected.310 The HDC also allocated local revenue raising functions and service delivery 
functions to the 74 county governments.311 Regions were also created with legislative and 
executive functions at the regional level. However, unlike counties, regional assemblies and the 
executive were to be elected by county assemblies within a region. The principal function of the 
regional government was to coordinate cross-county projects and functions, which included 
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formulation of policies for harmonious implementation and monitoring actual implementation.312 
Representation at the centre was to be through the senate, whose members were to be elected 
from county assemblies.313 
With regard to national relations with devolved units, the HDC provided that the relationship 
between levels would be cooperative. The HDC provided national government powers to 
suspend county governments or regional governments in extreme cases only (emergency and 
war).314 Cost considerations were the main reason why the CoE did not provide for 
decentralisation structures below the 74 counties in the HDC. The CoE, borrowing from the 
Wako Draft, thus left this to the discretion of the county governments to further decentralise if it 
was efficient to do so.315  
3.3.2 The Revised Harmonised Draft Constitution (RHDC) 
The CoE received comments and input after publication and dissemination of the HDC. The 
chapter on devolution received the second highest number of comments after the structure of 
the national executive. The CoE observes that support of the idea of devolution was wide and 
consistent.316 However, it received varied submissions regarding various aspects of the 
devolved government structure in the RHDC. The main issues on which submissions were 
received included: number of levels, boundaries of devolved units and the necessity, or not, of 
the regional level of government.  
With regard to the levels of government, the CoE noted a shift in support for three levels to two, 
“which was discernible from the suggestions and comments”.317 Two main reasons were 
advanced in support of a two-level system: first, the three levels of devolved government would 
be costly, and second, the 74 counties were small and would “lack resources to govern 
effectively”.318 Furthermore, the CoE report added, the 74 counties were too small to provide 
checks on the exercise of power at the national level. The boundaries of the 74 counties in the 
HDC were described as random and without any rationale in terms of “population, geographical 
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features and command of resources”.319 Regions, as provided for in the HDC, received negative 
views mainly because they had no clear role and “may become irrelevant”.320 The regions had 
no clear source of funds to perform their coordination and provide assistance to counties. 
Regions were composed of delegates (appointees) from the county governments and would 
thus not effectively supervise performance of functions by counties. Lastly, while regions were 
allocated regional planning and regional policy formulation functions and delivery of regional 
services, there was vagueness as to what these functions entailed.321  
Accordingly, the RHDC made a number of changes to address the concerns raised above. First, 
the levels were reduced to two (national and county government)322 “in accordance with the 
majority‟s preferences”.323 This change was made in response to concerns about the cost and 
roles of the regions as provided for in the HDC. Second, the 74 county units were abandoned 
and boundaries of administrative districts as at 1992, provided for in the District and Provinces 
Act, were adopted as county boundaries.324 The CoE explains that the 1992 districts were 
adopted for two main reasons: first, due to the removal of regions, there was a need for 
relatively large units which could provide checks and balances at the national level, a function 
that was to be performed by the regions; second, there was a need for units that had the 
capacity to provide services closer to the people. Thus the 1992 districts, which were the basis 
of the 47 counties adopted, were seen as appropriate to serve this purpose after the removal of 
regions.325  
The HDC was also criticised for its weak provisions relating to supervision and regulation, and 
the CoE was urged to add necessary measures to allow intervention by the national 
government.326 The HDC had only provided for suspension, a measure which would only be 
invoked in extreme cases rather than in the course of normal regulation and supervision.327 
However, the CoE argued that overt provisions on regulation and supervision of counties may 
create an opportunity for central intrusion into affairs of counties. Thus, the role of the national 
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government in the counties was couched in the RHDC as one of “ensuring capacity and 
resources” to counties in order to enhance their effectiveness.328 The RHDC also provided that 
intervention would be used only in a manner that respects the integrity of the system of 
devolution and provision of essential services.329  
Removal of the regions necessitated changes to the structure of the Senate at the national level 
whose membership was based on the regions. The majority of the views presented perceived 
the indirect election of senators, as provided in the HDC, as a weakness.330 The CoE was told 
that persons of “the right calibre” would not emerge from indirect election, and that “senators 
without popular support would carry less weight than members of the proposed National 
Assembly”.331 Accordingly, the RHDC provided for direct election of senators.332 In order to 
create a link between the directly elected senators and the counties, senators could sit in the 
county assemblies, but without a right vote; in addition, they had to furnish annual reports to 
their respective county governments.333  
The transitional arrangements in the HDC provided for dissolution of the PA.334 However, some 
views were expressed that the PA was “accessible to the people” at the local level and should 
be retained. The CoE took the view that locally elected representatives would be even closer 
and more accountable to the people. Besides, “the system of Provincial Administration in its 
current form was incompatible with, and may impede, the implementation of the system of 
devolution”.335 The RHDC thus retained the provision of “phasing out” the PA within five years of 
implementation of the constitution.336  
3.3.3 Parliament‟s views and proposals on devolution  
The 27-member PSC of the National Assembly and the National Assembly itself were both 
created as review organs in the Act.337 The PSC was supposed to examine the RHDC and build 
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a political consensus around contentious issues and hand the RHDC back to the CoE for 
redrafting in order to reflect the political consensus.338 The CoE was then supposed to hand 
over the RHDC with the changes by the PSC to the National Assembly, which could in turn 
make amendments but only after attaining a high threshold of 65 percent of members to support 
an amendment. While some suggested changes by the PSC were incorporated into the draft 
constitution, proposed amendments by the National Assembly did not sail through due to the 
high threshold required for proposed amendments.  
3.3.3.1 Proposals by the Parliamentary select committee (PSC) 
The CoE declined to accept some of the suggested changes by the PSC “for reasons of 
coherence and in order to adhere to the guiding principles of the process of constitutional 
review”.339 The PSC suggested the deletion of the objective of devolved government that 
provided that devolution will enhance checks and balances. However, the CoE observed that 
devolution did in fact offer other checks and balances, and thus rejected the proposal.340 The 
PSC also suggested the inclusion of a provision stating that “national government takes 
precedence over county governments”. However, the CoE was of the view that in order to 
ensure that both levels of government respected their mutual and functional integrity, neither of 
the governments was to be subordinate to the other. This proposal was rejected too. 
Furthermore, the CoE emphasised “assistance” and “building of capacity” of counties to ensure 
effective performance of functions as opposed to regulation by national government regulation, 
as was suggested by the PSC.341  
With regard to powers of the Senate, the PSC suggested that the name be changed to a “lower 
house” with primarily powers to represent counties at the national level.342 The PSC removed 
the legislative functions of the Senate and instead enhanced the Senate‟s power with regard to 
county finances. The PSC specifically proposed that decisions of the Senate on matters such as 
county finances could be overturned only by a 65 percent vote of the National Assembly vote.343 
The PSC also removed the role of the Senate in impeaching the president, and made 
impeachment a sole prerogative of the National Assembly.  
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The CoE considered that the 65 percent vote required to bypass a Senate veto, on any matter, 
may impede the National Assembly and general government business. The CoE also 
considered that a legislative role of the Senate would enhance the system of checks and 
balances at the national level. Furthermore, enhancing people‟s participation through devolution 
of power implied a strong Senate with legislative power,344 a public view that was presented to 
the CKRC.345 The CoE thus reinstated the legislative role of the Senate on county matters and 
also provided for only a simple majority vote in the National Assembly in order to overturn a 
decision of the Senate.346 The CoE also reinstated the role of the Senate with regard to 
impeachment of the president. The CoE argued that this will ensure that the president is not 
held hostage by “transient majorities” in the National Assembly.347 The CoE termed the change 
of name of the Senate from an “upper house” to a “lower house” a constitutional absurdity 
unheard of in comparative constitutional theory and practice, and reverted to the “upper house” 
name.348 
The PSC proposed establishment of an equalisation fund that would cater for marginalised 
areas. The CoE lauded this as an important sign of commitment to equitable distribution of 
national resources.349 The fund (0.5 percent of national revenue) was to be set aside for the 
provision of basic services in marginalised areas to bring them to the level of other areas. The 
Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) was given the mandate to identify areas to benefit.350 
The CoE added a provision that the fund would operate for 20 years, after which it would be 
reviewed.351 
The PSC suggested that the CRA should be removed and its functions transferred to the 
Senate.352 The CRA‟s was proposed as an independent body which will advise on vertical 
division of revenue between the centre and devolved units as well as horizontally among the 
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counties.353 The CoE reinstated the CRA mainly because of the complexity of the issue 
involving division of revenue. While Parliament could have the final decision on the division of 
revenue, analysis of figures and criteria for division of revenue required technical expertise such 
as the one that the CRA could provide. As the CoE explained:  
It is appropriate that the Parliament should make the final decisions on these matters but its 
political decisions need to be informed by independent skilled and professional analyses of the 
problems. The CRA does not supplant parliament. Its technical advice will strengthen debate in 
parliament and debate in parliament and enable parliament to make informed decisions. In 
addition, because CRA is an independent body, its advice is more likely to be trusted.
354
 
The CoE also recognised the relatively weak link between the senator and the county 
governments, links which can be further complicated by the fact that the senator and county 
governor may be from different parties. Thus, there is no guarantee that the senator would 
represent county government interests in matters of revenue-sharing at the national level. The 
CoE argued that the role of the CRA had the potential to address this gap.355  
3.3.3.2 Devolution debate in Parliament: Botched attempt to re-introduce regions  
The CoE submitted the Proposed Constitution to the National Assembly on 28 February 2012 
after responding to the PSC‟s suggested changes discussed above. At least 150 amendments 
to the Proposed Constitution were raised in Parliament. However, the high threshold of 65 
percent or 164 members required to pass an amendment could not be reached for any of the 
proposed amendments.356 A member allied to the ODM party sought to move a motion in 
parliament to amend the Proposed Constitution in order to reintroduce regional level. The MP, 
who was also a minister,357 argued for the regional level as follows:  
 
We have done so well in so far as separation of powers is concerned. The three arms of 
government are well established but when it comes to the issue of devolution of power and 
resources, and the participation of people, the draft constitution does not meet the principles that 
are set out in the Act and in the values. The counties, as they exist and as I understand, are to 
enhance people‟s participation. At the local level, the people should be able to participate in the 
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manner in which they will be governed. That is why we need the third-tier. The second-tier, which 
has the provinces, is to ensure that power at the centre can be checked and counterbalanced. If 
we have a second-tier that is not strong enough, then we may have created yet another imperial 
presidency.
358
  
 
MPs who opposed the motion on regions branded it an attempt to reintroduce majimbo, which is 
“dangerous to this country”.359 MPs who spoke made reference to the 2008 violence and its 
connection to the “majimbo” talk, indicating that removal of the regions was important for 
purposes of national cohesion.360 In the media, it was reported that regions were rejected on 
grounds that they would lead to ethnic violence.361  
3.3.4 Assessment of CoE deliberations and constitutional drafts  
The CoE identified three contentious issues around devolution: whether there should two or 
three levels, what the powers of each level should be, and how equitable distribution of 
resources should be structured in the devolved government structure. Indeed, a review of the 
devolution structures in the past drafts reveals that the structures were as varied as the number 
of drafts. Thus, the CoE had to decide on one structure or the other. However, there is a need to 
review the final structure that was adopted by the CoE in the light of the discussions and 
proposed structures in the past drafts. 
With regard to levels, the CoE abandoned the regional level, provided for in all past drafts 
except the Wako Draft 2005 that was defeated at the 2005 national referendum. The reasons 
given for this decision were largely based on cost considerations, efficiency and capacity.362 
While the CoE observed that the regions were to play an important role in “building national 
unity”,363 this concept was never canvassed by the CoE beyond mere mention. After removal of 
the regional level, it became necessary that the county units be kept large enough in order to 
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check the centre.364 This explains why the 74 counties in the HDC were reduced to 47 in the 
Proposed Constitution after the regional level was removed. 
The CoE did not consider the effect that removal of regions and reducing of the number of 
counties would have on the accommodation of ethnic diversity. Indeed, soon after the 
publication of the Proposed Constitution, MPs from the “minority districts” immediately rejected 
the draft and called for creation of more counties for “marginal groups”.365 The referendum 
campaigns saw the MPs for Kuria and Mt. Elgon constituencies charged for incitement to 
violence.366 In the August 2010 referendum, Kuria Constituency returned a “No” victory of 58 
percent, while Mt. Elgon Constituency returned a “No” victory representing 68 percent of the 
total vote.367 The Bomas Draft, and indeed all other previous drafts, had provided individual 
units for Kuria and Mt. Elgon. However, the CoE Draft used the 1992 administrative districts 
which denied these two areas their own units.  
While it is clear that the CoE never considered the “accommodation of diversity” element in 
deciding local units, there is a need to examine the reasons for this. First, the CoE had limited 
time to engage in the question of creating devolved units versus accommodating diversity. 
Indeed, the CoE admits that after the PSC consensus settled on a presidential system of 
government, this should have been followed up with a more nuanced devolved system than was 
provided for in the Proposed Constitution. The CoE stated:  
Ideally, the political consensus on the presidential system should have been followed by a 
fundamental revision of the structure of devolution (size and number of units, powers and 
functions, and revenue capacity) towards a more effective system of checks by the devolved 
governments, over the national governments. The CoE could not undertake such revision without 
encouraging other aspects of the consensus of the PSC.
368
  
Thus, the devolved structure remained unchanged despite the adoption of a pure presidential 
system. Moreover, the demarcation of boundaries tends to be a highly political exercise with 
various competing interests. With limited time and a relatively restricted mandate, the CoE 
chose to go with the 1992 administrative boundaries instead of negotiating new local 
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boundaries, which was bound to have been a long-running and explosive affair. The provision 
for an independent boundary review mechanism in accordance with objective criteria in all the 
CoE drafts may well be evidence that it was in effect a postponement of the politics of boundary 
demarcation.  
Furthermore, the decision to base county government boundaries on the 1992 administrative 
boundaries did not take into account the nature and history of the PA boundaries. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, PA district boundaries were defined along ethnic lines. The 1962 
Boundaries Commission report did not substantially revise this policy, and as a result post-
independence administrative district boundaries largely followed the colonial policy of ethnically 
exclusive units.369 In view of the colonial legacy of PA boundaries, the CoE should have 
examined the suitability of using the administrative boundaries in terms of nation-building and 
national unity before basing counties on them. Instead, it regarded the 1992 administrative 
district boundaries as large enough to provide checks and balances at the centre and ensure 
service delivery at the same time. 
Clearly, suitability of the units for accommodation of diversity was not considered by the CoE. 
This is confirmed by the Taskforce on Devolved Government appointed to advise the 
government on implementation of devolution. It conducted county consultation exercises in the 
“minority areas”, and wrote thus in its final report:  
[A] number of communities were opposed to the number of Counties, their boundaries and the 
composition. In Bungoma County, the Sabaot were opposed to the CoK 2010 because they had 
been grouped together with a large population of the Luhya community. In Elgeyo-Marakwet 
County, the Marakwet were opposed to them being grouped with the Keiyo because of past 
marginalisation. In Baringo County, many minority groups such as the Pokot, Njemps, Endorois 
and Arror feared the other dominant Tugen communities. In Migori County, the Kuria were 
opposed to being grouped together with the Luo majority. In Garissa County, the Abdalla clan of 
Ijara did not want to be grouped together with the dominant Abudwak and Aulihan clans.
370
 
It is thus clear that arguments of economic viability, efficiency and service delivery and ability to 
check on the national government took primacy over ethnic accommodation. There were no 
attempts to balance the development and economic arguments against the need to build 
national unity. As a result, virtually all small minority groups found themselves within larger 
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ethnic groups. The regional level could have been used to address “centre-constraining” 
concerns while the local level could have concentrated on accommodation and local service 
delivery. But this option was not given much consideration in the deliberations. However, the 
CoE‟s decision is understandable, given its limited mandate and available time as well as the 
complexities that could have emerged if it attempted to accommodate ethnic concerns through 
boundary demarcation.  
It is also important to note that even during the Bomas discussions, major decisions regarding 
the size, number of levels and their functions were mainly made on the basis of economic, cost 
and development concerns. For instance, the 19 regions originally proposed and supported in 
the Bomas discussions had an advantage of smaller regional governments though which 
minority communities could have a better say. However, the regions were reduced to 14 by the 
technical committee on the basis of cost considerations, thus “diluting” the influence of the 
minority communities in the proposed larger and fewer regions.  
The changes that were proposed by the PSC and the National Assembly must also be put in 
perspective. The attempt by MPs to weaken the role of the Senate and enhance the position of 
the national government vis-a-vis counties represents a broader tussle to keep the centralised 
system intact. It is true that in a devolved system, with a strong second chamber representing 
devolved units at the national level and exercising legislative power, has the potential to 
enhance accountability and hence “compete” with the National Assembly. In other words, the 
MPs (some of whom were ministers) acted out of self-preservation by attempting to retain the 
National Assembly‟s legislative powers in the new dispensation.  
Furthermore, the ODM party policy supported the regional level of government in order to 
enhance “participation in governance”. It is thus no surprise that the ODM side proposed the 
reintroduction of regions into the draft. It is also no surprise that all MPs who supported this 
amendment were ODM members and from the Rift Valley, while those opposed to regions were 
mainly drawn from the central and eastern regions of the country.371 The patterns of support and 
opposition to regions represented the old fissures that have been present since independence. 
However, supporters of the amendment were unable to marshal the high threshold of 65 
percent vote needed to amend the Proposed Constitution.372  
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4. Conclusion  
This chapter has analysed the constitutional review that led to the adoption of the current 
Kenyan Constitution in August 2010; more specifically, it has evaluated the various issues that 
informed the devolution deliberations and the context in which those deliberations took place. 
Issues of underdevelopment and sharing of resources, centralisation of power, and ethnic 
conflict were at the core of the discussions and deliberations on devolution. However, as the 
preceding examination has revealed, the three issues were not given equal weight.  
Major decisions regarding issues such as number of levels, size of units and powers and 
functions were made on the basis of development arguments relating to capacity and economic 
viability. While the potential of the devolved system of government to enhance unity and nation-
building was recognised in the process, these issues were not given adequate attention or 
addressed in detail. Furthermore, the potential of counties to limit central power was also 
recognised but many concessions were made in favour of the development purpose of 
devolution, the most notable being the omission of the regional level from the final draft. The 
rest of the chapters in this study analyse the design of devolution in Kenya‟s new constitution. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE STRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF COUNTY 
GOVERNMENTS  
1. Introduction  
Chapter 3 demonstrated how centralisation of power, underdevelopment and ethnic conflict 
continue to be the major obstacles to Kenya‟s effective statehood and nationhood. Chapter 4 
showed that in the constitutional review process, devolution of power was considered as a 
means to address these issues. What is thus important for this discussion is how the 
constitutional design of devolved government responds to them. While this thesis is focused on 
devolution, Chapters 3 and 4 reveal, too, that addressing centralisation, underdevelopment and 
ethnic conflict are not just devolution objectives but relate to broader political and systemic 
challenges facing Kenya. The Constitution adopted in 2010 seeks to address these three issues 
in a number of ways, and devolving power to counties is but one of them.   
While Chapters 6 and 7 will examine the powers and finances of county governments, this 
chapter evaluates the structures and institutional frameworks of county governments. 
Accordingly, after examining the objectives and principles of devolved government, it analyses 
the structures and institutions of county governments in terms of development, conflict 
resolution and limiting central power. More specifically, the chapter assesses how the size, 
number and institutional framework of county governments accommodate the three purposes 
through design. Importantly, this chapter assesses how the potentially conflicting design 
features of the three purposes are accommodated in county structures. 
In Chapter 4, it was emphasised that major decisions about the design of devolution in Kenya 
were made on the basis of development. As such, the argument presented in this chapter is that 
county government structures and institutional frameworks are primarily designed for the pursuit 
of development. Indeed, while it was possible to incorporate design features for the pursuit of 
other purposes without compromising development, these options were, for reasons that are 
unclear, not considered. As such, while ethnic conflict and limiting central power are recognised 
as objectives of devolution, the two purposes are ambivalently pursued in the design of the 
structure and institutional framework of county governments. 
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Development, ethnic conflict and limiting central power are broader political issues that, in 
addition, have been addressed through other constitutional mechanisms outside the devolution 
framework. Thus, before delving into the system of devolved government, the next section 
briefly examines the broader constitutional mechanisms put in place to pursue development, 
ethnic harmony and limited central power.  
2. Constitutional mechanisms to address centralisation, underdevelopment and 
ethnic conflict  
The 2010 Constitution can broadly be termed a framework to structure public power and 
enhance accountability in the exercise of that power. Inevitably, therefore, the presidency was 
the main target in the attempt to dismantle the centralised state structure. The personalisation of 
presidential powers and subordination of critical public institutions have been regarded as the 
main source of underdevelopment and ethnic conflict in post-colonial Kenya. The Constitution 
seeks to address these challenges by providing for a clearer separation of powers and 
introducing strong and effective checks and balances between the three arms of government. 
Furthermore, strong and independent national institutions have also been created, not only as a 
further limit to national executive power but to confront the developmental and other issues that 
underlie ethnic conflict in Kenya. 
 
2.1 Limited presidential powers   
While the 2010 Constitution retained the presidential system in which the president is both head 
of state and head of government,1 presidential powers have been significantly curtailed.  
First, there is a clear separation of powers between the executive and the legislature. Unlike the 
previous regime where the president could prorogue or dissolve parliament at any time,2 
parliament now runs its programme and legislative affairs independently of the executive. 
Furthermore, ministers are no longer part of the legislature, and this further reduces the 
president‟s control of parliament.3 The absence of ministers from parliament will, according to 
Ghai and Cottrell, oblige the president to negotiate with supporters of government policy in 
parliament, unlike the situation in the past when ministers controlled the parliamentary agenda.4  
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2
 Section 59 of the Constitution of Kenya (Act 5 of 1969) (repealed).  
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Second, there is a clearer separation of power between the executive and the judiciary, with the 
aim of creating an independent and impartial judiciary. While in the past the president used to 
appoint the chief justice, the appointment of the chief justice is now an independent process 
which involves the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), an independent national institution, and 
the National Assembly which vets and approves nominees for the position of chief justice before 
formal appointment by the president.5 Furthermore, appointment of judges is now vested in the 
Judicial Service Commission.6 These measures bolster the independence of the judiciary from 
the national executive.  
Apart from the separation of powers and functions, the presidency itself is subject to several 
limitations. The president can serve for two terms only, of five years each.7 The president can 
also be removed from office by an impeachment process involving the National Assembly and 
the Senate.8 Furthermore, while the president had unfettered powers over all key public 
appointments in which holders of constitutional and public offices served at his pleasure,9 such 
appointments are now subject to parliamentary approval. The National Assembly approves the 
appointment of cabinet secretaries,10 the secretary to the cabinet,11 principal secretaries,12 the 
Attorney-General and the Director of Public Prosecutions.13 The appointment of members of 
independent public institutions and offices is subject, too, to approval by the National 
Assembly.14  
In addition, the Constitution establishes national commissions and offices which perform various 
important functions independently from the control of the national executive.15 These institutions 
perform functions which were initially vested in the president. For instance, the JSC, as noted 
above, now appoints judges and participates in the selection of the chief justice. While the 
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president had power to appoint electoral commissioners,16 members of the Independent 
Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) are approved by the National Assembly, and this 
enhances the independence of the Commission from the national executive.17 
Other independent commissions include the Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) which 
advises on the distribution of national resources, the Salaries and Remuneration Commission 
which advises on public salaries, the National Land Commission,18 and the Commission on 
Implementation of the Constitution (CIC).19 The independent offices are those of the Attorney-
General, and the Controller of Budget.20 More importantly, while most of these institutions or 
their functions were previously under the national executive, they now operate as independent 
institutions outside the control of the national executive. The main objective of these 
independent offices and institutions is to “protect the sovereignty of the people”, “secure the 
observance by all State organs of democratic values and principles”, and promote 
constitutionalism.21 The CIC, for instance, at one point identified impunity of the national 
executive22 as a challenge to the effective implementation of devolution.23  
The executive is further constrained by a strong Bill of Rights which protects both individual and 
collective rights from interference by all state organs24 and even private parties.25 The Bill of 
Rights incorporates civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. As 
such, the national executive and indeed all relevant state organs are obligated to ensure that 
the enjoyment of these rights by every person is honoured. Any person whose rights or 
freedoms have been infringed on can approach a court,26 which can issue an appropriate order 
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or relief or remedy to stop the infringement.27 A court may thus protect a person from the 
arbitrary use of public power that infringes on fundamental rights and freedoms protected under 
the Constitution.28 Apart from judicial protection, the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality 
Commission (KNHREC) is constitutionally mandated to monitor the state‟s compliance with the 
Bill of Rights and other human rights obligations and may take measures necessary to ensure 
that the state lives up to its obligations.29 
In the past, the National Treasury exercised unfettered control over all government budgeting 
and expenditure.30 The cabinet, which was usually composed of presidential appointees, 
controlled the budget process within parliament.31 The president‟s control of parliament and the 
National Treasury in turn enabled him to use state resources to sustain patronage networks and 
divert resources to their home regions.32 However, budgeting powers are now shared with the 
National Assembly, which has power to amend the budget.33 The effect of these changes is that 
the budget process is now subject “to a wider set of actors, particularly giving citizens and MPs 
a greater role, and fundamentally reduc[ing] the traditional, undemocratic and nearly unlimited 
powers of the executive”.34 Furthermore, the Senate, which is part of the legislature, has special 
powers to determine both the criteria for, and division of, revenue among counties.35 Budget 
overview is delinked from the National Treasury and placed in the CoB, an independent office.36 
These changes, as the World Bank notes, “reflect a distrust of the centralised Executive and its 
opaque control over resources”.37 
2.2 Enhancing inter-ethnic harmony  
A number of measures are put in place in the Constitution to address ethnic conflict and 
enhance unity and harmony. Political parties, which sponsor presidential candidates and other 
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national and local candidates, are required to have a “national character”. Accordingly, the 
Constitution expressly prohibits the formation of political parties on the basis of ethnicity, region 
or religion.38 Political parties are required to uphold and promote national unity,39 as well as to 
respect the right of everyone, including minorities and marginalised groups, to participate in the 
political process.40 This provision is born of past experience with negative ethnic political 
mobilisation that formed the basis for ethnic conflict.  
Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated how successive presidents relied on ethnic support and how 
this culture laid the basis for deadly ethno-political conflict in Kenya. In order to address this, 
some authors call for electoral rules that encourage politicians to seek votes beyond their own 
groups, a measure that can form a basis for integration in ethnically divided societies.41 The 
Constitution implements this measure by providing that the president has to receive more than 
half of the total votes cast in the election42 and at least 25 percent of the votes cast in more than 
half of the 47 counties.43 Where the condition is not met, the top two candidates proceed to a 
run-off in which the candidate with the highest number of votes becomes president regardless of 
the margin or number of votes.44 In most cases, presidential candidates are forced to appeal for 
votes beyond their own ethnic communities, and this may form a basis for fostering ethnic 
integration. 
Once in office, the president has direct obligations to foster ethnic harmony and national unity. 
The president is required to respect, uphold and safeguard the Constitution and safeguard the 
sovereignty of the nation.45 The president is also required to promote and enhance unity and 
promote respect for the diversity of the people and communities of Kenya.46 Indeed, the 
president is required to be a “symbol of national unity”.47 Accordingly, the Cabinet and the entire 
national executive should reflect the regional and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya.48 Key 
appointments are vetted by the National Assembly, or sometimes jointly with the Senate, which 
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may facilitate scrutiny to ensure that diversity is respected in the appointments.49 In the past, 
appointments to key government positions often benefited individuals from the president‟s 
community,50 and this fomented conflict by engendering perceptions of exclusion by ethnic 
communities at the “periphery” of power.  
Such perceptions of ethnically-based economic marginalisation have underlain conflict in the 
past.51 The CRA seeks to address them by ensuring transparency and objectivity in the sharing 
of revenue raised nationally.52 For instance, the World Bank observes that in Nigeria, periodic 
reports on how national funds were distributed “helped to diffuse public mistrust of central 
government, focusing public scrutiny and pressure on the use of funds”.53 Furthermore, control 
of public finances and the budgeting process has become more participatory at the national54 
and county level. These measures have opened up the space for a more open and accountable 
process in public finances and thus have the potential to address perceptions of exclusion from 
state resources.  
In addition, the Bill of Rights prohibits discrimination on the basis of ethnicity.55 The right to 
language and culture are also protected, and persons can individually or collectively enjoy their 
language or culture.56 The Bill of Rights thus enhances the individual and collective rights of 
minorities and marginalised groups. Provisions on equality and non-discrimination will serve to 
protect individuals or groups of people from unfair treatment and work towards ensuring equality 
across the ethnic divide. The Bill of Rights requires the state to put in place affirmative action 
programmes targeted at minorities and marginalised groups.57 These measures may facilitate 
the inclusion of minorities and marginalised groups in governance by enabling them to maintain 
their distinct cultural and socio-economic identities.58  
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2.3 Mechanisms to address underdevelopment  
Chapters 3 and 4 detailed how centralisation of powers and personal rule contributed to 
underdevelopment through bureaucratic inefficiency, the plunder of resources and ethnically-
skewed allocation of state resources. However, the constitutional framework now forms a basis 
for a more accountable and transparent process that can facilitate the pursuit of equitable 
national development.59 This is especially important because the national government is 
constitutionally entitled to a maximum of 85 percent of revenue collected nationally, thus placing 
it in a vastly superior position to counties (which are entitled to a minimum of 15 percent) to 
address development issues. Additionally, the Constitution allocates the major taxes to the 
national government,60 leaving counties with a relatively small tax base.61 Indeed, Prud‟homme 
argues62 that with political will, the central government is better able to address inequalities and 
implement redistribution through macroeconomic allocation at the national level. The 
Constitution provides that national resources shall be used to promote equitable development 
which takes into account the special needs for marginalised groups or areas; this requirement 
may form a basis for the pursuit of equitable development at the national level.63 
The Constitution establishes the Equalisation Fund, which is under central government control 
and into which 0.5 percent of all the revenue collected nationally must be deposited.64 The Fund 
can be used directly by the central government or, through counties as a conditional grant, to 
enhance access to basic services including water, roads, health facilities and electricity in 
marginalised areas.65 The services targeted by the Fund are county functions; it is therefore 
most likely to be applied as a conditional grant for the target counties.66 Its purpose is to bring 
the quality of specified services in the marginalised areas up to the standard enjoyed by the rest 
of country,67 and is supposed to lapse after 20 years unless parliament extends the life of the 
fund for a further fixed period.68 While the Fund has been criticised for being too small,69 it can 
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supplement the efforts of county governments to enhance basic services to previously 
neglected areas and thus contribute to overall equitable development.70 Furthermore, the CRA 
should be consulted before any appropriations from the Fund are made, a requirement that 
enhances transparency and objectivity.71  
Indeed, all public funds should be utilised in accordance with the principles of public finance 
listed in the Constitution.72 The principles emphasise equity, transparency, and prudent use of 
funds for purposes of development, among other requirements. Offices and institutions such as 
the National Treasury, the ministry in charge of finance and planning, the Auditor-General and 
the Controller of Budget are all meant to ensure that national funds are used in a manner that 
promotes identified national priorities for development. The Bill of Rights, too, provides that 
every person is entitled to basic needs, which include food, water, health care, housing, 
education and social security.73 These basic entitlements lay a further basis for enhancing 
access to basic services and development across the country by all organs of state.  
2.4 Devolution: a means to achieve a wider constitutional purpose  
The preceding discussion shows that devolution is but one of the constitutional mechanisms put 
in place to address underdevelopment, ethnic conflict and the need to limit central power. 
However, the promises of devolution make the devolution of power not just an optional 
alternative but a necessity in the pursuit of the three purposes. Devolution of power enhances 
participatory governance by opening up multiple centres of decision-making,74 which can greatly 
enhance the pursuit of development, ethnic accommodation and limiting central power.  
Devolution of power can facilitate “people-centred development” through local democratic 
institutions.75 Devolution also reduces the inefficiency associated with central bureaucracy, 
thereby advancing effective development.76 Devolution of power also has the potential to 
facilitate the inclusion of subnational groups who are minorities and therefore have weak or no 
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representation in national structures.77 The process can promote the accommodation of 
subnational groups who are in competition for control of the centre and thus address conflict 
about power or resources.78 Furthermore, the very concept of devolution implies that there are 
limits on central power, given that power is transferred to local units and state power is thus 
vertically divided.79 These potential benefits of devolution make it indispensable to the pursuit of 
the three issues.  
3. Devolution as a core constitutional principle  
Devolution is woven into the national values and principles of the Constitution, thus making it a 
core constitutional principle. Sovereignty, which is declared as emanating from the people, is 
vested in both the national and county governments.80 In essence, the Constitution splits state 
sovereignty and power into national and county power. As such, counties are not mere 
subnational entities but polities that, on the basis of the concept of shared sovereignty, are 
meant to enjoy the same constitutional and political legitimacy as the national government.  
County boundaries are constitutionally recognised as the internal territorial divisions of the 
Kenyan Republic81 in Article 6 of the Constitution in which the republican status and sovereignty 
of the Kenyan state is declared. In a different part of the same Article, it is declared that national 
and county governments are distinct but inter-dependent and should thus conduct their affairs 
on the basis of consultation and cooperation.82 In the past, local authorities operated as 
appendages of the centre.83 By contrast, the treatment of counties in the Constitution invokes a 
different continuum altogether, one in which counties are of essence to the definition of the 
republic.  
The Constitution also lists “national values and principles of governance” which bind all state 
organs, state officers, public officers, and all persons when applying or interpreting the 
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Constitution, enacting or applying or interpreting a law, or making or interpreting policy.84 There 
are four categories of national values and principles of governance. The first category entails 
patriotism, national unity, sharing and devolution of power, the rule of law, democracy and 
participation of people.85 The second category encompasses human dignity, equity, social 
justice, inclusiveness, equality, human rights, non-discrimination and protection of the 
marginalised.86 The third category involves good governance, integrity, transparency and 
accountability.87 The last category deals with sustainable development.88 The fact that 
“devolution of power” is contained in the first category, even ahead of other important values 
such as human rights, shows the importance attached to devolution as a constitutional value 
and principle in Kenya‟s constitutional and legal order.  
County governments can participate in constitutional amendment through the popular 
initiative.89 While county powers are not equivalent to those of the national legislature in regard 
to constitutional amendment, the counties‟ participation in amendments enhances their 
significance in the constitutional order. Furthermore, while other constitutional provisions can be 
amended by a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly and the Senate, after following the 
procedures for amendment, the provisions dealing with the objects, principles and structure of 
devolved government are subject to a national referendum vote.90 Other provisions subject to a 
national referendum vote include amendments touching on the national values and principles of 
governance, sovereignty and the territory of Kenya.91 The requirement for a referendum 
entrenches devolution and makes the people, from whom all constitutional power emanates, the 
guardians of devolution.  
The constitutional provisions discussed above are indicative of the centrality of the concept of 
devolution in the restructuring and transformation of the Kenyan state. For instance, while a 
country like South Africa is generally considered a hybrid federal system, the preamble and 
founding provisions of its constitution do not elevate the devolution of power to provinces and 
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local governments as a core constitutional principle, as is the case in the Kenyan Constitution.92 
Ultimately, however, the substantive power and resources controlled by counties will determine 
their actual significance within the Kenyan state and political system. While the formal 
constitutional significance of devolution is clear, the actual powers exercised by counties and 
the nature and amount of resources controlled by them are even more important to 
understanding the substantive role that devolved government will play in Kenya. 
4. The objectives and principles of devolved government  
4.1 The objectives of devolved government  
The objectives and principles of devolved government are provided for at the beginning of 
Chapter 11 of the Constitution, which deals exclusively with devolved government. Article 174 
lists nine objects of devolved government:  
(a) to promote democratic and accountable exercise of power;  
(b) to foster national unity by recognising diversity;  
(c) to give powers of self-governance to the people and enhance the participation of the 
people in the exercise of the powers of the State and in making decisions affecting them;  
(d) to recognise the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their 
development;  
(e) to protect and promote interests and rights of minorities and marginalised communities;  
(f) to promote social and economic development and the provision of proximate, easily 
accessible services throughout Kenya;  
(g) to ensure equitable sharing of national and local resources throughout Kenya;  
(h) to facilitate the decentralisation of State organs, their functions and services, from the 
capital of Kenya; and,  
(i) to enhance checks and balances and the separation of powers.  
While subsequent provisions in the chapter on devolution describe the details of the devolved 
system, the objects provide guidance and a basis for understanding the intention and purpose 
of devolution. The objectives, thus, provide an important starting point for interrogating the 
purposes which the devolved system of government, as expressed in the Constitution, serves in 
Kenya.  
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4.1.1 Democratic and accountable exercise of power  
The first purpose of the devolved system of government is “to promote democratic and 
accountable exercise of power”.93 As institutions which will exercise power on behalf of people, 
counties will be accountable to the public through elections and other channels of enhancing 
democratic accountability. The democratic and accountable exercise of power, however, is a 
broader constitutional objective and purpose which all government, devolved or not, will have to 
respect. Indeed, the Constitution provides that all sovereign power belongs to the people and is 
to be exercised directly by the people or through their directly elected representatives.94 Thus, 
any person or institution which exercises power is, as a constitutional imperative, accountable to 
the people.  
However, devolution of powers for decision-making opens up multiple centres for decision-
making, thus facilitating as wide a degree of participation as possible.95 In this way, devolution 
enhances democratic and accountable exercise of power. Democratic and accountable exercise 
of power implies that decisions reflect the will of the people.96 Indeed, as stated earlier in this 
thesis, devolution is the institutional expression of a willingness to enhance the accountable and 
democratic exercise of power, and is a way through which the idea of democracy can be 
institutionally pursued. Through devolution, the people, to whom power belongs, can pursue 
their choices by influencing or determining the manner in which public power is exercised and 
decisions made locally.97  
The object does not, however, expressly identify the purpose served by democratic 
accountability. Discussions in Chapter 2 indicate that democratic accountability is in all cases 
tied to a specific purpose. For instance, as mentioned above, it can enhance participation in 
development and is indeed core to the concept of development.98 Democratic accountability 
furthermore implies representation of all groups in decision-making processes, and this may 
form a basis for inclusion in divided societies. Furthermore, democratic accountability implies a 
limited government that is subject to democratic controls.    
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4.1.2 Fostering national unity by recognising diversity  
The second object of devolved government is “to foster national unity by recognising diversity”. 
This object recognises two things: first, Kenyan society is diverse, and second, accommodation 
of that diversity is important for achieving national unity. The Constitution recognises various 
forms of diversity and seeks to protect them. This can be seen through the Bill of Rights 
outlawing discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or social origin, race, sex, religion, conscience, 
belief, culture, dress, language and other grounds.99 Accordingly, there is no doubt that Kenya 
has various diversities which this object is meant to promote and protect.100 
While the objective does not state which diversity should be accommodated in order to 
consolidate peace, Kenya‟s past experience leaves no doubt that the objective makes reference 
to ethnic diversity. In the Kenyan experience, real or perceived exclusion along ethnic lines led 
to political and ethnic conflict.101 Indeed, many provisions in the Constitution specifically require 
that the “regional and ethnic” diversity of the people of Kenya to be respected. These include 
the composition of the national executive,102 political party nomination lists for the national and 
county legislatures,103 and the public service.104 Ethnic diversity should also be respected in the 
composition of the Kenyan Defence Forces,105 the National Police Service106 and independent 
commissions.107 The Constitution further requires a specific law to promote ethnic and regional 
diversity, among other forms of diversity.108 
Devolution of power seeks to enhance ethnic accommodation in order to achieve ethnic 
harmony and peace by facilitating the sharing of power between the centre and subnational 
groups. Through devolved government, ethnic communities that are not in control of the 
presidency but have their own counties participate in the economic, political and governance 
process of the state; this addresses all or part of the perceptions of exclusion that underlie 
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ethnic conflict in Kenya. The object recognises that sustainable national unity requires political 
and economic inclusion of all ethnic communities, and that devolution of powers can be an 
institutional avenue to pursue the same.  
4.1.3 Self-governance and people‟s participation in decision-making  
The third object of devolved government is “to give powers of self-governance to the people and 
enhance the participation of the people in the exercise of the powers of the State and in making 
decisions affecting them”.109 In essence, this object calls for democratic and accountable 
exercise of power, just as the first object does. The only difference, perhaps, is the use of the 
phrase “give powers of self-governance” and the emphasis on “decisions affecting them” in the 
third objective. This may imply democratic exercise of power in the context of a devolved 
system of government. Particularly, the phrase “decisions affecting them” implies localised 
decision-making that enables communities to address local preferences varying from one 
community to another.  
It is only through devolution of power that the broad principle of “self-governance” can be 
institutionally realised. While development is not expressly mentioned in the object, the 
language used in this object is typical devolved-development talk. Devolved governance is 
exalted as a means of planning and of using resources to address local preferences in the 
name of allocative efficiency.110 This approach is supported by the principle of subsidiarity, 
which requires all functions to be performed at the lowest possible level unless effective 
performance requires such functions to be retained at the national level.111 Thus, while the first 
object on democratic and accountable exercise of power is general, the third object espouses 
the same but is particular to a decentralised-governance setting. However, both the first and 
third objects broadly emphasise the same broad principle of democratic and accountable 
exercise of power.  
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4.1.4 The right of communities to manage their own affairs and development  
The fourth objective of devolved government is “to recognise the right of communities to 
manage their own affairs and further their own development”.112 Like the third and first 
objectives, this one seeks to promote democratic and accountable exercise of power. This is 
because effective democratic decision-making implies that communities are able to influence 
the exercise of power in order to address their needs. To this extent, the fourth objective serves 
essentially a similar purpose to that of the first and third objects of devolved government. The 
phrase “their own affairs” equally implies the principle of subsidiarity, which calls for local 
decision-making for effectiveness and efficiency.113 
The fourth object has, however, expressly identified development as a purpose to be pursued 
through democratic decision-making. Thus, while communities will participate in decision-
making, this object adds that such participation is with the express purpose of enhancing their 
development. In so doing, the object ties the broader meaning of development, which 
emphasises participation, with decentralisation. Decentralisation is said to enhance institutional 
and allocative efficiency, hence leading to local development.114 Preferences, priorities, and 
needs in terms of development differ between regions and even localities. Devolution offers an 
avenue for localised decision-making that can address developmental issues relevant to the 
local context.115 Mechanisms of accountability, on the other hand, enable local communities to 
ensure that devolved units use powers and resources allocated to them in a manner that 
addresses democratically determined local needs and priorities.116 
4.1.5 Safeguarding rights of minorities and marginalised communities  
The fifth object of devolved government seeks “to protect and promote the interests and rights 
of minorities and marginalised communities”.117 International118 and Kenyan119 experience 
reveals that minorities and marginalised communities have been excluded from mainstream 
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social, political, and economic realms of the society. Thus, if the devolved system of 
government were to be inclusive, marginalised and minority groups would, of necessity, be a 
starting point in terms of enhancing inclusion. The object makes reference to two groups: 
minorities and marginalised communities. Unlike the term “minorities”, which is not defined in 
the Constitution, the phrase “marginalised communities” is given a fairly comprehensive 
definition. The Constitution specifies four categories of people who fit the description 
“marginalised community”. 
First, a marginalised community may mean a community, which, because of its relatively small 
population, has been unable to fully participate in the integrated social and economic life of 
Kenya as a whole.120 Second, a marginalised community may mean a traditional community 
that, out of a need or desire to preserve its unique culture and identity from assimilation, has 
remained outside the integrated social and economic life of Kenya as a whole.121 Third, a 
marginalised community may mean an indigenous community that has retained and maintained 
a traditional lifestyle and livelihood based on a hunter and gatherer economy.122 Lastly, a 
marginalised community may also mean pastoral persons and communities, whether nomadic 
or settled, that, because of their relative geographic isolation, have experienced only marginal 
participation in the integrated social and economic life of Kenya as a whole.123  
The Constitution, however, makes a distinction between a marginalised community and a 
marginalised group. The latter is defined as “a group of people” who have faced disadvantages 
and discrimination due to previous and current laws and practices.124 This object thus targets 
“communities” as opposed to identifiable groups who are not a “community”; the latter may be 
persons with disabilities, women, children, the youth, or other groups who do not fall within the 
definition of a “community”. 
While this object seeks to accommodate diversity, as is the case in the second objective, it is 
clear that the two objectives target different groups for accommodation and protection, 
respectively. Lack of accommodation of ethnic diversity may cause conflict. However, lack of 
protection of marginalised communities leads only to further marginalisation, as opposed to 
conflict. There is no real or major threat of conflict if the rights of marginalised groups are not 
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respected or safeguarded. On the other hand, lack of accommodation of ethnic diversity may 
threaten the political stability of a state. As such, the second object targets the groups that 
contest for the political power of the state, while this object targets groups that need protection. 
In the Kenyan context, the major ethnic communities who are contenders for the presidency fit 
within the second objective. However, the smaller ethnic communities who are not a risk to 
political stability fit within this objective.  
The term “minorities” or “minority” is not defined in the Constitution and, even internationally, 
does not have a universal definition, “partly because of the diverse contexts in which minorities 
exist globally”.125 While minorities in the Kenyan context may refer to different groups, this object 
focuses narrowly on ethnic minorities. In Kenya, no single ethnic community accounts for more 
than half of the country‟s population. As such, all ethnic communities can technically be referred 
to as minorities.126 However, such an approach ignores the dynamics of ethnicity, especially 
with regard to access to and control of political and state power. Five of the largest ethnic 
communities in Kenya account for over 50 percent of Kenya‟s population (which stands at 
around 41,609,728), while the rest, approximately 41 ethnic communities, account for almost a 
third of the total population.127 It can thus be concluded that minorities, in the Kenyan context, 
exclude the largest five ethnic communities but include the 41 who account for 30 percent of the 
total population.  
However, even within the smaller ethnic communities, there are those who are far more 
numerically inferior; of the 41 smaller ethnic groups, 18 have a population of less than 
100 000.128 It is less than likely that these communities can secure a county or, in some cases, 
even a county ward. It thus seems that the term “minorities” as used in this object refers to the 
smaller ethnic communities, while “marginalised communities” includes the smallest ethnic 
communities that may not constitute a county or even a county constituency, among other 
communities.  
Safeguarding the rights of minorities and marginalised communities may entail enhancing their 
participation in social, political and economic affairs in order to improve their livelihood. 
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Development and access to resources is the central tool for ensuring inclusion of marginalised 
groups or minorities, especially in the context of a developing country like Kenya. As such, 
democratic decision-making and the other developmental objects devolution still remain relevant 
to the protection and promotion of the interests and rights of minorities and marginalised 
communities.  
4.1.6 Socio-economic development service delivery throughout Kenya  
The sixth object of devolved government is “to promote social and economic development and 
the provision of proximate, easily accessible services throughout Kenya”.129 This object re-
emphasises what the other objectives discussed above have addressed. For instance, the need 
to protect the interests of minorities and marginalised communities is based on the realisation 
that marginalised areas have low socio-economic development and poor service delivery that 
need to be addressed. Effective safeguarding of the rights of minorities and marginalised groups 
will thus have to include socio-economic development and enhanced access to services 
throughout Kenya. Furthermore, the objects which seek to promote democratic accountability 
for purposes of development have the ultimate aim of enhanced socio-economic development 
and access to services throughout the country.  
4.1.7 Equitable sharing of national and local resources throughout Kenya  
The seventh object of devolved government is “to ensure equitable sharing of national and local 
resources throughout Kenya”.130 This object recognises the devolved system of government as 
an avenue for sharing of state resources both at the national and local level. The object contains 
two important elements: sharing of resources, and equity in the process of sharing of those 
resources. While the object recognises that state resources need to be shared across the 
country for development, there is further recognition of the need to share the resources 
equitably. Equity introduces the element of “need”, meaning that sharing of resources should be 
based on needs.  
Areas across the country are not equally endowed in terms of resources and thus have varying 
needs. Some of the disparities in terms of resources and needs are a result of past deliberate 
policies of exclusion from development and public resources. In these circumstances, 
distribution of resources according to mathematical equality will result in unfair distribution of 
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resources as it will ignore the disparities in the country, some of which were created or 
deepened through deliberate exclusion. As such, equity aims at “equalisation” and redistribution 
of resources in order to achieve equitable development. However, this object re-emphasises the 
main issues that previous objects dealing with development have addressed. Equitable sharing 
of resources is central to decentralised development131 and is also an important element in 
addressing ethnic conflict over state resources.  
4.1.8 Decentralisation of State organs, services and functions from the capital  
The eighth object of devolved government is “to facilitate the decentralisation of State organs, 
their functions and services, from the capital of Kenya”.132 The Constitution defines a “state 
organ” as a “commission, office, agency or other body established under this Constitution”.133 
Thus, the object can only, in this context, mean counties as they fit into the definition of a state 
organ. Indeed, most of the services offered by counties, along with their human resources, are 
concentrated in Nairobi and a few other urban areas, all to the detriment of the majority of the 
population based in rural areas.134 However, this object is only an emphasis of the foregoing 
objects that provide for equitable development and access to services.  
The phrase “state organs” may be interpreted to mean deconcentration of central government 
departments and agencies which are mostly based in Nairobi and have little or no presence 
outside of it. Indeed, the Constitution expressly provides that “a national state organ shall 
ensure reasonable access to its services in all parts of the Republic, so far as it is appropriate to 
do so having regard to the nature of the service”.135 However, in the context of devolved 
government, to which the object applies, the phrase can only mean decentralisation of services 
to devolved units. Thus, while deconcentration is a desirable objective, especially in order to 
enhance access to central government services, deconcentration falls outside of the normative 
meaning and application of the term “devolution”.  
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4.1.9 Enhance checks and balances and the separation of powers  
The last objective of devolved government is “to enhance checks and balances and the 
separation of powers”.136 There are two possible ways of looking at this object: first, it may refer 
to the role that the devolved system of government can play in enhancing accountability at the 
national level; second, the object may refer to accountability within the county structures. 
Devolution of powers has the effect of diffusing power from the centre to the devolved units. As 
such, the subnational level exercises control and powers over which the centre no longer has 
control.137 Accordingly, this vertical split of power has the effect of limiting or preventing absolute 
or total control of all powers by the centre.  
The only other way that county governments can enhance horizontal “separation of powers” at 
the national level is indirectly through the Senate, which represents county interests. 
Structurally, though, the Senate is part of the national legislature and is indeed provided for 
under a different chapter of the Constitution where its “separation of powers” functions are 
listed. However, the object may also be in reference to county structures, in which case it will 
require checks and balances between organs of government and the separation of power at the 
county level.  
4.2 Assessment of the objects of devolved government  
Six of the nine objects of devolved government (first, third, fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth) 
focus directly on development. These six objects deal with democratic accountability, effective 
participation, responsiveness and allocative efficiency, equitable sharing of resources, and 
enhancing access to services. All these aspects are important if devolution is to lead to 
development. For instance, it is mainly through accountable exercise of power that people will 
be assured that devolved units respond to local needs and enable communities to manage their 
own affairs and development.138 Furthermore, a properly designed devolved system can be 
used to pursue redistributive policies as well as enhance equitable sharing of resources, all of 
which are central to devolution for development.139 Thus, any effective system of devolution 
aimed at development will incorporate all of the six objects of devolved government.140  
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Two objects of devolved government (second and the fifth) are specific to conflict resolution as 
a purpose of devolving power. The two objects provide that devolved government will foster 
national unity by recognising diversity,141 and that the devolved system will safeguard the rights 
of minorities and marginalised groups.142 Kenya‟s experience shows that political and economic 
exclusion along ethnic lines has been the main cause of past internal conflicts.143 Indeed, even 
generally, exclusion of identifiable groups from effective political and economic participation of a 
state is the cause of internal conflicts in many conflict-ridden states.144 
In the Kenyan context, the devolved system of government can only promote national unity if all 
groups have a sense that they are able to participate effectively in the broader economic and 
political framework of the state. To this effect, the developmental objectives of equity and 
redistribution of resources and development remain central to resolving ethnic conflict in Kenya. 
Effective representation and participation in political structures, on the other hand, will enable all 
groups, especially minorities and marginalised groups, to also take charge of their own affairs 
and thus minimise their disaffection.145 Where all groups, including minorities and marginalised 
groups are effectively included, the potential for conflict is minimised or eliminated.146  
Only the ninth object is directly relevant to limiting of central power as a purpose of devolved 
government. As discussed above, the county governments will share power with the central 
government, thus limiting the latter‟s absolute control over all government power. Furthermore, 
and as indicated earlier, the Senate, which essentially represents counties at the national level, 
will also facilitate “county rule” at the national level.  
While only an analysis of the specific structures, powers and resources will reveal the most 
prominent of the three purposes, it is clear that much weight was placed on development in the 
formulation of the objectives of devolution. Indeed, as demonstrated in the discussions in 
Chapter 4, critical decisions on the structure of devolved government during the constitutional 
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review were made on the basis of development.147 This may thus explain the pre-eminence of 
the developmental purpose of devolution in the objects of devolution.  
The nine objects are, however, not exclusive but instead mutually reinforce each other. For 
instance, effective service delivery and equitable development has the potential to address 
development-related issues of conflict. Furthermore, centralisation of power is a source of 
internal conflict, especially where state power is in the exclusive control of a dominant group. 
Thus, an effective limit to central power has the potential not only to manage or eliminate 
internal conflict but to facilitate the devolution of necessary controls and thereby improve local 
efficiency and development. It is hence likely that the achievement of one object will assist 
achievement of the others.  
Nevertheless, while the objectives can be said to be mutually reinforcing, the discussions in 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that there are potentially conflicting design features for each of the 
three purposes. Objectives are, however, general and aspirational in nature, whereas the 
design of a system takes into account concrete details, some of which may be in conflict with 
each other. In such circumstances, the ideal situation is to identify these conflicting aspects and 
make trade-offs to ensure that the three purposes can be accommodated in one design.  
4.3 Other purposes pursued by devolved government?  
A further review of the nine objects reveals that democracy emerges as a purpose which may 
be treated as distinct from the three other purposes discussed above. Indeed, accountable 
exercise of power, self-governance, minority participation in political processes, and separation 
of powers are all aimed at enhancing the quality of representative democracy. Devolution of 
power opens up multiple centres for decision-making, thus enhancing democracy and 
accountability. However, a deeper analysis of the objects reveals that while democracy may be 
couched as a distinct purpose of devolution, it is primarily an instrumentality through which all 
the three purposes will be pursued and realised. Put differently, the democratic process 
facilitates participatory development, inclusiveness and provides ways to limit and control 
central power.  
Thus, while democracy is an important process listed as an objective of devolved government, it 
serves other substantive purposes without which the concept of democracy would be “hollow” 
and unhelpful. For instance, democratic participation in decision-making is only useful insofar as 
it leads to identification of developmental needs to be addressed. This may well be the reason 
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why most of the objectives emphasise development as key to democratic and accountable 
exercise of power. Furthermore, even inclusion in the context of conflict resolution is meaningful 
only if it addresses the substantive needs of excluded groups, which mainly revolve around 
resources. Accordingly, participation, accountability and decision-making must be linked to 
resources or other causes of conflict. 
4.4 Principles of devolved government  
The Constitution draws a distinction between objects of devolved government listed in Article 
174 and the three principles of devolved government in Article 175. The first provides that 
“county governments shall be based on democratic principles and the separation of powers”.148 
The second promises that “county governments shall have reliable sources of revenue to 
enable them to govern and deliver services effectively”.149 The third principle states that “no 
more than two-thirds of the members of representative bodies in each county government shall 
be of the same gender”.150  
While the objects of devolved government lay down the purposes of devolution, the principles of 
devolved government seem to deal with the question of the functioning of the counties as 
opposed to setting out the broad purpose. For instance, while the objectives require effective 
participation in development, the third principle (the one-third gender rule) lays down a definitive 
operational rule. All representative structures of county government will thus be required to obey 
the one-third gender rule. However, the third principle is less precise in its application. It merely 
restates the need for adequate resources for county governments without a definite process of 
achieving the same. The general nature of the principle and lack of specific details makes it 
unhelpful beyond a general recognition of the need for resources. The third principle, on the 
other hand, merely restates the ninth object which provides for separation of powers. 
 
5. County government units and boundaries 
The adoption of 47 counties in the 2010 Constitution as the only constitutionally entrenched 
level of subnational government impacts differently on the three purposes of devolving power. 
According to the World Bank, the developmental potential can be realised where units are small 
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enough to facilitate participation but large enough to ensure viability.151 Effectively limiting 
central power requires fewer and larger, and preferably homogenous, regional units.152 Conflict 
resolution, on the other hand, may demand smaller or larger units or both, depending on the 
circumstances.153  
The 47 counties adopted in the 2010 Constitution are based on the 46 administrative districts 
that existed as at 1992, along with Nairobi County which was considered a „special province” in 
the Provincial Administration (PA) structure.154 Chapter 4 analysed the factors that led to the 
adoption of the 47 counties, with the three purposes featuring prominently in the relevant 
deliberations. The background discussions and the reasons for adoption of those counties are 
documented.155 However, the impact and effectiveness of the counties may not necessarily be 
the same as was intended. This section evaluates the composition, size and number of county 
government units and the impact of these factors on the three purposes of devolution.  
5. 1 County boundary demarcation: ethnic accommodation?  
Ethnic conflict is, as argued in Chapters 3 and 4, caused mainly by perceptions of political and 
economic exclusion along the major ethnic lines. The devolved system of government aims at 
addressing ethnic conflict by recognising ethnic diversity and safeguarding the rights of 
marginalised communities. While boundary demarcation can be used to enhance 
accommodation of diversity and promote integration in divided societies, there is no agreement, 
in theory or in practice, on a universal approach for doing so. 
Proponents of ethnic exclusive units argue that the best approach is one that safeguards 
against dominance.156 Others argue that mixed units lay a basis for ethnic integration for the 
greater nation-building.157 Thus, in literature and practice there is no agreement on whether 
ethnically exclusive units or mixed units are the most appropriate in terms of accommodating 
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diversity and promoting inter-ethnic harmony. The legitimacy or lack of it in the pursuit of a 
particular approach in boundary demarcation may end up determining whether a selected 
approach will address conflict.158  
In Kenya, the legitimacy or not of the current boundaries must start with the stated reasons for 
adopting the current 47 county boundaries.159 The 47 counties are a product of a colonial policy 
that entailed an ethnically-based “divide-and-rule” strategy. However, the boundaries were not 
retained with the explicit purpose of continuing this policy. The 47 county boundaries were 
adopted because they are large enough to provide additional checks and balances and are at 
the same time economically viable.160 Thus, the current county boundaries that are ethnically 
defined are more of a historical accident that happens to coincide with other apparently 
legitimate purposes than a reflection of a deliberate policy to organise devolution on the basis of 
ethnicity.  
The CoE had a limited time and mandate to prepare a draft based on wide political consensus. 
Kivuva observes that the Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitutional Review (PSC) and 
the National Assembly failed to agree on a mechanism to determine the number, size and 
composition of county government units.161 Boundary issues are highly political, and the CoE 
had a narrow mandate and limited time. Furthermore, it is observed that there were forces bent 
on using the boundary issue to scuttle the entire review process.162 This led the CoE to settle on 
the 1992 districts, which were a somewhat politically neutral fall-back.163 However, while the 
adoption of the largely ethnic-based county system is a matter of accident rather than design, 
the system is still ethnically-based and thus subject to the possible perils and/or benefits of such 
composition.  
5.1.1 The ethnic composition and structure of counties   
The structure of county governments in terms of the ethnic composition can be analysed in five 
main ways. First, the county boundary structure fragments the larger ethnic communities into 
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several counties. Accordingly, each of the larger ethnic communities in Kenya has several 
counties that are carved out of the former “home provinces”.164 Due to their numerical 
superiority (relative to other ethnic communities) and the ethnic-based style of Kenyan politics 
these five largest ethnic communities (Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo, Kamba) have emerged as 
the more politically dominant communities. This is evidenced by the fact that in the run-up to 
general elections in Kenya, political coalitions and counter-coalitions are largely formed between 
these five communities while the smaller communities play a peripheral role in the coalition 
formation.165 Accordingly, the term “politically dominant” in reference to ethnic communities 
generally refers to the largest five.     
Second, a number of the smaller ethnic minorities that never had their “home province” in the 
former regime now have a “home county” or two under the 2010 Constitution. Third, there are 
ethnic minorities who, because of their small size, were not given their own counties and who 
can be termed “in-county” minorities. Fourth, in counties historical migration has also created 
“migrant” majorities that are not considered “indigenous” to the area. Lastly, there are counties 
that are fully or partially urbanised (for instance, Nairobi) and which form ethnic “melting pots”.  
Table 2 summarises information pertaining to the ethnic composition of the 47 counties. It is 
divided into four parts. The first lists the counties that resulted from the split of the larger ethnic 
communities. The second lists counties with “migrant” ethnic communities. The third part lists 
the ethnic communities that are small nationally but large enough to have a “home county”. The 
last part has information on Nairobi County, the only fully mixed and urbanised county with no 
single ethnic majority. Due to the unavailability of ethnically disaggregated data by county, the 
table refers only to the apparent majority ethnic group in each of the counties. Although other 
diversities such as religion may be prominent in some counties, the analysis focuses on ethnic 
diversity alone. 
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Table 2: Counties‟ ethnic composition 
 
Large ethnic groups 
Category/Ethnic 
composition  
County  Total 
population  
Land area (sq km) 
Kikuyu  Nyandarua  596 268  3 245  
Nyeri  693 558  3 337  
Kirinyaga  528 054  1 479  
Kiambu  1 623 282  2 543  
Murang‟a  942 582  2 559  
Percentage of total 
population: 38 605 929 
 11.36 percent   
Kalenjin  Uasin Gishu  894 179  3 345  
Nandi  752 965  2 884  
Baringo  551 561  11 015  
Kericho  758 339  2 479  
Bomet  724 186  2 471  
Percentage of total 
population: 38 605 929 
 9.54 percent   
Luo  Siaya  842 304  2 530  
Kisumu  968 909  2 086  
Homa Bay  958 991  2 586  
Migori 563 033  1 969  
Percentage of total 
population: 38 605 929 
 8.63 percent   
Luhya Kakamega  1 660 651  3 051  
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 Vihiga  554 622  531  
Bungoma  1 630 934  3 593  
Busia  488 705  1 134  
Percentage of total 
population: 38 605 929 
 11.2 percent   
Akamba  Machakos  1 098 584  6 208  
Kitui  1 012 709  30 496  
Makueni  884 527  8 009  
Subtotal  21 18 728 943  195 100 
Percentage of total 
population: 38 605 929 
 48.5 percent   
 
“Migrant” ethnic majorities 
Category/Ethnic 
composition  
County  Total 
population  
Land area (sq km ) 
Kikuyu  Nakuru  1 603 325  7 495  
Kikuyu  Laikipia  399 227  9 462  
Luhya  Trans-Nzoia  818 758  2 496 
Subtotal  3 2 821 310 19 453  
Percentage of total 
population: 38 605 929 
 7.3 percent   
 
Smaller ethnic groups 
Category/Ethnic 
composition  
County  Total 
population  
Land area (sq km) 
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Kisii  Kisii  1 511 422  2 542 
Nyamira  598 252  899  
Meru  Meru  1 356 301  6 936  
Tharaka-Nithi  365 330  2 639  
Embu Embu  516 212  2 818  
Maasai  Samburu  223 947  21 022  
Narok  850 920  17 933  
Kajiado  687 312  21 901  
Somali  Garissa  623 060  44 175  
Wajir  661 941  56 686  
Mandera  1 025 756  25 991  
Turkana  Turkana  855 399  68 680  
Isiolo  143 294  25 336  
Borana  Marsabit  291 166  70 961  
Waswahili, Duruma, 
Giriama, Rabai, Boni, 
Digo  
Mombasa  939 370  219  
Mijikenda  Kwale  649 931  8 270  
Kilifi  1 109 735  12 610  
Tana River  240 075  38 437  
Lamu  101 539  6 273  
Taita  Taita/Taveta  284 657  17 084  
Pokot  West Pokot  512 690  9 169  
Marakwet  Elgeyo/Marakwet  368 998  3 030  
Subtotal  22 13 917 307  463 611  
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Percentage of total 
population: 38 605 929 
 36.0 percent   
 
Mixed ethnic settlement 
Category/Ethnic 
composition  
County  Total 
population  
Land area (sq km) 
Mixed  Nairobi  3 138 369  695  
Percentage of total 
population: 38 605 929 
 8.1 percent   
Total  47  38 605 929 678 859  
 
Sources: Independent IEBC „Final report of boundaries of constituencies and wards‟ (2012); 
CRA „Kenya: County fact sheets‟ (2011); Republic of Kenya „2009 population and housing 
census results‟ (Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030) (2010)  
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Map 2: County boundaries  
 
 
 
Source: Softkenya-all about Kenya http://softkenya.com/county/kenya-counties-map/  
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5.1.1.1 “Fragmentation” of the large ethnic communities  
The five largest ethnic communities in Kenya account for over 50 percent of the total Kenyan 
population and each controlled a “home region” in the former system of provincial 
administration. However, as can be seen from Table 2 and Map 2, these communities have 
been split into several counties – the Kikuyu community, into five, the Luhya, into four, the Luo, 
into four, the Kalenjin, into six, and the Kamba community, into three, the 22 counties account 
for over 60 percent of the country‟s population. 
Apart from the former “home regions”, some of the large ethnic communities are “migrant” 
majorities in other counties outside of the “home regions”. This can be traced to historical 
factors such as displacement from the central region leading to immigration to other regions like 
the Rift Valley. The movements into other regions have, in some cases, fundamentally altered 
the ethnic composition. Nakuru County, in the former Rift Valley, was originally inhabited by the 
Maasai, but historical migration of the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin into the area has turned them into 
a tiny minority.166 Other counties with substantial “migrant” majorities include Trans-Nzoia (with 
a Luhya Majority) and Laikipia (with a Kikuyu majority). In some cases, the “migrant” 
communities have a concentrated rural settlement, mainly as a result of ethnically exclusive 
land allocation schemes after independence;167 in others, there are predominantly mixed and 
urban-type settlements due to ever-increasing rural-urban migration.  
5.1.1.2 A “home county” for the bigger minorities  
The 47 county boundaries also had the effect of giving the smaller ethnic minorities a “home 
county”. Most of these ethnic communities were minorities within the former provinces but now 
have their own territorial units. These approximately 12 ethnic communities168 each control one 
or two counties and have a total of 20 counties. The total population of these counties accounts 
for approximately one-third of the country‟s population.  
5.1.1.3 The emergence of “county minorities”  
Not all ethnic communities have a “home county” in the current structure. A number of the 
minority ethnic communities share counties with larger ethnic communities. As indicated in 
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Chapter 4, the removal of the regional level necessitated the reduction of the number of county 
governments from 74 to the current 47. While these minority ethnic communities had earlier 
been allocated their own units, removal of the regional level meant that they will be combined 
with the larger communities. As noted earlier, approximately 18 communities have a population 
of 100 000 or less, and these form part of the county minorities.169  
Within these smaller minorities, there are some that are much larger than the 100 000 referred 
to above and which thus form a substantial minority within their respective counties. Among the 
larger “in-county minorities” are: the Kuria in Migori County, Sabaot in Bungoma County, Teso in 
Busia County and Marakwet in Elgeyo-Marakwet.170 Most of them remain consistently opposed 
to the current county boundaries and even voted against the Constitution in the 2010 
constitutional referendum.171 In addition, there are much smaller minorities, such as those 
numbering 100 000 or less, who may be too small to have a significant “group impact” even in 
county level politics.  
5.1.1.5 Urbanised counties: the ethnic “melting pots”  
Four counties are either fully urbanised or have majority urban-based populations: Nairobi, 
Machakos, Kiambu and Mombasa. A predominant characteristic of urbanisation is that it creates 
non-concentrated mixed ethnic settlement due to rural–urban migration across ethnic 
boundaries. As a result, most urban areas have mixed ethnic settlement as opposed to the 
ethnically exclusive settlements in most rural areas of the country. However, except for Nairobi, 
which is “fully mixed”, all other urban areas of the country have a predominant local ethnic group 
in their urban population structure. While Machakos and Kiambu counties are urbanised, the 
Akamba and Kikuyu, respectively, are the dominant communities in the two counties. Even in 
Mombasa, which is fully urbanised with many “migrant” communities from the hinterland, the 
“indigenous” ethnic communities, who include the Swahili, Duruma, Giriama, Rabai, Boni and 
the Digo, are the dominant ethnic communities. Kenyans of Asian and European origin are also 
located mostly in urban areas. 
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5.1.2 The role of county boundaries in the management of ethnic conflict  
The current county boundaries will have an inevitable impact on ethnic harmony in the country. 
First, the splitting of the larger ethnic communities into several counties may impact on ethnic 
mobilisation. Second, the granting of “home counties” to smaller groups that hitherto had no 
home regions has the potential to impact on ethnic accommodation. Third, the current 
boundaries have given rise to “in-county” minorities and this may form a basis for ethnic minority 
conflict. Lastly, urbanisation is increasingly creating a “melting pot” of different ethnic 
communities across the country due to rural-urban migration; this is also likely to affect ethnic 
harmony.  
5.1.2.1 Fractionalisation of larger groups: a “brake” on negative ethnic mobilisation?  
Opinion on the effect of “ethno-fragmentation” on inter-ethnic relations is divided, with some 
scholars supporting it and others criticising it. Barkan and Mutua argue that the splitting of the 
larger ethnic blocs acts as a “brake” on ethnic mobilisation in Kenyan politics.172 They observe 
that due to the fractionalisation, “[d]evolution is also likely to break up the concentrations of 
power wielded by Kenya‟s largest ethnic groups particularly the Kikuyu, the Kalenjin, the 
Kamba, the Luo, and the Luhya – who together comprise 70 percent of the country‟s 
population”.173 This is because the counties will on average serve populations smaller than 
these groups.174 
Barkan compares this fractionalisation to the gradual division of the Nigerian regions from the 
original three to the current 36 states.175 He observes that since it is not possible to alter the 
ethnic composition or make-up of a country, leaders have to manage the ethnic fault lines which 
vary from one country to another and sometimes run deep.176 Roeder supports this strategy, 
observing that the fractionalisation of larger ethnic groups in Nigeria has empowered smaller 
ethnic groups and at the same time politically “weakened” the larger ones.177 Initially, Barkan 
                                               
172
 Barkan JD & Mutua M „Turning the corner in Kenya: A new constitution for Nairobi‟ Foreign Affairs (Published by 
the Council on Foreign Relations) (2010).  
173
 Barkan & Mutua (2010).  
174
 Barkan (2011) 10.  
175
 Barkan JD „Ethnic fractionalization and the propensity for conflict in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania‟ in Herbst J, 
McNamee T & Mills G (eds) On the Fault Line: Managing the Tensions and Divisions within Societies (2012) 150.  
176
 Barkan (2012) 150.  
177
 Roeder PG „Ethnofederalism and the mismanagement of conflicting nationalisms‟ Erk J & Anderson LM (eds) The 
Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions? (2010) 25.  
 
 
 
 
236 
 
argues, independence leaders used the “myth of national unity”, repression and resource 
patronage to manage the “fissiparous tendencies” of their societies. However, the strategy is 
now shifting as countries such as Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda178 have adopted the 
“fractionalisation approach” “by establishing some form of “compensatory regime” that 
simultaneously considers the level of ethnic fractionalisation and the geographic pattern of 
uneven development.”179 The resulting state structures, he adds, are semi-federal structures 
that respond to various ethnic and development issues, structures which were rejected by 
independence leaders but whose “time has come” in many countries.180   
The four largest ethnic groups in Kenya account for almost two-thirds of the population. This 
composition, Barkan argues, “raises the prospect for conflict because, depending on its size, the 
largest group needs only form an effective coalition with two or four partners to control the 
state”.181 The danger in such an arrangement is that other large groups will rush to form 
“counter-coalitions” and in the process deeply divide the country in a deadly “zero-sum” game of 
ethno-political competition.182 At independence, the KANU/KADU political conflict was a contest 
between the large and politically dominant communities versus the smaller communities. 
However, the conflict now pits the larger communities against each other while the smaller 
communities have taken whichever side they deem expedient.  
Given that fragmentation works against the political objective of the large communities, it is 
bound to be opposed by them. Indeed, in Nigeria only military regimes could carry out the 
largely “undemocratic” fragmentation of units to the current 36 states.183 In Kenya, for instance, 
it has been argued that Kalenjin politicians opposed the Constitution because devolution had 
the potential “break up their power base in the present Rift Valley Province”,184 leading to a “No” 
victory in the 2010 referendum.185  
As early as 1996 when Moi was still in power, Southall and Wood correctly predicted that “fears 
for the post-Moi future” may lead the Kalenjin to support genuine devolution of power, if only as 
a measure to counter central government domination in the hands of the other major ethnic 
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communities.186 Moi‟s rule has been described as a coalition of smaller ethnic groups formed to 
counter the larger Luo and Kikuyu communities.187 Given that the larger ethnic communities are 
wont to oppose fragmentation, one may be surprised that the other large communities never 
joined the Rift Valley in opposing the counties. The political leaders from the other major 
communities enjoyed “incumbency” through a coalition agreement which shared powers 
between the president (kikuyu) and the Prime Minister (Luo). Both campaigned for the “Yes” 
vote in the 2010 Constitution. It can be argued that the advantages of “incumbency” made the 
two communities turn a blind eye on the effects of fractionalisation. Another reason that political 
leaders from other larger communities supported the fractionalisation is because large regions 
were also associated with the ethnically divisive talk of majimbo which was commonly 
interpreted as a return to the pre-colonial exclusive ethnic spheres.  
Given that the larger ethnic communities are not under one polity, fragmentation denies the 
communities a ready structure for ethnic political mobilisation. While it is still possible for the 
larger communities to ethnically mobilise across the current county boundaries during 
presidential elections, the county boundaries do not complement this destabilising effort. Thus, 
regardless of the reasons for the support of the devolved structure, the current county 
boundaries have the potential to address ethnic conflict in Kenya.  
5.1.2.2  “Diluting the centre”: diffusing power to smaller ethnic groups  
There are two main ways in which the current boundaries may facilitate the accommodation of 
the smaller ethnic groups. First, the “establishment of the counties will provide each ethnic 
group, particularly those that are not part of the governing coalition of the national government, 
with a measure of control over its own affairs”.188 Indeed, where powers and resources are 
devolved to groups that are not in control of the centre, such devolution may form part of 
economic and political inclusion and thus address possible conflict.189 Second, in the face of 
domination by the larger ethnic communities, fractionalisation has the effect of politically 
“weakening” the larger ethnic communities, thereby “equalising” them with the smaller ethnic 
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communities. Roeder observes the same effect in Nigeria after the gradual fragmentation of the 
larger communities.190 
In the Kenyan context in particular, “home counties” are an important step towards management 
of ethnic harmony. Past centralisation of political powers and resources ensured that only the 
president‟s ethnic community had access to state resources and development; the smaller 
ethnic communities had no chance, due to their small size, of capturing the presidency. As 
such, it would not have been possible, under a centralised system, to access and control state 
resources and powers at the centre. Devolution of powers hence enables the smaller ethnic 
communities to share in the powers and resources of the state while the larger ethnic 
communities struggle for the presidency.  
From the earlier discussion and table above, the smaller communities (which exclude the 
largest five, the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luo, Luhya and Kamba) will control approximately 22 of the 47 
counties. This is can be contrasted with the 108 parliamentary constituencies out of 290 
parliamentary constituencies.191 With powers and resources being shared through counties, the 
current boundary structure has the potential to ensure that ethnic communities with a “home 
county” effectively participate in sharing of state powers and resources. However, overall 
effectiveness also depends on how county powers and finances, as well as the structure and 
powers of the Senate, are designed. (These other matters are examined in later chapters.) 
Not all agree that the current county structure will foster ethnic harmony. Akoth, for instance, 
argues that the Constitution awards “sovereignty to ethnic groups” through ethnically defined 
boundaries of county governments.192 He criticises this approach as one that “highlights 
differences at the expense of the pursuit of perpetual peace”, 193 and concludes that the 47 
counties are no different from the colonial administration design of Maasai country, Akamba 
country and other colonial-era ethnic homelands.194 Indeed, experience generally shows that 
conflict or potential conflict has been greatest where identity issues coincide with territorial 
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boundaries.195 It has been added that such an approach “freezes” group differences and slows 
down any processes towards integration and peace.196  
The divided opinion on Kenyan county boundaries does not come as a surprise, given the 
general lack of consensus, in both theory and practice, on the ideal approach to boundary 
demarcation for unity. The divergent views are valid: the county boundaries highlight historical 
and economic ethnic disparities which can further deepen perceptions that drive ethnic conflict. 
While communities can seek cross-ethnic integration, the ethnically exclusive nature of 
boundaries may actually fail to provide a structural basis to facilitate such integration. However, 
it is also true that many ethnic communities have been economically and politically marginalised 
and that this structure holds real potential to ameliorate past exclusion. Furthermore, the 
“equalisation” of the smaller and larger communities through fractionalisation has enhanced 
general inclusiveness, the lack of which contributed to past ethnic conflict. Thus, while there is 
some risk of further ethnic conflict, the current boundary structure also has potential benefits. 
5.1.2.3 The question of county ethnic minorities 
While 74 counties had initially been proposed, removal of the regional level necessitated the 
reduction of counties to the current 47 counties.197 However, this meant that a number of small 
ethnic communities would have to share counties with the larger communities. The communities 
denied counties include the Kuria in Migori County, the Sabaot in Bungoma County, the Teso in 
Busia County and other “in-county minorities” in counties such as Elgeyo-Marakwet, Baringo, 
and Garissa.198 Most of these “in-county minorities” are opposed to the current county 
boundaries199 and voted against the Constitution in the 2010 referendum.200 Due to their weak 
voice, their calls for the creation of their own counties were largely ignored in the review 
process.201  
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However, calls by “in-county minorities” for the creation of their own counties are likely to 
continue. The current county boundaries are largely ethnically defined and this may have a 
spiral effect as “in-county” minorities” end up demanding nothing less than “our own county”. 
Referred to as “ethnic entrepreneurship”, this trend is led by elites in smaller minority groups 
who see creation of autonomous units as a way of accessing state resources and 
opportunities.202 Adjustment of boundaries and creation of more counties is subject to a rigid 
constitutional procedure which includes a national referendum where the larger ethnic 
communities would participate.203  
The TFDG suggests that decentralisation of power to levels below the county government may 
encourage “in-county” minorities to participate in governance and thus make decisions affecting 
their livelihood.204 However, effective accommodation of county minorities can only be achieved 
through real sharing of powers and resources with the minorities. Counties have discretion on 
what to decentralise to the sub-county level and how to do it.205 Accommodation of “in-county 
minorities” will thus depend on whether counties will be willing to devolve powers and 
resources. The sub-county structures (rural and urban) are discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter, which deals with powers and functions.  
5.1.2.4 Urbanisation: a game changer to ethnic conflict?  
There are a few counties that are either fully urbanised or have a majority urban-based 
population. Even those counties with a few urban areas are experiencing an increased mixed 
ethnic settlement as a result of rural-urban migration. Indeed, it is estimated that more than half 
of Kenya‟s population will be urbanised by the year by the year 2030.206 Barkan argues that 
urbanisation adds a further dimension to inter-ethnic relations in the country. He observes that 
there is “a growing vibrant middle class of entrepreneurs, technocrats, and business leaders” 207 
who are “predominantly young, urban and educated”208 and have little time for the old-style of 
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ethnic politics. He argues that this raises hopes “that the ethnic fault lines of division in the 
country may one day lose their potency”. 209  
However, while the ethnic “melting pot” may introduce a different dimension to the politics of 
ethnicity in Kenya, this is yet to happen. Currently, most of the country‟s population is based in 
rural areas that are defined largely along ethnic boundaries. As such, the social change 
produced by urbanisation has yet to make a significant impact on Kenya‟s ethnically-based style 
of politics. 
5.2 Forty-seven counties: too many/too small to limit central power?  
Ghai and Cottrell state that “the truth is that there are too many counties, which most likely will 
weaken the county as against the centre” and that this could be cured only if the counties “are 
able to present a united stand”.210 They add that the situation could have been different if the 
centre was confronted by a smaller number of counties of around five to eight.211 Indeed, it has 
been argued that even for more stable federations like Germany and the USA, the 16 Landers 
and 50 states respectively are too many as they have the potential to “dilute” their power vis-a-
vis that of their respective federal governments.212 Indeed, fragmentation has been used as a 
strategy for central control, as demonstrated in Uganda.213 Even Nigeria‟s gradual fragmentation 
had a “recentralisation effect”.214 It is clear that in terms of constraining the centre, counties start 
from a structurally weak position with the 47 units. 
However, as Ghai and Cottrell state, the position of counties vis-a-vis the centre can be 
enhanced if counties present a united stand.215 This implies a strong horizontal cooperation 
between the counties in order to counter their fragmented structure. The TFDG observes that 
“close kinship linkages” may facilitate such cooperation,216 but other factors such as the powers 
and resources controlled by the counties will also determine the ability of counties to constrain 
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or limit central power. Furthermore, the rigid constitutional amendment procedure, which 
includes a referendum, protects the counties from being further fragmented through adjustment 
of boundaries to create new counties.217  
5.3 Forty-seven counties and development: an unclear developmental role 
The 47 counties complicate the developmental role in two main ways. First, while the counties 
are not regions, they are not truly local units either; the World Bank maintains that the 47 
counties are “not a substitute for local governments”.218 Indeed, the Bank calls for small units in 
order to enhance participation in development.219 However, the 47 county governments 
replaced 175 local authorities220 and over 250 deconcentrated administrative districts221 which 
were involved in service delivery in the previous order. Thus, even by Kenyan standards, 
reducing the local authorities to less than half the original number may affect local participation 
in development. Indeed, during the constitutional review process, many people called for 
devolution of power to the local level,222 and the creation of 47 counties seems instead to have 
concentrated powers in the 47 “non-local” points only. The counties have constitutional powers 
to decentralise services to levels below, which has the potential to facilitate effective local 
participation. (Decentralisation to levels below counties in discussed in the next chapter as a 
county power.) 
Second, due to their small size relative to regions, counties cannot effectively take up 
developmental functions such as regional infrastructure, which straddle several counties, unless 
they jointly perform such functions.223 For instance, the World Bank states that counties are “not 
big enough to become strong regional blocks”,224 and that while counties may desire to attract 
industrial development, they are “too small to generate economies of scale, which companies 
need to be successful”.225 It is thus clear that while counties may be eager to pursue broader 
development, their size places limits on the nature of the developmental role they could play. 
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County effectiveness will, however, also depend on the interpretative approach taken in defining 
their constitutional powers.226  
5.4 Assessment of the boundaries, size and number of counties  
The size, boundaries and number of counties have an inevitable impact on the three purposes 
of devolving power. From the discussions in Chapter 2, the ideal size, number and composition 
of devolved units vary with the purpose. Accordingly, the impact of the size and composition of 
the 47 counties will vary with the purpose.   
5.4.1 The impact on development  
Decentralised development requires small but economically viable units for effective 
participation. 227 In Kenya, this was a concern as the 47 counties were reduced from the 74 that 
were initially proposed on the grounds, among others, of economic viability.228 The 47 counties 
cannot, however, be termed as local units and are not, as the World Bank observes, substitutes 
for local governments.229 There is the potential risk that the 47 counties, due to their relatively 
large size, may hinder effective local participation and local service delivery. In South Africa, 46 
district municipalities, which were largely established as an “upper tier” level above the country‟s 
283 municipalities at the local level, failed to facilitate effective local service provision as 
intended partly because of their size.230 The Constitution envisages decentralisation to levels 
below the county including a separate framework for urban governance, and this has the 
potential to fill the gap by facilitating local participation.231 
5.4.2 The impact on ethnic accommodation  
The main ethnic conflict in Kenya is between major communities who are “presidential 
contenders”. However, the smaller ethnic communities also feel excluded from power and 
development because of perceptions that power and resources are skewed in favour of the 
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president‟s community. Devolution of powers and resources has the potential of diffusing power 
from the centre by sharing it with other subnational groups not in control of the presidency.232  
First, the largest ethnic communities have been split into several counties. This 
“fractionalisation” has denied the larger ethnic groups a “home region” that could facilitate 
negative ethnic political mobilisation. However, it is also true that the fragmented nature of the 
counties has contributed to the “unattractiveness” of the units to the large groups. Indeed, 
fractionalisation as a strategy has, in practice, largely been achieved without the enthusiastic 
support of the group that is fragmented.233 As explained in Chapter 4, this is part of the reason 
why the current devolved system of government was opposed in the Rift Valley. Arguably, a 
“home region” could have been a better fall-back position for the big losers than the fragmented 
units. Perhaps due to a lack of a “home region”, the larger ethnic communities may be even 
more determined to capture the presidency, thus intensifying ethnic conflict.  
For the smaller ethnic communities that are large enough to get a “home county” and do not 
have an “ethnic political stake” in the presidency, the county boundary structure offers a basis 
for their political and economic inclusion. While their overall effectiveness will depend on the 
resources and powers exercised by counties, the county boundaries provide the basis for 
economic and political inclusion. However, there is also a risk, as argued by some authors, that 
ethnically exclusive boundaries may “freeze” identities and hinder ethnic integration. Indeed, the 
current boundaries highlight the kinds of historical disparities that have the potential to be 
construed as ethnically biased and thus to deepen the perceptions that drive ethnic conflict.  
For the “in-county” minorities, there may be continued disaffection with the current county 
structures that deny them “home” units. While some counties may choose to share powers and 
resources with county minorities through decentralisation, and thereby facilitating the latter‟s 
inclusion, there is no constitutional guarantee for such an arrangement beyond the mere 
recognition of the need to safeguard the rights of “in-county minorities”. County minorities may 
not be a threat nationally but can threaten stability in their respective counties. Accordingly, the 
risk exists that the current county boundaries could form the basis for minority ethnic conflict.  
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5.4.3 Impact on the ability to limit central power 
Important ingredients for constraining central power are regional units that are large, few in 
number, endowed with resources and powers and preferably homogenous in composition.234 
Although the counties were reduced from the proposed total of 74 to the current 47 in order to 
enhance their ability to check the national government,235 they are still too fragmented for the 
task.236 While the regions that were provided in the initial constitutional drafts had no clear 
powers and resources,237 their retention in the final structure could have created an impetus for 
the gradual devolution of regional-scope functions to the regions. Indeed, the relatively weak 
South African provinces are said to provide an important basis for limiting central power.238 The 
absence of a regional level in Kenya, however, may lead to recentralisation of power due to the 
lack of a level capable of effectively handling matters with regional scope. 
5.4.4 Is there a balance of purposes in the structure of county boundaries?  
The 47 counties were, as argued in Chapter 4, a clear attempt at balancing the developmental 
and central power-limiting purposes of devolution. While the 74 units proposed initially were 
adequate to facilitate local participation, they had to be reduced to the current 47 counties in 
order to fill in the gap left by removal of regions. However, this is a case of design versus 
effectiveness. The 74 counties that were proposed initially would definitely have been 
completely weakened in terms of constraining the centre, but the current 47 counties are still 
ineffective for the purpose. Furthermore, the 47 counties have created uncertainty with regard to 
effective local government. Thus, while there are clear trade-offs between the two purposes, the 
compromise structure is unsuitable for the pursuit of the two purposes which informed the 
compromise.   
The impact of the current county boundaries on ethnic accommodation was not explicitly 
considered during the review process. This is despite the fact that regions were highlighted as 
important for purposes of accommodation.239 There are “default” risks and advantages of the 
county boundaries to ethnic accommodation, as discussed earlier. However, this is not as a 
result of a conscious or explicit trade-offs with the other two purposes. It is thus clear that ethnic 
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accommodation was not seriously considered in the design, despite the possible benefits and 
risks presented in the structure. On the other hand, development and limiting of central power 
were considered and trade-offs duly made. The resultant structure is essentially ineffective in its 
design unless complemented by other measures that can address the potential pitfalls in the 
design.  
6. The institutional design of county governments 
Institutions of devolved government are the main avenues through which decisions will be made 
and the objectives of devolved government institutionally pursued. Institutional structures are 
thus important in the pursuit of the three purposes of devolution. In regard to development, the 
local institutional design should generally facilitate local accountability, as this will form a basis 
for the realisation of local preferences.240 For conflict resolution, the institutions should facilitate 
inclusiveness both in terms of the structure and the actual decision-making process.241 
Institutional design should also promote local autonomy, which is important for limiting central 
power.242                                                                                                                                                                           
The county government structure generally replicates national government structures. It 
provides for a “presidential system” headed by an elected county governor who appoints his or 
her “cabinet” (the County Executive Committee (CEC)) subject to approval by the County 
Assembly (CA),243 the legislative arm of the county government. Similarly, there are a number of 
institutional checks and balances put in place to limit the powers of the governor and enhance 
accountability in the county government generally.  
6.1 The County Assembly  
The CA is composed of representatives from single-member county wards244 elected for a term 
of five years.245 The TFDG proposed a total of 1450 country wards,246 which is the number 
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adopted in the CGA.247 Each county has at least 15 wards.248 Special interests are also 
represented in the CA. First, there are “gender seats” to ensure that no more than two-thirds of 
the membership of the CA is of the same gender.249 Second, the Constitution provides that 
“marginalised groups” (including persons with disabilities and the youth)250 are to be 
represented in the CA. This provision seems implicitly to exclude “marginalised communities”. 
However, the CGA which implements the constitutional provisions places the number at six251 
and makes reference to both “marginalised groups” and “marginalised communities” as defined 
in the Constitution.252 Indeed, the Constitution uses the term “including” and therefore does not 
exclude other categories. Gender and special seats are filled through pre-determined political 
party lists on the basis of their performance in the FPTP county ward seats.253 Parties are thus 
allocated gender and special seats in the proportion of FPTP seats won in all the county 
wards.254 
The implication of this system is that a political party which wins most or all of the FPTP seats 
may end up being allocated most or all of the gender and special seats in the CA. While the 
Constitution describes this system as “proportional representation by use of party lists,”255 the 
system differs from known PR systems, where seats are usually allocated in the proportion of 
party votes.256 On the contrary, in the system provided in the Constitution, allocation of special 
seats is based on seats won through FPTP.257 Oloo observes that this “strange” system does 
not enhance proportional representation because if the FPTP produces a disproportionate 
result, most or all special seats will still be allocated to the dominant party, thus causing a 
further disproportion.258  
                                               
247
 Section 26 (1).  
248
 Section 26 (3) (a) CGA, subsequent reviews, to be carried out between 8 and 15 years, are to ensure that all 
counties have at least 25 wards. 
249
 Article 177 (1) (b).  
250
 Article 177 (1) (c).  
251
 Section 7 (1).  
252
 Section 7 (1) and section 35 (2)(b) of the CGA.  
253
 Article 177 (2).  
254
 Article 177 (3).  
255
 Article 90 (1).  
256
 Oloo (2011) 8.  
257
 Article 90 (1).  
258
 Oloo (2011) 8.  
 
 
 
 
248 
 
In a bid perhaps to have a “neutral voice” in the CA, the CA is required to elect a speaker from 
outside the CA and who becomes an ex officio member.259 While the Constitution is silent on the 
procedure for removal of a CA speaker, the CGA provides that the speaker can be removed by 
a resolution supported by 75 percent of the CA.260 The CGA provides that English and Kiswahili 
shall be the only languages used to transact official business of the CA, thus excluding local 
languages from CA proceedings.261 
The CA is constitutionally empowered to enact county laws necessary or incidental to the 
exercise of county powers and performance of allocated functions.262 The CA is also 
constitutionally mandated, within the framework of separation of powers, to exercise oversight 
over the CEC and the county executive generally.263 Accordingly, the CA has powers to approve 
the budget and expenditure of the county governments.264 The CA also reviews and approves 
management and development plans prepared by the CEC,265 as well as plans for the 
management and exploitation of the county‟s resources.266 In addition, the CA is constitutionally 
empowered to approve borrowing by a county government.267  
The CGA extends the CA‟s oversight role to appointments by the county governor. While the 
county governor is empowered to appoint CEC members, the CA is empowered to vet and 
approve the appointments.268 The CGA provides that the CA shall not approve nominations to 
the CEC which do not respect the one-third gender rule269 or which do not enhance the 
representation of minorities, marginalised groups, and marginalised communities.270 The CA 
can also reject nominations for the CEC which do not reflect the community and cultural 
diversity of a county.271  
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Implementation of the “one-third gender rule” is straightforward. There is, however, no clear and 
objective way for the CA to arrive at a decision that the CEC represents the cultural and 
community diversity. The CGA provides that the CEC nominees should “to the fullest extent 
possible” reflect the community and cultural diversity of the county272 but this provision is vague 
and imprecise. This is even more complicated in multi-ethnic or urbanised counties which may 
have more diversity than can be accommodated in the CEC.  
Other appointments which require approval of the CA are the County Public Service Board 
(CPSB),273 county chief officers,274 the clerk to the CA,275 the county secretary,276 and any other 
appointments as may be provided by other legislation.277 
6.2 The County Executive  
The county executive is composed of the county governor, deputy county governor and 
members of the County Executive Committee (CEC).278 The county governor is directly elected 
by county voters. However, unlike the president, who needs a specified majority of votes and 
proportion of votes from the counties, the county governor only needs to garner the most votes, 
regardless of the proportion or margin, in order to be elected county governor.279 Thus, a 
governor need not obtain 50 percent of the vote where there are more than two candidates. The 
governor can only be re-elected once, as with the president.280 An aspirant for the county 
governor‟s seat selects a running mate who becomes a deputy county governor of the winning 
candidate.281  
Apart from the gender rule and requirements for community cultural diversity, a CEC member 
must be a holder of a university degree and have at least five years‟ relevant experience,282 and 
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this, unlike the “fluid” rule on diversity, is a hard rule that must be fulfilled.283 The Constitution 
caps the CEC membership at ten or less.284 While the Constitution vests executive authority 
collectively in the CEC,285 it specifies that CEC members are accountable to the county 
governor.286 The Constitution specifies that the county governor and his or her deputy are the 
chief executive and deputy, respectively,287 thereby establishing the governor as “the real head 
of government” at the county level.288  
The Constitution is vague on the functions of the governor, but the CGA expands the functions 
to include coordination of all executive functions in the county.289 The county governor assents 
to county legislation290 and may veto legislation. However, the governor‟s veto can be 
overturned by a two-thirds vote of the CA.291 The president may also assign “state functions” to 
the governor, though what amounts to “state functions” is unclear in the Constitution or CGA.292  
The Constitution lays down the grounds for removal of a county governor from office293 but 
leaves the procedure to be determined by national legislation.294 The CGA295 provides that the 
CA can institute proceedings for the removal of the governor.296 However, the actual 
impeachment power of the county governor is reserved for the Senate which makes the final 
decision, by a vote of a simple majority, on whether a governor should be removed from 
office.297 
As the Constitution is also silent on the manner of dismissal of CEC and the procedure, it is 
provided for by the CGA. A member of the CEC can be removed from office for incompetence, 
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abuse of office, gross misconduct, or failure to attend three consecutive CEC meetings without 
any reasonable excuse or written authority of the governor.298 A member of the CEC may also 
be removed from office for gross violation of the Constitution, or on grounds of mental or 
physical incapacity which renders the member unable to discharge the functions of a CEC 
member.299 The CA can institute proceedings for the removal of a CEC member and vote to 
have a member of the CEC removed from office.300 The governor is required to promptly 
dismiss a member of the CEC against whom CA proceedings, on the grounds listed above, 
have been completed. 301 Regardless of the procedure involving the CA in removal of a CEC 
member, the governor can dismiss a CEC member if the governor “considers that it is 
appropriate or necessary to do so”.302  
While the Constitution provides for autonomy of the county executive to hire staff,303 the powers 
to do so are delinked from the county governor and vested in another county body, the County 
Public Service Board (CPSB).304 The CGA establishes a CPSB305 for each county which is 
charged with power to establish and abolish offices in the county.306 The Constitution, however, 
provides that the nationally-based Public Service Commission shall “hear and determine 
appeals in respect of county governments‟ public service”.307 While the governor has power to 
appoint the CPSB members, the CA vets and approves the nominees to the CPSB whose 
membership is restricted to three to five members.308 In order to enhance the independence of 
the CPSB, the members serve for a non-renewable term of six years.  
The Constitution is general and vague on the nature and extent of national Commission‟s 
jurisdiction with regard to appeals. The CGA provides that appeals to the national Public Service 
Commission can cover recruitment, selection, appointment, and qualification attached to any 
office.309 Appeals can also be made in respect of remuneration and terms and conditions of 
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service, national values and principles of governance, retirement or other removal from service, 
pensions and gratuity, and other matters the national Commission considers as falling within its 
constitutional competence.310 The CGA thus extends the jurisdiction of the nationally-based 
Public Service Commission to virtually all matters concerning county public service and thus 
leaves almost nothing to the CPSB‟s exclusive jurisdiction.  
6.3 Assessment of county institutional design  
The county institutional design discussed above has an inevitable impact on the three purposes. 
The county institutional structures are expected to facilitate local responsiveness and 
accountability, which are critical in addressing local preferences. Additionally, the institutional 
design should promote inclusiveness by reflecting the county‟s diversity and enhancing inclusive 
decision-making. Lastly, the institutional design should facilitate the autonomy of county 
government and thus the ability to limit central power. The design discussed above has the 
potential to advance the realisation of the three purposes. However, aspects of the design may 
also hinder the realisation of those purposes. 
6.3.1 County institutional design and development  
6.3.1.1 Design aspects which promote effective development  
The county governor is directly elected by voters, a factor which the World Bank argues is 
necessary for enhancing accountability at the subnational level.311 Direct elections give voters a 
chance to vote for a person of their choice, and it is assumed that voters make a rational choice 
and vote for a person who will respond to local preferences.312 Direct elections are also 
extended to county ward representatives, meaning that voters can use the electoral process to 
hold their representatives accountable.  
The county governor is the head of the executive, and members of the CEC are accountable to 
him or her. The county governor is thus able effectively to make decisions and can be held 
accountable by the electorate accordingly. Direct elections and the decision-making powers can 
direct the county governor to address local preferences and thereby promote effective devolved 
development.  
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6.3.1.2 Design aspects which may hinder effective development  
While the county governor has powers to make executive decisions, he needs an effective 
majority in order to ensure that his or her decisions are approved or supported in the CA. 
However, there is no requirement that a county governor must win with a specified proportion of 
county wards or margin of votes. It is possible for a county governor to be elected by a minority 
vote, courtesy of a split vote, in cases where there are more than two candidates. In such a 
situation, the minority governor may lack support in the CA and county business may end up 
being frustrated or even derailed. If important processes such as approval of budget, 
expenditure, and appointments, are frustrated or derailed, the development process may be 
affected.  
Effective participatory development requires that all sectors of society are represented in 
democratic structures.313 Indeed, the World Bank argues that effective participation can be 
measured only from the ability of the marginalised to hold political and administrative leadership 
to account.314 However, the FPTP system for electing representatives of county wards favours 
local majorities.315 Minorities and marginalised communities are further excluded by an 
unfavourable system of nominating special representatives. As such, the institutional design 
does not facilitate effective participation. 
6.3.2 Institutional design of county governments and ethnic accommodation  
6.3.2.1 Design aspects which enhance ethnic accommodation  
The county institutional design enhances ethnic accommodation in a number of ways. First, the 
fractionalisation of the larger ethnic groups has created several “intra-community” electoral 
processes. This has the potential to divert attention from broader group political mobilisation to 
the county elections that happen intra-communally, and may have the overall effect of putting a 
brake on community-wide political mobilisation. Indeed, the main ethnic conflict is between the 
large communities. The county electoral system may diffuse community-wide political 
mobilisation by making each county, a fragment of the larger group, concentrate on its individual 
political processes.  
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For the smaller ethnic communities with “home counties”, the county institutional design will 
enable communities to choose their own representatives. The FPTP system allows them to 
elect the county governor and their ward representative directly. The institutional design thus 
facilitates effective inclusion in governance for communities with “home counties”. 
6.3.2.2 Design aspects which hinder ethnic accommodation  
The FPTP system for electing the county governor and ward representative has the potential to 
exclude “in-county minorities.” Furthermore, while the need for special representation of 
minorities is recognised, the system used to choose the representatives negates the intention. It 
is unlikely that county minorities will secure the governor seat or even, in some cases, county 
ward seats. The IEBC, too, did not consider county minorities in the demarcation of county ward 
boundaries.316 The dominant party, which incidentally belongs to the county majority, has the 
prerogative of choosing minority representatives and may end up choosing party loyalists as 
opposed to genuine representatives of “in-county minorities”.317 The county institutional design 
excludes county minorities, despite recognising the need for their representation; this may form 
the basis for ethnic minority conflict.  
In regard to election of a governor, lack of proportion or margin requirements may hinder ethnic 
accommodation. A candidate from the majority ethnic community may end up relying on his or 
her own ethnic community to win. In contrast to the national level, the president is not only 
required to win more than half the votes but should also win votes in more than half of the 47 
counties.318 A similar requirement for governor elections could have forced candidates to cross-
appeal for votes, which could have given impetus to ethnic integration.319 The current structure 
could end up merely replicating the all-too-familiar pattern of national politics where candidates 
appeal for political support from their own communities to the exclusion of other communities.320 
A governor elected into office on the basis of majority ethnic support is likely to serve ethnic 
interests and thus exclude other communities. The provisions requiring that community and 
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cultural diversity be respected are not clear and are hence not an adequate safeguard for ethnic 
accommodation in county structures. A partisan CA, mainly as a result of the FPTP system and 
mode of choosing nominees, may further exclude minorities not represented in the CA by 
approving and supporting executive policies conceivably aimed at the exclusion of “in-county 
minorities”. 
The academic qualifications and extensive professional experience required for appointment to 
the CEC may lock out marginalised communities, who normally have low formal literacy 
levels.321 In essence, this requirement prioritises the developmental purpose of devolution over 
representation of diversity. County minorities are already disadvantaged by the FPTP system, 
and the requirement for academic qualifications may cause further exclusion. It thus can be 
concluded that the county institutional design excludes county minorities and that this could 
form the basis for county minority conflict. While county minorities are not a major political 
threat, they can be disruptive at the county level where they have a stronger presence; the 
constitutional design may, in this regard, form a basis for such conflict. 
6.3.3. County institutional design and limiting central power  
6.3.3.1 Design aspects which enhance the ability to limit central power  
The county institutional design generally enhances the autonomy of county governments from 
the central government. While county power is divided into executive and legislative power, both 
are exercised by elected representatives at the county level. Nomination of special 
representatives in the former local authorities was done by the central government in the past; 
however, the process is now done by political parties using pre-determined party lists. This 
enhances institutional autonomy, as central nominees have been used in the past to undermine 
local councils in opposition areas. Furthermore, a directly elected governor is believed to have a 
sounder basis for asserting county autonomy and challenging an intrusive central government 
than one who is appointed.322 
6.3.3.1 Design aspects which hinder the centre-constraining ability of counties  
There are a number of design gaps which are left to national legislation, a situation which may 
create an opportunity for central government to undermine county autonomy through national 
laws. While impeachment proceedings against the governor are commenced in the CA, the 
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CGA bestows the actual impeachment powers on the governor in the Senate. The Senate is 
established to protect the interests of counties, but in a situation where the president has control 
of the Senate; such a power may be prone to abuse. For instance, the president may use the 
Senate to remove “errant” governors whenever an opportunity presents itself in the Senate.  
The Constitution generally states that the national Public Service Commission has powers to 
hear and determine appeals from decisions of the CPSB. However, the CGA lists grounds of 
appeal to include decisions on recruitment, retirement, and remuneration. It appears that the 
national Public Service Commission can overturn all matters that the CPSB. The national Public 
Service Commission may end up end intruding into areas of county government autonomy such 
as power to hire staff and terminate services at the county level. It can thus be concluded that 
while the county institutional design generally grants autonomy to county governments, there 
are design gaps that could allow county autonomy to be undermined by national legislation.  
6.3.4 Is there a balance of purposes in the design of county government structures?  
The FPTP system is potentially a major impediment to ethnic accommodation despite the many 
benefits it presents to Kenya.323 The PR system, which is recommended for both 
development324 and conflict resolution,325 may have been the ideal compromise between the two 
purposes. While the CoE purports to have adopted a PR system for choosing special 
representatives, the system only serves to further exclude minorities. The current electoral 
system thus serves development but hinders ethnic accommodation. The FPTP system used for 
electing the governor likewise favours development and the limiting of central power, but it does 
not facilitate ethnic accommodation. Indeed, ethnic accommodation requires collective exercise 
of powers in order to enhance inclusiveness. However, the structures entitle a powerful 
individual to make decisions, something which is potentially ethnically divisive. Although ethnic 
accommodation was considered during the deliberations, it was not given serious attention, 
especially with regard to viable trade-offs with the other two purposes.  
Competence is important for effectiveness, but the high qualification required for CEC members 
may exclude county minorities. While community and cultural diversity is provided for as an 
element in the composition of the CEC, it is a secondary requirement which comes after a hard 
rule on qualifications. As such, development is elevated at the expense of ethnic 
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accommodation. It can thus be concluded that the county institutional design only succeeds at 
balancing development and the limitation of central power at the price of neglecting ethnic 
accommodation.  
Some aspects of the design impede realisation of all the three purposes. Simultaneous county 
and national elections are likely to see county development issues sidelined in national political 
campaigns.326 Worse still, joint elections are most likely to focus on ethno-political competition 
for the control of the presidency and hence negate the very benefits that can be derived from 
fragmentation of the communities that are presidential contenders. What is more, presidential 
candidates may end up having their lackeys elected as county governors, thus forming a basis 
for undermining county autonomy. 
7. Conclusion  
This chapter has evaluated the size, number and boundaries of counties as well as the 
institutional design of county governments. In regard to county boundaries, there was an explicit 
attempt to balance development and the limiting of central power. However, the resulting “hybrid 
level” is ineffective for the pursuit of both of them. In terms of conflict resolution, the 
fractionalisation of larger ethnic communities and “equalisation” with smaller ethnic communities 
may prevent ethnic mobilisation, but it also makes the county level an unviable consolation prize 
to losers in the presidential contest. Similarly, both the county boundaries and institutional 
design serve to exclude county minorities, hence creating the potential for county ethnic conflict.  
The limitations brought by the county boundary and institutional design may, however, be partly 
remedied by other measures. Sub-county structures may actually ensure effective participatory 
development and accommodation of ethnic minorities. Furthermore, while the counties are 
structurally weak in limiting central power, mainly as a result of their fragmented nature, the 
design of the centre may address this weakness by providing institutional arrangements that 
can enhance the limiting and even counterbalancing of central power at the centre. Accordingly, 
there are several other factors that may enhance the pursuit of the three purposes regardless of 
these structural limitations. The next chapter discusses county powers and functions.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF COUNTY GOVERNMENTS  
 
1. Introduction  
In order to realise development, devolved units should, within necessary national controls, have 
a final say over clearly defined and relevant functions.1 Cleary defined functions can facilitate 
accountability as local communities will know what is expected of their local authorities and hold 
them to account accordingly.2 Moreover, in terms of resolving internal conflict, the powers of 
devolved units should be relevant to3 the “narratives that support conflict” in a particular 
context.4 These may include powers, resources and/or identity issues such as language and 
culture.5 Furthermore, the powers devolved to constituent units should be politically significant 
and thus directly or indirectly impose constraints on central power.6  
The Constitution stipulates that sovereign power, which emanates from the people, is vested in 
parliament and the legislative assemblies of county governments, as well as in the national and 
county executive structures.7 This provision reflects a fundamental change in approach to 
powers of subnational governments in Kenya. While the former local authorities derived their 
powers from national legislation and administrative fiat, the powers of county governments are a 
product of the constitutional division of state power and shared sovereignty. This chapter 
examines the powers and functions of county governments.  
County government powers are, for purposes of enhancing accountability, divided into 
legislative and executive powers.8 The Constitution empowers counties to make any laws in 
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exercise of their powers; they can also pass laws on matters which, though not within their 
jurisdiction, are incidental to the effective exercise of county powers.9 Counties can be assigned 
more powers by national legislation. Furthermore, governments at either level can transfer their 
respective functions to the other level, subject to the receiving government‟s consent and other 
conditions stipulated in the Constitution. The counties thus have what can be termed original 
powers, along with the possibility of acquiring more powers through assignment or transfer.  
It was argued in Chapter 5 that the number and size of counties pose a challenge to the pursuit 
of the three purposes. This chapter, too, argues that tension between the “regional” and “local” 
role of counties is evident in the distribution of powers and functions, a tension which in turn 
complicates the pursuit of development. Additionally, counties are denied powers necessary to 
address some of the root causes of ethnic conflict. The nature of powers and functions devolved 
to counties makes them typical local government units engaged in local service delivery. While 
these powers are important for local service delivery development, they diminish the “political 
significance” of counties in the national political scene and inhibit counties from effectively 
limiting central power. Accordingly, while county powers are suited for local development, the 
powers are too weak to limit central power and cannot facilitate ethnic accommodation of the 
larger communities, who are likely to remain fixated on the “all-powerful” centre.  
2. Original county powers  
The Fourth Schedule is the main source of county powers and functions.10 The Constitution also 
provides that counties may make any laws necessary in order to facilitate the effective exercise 
of Fourth Schedule powers. In other clauses, the Constitution empowers counties to participate 
in constitutional amendments through the popular initiative. The Constitution also grants 
counties some powers over community land which counties hold in trust for the local 
communities. Moreover, counties have powers over local government. The constitutional 
entrenchment of these specific powers implies that counties can draw directly upon the 
Constitution as the source of their powers. De Visser refers to this kind of power as “original” or 
“primary” power.11  
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2.1 Fourth Schedule functions 
The Constitution distributes national and county government powers through two separate lists 
in the Fourth Schedule, which contains national (Part 1) and county functions (Part 2), 
respectively. There is no explicit list of what is concurrent or exclusive to the two levels of 
government as is the case, for instance, in the South African12 and Nigerian13 constitutions. As 
such, concurrent powers and functions are implied by the two lists in the Fourth Schedule.  
2.1.1 Functional areas of county governments  
Functional areas listed in the second part of the Fourth Schedule as county functions include, 
inter alia, agriculture, health, transport and communication, infrastructure and development, 
planning and trade. In agriculture, counties have powers over crop and animal husbandry, 
livestock yards, county abattoirs, plant and animal disease control, and fisheries.14 In the health 
sector, functional areas that fall under the county domain include “county health services” which 
are disaggregated as: county health facilities and pharmacies; ambulance services; promotion 
of primary health care; and licensing and control of undertakings selling food to the public. Other 
county health services include veterinary services, cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria, 
refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal.15 County functional areas also include 
control of air and noise pollution and other public nuisances, and outdoor advertising.16 
The Fourth Schedule allocates “county transport” to counties, which includes county roads, 
street lighting, traffic and parking, public road transport, and ferries and harbours. Regulation of 
international and national shipping is, however, reserved for the national government.17 In trade 
development and regulation, counties have powers over markets, trade licences, fair trading 
practices, local tourism, and cooperative societies.18 With regard to planning and development, 
counties have powers over “county planning and development”, which includes statistics, land 
survey and mapping, boundaries and fencing, housing, and electricity and gas reticulation and 
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energy regulation.19 In addition, counties have powers over “county public works and services” 
which include storm water management systems in built-up areas, and water and sanitation 
services.20 
In the education sector, counties have a mandate over pre-primary education, village 
polytechnics, homecraft centres and childcare facilities.21 Counties also have powers over 
“cultural activities, public entertainment and public amenities”. These include betting, casinos 
and other forms of gambling, racing, liquor licensing, cinemas, video shows and hiring, libraries, 
museums, sports and cultural activities and facilities, and county parks, beaches and recreation 
facilities.22 Counties have powers, too, to ensure the coordination and participation of 
communities and locations in governance at the local level. Specifically, they have powers to 
assist communities and locations to develop the administrative capacity for the effective 
exercise of the functions and powers as well as for participation in local governance.23  
Other areas listed as county functions in the Fourth Schedule are “animal control and welfare” 
which include licensing of dogs, and facilities for the accommodation, care and burial of 
animals.24 Counties have powers over fire fighting services and disaster management,25 as well 
as powers over the control of drugs and pornography.26 
The county functions highlighted above have been described as “very high-level aggregated 
functions”; it has been observed, too, that “additional decisions are required at a more detailed 
intra-sectoral level”.27 A government report has also noted that many of the national and local 
functions were understated while others were totally omitted.28 The county functions can be 
described as broad functional areas that require further clarity on the specific powers allocated 
to each level of government.  
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The World Bank identifies “basic health and education, street lighting and cleaning, water, 
sewerage and power, public markets and refuse collection, major transport networks and land 
development for business and residential purposes” as typical local government functions.29 
Most of these functions appear in the list of county functions, and it can be preliminarily 
concluded that counties will be generally in a position of providing basic local services.  
A further reading of the functions in the first and second parts of the Fourth Schedule shows that 
county powers are limited in essential areas. For instance, counties have been denied powers 
over primary and secondary education which is, in conventional and comparative practice, a 
function left to lower levels of government.30 Counties are limited31 to pre-primary education, 
village polytechnics, homecraft centres and childcare facilities only.32 Counties have also been 
denied powers over language policy and the promotion of official and local languages.33 This 
means that counties cannot determine the use of local languages or provide an essential 
service such as education. The overall effectiveness of county powers and functions will, 
however, depend on the nature, extent and scope of powers exercised by counties. This will, in 
turn, depend on how the county powers are interpreted.  
2.1.2 The scheme of distribution of the Fourth Schedule powers and functions  
While the full extent and nature of county powers is subject to further clarification and 
interpretation, there is still a discernible trend or pattern in the allocation of functions between 
the national and counties. First, the Fourth Schedule generally allocates policy-making to the 
national government while responsibility of implementation is left mainly to county governments. 
Second, functions and powers that are national in nature or scope are generally allocated to 
national government, while powers and functions which require local implementation are 
generally allocated to county governments. 
2.1.2.1 “Policy-making” versus “implementation”  
The national government is vested with policy-making powers over health,34 agriculture, 
transport, energy, economic policy and planning, and tourism policy and development. In each 
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of these areas, county governments are generally allocated an implementation role. Counties 
are, for instance, allocated powers over county health services, trade development and 
regulation, local tourism, electricity and gas reticulation and energy regulation, among other 
functions.  
However, the division between national and county functions (policy-making versus 
implementation) is by no means neat. In education, for instance, the national government is in 
charge of policy as well as primary and secondary education, an implementation role usually left 
to the subnational level.35 Furthermore, concurrent powers imply that both levels of government 
possess equal powers over concurrent matters, a situation which further negates clarity in the 
division of power.  
2.1.2.2  “National” functions versus “county” functions  
Many of the functions allocated respectively to the national and county governments amount to 
shared functional areas. However, there is also a discernible attempt in the Fourth Schedule to 
create some distinctness between what is allocated to the national and the county government. 
Some of the functions that seem to have “national scope” are allocated to the national 
government. These include powers over use of international waters and water resources36 and 
national economic planning,37 and national statistics and data on population.38 In the health 
sector the national government has powers over “national referral health facilities”;39 it also has 
powers over ancient and historical monuments of “national importance”.40  
Counties, on the other hand, have functions with a “county” qualification. These include “county 
health services”, “county roads”, “county transport”, “county planning and development”, and 
“county public works”. While other functions do not have the “county” prefix, the very nature of 
the function requires “local” performance, for example, ensuring and coordinating community 
participation, local markets and local livestock sale yards. However, neither the “county” 
qualification nor the apparent national-local dichotomy of the functions makes the division of 
powers clear. The exact nature and scope of county powers may only become clear after the list 
of county powers has been interpreted and unbundled into specific powers.  
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2.1.3 The uncertainty and complexity of the Fourth Schedule powers  
As indicated earlier, the Fourth Schedule functions need further clarity due to their highly 
aggregated nature and the lack of an explicit list of concurrent powers and functions. 
Furthermore, while there is a discernible trend of “policy versus implementation” and a “national-
local dichotomy” in the division of functions, it is a general delineation with no clear and specific 
boundaries. Indeed, some functions which are of a local nature, such as primary education and 
policy on use of local languages, are allocated to the national government. Accordingly, the 
Fourth Schedule alone does not provide assistance in understanding the specific powers of 
counties and those of the national government. 
The lack of an explicit list of concurrent powers means that concurrent powers are to be 
determined from the two lists.41 Yet this distinction is important, given the varying constitutional 
treatment of the different kinds of county powers. The national government has no jurisdiction 
over a function that is exclusively allocated to the county level. For instance, if a county passes 
a law on a matter of concurrent jurisdiction that is clearly overridden by national legislation, such 
a law is only rendered inoperative (not invalid) to the extent the inconsistency.42 However, if a 
law is passed by any level of government on a matter that is exclusively vested in another level 
of government, such a law is simply unconstitutional and invalid by dint of the lack of jurisdiction 
to pass the law.  
Exclusive powers thus have the potential to bolster the autonomy of county governments as the 
national government is excluded from exercising any of these powers. On the other hand, while 
both levels have the same powers over matters of concurrent competence, the powers are 
limited by overrides. De Visser defines “concurrent powers” as a scheme of division of powers 
where “both spheres have the same legislative competency and the overriding provisions 
determine which law prevails in a case of conflict”.43 Therefore, a distinction between what is 
current and exclusive in the Fourth Schedule is important as it forms a basis for understanding 
the nature, scope, and extent of county powers. There is, however, no neat boundary between 
concurrent and exclusive powers, and what belongs to either category will be determined 
through interpretation. 
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Given that the two lists in the Fourth Schedule do not, for the reasons advanced above, offer 
clarity on the specific powers of the national and county functions, one may have to rely on 
other relevant constitutional provisions to understand the nature and extent of the respective 
powers and functions listed in the Schedule.  
2.1.4 Interpreting the Fourth Schedule  
There are four important constitutional provisions that may aid understanding of the nature and 
scope of the Fourth Schedule powers. The first states that “except as otherwise provided by this 
Constitution, the functions and powers of the national government and the county governments, 
respectively, are as set out in the Fourth Schedule”.44 While it states an obvious point, this 
provision affirms that the intention was actually to divide powers and functions between the two 
spheres of government. Accordingly, any approach or interpretation adopted should give effect 
to that intention. For instance, this provision implies that the Fourth Schedule cannot be 
interpreted or construed in a manner that leaves counties with no substantive power. Therefore, 
while it is a general provision, it serves as a basic restatement that counties are to exercise 
some power even though the scope or extent of it is not clear at this point.  
The second provision is on concurrency, stating that “a function or power that is conferred on 
more than one level of government is a function or power within the concurrent jurisdiction of 
each of those levels of government”.45 However, as argued earlier, the lack of an express list of 
concurrent powers complicates the application of this provision as concurrent powers can only 
be inferred on the basis that they appear on both lists in the Fourth Schedule. The powers 
intended to be concurrent are not apparent from the two lists in the Fourth Schedule, which 
means that it is only through interpretation that concurrent powers can be identified. However, 
the list of concurrent powers is likely to vary depending on the interpretation of, or approach 
taken to, the issue of concurrency of powers. 
The third provision can be termed the “residual powers clause”. It states that “a function or 
power not assigned by this Constitution or national legislation to a county is a function or power 
of the national government”.46 The implication is that all powers not reflected in the Fourth 
Schedule are essentially national government powers. However, given the preceding 
discussions, this provision is by no means absolute. For instance, the fact that the functions are 
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described as “highly aggregated” implies that there are specific functions falling within the 
county category that are not listed in Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule. Indeed, the county list uses 
the term “including” when giving specific elements of a general county function, thus implying 
that the list is not exhaustive.47 Therefore, while there are many functions that are not expressly 
listed in the Fourth Schedule, not all of them fall within the category of unassigned functions that 
revert to the national government.  
The last provision states that “for greater certainty, Parliament may legislate for the Republic on 
any matter”.48 The extent of this provision is not clear at all. Like the other constitutional 
provisions discussed above, it is subject to further interpretation and can, depending on the 
interpretative approach taken, have varying meaning(s) and implication(s) in regard to the 
nature and scope of county powers. One approach may interpret the provision as vesting 
parliament with powers over all matters. Since there is no list of exclusive county powers, all the 
powers will essentially be concurrent and both levels can legislate, subject to the applicable 
legislative overrides. In the second approach, this provision can be interpreted restrictively to 
mean that parliament is only limited to providing greater clarity to county powers as opposed to 
a power to substantially alter the nature or scope of county powers. 
It thus appears that the kind of interpretation given to powers in the Fourth Schedule will 
determine the nature and scope of county powers. The vagueness of the constitutional 
provisions discussed above means that powers listed in the county section can either be 
exclusive or concurrent. As explained above, the classification of powers as either exclusive or 
concurrent has implications in that the different kinds of power are treated differently under the 
Constitution. This uncertainty opens the county powers in the Fourth Schedule to two possible 
interpretations.  
2.1.4.1 The “pro-centre approach”: amplifying the concurrency of county powers  
Under the “pro-centre approach”, the county powers listed in Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule may 
be interpreted as concurrent powers and functions. The Constitution recognises concurrency of 
powers and functions,49 but there is no express list of exclusive or concurrent powers in the 
Fourth Schedule, thus leaving the determination of concurrent powers to interpretation of the 
two lists. This approach is backed by the fact that only a few, if any, functional areas are not 
                                               
47
 Items 1-8, Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule.  
48
 Article 186 (4).  
49
 Article 186 (2).  
 
 
 
 
267 
 
shared with the national government. Indeed, the preceding parts have shown that the national 
government has policy-making powers over virtually all county powers. As such, most or all of 
the county powers in Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule will be concurrent national and county 
powers.  
To this end, Article 186(4) of the Constitution can be interpreted to mean that the national 
government can pass laws on any matter that appears in the county list. Concurrency of 
powers, however, also means that counties have same powers and can pass laws on the same 
issues. Both the national and county laws are, in the case of a conflict, subject to the overrides 
clause in the Constitution. Accordingly, the nature and level of county autonomy in this 
approach will depend on how the overrides clause is applied to county powers. On the one 
hand, an overly “generous” interpretation of the overrides clause (one in favour of the national 
government) may end up shrinking the powers of counties; on the other, a restrictive 
interpretation (one in favour of counties) may end up expanding the scope of county powers in 
matters of concurrent jurisdiction.   
The Constitution provides that national law prevails if it applies uniformly across the country and 
if the national law provides for a matter that cannot be effectively regulated by individual county 
law. National law also prevails if the matter requires “national uniformity” and the national law 
provides the required uniformity by establishing national standards or national policies. The 
national legislation can also prevail over county law if the national law is necessary for: 
maintenance of national security and economic unity; protection of the common market in 
respect of the mobility of goods, services, capital and labour; promotion of cross-county 
economic activities; promotion of equal opportunity or equal access to government services; 
and protection of the environment.50  
The Constitution does not list instances where county legislation prevails; it simply provides that 
county law prevails if none of the conditions for national overrides apply.51 In determining 
conflict between county and national legislation, courts are required to prefer an interpretation 
that avoids conflict to one which leads to it.52 Ghai and Cottrell argue that with regard to 
overrides, national law may trump county legislation in many instances as it is “subject to very 
limited safeguards”53 over county laws. Accordingly, if an overly “generous” approach (in favour 
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of the centre is taken) is taken, the national government may end up legislating on most or all of 
the functional areas that appear as county functions in the Fourth Schedule. A less “generous” 
interpretation of the legislative overrides may, on the other hand, safeguard the scope of county 
powers.  
Exclusive county powers limit the national government role to national policy-making and 
regulations only, and this are arguably less restrictive than the generously-worded overrides. 
However, under this “pro-centre approach”, very few powers, if any, listed in Part 2 of the Fourth 
Schedule will amount to exclusive county powers. Indeed, for any power to amount to an 
exclusive power, it must be unambiguously clear that it only appears in Part 2 of the Fourth 
Schedule and that it does not need any conceivable clarification, something that is almost 
impossible. Both levels have functions in all major sectors such as health, education, planning 
and development, agriculture, trade development. It is therefore highly unlikely that one can 
identify a single exclusive power under this approach.  
Under the “pro-centre approach”, the “residual power clause” which vests residual powers in the 
national government may end up being of little or no use.54 Furthermore, the constitutional 
provision which provides for the “national-county dichotomy” in powers and functions will also be 
of diminished significance as few or no powers will be purely county powers. Article 186 (4), on 
the other hand, will be of significance as national legislation will, subject to the override clause, 
determine the extent and scope of county powers.  
2.1.4.2 The “pro-county approach”: amplifying the exclusivity of county powers  
In terms of the “pro-county” approach, most of the functions listed in Part 2 of the Fourth 
Schedule are interpreted as providing counties with exclusive powers over which the national 
government cannot exercise legislative power. Under this approach, the role of the national 
government is limited to making policies and regulations on the exercise of county powers as 
opposed to exercising legislative power.  
In the “pro-county” approach, the generally discernible patterns of “policy versus 
implementation” and “national versus local functions” are seen as being of significance as they 
support the assertion that there is an intention to delineate county powers which the national 
government can only supervise or regulate. Accordingly, aspects such as the “county” 
qualification are seen as important for understanding the nature and scope of the county 
powers. However, as argued earlier, the nature of the list of county powers in the Fourth 
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Schedule is such that the powers must be further interpreted and clarified in order to arrive at 
specific county powers.  
In the “pro-county approach”, Article 186 (1) – which recognises that powers are divided into 
national and county in the Fourth Schedule, respectively – becomes key to emphasising the 
distinctiveness of county powers from national powers. This provision implies that there is an 
intention to delineate county powers over which the national government has no jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, the “pro-centre” approach, which leaves no specific powers for counties, can be 
argued as contrary to the spirit and intent of this provision.  
The provision which recognises concurrency of powers will, under this approach, be narrowly 
interpreted in order to restrict the role of national government. For instance, it may be argued 
that while the national and county governments have shared functional areas, the Fourth 
Schedule delineates specific and distinct powers for each level even though the operational 
sectors are shared. Accordingly, concurrency will be recognised only in cases where the Fourth 
Schedule confers exactly the same specific power as opposed to a generally shared functional 
area. The “county” qualification and other assisting factors become important for defining 
exclusive county powers. 
Under this approach, the “residual power clause” will be important in determining county 
powers. As indicated earlier, the Fourth Schedule powers need to be disaggregated and 
unbundled. Indeed, not all the functions that are not expressly listed in the Fourth Schedule 
amount to unassigned, and therefore national, functions. Accordingly, the starting point under 
this approach is first to define and determine county powers and then declare the rest as 
unassigned and therefore national government functions.  
The provision which empowers the national government to legislate on any matter for greater 
certainty55 will similarly be restrictively interpreted. Under this approach, Article 186 (4) can be 
interpreted to mean that the national government is restricted to providing clarity on what has 
already been allocated to counties by the Fourth Schedule. This means that the county 
functions in Part 2 of the Fourth Schedule confer certain definable powers to counties which 
only need greater clarity or certainty through national legislation. This is different from the “pro-
centre” approach, which sees the provision as providing the national government powers to 
legislate on the county functions, subject to overrides only. Accordingly, the national 
government is restricted to a secondary role of providing further clarity as opposed to defining 
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primary powers, which, under this approach, are deemed as already determined in the Fourth 
Schedule.  
A number of constitutional provisions can also be relied on to endorse this approach. First, 
Article 186 (1), which provides that powers are divided into national and county, can only be 
meaningful if counties have substantive powers that they control to the exclusion of the national 
government. Second, Article 186 (2), which deals with concurrency, also implicitly recognises 
that there are some powers that will be exclusively county powers. Lastly, Article 186 (3) 
envisages powers as belonging either to counties or the national level, with the unassigned 
powers reverting to the national level. Article 186 (4) should thus be interpreted in a manner that 
gives effect to articles 186 (1) to (3), and this can only be achieved through the “pro-county 
approach”.  
The phrase “[f]or greater certainty” can be interpreted to imply that the Constitution has already 
determined the fundamental division of power and that this is only a residual or secondary role 
of refining the division of powers within the general constitutional scheme of distribution of 
functions. The phrase “for the Republic” may also be interpreted as implying a power to address 
general issues for “the Republic”. Put differently, the provision should not be interpreted as 
giving the national government power to legislate for counties. Rather, it should be limited to 
enacting framework legislation while the exercise of specific powers should be left to counties. 
Accordingly, the phrase “on any matter” is qualified in two ways (as opposed to being absolute). 
The phrase means, first, that the section only provides greater clarity on an already-defined 
power, and second, the clarity must relate to a general matter of a “Republic nature” which 
applies to all counties. Secondly, the fact that the provision is contained in a section of the 
Constitution which deals with interpretation of national and county powers means that it is 
limited to powers as opposed to other aspects of devolution.  
2.1.4.3 Picking an approach that is congruent to the constitutional objectives  
The vagueness in the design of county powers and functions and the division of powers 
between the national government and counties paves the way for two opposing interpretations. 
While the two approaches lead to vastly different results in terms of the nature and extent of 
county powers, both approaches have a constitutional backing. However, the possibility of two 
constitutionally tenable but opposing approaches to interpretation of county powers points to the 
weakness in the design of powers and functions in the Constitution. The current design of 
county powers leaves the possibility for weakening county powers by declaring them concurrent 
 
 
 
 
271 
 
and therefore subjecting them to “generously”-worded national overrides. On the other hand, a 
“pro-county approach” can result in significantly expanded county powers that the national 
government can only supervise and regulate within the relevant constitutionally set limits.  
Is there an interpretation, among the two approaches, that can indeed be considered congruent 
with the broader constitutional purpose and objective of devolving power? Such an inquiry must, 
of necessity, commence with understanding the processes or implications inherent in the very 
nature of the concept of devolution. Furthermore, one must also understand the broad 
constitutional objectives and the specific role that counties are meant to play in the pursuit of 
those objectives. Specifically, one must understand how the constitutional objectives impact on 
the powers to be exercised by county governments.   
Devolution was defined at the beginning of this thesis as a process which entails the transfer of 
power to the subnational level. Therefore, an interpretation that favours the control of power by 
a subnational unit is essentially a “devolution approach” that gives effect to the meaning and 
application of the concept of devolution. It was noted in Chapter 5 that devolution is part of a 
broader constitutional framework meant to pursue development, resolve conflict and limit central 
power. Accordingly, the very nature of the concept of devolution favours the “pro-county 
approach”, which can facilitate the transfer of real power to counties.  
The founding provisions of the Constitution may also offer guidance on the approach to be 
taken in regard to interpretation of powers. The Constitution shares sovereignty, which 
emanates from the people, between the national government and counties.56 Devolution is also 
woven into the definition of the Republican status of the Kenyan state.57 Both levels are defined 
as distinct but interrelated in the founding provisions.58 The spirit and intent of these provisions 
is reflected in the constitutional objectives of devolved government.59 Counties are expected to 
facilitate communities to pursue their own development,60 enhance peace by facilitating political 
and economic inclusion,61 and limit central power.62 However, counties can only reflect this 
constitutional standard and expectation if they control powers that enable them to pursue this 
purpose and therefore match up with the constitutional significance given to devolution.  
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Apart from the founding provisions, the constitutional provisions specific to powers and functions 
in Article 186 imply that counties should control substantial power to the exclusion of the 
national government. The provisions which recognise, the Fourth Schedule,63 concurrency,64 
and residual power,65 all imply that counties exercise some power exclusively as well as 
concurrently. It is in this regard that Article 186 (4) should be interpreted restrictively, in order to 
give effect to the spirit and intent of the other interpretational previsions and the broader spirit 
and intent of the Constitution.  
The “pro-centre approach” can also be justified as being in line with the broader constitutional 
objective. For instance, concurrent powers, which are amplified under the “pro-centre” 
approach, ideally confer the same powers to both levels, thus making the counties “as powerful 
as the national government”. However, this position is only ideal and is negated by two main 
points. First, a careful look at Fourth Schedule functions reveals that there are many national 
government functions which clearly do not fall within county functions. These include functions 
such as foreign affairs national defence, police services, courts, monetary policy, central 
banking, among other functions that are typically vested in the national government 
exclusively.66 The impact is that concurrency is unlikely to “disturb” national government power 
as it would county powers. Accordingly, the argument that concurrency may “equalise” the two 
levels would be more of a myth than reality. Second, the generously-worded override clauses 
work in favour of the national government and thus have the potential to “strangle” counties.  
2.1.5 Applying the “pro-county approach” to the Fourth Schedule powers  
Even after choosing the “pro-county approach”, which is argued above to be in alignment with 
broader constitutional purpose and objectives, the county powers in the Fourth Schedule need 
further interpretation. Accordingly, within a broader choice of the “pro-county” approach, further 
interpretation is still necessary. The functions listed in the Fourth Schedule need further 
disaggregation, the “county” qualification is also not clear in scope, and many of the listed 
county powers are not exhaustive. Furthermore, while concurrency is substantially curtailed 
through the pro-county approach, it still needs to be determined within the broad “pro-county 
approach”.  
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As with the “pro-county” and “pro-centre” approaches discussed above, there are two possible 
ways of interpreting county powers in the Fourth Schedule. The first can be a restrictive 
approach to county powers, within the broad “pro-county approach”, whereas the second 
involves further generous interpretation of county powers. The upshot of this situation is that 
some powers and functions may still fall into either category of county or national powers. As 
such, the scope and extent of county powers will depend on the second approach taken to 
county powers. Indeed, the World Bank notes that usually many functions are recentralised and 
then decentralised as functions are continuously refined.67  
2.1.5.1 A restrictive interpretation to county powers: the South African approach  
A restrictive interpretation may limit the exclusive powers of counties to “intra-county” matters or 
matters that have a “county scope” only. This approach was used by the South African 
Constitutional Court, which concluded that “where provinces are accorded exclusive powers 
these should be interpreted as applying primarily to matters which may appropriately be 
regulated intra-provincially”.68 Using this approach, Steytler and Fessha argue that in order to 
identify a “municipal health service”, one should ask “whether a specific health facility serves 
(and intends to serve) a community broader than a particular municipal area”.69 They further 
argue that “a municipal competence must be interpreted to deal with intra-municipal activities 
and concerns only and excludes activities with an extra-municipal dimension”.70 With regard to 
roads, Steytler and Fessha argue that “if the purpose of a road is to link two or more 
municipalities, there is an extra-municipal dimension to the road and it must be regarded as 
provincial”.71  
A South African approach to county powers may mean that functions which straddle counties 
will revert to the national government. If applied to Kenya, this provision will, for instance, mean 
that provincial hospitals which offer services beyond the boundaries of the host counties will fall 
under national government. Indeed, the status of provincial hospitals is unclear as they can fall 
in either category.72 While the World Bank categorises the provincial hospitals as unassigned 
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functions, it also recognises that the hospitals may still fall under counties and that this depends 
on the approach taken with regard to interpretation.73 The same uncertainty applies to other 
“regional-scope” functions such as cross-county bulk water supply infrastructure,74 regional 
roads and other functions, or activities with a cross-county scope.75 
2.1.5.2 A further “generous interpretation” to county powers  
Under the generous approach, county powers will not necessarily be restricted to “intra-county” 
activities only. As a result, provincial hospitals, regional water supply infrastructure, and regional 
roads, among other “regional scope” functions, may be vested in county governments. This may 
be informed by the reasoning that “cross-county” functions are not necessarily national functions 
and can actually be allocated to a county. It is therefore apparent that some of the powers may 
actually fall in either category of powers in the Fourth Schedule and that this will depend mainly 
on the interpretative approach taken in determining the nature and scope of county powers. Like 
the “pro-county” and the “pro-centre” approaches discussed above, one may still ask which 
interpretation would be preferable in the Kenyan context.  
2.1.5.3 A “restrictive” versus “generous” interpretation: what are the merits?  
The possibility of there being further differing approaches to interpretation, even after the “pro-
county approach” has been settled on, points to a further weakness in the design of powers and 
functions. The county powers, even after they are secured through a “pro-county approach”, 
may be expanded or contracted, although not to the extent of the “pro-centre approach” 
discussed earlier above. The “generous interpretation” may also be justified on the same 
grounds as that of the “pro-county approach” because it expands county powers. However, a 
number of other factors may favour one interpretation over the other.  
For instance, unlike South Africa, Kenya has no regional or provincial level of government. As 
such, its “competitor” for powers and functions is the national government. Thus, while inter-
municipal functions can still remain “decentralised functions” which belong to the province in the 
South African context, in Kenya “inter-county” functions could end up being centralised due to 
the fact that the national government is the only other level above the county. Indeed, while 
counties can form joint committees and authorities, “regional-scope functions” cannot be 
constitutionally allocated to a group of counties. There is no constitutionally recognised entity 
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with an inter-county scope except the national government. Accordingly, a power can only be, 
constitutionally, a national or county power.  
However, mainly as a result of their small size and “fragmented” nature, counties may also not 
effectively take up some of the cross-county functions. A county that, for instance, hosts a 
“regional-scope” facility such as a provincial hospital may be less inclined to use its funds to 
provide services which extend beyond its borders. It is in this context that the World Bank warns 
that if provincial hospitals are left wholly to counties, the facilities and services are likely to 
decline.76 In this regard, the World Bank advises that if the hospitals are allocated to counties, 
the national government may give “conditional grants” to counties which host provincial 
hospitals in order to maintain the vital “regional scope” of health services.77 The World Bank 
also calls for “creative approaches” which include effective horizontal cooperation in order to 
enhance the effective management of these “regional-scope” services.78 
This complication with regard to powers and functions emerges from Kenya‟s unique devolution 
structure which does not have a regional tier. A regional level would, perhaps, have provided a 
basis for implementation, or even coordination only, of “regional-scope” functions. While 
provinces in South Africa have no clear powers and are generally politically weak, they perform 
important coordination functions that would otherwise fall to the national government and lead to 
central bureaucracy and eventual local inefficiency.79 Kenya, on the other hand, needs “creative 
solutions” such as effective horizontal cooperation in order to address its structural 
shortcomings. 
2.1.5.4 Concurrency of powers under the “pro-county approach”  
Unlike the “pro-centre approach” which declares all powers as concurrent, the “pro-county 
approach” uses factors such as the “county” qualification and the “national-local dichotomy” to 
minimise concurrent powers. Accordingly, concurrent powers are those which, from the reading 
of national and county government lists, confer the exact nature and scope to both levels. Even 
within the same sector, powers can be interpreted as exclusive components such as policy-
making, national functions, and local functions. In the health sector, for instance, the exclusive 
national government functions are policy-making and national health facilities, while county 
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exclusive powers are “county health services”. Using this restrictive approach, it is difficult to 
identify what is conferred concurrently to the national and county government.  
The World Bank identifies “disaster management” as a concurrent function.80 In the national 
government function, the power appears as “disaster management” while in the county section it 
is listed as “fire fighting services and disaster management”. This may be reasonably interpreted 
as a concurrent power as it has no “county” qualification to it, although such a determination is 
by no means absolute. Energy regulation also seems to be a concurrent national and county 
government function. The national item reads “energy policy, including electricity and gas 
reticulation and energy regulation”, while the county item reads “electricity and gas reticulation 
and energy regulation”. Accordingly, both vest “energy regulation” in the respective 
governments. A national government report has proposed that counties will only have powers to 
license and regulate plants below 3 Mega Watts.81 Such a move may be subject to the overrides 
clause and may or may not pass the test. What is clear, though, is that concurrency is subject to 
a far stricter test under the “pro-county” approach and few powers will fall under the category of 
concurrent powers. 
2.1.5.5 National government role in limiting/defining county power  
While counties have both exclusive and concurrent powers, the role of the national government 
may impact on the full scope of county powers. First, the national government has exclusive 
power to make policies and this may impact on the manner in which counties perform their 
functions. Furthermore, the extent of policy-making powers is not clear. For instance, while 
policy formulation is clear, the extent to which national government can carry out “policy 
coordination” is not exactly clear.82 As a result, “policy coordination” or other “national 
regulation” mechanisms may end up having far-reaching consequences in the exercise of 
county powers.  
Second, the overrides clause may end up limiting county powers in matters of concurrent 
national and county jurisdiction.83 The grounds under which national law prevails have been 
described as too limiting to counties.84 Accordingly, many of the laws passed by the national 
government on matters of concurrent jurisdiction may end up prevailing over county laws. 
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However, the “pro-county approach” limits the scope of concurrency, meaning that very few 
functions, if any, will be subject to the generously-worded overrides if the “pro-county approach” 
is adopted.  
2.2 Incidental power of counties 
County governments can exercise their powers beyond the expressly listed functions. However, 
this is envisaged only in situations where such powers are necessary or incidental to the 
exercise of listed county functions.85 Again, the extent of incidental power is not clear even in 
the comparative experience of federal or devolved systems.86 De Visser argues that incidental 
power “is not intended to increase number of functional areas”.87 While an incidental power has 
the potential to create overlaps with national government powers, the intention is not to make an 
incidental power a concurrent power as the county will be exercising power in an area that is, 
strictly speaking, outside its competence. An incidental power should, by its very nature and 
name, just be incidental to the performance of a different and substantive county function. While 
the Constitution seems to limit the incidental power to Fourth Schedule functions,88 it would 
seem consistent to allow counties to exercise incidental power over all other powers.  
2.3 Other constitutional powers of county governments  
While the Fourth Schedule is the main source of county powers and functions, there are also 
other constitutional provisions which vest original powers in county governments, namely: 
powers over community land, participation in constitutional amendment through the popular 
initiative, and powers over local government.  
2.2.1 The role of counties in constitutional amendment by popular initiative   
Counties can play a role in a constitutional amendment by popular initiative.89 A popular 
initiative for constitutional amendment is commenced through a draft amendment Bill or in the 
form of a general suggestion which is signed by at least one million registered voters and 
submitted to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC).90 The IEBC, after 
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verifying compliance with relevant provisions, is required to submit the draft Bill to each CA for 
consideration within three months of receiving the draft Bill or suggestion for amendment of the 
Constitution.91  
County Assemblies (CAs) have three months to deliberate and vote on the draft Bill. If passed, 
each CA Speaker is required to pass on the draft Bill and a certificate indicating that the CA has 
approved it, to the speakers of the National Assembly and Senate.92 If the draft Bill is approved 
by half of the counties, it is introduced in parliament without delay and the constitutional 
amendment goes through if supported by a simple majority of both chambers of parliament.93 If 
both chambers pass the Bill, it shall be submitted to the president for assent and if rejected, the 
amendment shall be subjected to a referendum.94   
While the counties are empowered to participate in amending the Constitution by popular 
initiative, their involvement is triggered only after the public has initiated the process. As such, 
while parliament can commence a constitutional amendment process, the counties have no 
powers to initiate an amendment. The counties have to wait for the public process of collection 
of signatures and their verification by the IEBC before the CAs can be properly seized of the 
process. Furthermore, constitutional amendment by popular initiative appears to be a lengthy 
and complicated process that cannot be used regularly. Constitutional amendment by 
parliamentary initiative, discussed in Chapter 8, seems the most practical and convenient route 
for any future constitutional amendments. 
2.3.2 County powers over community land  
Counties are empowered to hold unregistered community land in trust for local communities.95 
This provision has its roots in the former Constitution where community land, then referred to as 
“trust land”, was held in trust for local communities by county councils established for rural areas 
under the former Constitution96 and the now-repealed Local Government Act.97 Trust lands were 
originally native reserves held by British Native Boards but transferred to the county councils 
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under the former constitutional dispensation, after independence.98 Community land can only be 
disposed off in accordance with national legislation99 which protects the respective individual 
and collective rights.100 Community land includes lands held by specific communities such as 
forests, grazing areas or shrines, ancestral lands and lands traditionally occupied by hunter-
gatherer communities.101  
However, it is apparent that county governments will play only a peripheral role with regard to 
land issues. While the Constitution recognises other categories of land, such as public and 
private land, counties are only required to hold “trust land” or “community land” on behalf of 
communities. Even then, most of the powers over land administration, including community 
land, are vested in the National Land Commission, an independent nationally-based 
institution.102 Powers vested in the National Land Commission include change of category of 
land, revision, consolidation and rationalising existing land laws, prescription of minimum and 
maximum holding acreages with respect to private land, protecting and conserving public land 
and other general matters related to land administration.103 
Indeed, even under the former Constitution, the county councils were completely unable to 
protect the interests of communities. The president, for instance, had constitutional powers to 
solely set aside trust lands for a different purpose other than the benefit of a community.104 
These unfettered presidential powers were used to alienate public and trust lands which were 
given to politically connected families and individuals.105 As a result, the mandate of county 
councils to play custodian to community lands was negated by the arbitrary use of presidential 
powers over land.106 Indeed, a substantial part of land that was formerly “trust land” or 
“community “ is now private land subject to central administration rather than counties; in the 
case of the remaining “trust land” or “community land”, the counties play only a “caretaker” role 
on behalf of the local communities. 
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2.3.3 Local government as a county power  
As the World Bank observes, the 47 counties are “not a substitute for local governments”.107 
The 47 counties were, as highlighted in Chapter 4, reduced from an initial proposed number of 
74 counties in order to cover the void left by the removal of the regions.108 This compromise 
makes the 47 counties too large to be local governments. Furthermore, the current 
constitutional framework for devolved government is essentially a symmetrical devolution of 
power to the 47 counties without differentiating the rural and urban divide within the particular 
counties. Prud‟homme terms such an arrangement, one which regards devolution to cities as 
being the same as devolution to villages, a “decentralisation absurdity”.109 
The Constitution recognises the complications created by the current structure. First, it 
envisages the decentralisation of services from the county to lower levels: “every county 
government shall decentralise its functions and the provision of its services to the extent that is 
sufficient and practicable to do so”.110 Second, the Constitution recognises the need for a 
differentiated approach to rural and urban governance. Accordingly, “[n]ational legislation shall 
provide for the governance and management of urban areas and cities”.111  
Measures to provide for further decentralisation are in tandem with public views. During the 
constitutional review process, there were overwhelming public views that services should be 
decentralised to the local level in order to enhance access to basic services.112 Specifically, the 
majority of the members of the public who gave their views rejected regions as the principal 
units of devolved government as they are too far from the people at the local level.113 As such, 
concentrating power in the 47 counties will negate the purpose that devolved government is 
meant to serve for the public, namely, enhancing access to basic services to the local level.  
The differentiation of rural and urban governance also has a strong basis in Kenya‟s past 
experience. A 1995 Kenyan government report observes that where urban and rural areas were 
combined under the same local authorities, agricultural taxes were redirected to the provision of 
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urban services, thus “draining” rural areas114 and leading to neglect of rural services.115 The 
World Bank notes that, with the exception of a few fully urbanised counties, most of the counties 
have predominant rural areas in which the majority of the population live.116 However, contrary 
to the situation in the past, urban areas are, according to the World Bank, the “losers” in the 
current structure because the composition of counties may create a “strong rural bias”.117 The 
Bank warns that this could result in county resources being drained into rural areas to the 
detriment of urban areas.118 Regardless of the effect of combining rural and urban areas, the 
differentiation of rural and urban governance is important due to the varying nature of needs and 
preferences.  
However, there is no substantive constitutional framework for decentralisation of powers to 
levels below counties beyond the formal constitutional recognition of the need to do so. The 
constitutional provisions on decentralisation to the sub-county level are general, vague and 
unclear. This is mainly as a result of merging regional and local functioning to the county level; 
local government powers are listed as county functions in the Fourth Schedule. In most systems 
of multilevel government (usually composed of the national, regional and local level), power 
over the local level is normally treated as a power of either the national or regional level or is a 
joint competency of the upper levels.119 In Kenya, the difficulty arises from the fact that local 
government powers are primary constitutional powers of counties and can thus not be 
institutionally delinked from counties.   
2.3.3.1 Urban local government: management of cities, municipalities and towns  
The Constitution merely provides that national legislation should provide for urban governance 
which should entail: criteria for classifying urban areas into cities and other categories; 
principles of governance and management of urban areas; and provisions for public 
participation in urban governance.120 The Constitution also provides that the legislation should 
provide for the governance of the different categories of urban local government.121 The TFDG 
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points out that the Constitution did not adequately provide for urban local government and thus 
failed to recognise the dynamic of urbanisation.122 For instance, while the Constitution requires 
public participation in urban governance, it fails to clarify if and whether urban areas should 
have elected leadership. The Urban Areas and Cities Act (UACA),123 enacted to govern urban 
areas, does not provide for elected urban leadership. Public accountability is instead provided 
through indirect public and stakeholder participation, and it is not clear whether such a measure 
satisfies the Constitution or not.124 
As required in the Constitution, the UACA classifies urban areas into municipal, city and town 
status. Municipal councils and cities have a separate corporate existence, but towns are not 
administratively delinked from the county.125 While the president formally confers a city status, 
the decision is made by the CEC and the CA with the concurrence of the Senate.126 However, 
only the county government can confer a municipal or town status.127 City counties will be 
managed under the law relating to county governments.128  
One question that arises is the nature and extent of the national government‟s role in urban 
governance. The powers of the national government over urban management appear weak. 
Urban local government powers and functions are essentially county powers. Furthermore, all 
the major sources of funds for local urban government are vested in the counties.129 The World 
Bank argues that the constitutional provisions on urban areas could be interpreted to mean that 
the Constitution intended to give national government powers to establish urban local 
government and that this should extend to powers to give urban local government functional 
responsibilities.130 The World Bank argues that the provision could also mean that national 
legislation is required to set a framework for urban governance while counties have a choice to 
set up urban local government and resource them.131 The UACA, the World Bank argues, has 
provisions that reflect a compromise between these two competing interpretations.  
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However, the fact that urban local government powers and functions as well as sources of 
finance are listed as county powers makes it hard for national legislation to vary these powers 
without the consent of the counties. In essence, the institution of urban local government is 
functionally fused with the county government. In turn, the counties have constitutional 
protection over their powers and functional areas. Thus, while the UACA provides for 
classification of urban areas and different management, it recognises the primary constitutional 
autonomy of counties over urban local government by giving counties the actual powers of 
deciding the status or category of an urban area.132 The World Bank also observes that there is 
no clear process for delegation of the functions to urban areas.133 
The Act is explicit that cities and urban areas are agents of counties134 and that institutional 
accountability lies with their respective county governments.135 The appointed leadership of 
cities and urban areas136 is accountable to the county governor, who has power to remove any 
member of a municipal or city board from office.137 The UACA also mandates county 
governments to define and demarcate the operational sectors138 of urban areas as well as 
delegate functions to urban areas.139 County governments will determine and approve revenue-
raising functions for urban areas.140 Furthermore, the budget estimates of all urban areas are 
debated and approved by the CA and funds disbursed from the county government.141 While the 
cabinet secretary can make regulations under the Act, the Senate has to approve the 
regulations before the same can take effect.142   
It is clear that the national government has an almost insignificant role to play in terms of urban 
local government. County governments are constitutionally and legally empowered to control 
the vital processes of urban local government. Urban local government, it is submitted, is a 
county power as opposed to a concurrent or exclusively national power. The World Bank 
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observes that the devolved system of government in essence places urban management under 
counties.143 The Bank concludes that the “effectiveness of urban management will thus depend 
to a large extent on county government decisions, concerning delegation of powers and 
revenues to urban roads, and how they hold them accountable”.144 
2.3.3.2 Rural local government  
County governments have an absolute discretion regarding how to, and what to, decentralise in 
respect of rural areas. Ghai and Cottrell argue that even “having local offices of the county 
government is enough to satisfy the Constitution”.145 However, the local nature of functions such 
as coordination community and location participation implies the presence of sub-county 
structures for effectiveness.146 Indeed, the concept of local participation will be negated if 
powers are “centralised” to “county capitals” only. The principle of subsidiarity also means that 
local planning and participation should be decentralised to the local level in order to realise 
meaningful participation; by implication, this calls for measures beyond mere field offices. Apart 
from the elusive concept of subsidiarity, there is no other compelling provision in the 
Constitution that specifically obligates counties to decentralise planning and services to the local 
level in rural areas.147  
3. Additional county powers  
While the Fourth Schedule lists the primary source of county powers, the Constitution provides 
that counties can receive added powers and functions beyond those listed in Part II of the 
Fourth Schedule. First, the national government can, through national legislation, assign powers 
and functions to counties. Second, the national government can, with the agreement of a county 
government, transfer national functions to a county government. While both assignment and 
transfer of functions all end up adding more powers and functions to counties, the nature and 
scope of county power may vary according to the process followed. 
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3.1 Assigned powers  
The national government can, through national legislation, assign powers and functions to 
county governments.148 The Constitution states that “a function or power not assigned by this 
Constitution or national legislation to a county is a function or power of the national 
government”.149 There is no further constitutional provision regarding assignment of functions to 
counties. As such, assignment of functions is only mentioned in a constitutional provision which 
deals with residual functions. Powers assigned by national legislation appear to be more of a 
permanent power than temporary delegation. De Visser describes assigned powers as a form of 
devolution due to the permanency attached to an assigned function.150 From the wording of 
Article 186 (2), the national government can assign powers to counties without the latter‟s 
consent. The national government may, for instance, assign counties powers and functions 
which are not assigned to either level through the Constitution.  
While the Constitution requires that the transfer of functions be accompanied by funds, there is 
no equivalent provision for assignment of powers. However, it can be assumed that in vetting 
national legislation, the Senate (whose role is discussed in Chapter 8) can prevent functions 
from being piled upon counties via national legislation without corresponding funds being made 
available. In this regard, the CRA is also required to make recommendations to the Senate or 
the NA on any legislation that touches on county financial matters.151 Each House is required to 
consider the recommendations by the CRA before voting on the Bill.152 Furthermore, one of the 
principles of devolved government provides that counties should have adequate resources to 
perform their functions.153 These measures may operate as general safeguards to unfunded 
mandates to county governments. 
There is no constitutional provision that empowers the national executive to assign powers 
administratively or by executive action only. The Constitution provides that a county executive 
committee shall perform functions conferred on it by the Constitution or national legislation.154 A 
county executive is also under duty to implement national legislation within the county to the 
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extent that the national legislation requires.155 It is thus clear that executive functions can be 
assigned to county governments only by national legislation. The CGA, for instance, provides 
that the President can assign the county governor “state functions” on the basis of mutual 
consultations.156 However, while what amounts to “state functions” is not clear, they certainly do 
not include any of the national executive powers in the Fourth Schedule or in other parts of the 
Constitution. 
3.2 Transferred powers  
Powers and functions can be transferred between the two levels of government subject to 
mutual consent and if the power so transferred would be performed more effectively by the 
receiving government. The transfer should also be permitted by the legislation under which the 
power is created.157 While county governments would have to agree individually to a transfer of 
functions, it appears that a collective agreement by county executives through 
intergovernmental structures can also lead to a general transfer of functions to all counties.158  
The Constitution provides that where a power is transferred from one level to another, 
“constitutional responsibility for the performance of the function or exercise of the power” 
remains with the level to which the power is assigned in the Fourth Schedule.159 The meaning of 
“constitutional responsibility” over transferred functions is not clear. For instance, it is not clear 
whether the donating level can unilaterally resume transferred functions without reference to the 
receiving level. The agreement for transfer of powers may, however, provide for a procedure 
through which transferred powers can revert to the donating level. 
What is clear, though, is that transferred functions are merely delegated functions and there is 
limited discretion in the exercise of donated powers. While legislative assignment of functions 
can create a certain degree of permanence, transferred functions are merely delegated 
functions which can revert to the donating level. However, the level of discretion may also 
depend on the provisions of the authorising legislation or the terms of the transfer agreement.  
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The Constitution provides that one of the grounds for the transfer of powers and functions is if a 
power or function can be exercised more effectively by the receiving level of government.160 
This provision incorporates the principle of subsidiarity, which requires that “a government 
function should be performed as close to the citizenry as possible”.161 Indeed, the scheme of 
distribution of power in the Fourth Schedule generally adheres to the principle of subsidiarity. 
For instance, the national government has the bulk of the policy-making powers while counties 
mainly implement. Furthermore, functions that are national in nature are generally at the 
national level, while counties are generally allocated matters which require local implementation.  
However, while the Constitution recognises the principle of subsidiarity, its effect and application 
is not clear; Steytler and Fessha describe the principle as “notoriously vague and imprecise”.162 
For instance, while primary education is a function that is conventionally allocated to the 
subnational level of government,163 the Constitution has allocated primary education to the 
national government. The principle of subsidiarity calls for primary education to be either 
assigned or transferred to counties.164  
4. Limits to county government powers  
There are instances where exercise of county powers and functions can, in terms of the 
Constitution, be stopped by the national government. First, the Constitution recognises that 
counties can be delayed from assuming their allocated functions until they develop the requisite 
capacity. Second, even where a county has assumed all the powers, the national government 
can still intervene in county governments and take over functions of counties.165 Third, and as a 
last resort, the Constitution provides a procedure through which exercise of county powers can 
be suspended.166  
National intervention in counties should, however, be distinguished from other national powers 
over county government matters such as policy-making and national regulation, and the setting 
of national standards. While national intervention or suspension of counties has the effect of 
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limiting county powers, the other powers of national government, such as policy-making, serve 
to define the parameters and scope of county powers as opposed to limiting the powers of 
counties. As such, national regulation or policy-making and setting of national standards only 
delineate county powers as opposed to halting the exercise of county powers. Intervention and 
suspension, on the other hand, is a constitutionally sanctioned intrusion into functional areas of 
counties for purposes recognised and provided for in the Constitution. 
4.1.1 Transition to counties: gradual transfer of powers to counties  
The Constitution provides that county powers will be devolved gradually over a period of three 
years.167 This measure will ensure that transition to county governments does not lead to 
disruption of services.168 Indeed, the World Bank advises that devolution of power can be 
delayed until the subnational level develops adequate capacity to handle functions.169 
Parliament enacted the Transition to Devolved Government Act (TDGA) to implement the 
constitutional provisions above and the Act establishes the Transitional Authority (TA) to 
manage the process.170 The TDGA permits asymmetrical devolution of powers to counties that 
are ready to assume their constitutional powers.171 The TA is mandated to assess the readiness 
of the county to receive the functions172 and has to propose “clear and practical” measures to 
develop the capacity of a county deemed not ready.173 However, the Senate is the final authority 
with regard to a decision on the transfer of powers to a county.174 The transition process is 
monitored by the Commission on Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) to ensure objectivity 
and integrity of the process.175  
4.1.2 National intervention in county governments  
There are two main grounds for a national intervention in a county government: first, where a 
county is unable to perform its functions;176 second, where a county fails to operate a financial 
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management system that complies with the requirements prescribed by national legislation.177 
The power of the national government to intervene on financial matters is discussed in the next 
chapter, which focuses on the financial and fiscal powers of counties. The Constitution requires 
national legislation to provide for intervention where a county fails to perform its functions. The 
law should authorise the national government to take appropriate steps to ensure that a county 
resumes its functions. The law should also, where necessary, enable the national government 
to assume performance of county functions.178  
The Constitution generally adopts a fairly restrictive approach as it clearly provides that 
interventions should only be made when necessary and should be limited to necessary 
measures during the intervention.179 An intervention should only take place after giving 
adequate notice to the concerned county. Deliberate effort should be made to ensure that a 
county resumes responsibility of its functions.180 The Constitution also provides that national 
legislation should allow for a procedure under which the Senate may, at any time, end an 
intervention in a county government.181  
4.1.3 Suspension of county governments  
The Constitution provides that powers of county governments can be limited through 
suspension. However, suspension is an extreme measure: a county can be suspended only in 
an emergency arising out of internal conflict or war, or in any other exceptional 
circumstances.182 What amounts to “exceptional circumstances” is determined by an 
independent commission of inquiry investigating the allegations against a county government. 
The President can suspend a county only after the commission recommends it and the Senate 
authorises it.183 The Senate may, however, and at any time, terminate the suspension of a 
county.184 During the period of suspension, the Constitution provides that arrangements are to 
be provided for the performance of the powers and functions of a suspended county.185 The 
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maximum period of a suspension of a county is 90 days,186 after which elections for the affected 
county shall be held.187  
The CGA defines the “exceptional circumstances” in the Constitution as “actions that are 
deemed to be against the common needs and interests of the citizens in the county”.188 The 
CGA also clarifies that both the legislative and executive are affected and members of both 
organs will retain only half of their benefits.189  
5. Assessment of county powers and functions  
The various factors, discussed in the preceding sections, which affect the nature and scope of 
county powers also have an inevitable effect on the three purposes of devolution. The main 
issue in the assessment of county powers, therefore, is whether the current design of the 
powers and functions of county governments can help or hinder the pursuit of development, 
ethnic harmony and the limiting of central power.  
5.1.1 County powers and development  
With regard to development, counties are expected to enhance access to basic services, 
address regional disparities through redistribution, and realise equitable development. Counties 
are also expected to enhance equity in the distribution of available national resources in order to 
promote equitable development. As earlier discussed, these objectives are rooted in past 
experience where centralised policies led to inefficiency and poor service delivery, growing 
economic disparities and skewed distribution of national resources. During the constitutional 
review process, there were specific calls to devolve power and resources to the local level in 
order to enhance access to basic services. There were calls for affirmative action to enhance 
access to services in areas and communities that were previously neglected and excluded from 
development.190  
A review of the design of the powers and functions of county governments reveals that there are 
aspects of the design that will advance the realisation of the developmental purpose of 
devolution. However, there are also a number of factors that may hinder the realisation of the 
developmental objective.  
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5.1.1.1 Design aspects that enhance development  
A key value in devolution is that units should have a final decision-making power to be able to 
match available local resources to preferences.191 The Constitution entrenches county powers 
by dividing powers between the national government and the counties. The elaborate list of the 
functional areas of county governments in the Fourth Schedule gives county powers a solid 
constitutional backing. The “original” or “primary” powers in the Constitution provide counties 
with the basis for addressing local preferences, while the national level will be mainly in charge 
of policy, national regulation and setting standards. 
The county functional areas touch on most or all the sectors concerned with basic services and 
local development. These include health, housing, water and sanitation, county infrastructure 
and development, community participation, agriculture, trade and development regulation, gas 
and electricity reticulation. All these sectors are critical to local service delivery and 
development.192 While the specific powers that counties exercise in each sector will vary – and 
in some cases, such as education, they are very limited – the functional areas are generally 
relevant to local service delivery and local development. Effective exercise of powers in the 
listed functional areas has the potential to enhance access to basic services and development 
as envisaged in the objectives of devolved government.  
The symmetric devolution of powers to the 47 counties enables all counties to exercise the 
same powers and functions. This has the potential of enhancing access to services and 
development to areas that were previously neglected. Past policies resulted in inequitable 
access to basic services such as basic health care193 and skewed distribution of national 
resources. Accordingly, counties can use their powers to expand and enhance access to basic 
services and development to previously neglected areas. The asymmetry of powers envisaged 
in the transition period is only meant to ensure that counties are ready to take up powers and 
functions and that there is no disruption of service delivery.  
County powers are subject to national policies and standards and the supervision of the national 
government. This will ensure that all counties exercise their powers in accordance with the set 
overall objectives. Furthermore, important issues such as redistribution and equitable sharing of 
national resources are assured through effective monitoring of devolved units.194  
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5.1.1.2 Design aspects that pose a risk to development 
A number of potential pitfalls in the design of county powers and functions may impede the 
realisation of development. The vaguely defined county powers may affect the developmental 
purpose of county government. First, many of the vaguely defined functions could end up being 
centralised in the national government, thus limiting the capacity of counties to provide local 
services and development. Second, vaguely defined functions may lead to neglect of essential 
functions by both levels of government in the hope that the other level will shoulder the 
responsibility.195 Vaguely defined powers also lead to weak accountability as there is no clear 
actor whom the public can hold to account.196  
The poor design of powers and functions is partly traceable to the “hybrid” structure that 
combines “regional powers” and “local powers” in one level, thus adding to the complexity. For 
instance, while the Constitution envisages a local government structure, at least for the urban 
areas, local government functions are fused with county government functions. Indeed, there is 
a symmetric devolution of powers to the 47 county governments, with very weak distinction 
between urban and rural areas.  
The “hybrid” structure has complicated the design of county powers for development in a 
number of ways. The symmetric devolution of powers to the 47 counties without a clear 
distinction between rural and urban settings may affect development. The World Bank warns 
that urban services and overall economic growth may be affected.197 However, past experience 
also shows that rural development could be neglected.198 An appropriate design is one which 
considered the respective needs of rural and urban areas and designed powers appropriate for 
each of the areas. The current design lumps rural and urban local government powers in county 
governments, and this may affect the developmental role that county governments can play. 
Without effective decentralisation of powers and functions to levels below the current 47 
counties, participatory development may be affected. The 47 counties are too large and are not, 
as observed by the World Bank, a substitute for local governments.199 If powers and functions 
are “centralised” to the 47 counties without any effective further decentralisation, it is possible 
that participatory development will be affected. The Fourth Schedule allocates counties the 
                                               
195
 World Bank (1999) 115.  
196
 World Bank (1999) 115.  
197
 World Bank (2012) 181.  
198
 Republic of Kenya (1995) 17.  
199
 World Bank (2012) 177.  
 
 
 
 
293 
 
responsibility to ensure effective local and community participation in planning and 
development. However, this is only possible if planning and development functions are 
effectively decentralised from counties to the lower levels in order to facilitate effective 
participatory development.  
Counties have also been denied some powers relevant to important local services and 
development. As such, the design of powers has limited the role of counties in the provision of 
important local services relevant to basic services and development. For instance, counties 
have powers over pre-primary education and childcare facilities only. Comparative 
decentralisation practice shows that powers over primary and secondary education are normally 
devolved to lower levels of government while national governments normally limit their roles to 
national policies.200 The World Bank proposed that this function should be devolved to the 
county level.201 After independence, local governments were in charge of primary and 
secondary education, but the services were taken over by the national government in 1969.202 A 
few local authorities continued to manage primary and secondary schools after the take-over. 
However, all schools may end up being transferred to the national government if this function is 
not transferred to counties. 
While supervision and national regulation is an important part of devolved development, there is 
no clear boundary between county government operations and the extent of the national 
government‟s regulatory and policy-making role. The World Bank, for instance, notes that while 
it is easy to delimit the scope of policy formulation, it is not easy to draw the line with regard to 
coordination of implementation of the policy.203 There is a risk that the central government may 
use its policy implementation powers to intrude into the functional areas of counties and in the 
process hurt county efficiency and effectiveness. Where such intrusion affects the discretion of 
counties to address local needs and development, the developmental purpose of devolved 
government will have been affected or even negated.  
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5.1.2 County powers and ethnic conflict  
Devolved units can only assist in resolving internal conflict if they have powers to address the 
“narratives which support conflict”.204 The factors may either be identity conflict, resources and 
political powers, or a mixture of these factors.205 The main political and ethnic conflict in Kenya 
is between the major ethnic groups in Kenya who are embroiled in destructive competition for 
control of the presidency.206 This competition is driven largely by a perception that the president 
will divert state resources and powers to his ethnic community to the exclusion of other ethnic 
groups. 
Perceptions of exclusion are informed by past experience in which incumbent presidents 
diverted state resources, development and other benefits to their home regions.207 Regional and 
interpersonal disparities, often perceived along ethnic lines, have further deepened these 
perceptions.208 There is a widespread feeling among the major ethnic communities that the only 
way to address their political and economic exclusion is to capture the presidency.209 In turn, 
this has led to conflict between the major ethnic groups who are “presidential contenders”. Land 
and land-based resources top the root causes of ethnic conflict in Kenya; unresolved historical 
land injustices and perceptions of exclusion from land ownership along ethnic lines have been 
the major drivers of ethnic conflict.210 
As such, the only way that counties can also address ethnic conflict in Kenya is if they are 
allocated powers to address the root causes of conflict. This can happen only if county powers 
provide an alternative to control of the presidency. In such a situation, communities not in 
control of the presidency will ideally be content with exercising county powers. Such a division 
of power has the potential to diffuse political attention from the centre to the counties.211 If the 
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major ethnic communities find the county level a viable political alternative, the presidency will 
no longer be the “life-and-death” prize it currently is. 
While the main political conflict is between ethnic communities that are “presidential 
contenders”, there are the smaller ethnic communities who, though not a major threat nationally, 
can be disruptive. As such, counties should enable these communities as well to engage in 
power-sharing and development. Moreover, among the smaller ethnic communities are ones 
still even smaller; referred to in the Constitution as “marginalised communities” and “minorities”, 
they have distinct lifestyles and cultures which, too, should be maintained for purposes of local 
peace and harmony. In most cases, the lifestyles revolve around land and land-based 
resources.212 Counties should also be given powers to address the existing regional and 
economic disparities that are perceived along ethnic lines and which fuel conflict. As such, 
county powers should enable counties to enhance access to essential services and 
development in order for these perceptions of exclusion to be addressed. 
The main question, then, is whether the county powers discussed above can engage with the 
issues that define ethnic conflict in Kenya. A review of the powers of counties reveals that while 
counties may be in a position to address some of these issues, most county powers are too 
limited to be able to do this effectively.  
5.1.2.1 County powers and ethnic political accommodation  
For the purposes of considering ethnic political accommodation, ethnic groups in Kenya may be 
divided into three major categories: the “big five” who are presidential contenders; the smaller 
ethnic communities who are too small to capture the presidency but able to secure a county or 
two; and “in-county” minorities who are too small to have a county of their own. The way in 
which county powers have been designed has a different impact in each of these categories of 
ethnic communities. 
For the larger ethnic groups, county powers can address ethnic conflict only if they provide a 
viable “consolation prize” in lieu of control of the presidency. Given the nature of most of the 
powers exercised by county governments, the counties amount to vehicles for local service 
delivery as opposed to being institutions that wield significant political and state power.213 In 
addition, the possibility exists that county powers could be constricted even further by the 
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adoption of a restrictive interpretation of county powers and functions. There are limited grounds 
on which county laws and powers can override the national government in matters of concurrent 
jurisdiction, and the national government retains a regulatory, supervisory role in respect of 
most or all powers exercised by the counties. 
Each of the major ethnic communities holds the possibility of clinching the presidency and might 
not see the weak county powers as an alternative to the control of the presidency. The bulk of 
political powers and resources are retained at the centre, with the Constitution retaining a pure 
presidential system, albeit with clipped presidential powers. The limited county powers diminish 
the “political significance” of counties, meaning that the presidency may thus remain a highly 
attractive prize to these communities. Barkan warns that this situation could make the large 
ethnic groups rush to form “counter-coalitions” and in the process deeply divide the country in a 
deadly “zero-sum” game of ethno-political competition.214 Indeed, the run-up to the March 2013 
general elections saw gradual ethnic and political polarisation as coalitions and counter-
coalitions formed around the big five ethnic communities.215  
While the Constitution formally recognises the people‟s sovereignty as the basis for exercise of 
county powers, the actual content of county powers does not represent any fundamental 
sharing of state and political power. This division of sovereignty and powers between the 
national and county government is more symbolic than real, and the bulk of political and 
economic power has remained in the hands of the national government. Despite the fact that 
county powers are constitutionally recognised and entrenched, the powers are diminished by a 
number of factors discussed in the preceding sections. The larger ethnic communities are thus 
likely to remain fixated on capturing the presidency.  
For smaller ethnic communities with a home county or two, the current design of county powers 
may actually address their ethnic grievances and bring about their political inclusion. Being too 
small in number to capture the presidency, most of these communities are content with political 
and economic inclusion at the county level. The constitutional recognition and entrenchment of 
county powers and functions is of significance to these smaller ethnic communities. In the past 
regime, powers and functions of local authorities were subject to administrative authorisation 
and other forms of control.216 The local authorities were overshadowed by central government 
departments and were largely irrelevant to local communities.217  
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Counties now have powers over crucial sectors and will play a relevant role in local 
development. Ethnic communities, through “home counties”, will shape their own development 
at the local level as opposed to complying with a centrally determined agenda, as was the case 
in the past. The smaller ethnic communities will thus have a chance, through county democratic 
processes, to participate in the political governance of the country. This has potential to address 
their grievances relating to political exclusion. Therefore, while the larger ethnic communities will 
find county powers inadequate to quench their “political thirst”, the smaller ethnic communities 
with no stakes in the presidency may well be content with the current county powers.  
However, the fact that the larger ethnic communities will remain in competition for control of the 
presidency means that threats to ethnic harmony and national political stability still exist. 
Whereas ethnic conflict in the independence era was between the larger, more dominant ethnic 
groups and the smaller ethnic communities, the nature of the conflict has changed. The large 
and politically dominant groups are divided and in open political competition; smaller ethnic 
communities have gradually been drawn into the conflict between the major ethnic groups, and 
could still play a role in ethnic conflict by taking sides in the “presidential contest” between the 
larger communities.  
For the tiny ethnic groups who are minorities at the county level, the manner of decentralisation 
of powers to levels below counties will determine whether they will be included or not. “in-county 
minorities” can only be accommodated through decentralisation of powers and resources from 
the county level to the sub-county level in order to facilitate their political and economic 
inclusion. However, the preceding discussions have shown that the framework for 
decentralisation of power to levels below the county is weak and unclear. Counties have almost 
complete latitude on what to, and how to, decentralise from the county level. Even mere 
deconcentration without any real decentralisation of powers and resources can still satisfy the 
Constitution. However, county minorities will only be effectively included if powers and 
resources are devolved to the sub-county level where the minorities are dominant. If powers 
and resources are concentrated at the county level where they are in the hands of the dominant 
ethnic group, county minorities may protest against such exclusion, leading to conflict.  
While “in-county minorities” may protest at exclusion, they – much like the slightly bigger ethnic 
minorities with a “home county” or two – are not a threat to national political stability. However, 
where county minorities form a substantial part of a county population, they are capable of being 
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disruptive at the county level. This is true of groups such as the Kuria in Migori County, the 
Marakwet in Elgeyo County, the Sabaot in Bungoma County and the Teso in Busia County. 
Singo‟ei, for instance, warns that “while Luos are dominant in Migori and can secure most 
positions at the county level, the stability of the country depends also on the extent of inclusion 
of the Kuria minority”.218 Concentrating powers and resources at the county level may lead to 
resentment and minority conflict in reaction to real or perceived domination by the local ethnic 
majority in counties where there is a substantial presence of “in-county minorities”. It has been 
observed that minimal attention was given to the “within-county” dynamics of devolution – 
dynamics relating, for instance, to intra-county equity – and this has the potential to ignite 
county minority conflict.219  
Thus, it can be concluded that while county powers have been constitutionally entrenched and 
safeguarded, the possibility remains that ethnic and political conflict will continue because the 
larger ethnic communities, the main threat to political stability, are likely to be dissatisfied with 
county powers and may still focus on clinching the presidency. While the smaller communities 
with a home county may be content with county powers, past experience shows that they are 
usually drawn into competition for presidency by taking sides with the larger ethnic communities, 
thereby aggravating the conflict. The lack of a clear framework for decentralisation of powers to 
county ethnic minorities may also lead to perceptions of exclusion from county powers. As such, 
there is a likelihood of county minority conflict in counties that host substantial numbers of 
county ethnic minorities.  
5.1.2.2 County powers and equity  
The Constitution provides for symmetric devolution of powers to all the 47 counties. As such, 
counties with areas that were previously neglected now have powers to enhance access to 
services and ensure effective local development. County functional areas include health, roads 
and infrastructure, planning and development, water and sanitation, gas and electricity 
reticulation and energy regulation, and agriculture. These are much-needed services in 
neglected areas, and counties will have the functional competence to provide them. The World 
Bank, for instance, notes high disparities in nutrition levels between children in Wajir and 
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Mombasa counties,220 and this is evidence of the high disparities in access to essential services 
such as basic health care.  
More importantly, the regional and economic disparities in terms of development and access to 
services have often been perceived along ethnic lines, thus forming a basis for ethnic conflict. 
Most of these disparities have their roots in colonial policies which were perpetuated by post-
colonial government development policies.221 County powers are generally relevant to the 
expansion of these services and development to previously neglected areas.  
However, addressing development-related disparities takes time and may require “long-term 
patience” before any real change can be apparent.222 Indeed, the World Bank has noted that 
counties where access to services is needed most are the ones with the lowest capacity to 
deliver, capacity which needs to be built over time.223 This means that, regardless of the powers 
and resources allocated to counties with little or no services and development, it will take a long 
time before they are “pulled up” to the same level as other counties that perform relatively well. 
Inequalities are thus likely to persist despite the fact that counties have relevant powers to 
address them. Aggrieved perceptions based on inequalities might continue to stay in force – 
and continue to fuel ethnic conflict.  
The ability of counties to address regional and economic disparities will also depend on other 
factors, such as the amount of resources that are availed to counties for purpose of providing 
essential local services and development. Furthermore, the division of resources has to 
consider the disparities within counties, which implies that must be equity in the distribution of 
resources between the county governments. (County finances and the equitable share of 
resources are discussed in the next chapter.) 
5.1.2.3 County powers and the land question  
Because the land issue is at the heart of ethnic conflict in Kenya,224 counties need extensive 
powers over land matters if they are effectively to engage with land-related ethnic grievances. 
These include powers to address land-related historical injustices, for instance by restoring land 
in clear cases of unfair dispossession. However, county powers are limited to holding 
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community lands in trust for the local communities. Substantial power over land issues lies with 
the nationally-based NLC. 
Indeed, the complexities of the land question mean that the county is not the appropriate forum 
to address some of the root causes. For instance, while counties may host persons displaced 
from other counties, restoring possession may require the national government, which has 
better capacity to address a matter of such a scope. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, 
the land question permeates every national political issue, including devolution.225 This question 
demands a comprehensive response that clearly goes beyond the current scope of county 
powers and which may require utilisation of the more effective national mechanisms. 
5.1.2.4 County powers and ethnic and cultural identity  
Where the identity of a subnational group is threatened by a dominant culture or identity, there 
is bound to be conflict. Devolution can address such a conflict only if the devolved units have 
powers to protect, promote and preserve the identity of the respective subnational group(s).226 
Accordingly, devolved units should have powers over matters that enhance the threatened 
identity; these may include matters such as use of language, ethnic identity, or even the 
“unique” socio-economic activities or a lifestyle which defines a specific identity that is otherwise 
discordant with the mainstream or dominant culture or language. 
Kenya has 43 major ethnic communities with diverse cultures and languages. The fact that most 
of the 47 counties are ethnic-based implies that each ethnic group can potentially use its home 
county or counties to promote and protect its ethnic and cultural identity. Indeed, counties have 
powers over “cultural activities and facilities”.227 The main ethnic conflict in Kenya is, however, a 
struggle between the major ethnic communities for political and economic power. Ethnic identity 
is thus appropriated as a means for accessing state powers and preserving political power and 
wealth. Ethnic identity per se is not the political objective or goal of political leaders in the major 
ethnic communities. Instead, the ethnic tag is used almost purely as a tool for leveraging access 
to state, political, and economic power.  
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The power to promote the use of local languages is, for instance, retained at the national 
government and counties are restricted to two national languages (Kiswahili and English) in the 
conduct of official county business. One would expect the counties, which are mainly ethnically-
based, to claim powers to promote their respective local languages and identity. However, there 
is little doubt that most counties are content to use the two official languages. The Kenyan 
situation is different from other states where accommodation of local identity and languages is 
important for securing peace. In Macedonia, for instance, denying the local governments 
powers to use their local languages may foment conflict. In Kenya, though, English and 
Kiswahili are considered ethnically neutral and therefore acceptable, while the use of local 
languages is generally deemed to be divisive. Promotion of cultural and ethnic identity per se, 
especially for the larger ethnic groups, is not a political priority. 
Most ethnic groups in Kenya share a common social and economic lifestyle. While different 
ethnicities identify themselves on the basis of language, their lifestyle and economic activities 
are basically integrated. However, there are other ethnic communities with a cultural identity and 
lifestyle distinct from the mainstream Kenyan social and economic lifestyle,228 for instance, the 
Maasai, who are found mainly in three counties, Narok, Kajiado and Samburu.229 Other ethnic 
communities with a distinct cultural and socio-economic identity include the Sengwer, Ogiek and 
Endorois, who are found in the former Rift Valley Province.230 However, official government 
statistics have always sought to place these smaller but culturally distinct groups under larger 
ethnic identities, such as the Kalenjin, against their choice.231 
A number of factors make the socio-economic lifestyle of these communities distinct from 
mainstream Kenyan society. Their lifestyles are mainly connected or tied to land-based 
resources. The communities rely on traditional and communal land tenure systems, pastoralism, 
or simple “hunter-gatherer” economies. While the rest of Kenyan society is being gradually 
integrated into mainstream socio-economic life, these communities seek to preserve their 
distinctiveness; as such, their identity has existed alongside a dominant and mainstream socio-
economic lifestyle.232  
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The definition of “marginalised communities” in the Constitution targets these communities. 
Marginalised communities are typically small in number, not fully integrated to the social and 
economic life of Kenya, and have sought to preserve their distinct lifestyle. One of the objects of 
devolution is to protect and promote the interests and rights of minorities and marginalised 
communities.233 Concerns raised by these groups include the dispossession of ancestral land 
and resource rights, and developments which distort their livelihoods, such as commercial 
developments, the gazettement of forest areas as public and government land, and other 
mainstream economic activities injurious to their distinct socio-economic lifestyle.234 Other 
challenges include charges of trespass when they try to access grazing grounds as well as 
intimidation for squatting on “public land”,235 land which in most cases belonged to them 
communally in the past. In Lamu County, for instance, the proposed Lamu Port mega project is 
said to have the potential to destroy the “distinct culture and creed” of the local people in Lamu 
such as the Bajuni, Sanye and Boni.236 While these communities do not pose a national political 
threat, they could be potentially disruptive at the county level where their presence can be felt. 
Counties should have powers that can address the needs and concerns of these communities. 
However, counties will only have a limited role to play in the protection of the rights and interests 
of these communities. First, land and land-based resources appear a primary concern for most 
or all of these communities. Counties have only the limited role of being custodians of existing 
community land. For existing land that is registered as community land, counties have powers to 
ensure that such land is used in accordance with the interests of the local communities. 
Counties have no powers to restore land rights, administer land or determine the use of land. 
Some of the lands which initially belonged to these communities are now listed as “public land”, 
“private land”, and other categories of land over which the counties do not have an explicit 
mandate. The nationally-based NLC has the bulk of the powers that are important for protecting 
the culture and identity of these groups.  
Powers over education can enable counties to promote awareness of the social and economic 
lifestyle of these communities and also to provide education in a way that suits these lifestyles. 
However, county powers in matters of education are limited to pre-primary schools, childcare 
facilities and village polytechnics. As such, counties do not have powers, for instance, to set up 
                                               
233
 Article 174 (e).  
234
 Sing‟oei (2012) 11.  
235
 Sing‟oei (2012) 11.  
236
 Sing‟oei (2012) 15.  
 
 
 
 
303 
 
mobile primary schools for school-going children from pastoralist communities. This is a function 
of the national government. Furthermore, only the national government determines the syllabus 
and the content thereof. As such, it falls upon the national government to include awareness of 
these communities in the curriculum.  
In addition, counties have no powers over the promotion of local languages. As such, it is only 
the national government that will regulate the use of local languages. The CGA already restricts 
county business to Kiswahili and English, and this may limit marginalised communities who 
have little or no knowledge of the two official languages.237 
Since counties have powers to deliver basic services in the main sectors such as health, 
infrastructure, agriculture, planning and development at the county level, water and sanitation, 
and other service delivery sectors, they may extend these services to the marginalised 
communities. Most of these services are lacking in areas where marginalised communities live; 
accordingly, counties may extend them to these communities. For instance, counties may 
decide to dig boreholes for pastoralist communities, establish a system of mobile health 
services, and ensure that the socio-economic lifestyle of these communities is considered in all 
county planning and development projects. However, most of these services will also be subject 
to national government regulation and policies. It is also possible that the extent of county 
powers in these functional areas may expand or contact, depending on whether the county 
powers are interpreted generously or restrictively.  
5.1.3 County powers and the limiting of central power 
One of the objectives of devolved government is to limit central power.238 This can only be 
achieved if the extent of power under the control of counties amounts to a substantial and 
effective vertical power division between the centre and the counties. Ideally, this would 
transform counties into effective counterweights to central power. However, an assessment of 
the powers of county governments reveals that while there are aspects of the design that may 
enhance the ability of counties to limit central power, many of the design aspects also weaken 
that ability. 
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5.1.3.1 Design aspects that enhance counterbalancing of central power  
The express constitutional recognition of people‟s sovereignty as the basis for the exercise of 
county powers enhances the political significance of counties. Counties are not agents of the 
national government but exercise shared sovereignty with the national government. County 
powers are thus a product of the fundamental division of the political powers of the state. While 
the former local authorities drew their authority from administrative directions, counties draw 
their powers from the Constitution. The role of the counties in constitutional amendment through 
the popular initiative also enhances the “political significance” of counties in that it is recognised 
that counties are integral to the entire constitutional system. 
The powers of counties are constitutionally entrenched: Part II of the Fourth Schedule to the 
Constitution lists the functional areas of county governments and other clauses which grant 
counties primary or original powers. County powers can thus be varied only through a 
constitutional amendment. While counties can have added powers and functions though 
assignment or transfer, the counties have to consent to a transfer of functions. In regard to 
assignment of powers, the Senate (which is discussed in Chapter 8) has power to vet national 
legislation that seeks to assign powers to county, and this may act as a safeguard on county 
interests with regard to assignment of powers.239 Accordingly, counties are protected from 
becoming agents of the national governments by procedures of transfer and assignment of 
powers which safeguard county interests. 
While the bulk of county government functions were performed by the former local authorities,240 
some of the powers granted to county governments will be devolved to counties for the first 
time. These include functions such as gas and electricity reticulation and energy regulation, and 
constitutional amendment, which were never performed by the former local authorities. As such, 
there is a slight expansion of the functional areas of the former local authorities. Furthermore, 
depending on the interpretation given to county powers, counties may end up with expanded 
powers far beyond those of the former local authorities. For instance, provincial hospitals may 
end up with county governments, thus expanding the scope of county powers in the health 
sector. A similar approach to other mainstream sectors may end up significantly expanding 
county powers.  
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5.1.3.2 Design aspects that limit counterbalancing of central power  
Beyond the symbolic treatment of the status of counties in the constitutional structure, the actual 
content of county powers appears weak. Counties will essentially have powers similar to those 
of the former local authorities, with only a marginal expansion in a few areas. Furthermore, a 
number of weaknesses in the design of county powers may lead to further contraction of powers 
and (re)centralisation. The nature of the bulk of powers exercised by local governments makes 
them much more like local governments engaged in local service delivery than politically 
powerful regional units that can counteract central power. The supervisory and regulatory role of 
the national government over county matters is more like “typical national government 
regulation” of local governments as opposed to “federal governance” between the federal level 
and the constituent units. Concurrent powers and functions are also subject to generously-
worded national overrides.  
The county powers are typical local government powers that are subject to many central 
government policies and regulations. In essence, only a few functional areas were added to the 
powers exercised by the former local authorities. It is in this context that Ghai and Cottrell 
comment that the limited county powers “are somewhat at odds with the rather elaborate 
institutional arrangements, including the Senate at the national level for the protection of county 
interests”.241 The involvement of county powers in constitutional amendment via popular 
mandate enhances their significance. However, the process is complex and lengthy; it is less 
than likely that any constitutional amendments will take this route. Furthermore, counties play 
only a “gate-keeping role” in that they do not initiate any amendments. The participation of 
counties in constitutional amendments is incumbent on other processes that are external to the 
counties: public petitions for constitutional amendment and verification by the IEBC, before the 
counties vote on the proposed amendment.  
The extent and scope of county powers is not clear as the functional areas are vaguely defined. 
A number of functions may become either national or county functions, depending on the 
approach taken to the interpretation of county functions. Therefore, there is a possibility that 
county powers may be contracted or expanded depending on the interpretation. A restrictive 
interpretation may end up limiting the scope of county powers and centralising powers to the 
national government. For instance, many of the functions listed in Part II of the Fourth Schedule 
could end up spilling across county governments. If county powers are limited to intra-county 
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activities, the scope of county powers will be narrow. If all cross-county activities are left to the 
national government, there will be little left for counties. Furthermore, a “pro-centre” 
interpretation may make all county powers to be subject to the “generously” worded national 
overrides. As such, there is a danger that powers that could belong to counties will be 
centralised.  
The uncertainty with regard to certain powers and functions of counties can be traced to the 
“hybrid” nature of the county level. There are powers and functions which could easily have 
fitted as “regional functions” if there were a regional level of government. However, under the 
current structure, powers and functions considered beyond counties may automatically revert to 
the national government. The 47 counties are too fragmented, a situation which might limit the 
exercise of some powers and functions and see these reverting to the national government.  
5.1.4 Is there a balance of purposes in the design of county powers?  
Design features that are common or neutral to the three purposes need no balancing. However, 
there must be trade-offs between the conflicting features for a balanced pursuit of the three 
purposes of devolution. With regard to the design of powers and functions, many design 
aspects are common. Indeed, devolved units need autonomy and powers in order to make and 
implement decisions on development, enhance political inclusion and limit central power. 
Accordingly, there is no major conflict in the design of powers and functions for the three 
purposes. However, the level of autonomy or amount of power differs with the three purposes 
and the current design suits the developmental purpose more than the other two purposes.  
The county powers are too limited to pacify the “thirst” of the larger ethnic communities. 
Accordingly, county powers cannot counterbalance or effectively limit central power. However, 
the same powers are relevant and sufficient for the pursuit of local development. As such, ethnic 
accommodation and the limiting of central power were not carefully considered in the design of 
county powers. Furthermore, many of the powers and functions relevant to the root causes of 
ethnic conflict in Kenya, such as land, were retained at the national level, thus limiting further 
the ability of counties to address ethnic conflict.  
While decentralisation of powers to sub-county structures offers a chance to accommodate “in-
county minorities” and facilitate local participation, it is likely that decentralisation to the sub-
county level will serve the developmental purpose more than the ethnic accommodation. 
Indeed, the urban local government system is created with the goal of effective service delivery. 
Ghai and Cottrell also note that the emphasis is on “decentralisation of services” as opposed to 
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political inclusion of county minorities.242 It can thus be concluded that while autonomy and 
powers are important for the three purposes, the current design emphasises the developmental 
purpose to the exclusion of the other two purposes. 
6. Cooperative government  
While devolution of power implies separate government at national and local level, the 
interconnectedness and interaction of the national and devolved units is inevitable.243 
Information-sharing is important if national priorities are to be informed by local needs and if 
there is to be a local understanding of national policies and objectives.244 Thus, it is only through 
cooperation that there can be a coordinated and harmonious agenda. Cooperation, unlike other 
elements such as regulation and supervision, is based on the equality of the levels of 
government.245  
In turn, the emphasis on equality between national and subnational units of government may 
have relevance not only to the overall development agenda but also ethnic accommodation and 
the ability to limit central power. Arguably, equality of levels can enhance the significance of 
counties: the national government may, for instance, be constrained in the exercise of its 
powers by an “injunction” of first consulting counties before exercising any power that could 
impact on county operations. It is in this context that De Visser remarks:  
National government must genuinely relinquish power to local government and not use their 
supervisory powers to thwart decentralisation and, at the same time, local governments must not 
use their powers at will or at the expense of the national development agenda.
246
  
Importantly, De Visser warns that a distinction must be made between coordination and 
cooperation. In the former, he observes, there is a person at the centre charged with “ensuring” 
a smooth flow of things, and this reinforces the “vertical relationship” which is inimical to equality 
of levels of government.247 Subnational governments, the “junior partners” in the relationship, 
are the most likely “losers” if coordination (the need to work together) is emphasised at the 
expense of cooperation (on the basis of equals).248 Steytler refers to these two aspects as 
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“coercive” and “cooperative” models of intergovernmental relations, respectively;249 cooperative 
government is the appropriate one, as it emphasises interaction between equals. Steytler and 
De Visser 250 argue that the words “distinctive” and “interdependent”, also used in the Kenyan 
Constitution, represent autonomy and the need to pursue a common agenda, respectively.251  
The Constitution provides principles and a general framework for cooperation between counties 
and the national government. The national and county levels are established as distinct and 
interdependent. Accordingly, both governments shall conduct their “mutual relations” on the 
basis of consultation and cooperation.252 Governments at both levels are required to perform 
their functions and exercise their respective powers in a manner that respects the functional and 
institutional integrity of the other level.253 Both levels are also required to liaise for the purpose of 
exchanging information, coordination of policy and administration, and enhancing capacity.254 
The Constitution also recognises that both levels can form (vertical and horizontal) joint 
committees or authorities for purposes of effective performance of functions and exercise of 
powers.255  
6.1 Cooperative government and development  
The common objectives of devolved government, the majority of which are geared towards 
development, imply a common understanding in the pursuit of development. Mutual 
understanding is, in turn, based on consultation and the sharing of information. In practice, this 
will entail consultation between, and within, levels of government as well as participation in the 
formulation of national development policies and priorities.256 The discussions in the preceding 
parts reveal that many structural and functional aspects of national and county powers will 
require vertical and horizontal cooperation for effective devolved development.  
First, while the Constitution generally delineates respective functional areas for both levels of 
government, most of the functional areas are basically shared. Clarification of the nature and 
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extent of specific powers and responsibilities is a continuous process of refinement.257 A number 
of functions may either end up as county or national government functions or shift between the 
two levels. This process requires cooperation and consultation in order to create a mutual 
understanding of the boundaries with regard to powers and functions. An inherent benefit of 
cooperation is that joint clarification of the respective powers and functions can end in clearly 
defined and commonly agreed powers. Clearly defined powers will in turn ensure efficiency in 
performance of functions and accountability, as the public will know which government to hold 
accountable for non-performance.258 This will lay a strong basis for effective devolved 
development.  
Second, the structural limitations (size, number, institutional structures) on the developmental 
role of counties were discussed in the previous chapter and the preceding parts of this chapter. 
However, the limitations related to size and number of counties may be partly addressed if 
counties can ensure effective horizontal and vertical cooperation in the performance of 
functions. The 47 counties are too fragmented to effectively take up functions that are cross-
county in nature. The World Bank observes that while counties can cooperate in performance of 
functions, “the sheer number of counties will challenge effective decision-making”.259 The World 
Bank proposes stronger and more effective structures of horizontal cooperation that are capable 
of making decisions.260 Accordingly, effective horizontal cooperation may cure the structural 
deficiency caused by the fragmented nature of counties.261  
6.2 Cooperative government and ethnic accommodation  
An important aspect of both vertical and horizontal cooperation is that it will bring counties into 
interaction through joint performance of functions and other matters that require cooperation 
between the different counties. The majority of the 47 counties are ethnic-based, and effective 
cooperation means that different ethnic groups will, through cooperative government structures 
and forums, interact on issues of development and other activities. Such a process has the 
potential to form the basis for ethnic integration and minimising ethnic conflict. A central element 
in cooperation is the emphasis on equality of orders, and this has the potential to pacify ethnic 
groups that are not in control of the presidency (and therefore the national government). At the 
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very least, the “political significance” of counties vis-a-vis the national government is enhanced 
by the emphasis on equality.  
However, despite the potential benefits of cooperation highlighted above, the process of 
cooperation may itself lay a basis for further ethnic conflict and polarisation. For instance, while 
horizontal cooperation may facilitate effective exercise of power, it may, in the same breath, 
facilitate the re-grouping of the major ethnic communities who were split several counties. 
Horizontal cooperation may lead to the formation of the old regional ethnic blocs and thus lay a 
basis for negative ethnic mobilisation. Indeed, while “close kinship linkages” can facilitate 
horizontal cooperation, as suggested by the TFDG, it could facilitate the re-building of the 
former ethnic homelands. 
An unmitigated assumption that lower levels of government have, through cooperation, a truly 
equal place with national government is, as De Visser states, “somewhat of a sophistry”.262 It is 
unlikely that the concept of equality and cooperation will pacify ethnic communities who lose the 
presidency. Joint performance of functions may also lay a basis for further ethnic-based political 
wrangles over resources and management of joint development projects. Thus, while there is a 
possibility that cooperation may foster ethnic integration, there is no guarantee that it will be 
achieved. “Cooperation” may actually deepen ethnic animosity and conflict.  
6.3 Cooperative government and limiting of central power  
Vertical cooperation limits both levels of government from unilateral exercise of autonomy. In 
this regard, it has the potential to limit the powers of the central government. The national 
government is obliged, under the principle of cooperation, to consult with county governments 
before exercising its powers on matters of mutual concern. It is clear that while equality of 
orders is emphasised in cooperation, a clear beneficiary of the principle is the county 
government, which is most likely to emerge as a “junior partner” in intergovernmental 
relations.263 Some of the restrictions which emanate from the principles of cooperative 
government against the national government have the potential to enhance the position of 
counties vis-a-vis the centre.   
While the counties are too fragmented to effectively counterbalance central power, it has been 
argued that they could counter this structural limitation by presenting a united stand in their 
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relations with the national government.264 This implies strong horizontal cooperation in dealings 
with the central government. A united stand by the counties may make counties more powerful 
together when bargaining with the national government. Conflicts and fragmented voices from 
counties will, on the other hand, add to the structural limitations and weaken counties if they 
deal with the national government individually.  
The small size and number of counties limits their effective exercise of powers and functions, 
especially functions that have a cross-county dimension. While such functions may fall on the 
national government due to the fact that they straddle county boundaries, horizontal cooperation 
has the potential to enable counties to effectively perform such functions. In essence, effective 
horizontal cooperation may enable counties to claim and perform functions which they could 
otherwise not perform effectively as individual devolved units. Through cooperation, counties 
can claim more powers from the centre and exercise them more effectively. This will, in the long 
run, limit central government power and at the same time make counties more powerful.  
 
7. Conclusion  
The preceding discussions reveal that the impact of the design of county powers will vary with 
the three purposes. While the vaguely defined powers of counties and the limited role of 
counties in crucial sectors may pose a challenge to the developmental role of counties, the bulk 
of the powers are more suited to the pursuit of development. Accordingly, if other enabling 
factors such as finances are present, the current design of county powers will generally enable 
counties to pursue development to the exclusion of ethnic accommodation and limiting central 
power.  
County powers are too limited to ensure effective political accommodation of the ethnic groups 
that are perennial contenders for the presidency. While the powers may facilitate the ethnic 
accommodation of smaller groups that are not in competition for the presidency, the major 
threat to political stability in Kenya is between the larger ethnic groups who are likely to remain 
fixated on the presidency. The weak framework for decentralisation of power to the sub-county 
level may also lead to county minority conflict if dominant groups in counties exclude them 
politically and economically at the county level. Furthermore, most of the powers relevant to 
addressing issues that underlie ethnic conflict in Kenya have been allocated to the national 
government.  
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While the Constitution provides that the distribution of powers between the national and county 
governments is rooted in shared sovereignty, the bulk of powers have been retained at the 
national level. County powers are too limited to enable the county governments to limit central 
power. The division of powers is slanted in favour of the centre which retains critical powers and 
functions. Furthermore, the size and number of counties is itself a structural limitation in the bid 
to counterbalance central power. Cooperative government may assist counties to address 
structural limitations, but there is no guarantee that this will be achieved. As a result, counties 
will be limited in their ability to limit central power.  
However, even with a design of powers that generally favours development, there are other 
factors that will determine the overall effectiveness of counties; these include the institutional 
design dealt with in the last chapter, and the availability of funds to finance operations. The next 
chapter examines the fiscal design of county governments and its impact on the three purposes. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
FISCAL AND FINANCIAL POWERS OF COUNTY GOVERNMENTS 
1. Introduction  
Fiscal autonomy enables devolved units to match local preferences with available resources 
and thereby improve local service delivery and development.1 In situations of internal conflict, 
fiscal autonomy and control over local resources may facilitate the economic inclusion of 
subnational groups, the lack of which is a common ground for conflict.2 Effective fiscal and 
financial powers also provide an important basis for limiting central power;3 weak or absent 
fiscal powers, on the other hand, expose devolved units to the risk of political subordination and 
control by the centre.4 
This chapter examines the fiscal and financial powers of county governments through the prism 
of development, ethnic accommodation and limiting central power. First, the nature and extent 
of county powers to raise revenue locally, and the extent to which such powers facilitate 
effective local self-rule, are examined. Second, the chapter evaluates the design of 
intergovernmental transfers to county governments and the extent to which the design facilitates 
or limits self-rule. However, before delving into the details of the design, the chapter starts by 
examining, among other constitutional principles, the principles of public finance that underlie 
the fiscal powers of counties. 
The argument presented in this chapter is that counties are denied crucial sources of local 
revenue and will thus be dependent on central transfers to perform their functions. While there 
is a constitutional minimum county share from revenue raised nationally, official5 and 
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independent estimates6 indicate that it may not be enough to cover the revenue needs of county 
governments. Accordingly, county governments are highly likely to require additional funds 
beyond their minimum equitable share. While the Constitution provides that additional funds 
may be provided conditionally and unconditionally, the manner in which additional funding will 
be provided is likely to have an impact on the three purposes of devolution.  
1.1 Principles of public finance and devolution  
The Constitution lists five main principles that are meant to “guide all aspects of public finance in 
the Republic”.7 The first principle provides for openness and accountability, including 
participation in financial matters.8 All public institutions, including counties, are required to carry 
out financial matters in a transparent manner. This means that financial records and other 
information regarding public finances should be easily accessible to the public for scrutiny. 
Accountability also implies that there should be means through which the leadership of all public 
institutions can be held to account. Public participation, on the other hand, means that public 
institutions should facilitate public engagement in all matters concerning public finances, which 
include planning, budgeting and monitoring of budget implementation.  
The second principle provides that the entire public finance system shall promote equity in three 
main ways.9 First, the burden of taxation shall be shared fairly.10 Second, revenue raised 
nationally shall be shared equitably among national and county governments.11 Third, public 
expenditure shall promote the equitable development of the country, including by making 
special provision for marginalised groups or areas.12 This principle recognises the element of 
fairness in the conduct of all matters of public finance. Taxation should be designed in a way 
that recognises disparities; doing so enhances fairness because the varying capacities will be 
taken into account in the payment of taxes. The division of revenue between and within levels of 
government should also take into account in respect of the disparities and needs. In order to 
remedy past injustices, the principle also calls for “affirmative action” in matters of public finance 
with respect to areas or groups that were previously and deliberately marginalised.  
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The third principle provides for “inter-generational equity” in the conduct of public finances, and 
requires that all the benefits arising from public borrowing and the use of resources be shared 
equitably between present and future generations.13 While fairness has mainly focused on 
current disparities, fairness between generations is also increasingly becoming a concern.14 The 
Constitution thus requires that in all matters concerning public finance, the interests of coming 
generations must be taken into consideration. The effect of this principle is that resources have 
to be divided fairly between the current generation and future generations. Accordingly, policies 
of public finance should not lead to depletion of resources or future “debt bondage” as a result 
of excessive public borrowing; it also means that there should be fair sharing of the costs of 
current investments, which will have benefits for future generations.  
The fourth and fifth principles provide that public money shall be used in a prudent and 
responsible way, and that financial management shall be responsible with clear fiscal reporting, 
respectively.15 These two principles require that finances should be used for intended purposes 
and laid down procedures be followed to ensure that the intended purposes are met. 
While the principles above apply to all public institutions, including counties and other 
institutions of devolved governance, there are also objectives and principles that pertain 
specifically to devolution. It is thus important to understand the relationship between the 
principles and objectives of public finance and those of devolved government. The objectives 
and principles of devolved government, as discussed in Chapter 5, reveal that there is little, if 
any, dissonance between the principles of public finance and the objectives and principles of 
devolved government. Indeed, the objectives of devolved government strongly emphasise 
accountability,16 participation,17 equity,18 and affirmative action to marginalised communities and 
areas;19 they are thus aligned with the broad objectives and principles that bind all other public 
institutions.  
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1.2 The Constitution‟s approach to county financing: the “funding model”  
In regard to county financing, a county is expected first to raise its own revenue to the best of its 
revenue potential. Determination of the county share from revenue collected nationally is to be 
informed by, among other factors, “the need for economic optimisation of each county and to 
provide incentives for each county to optimise its capacity to raise revenue”.20 Accordingly, the 
Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) which recommends the county equitable share is 
required, before making proposals on the county share, to take into account the need for 
resource optimisation by counties.21 The CRA is also expected to encourage fiscal 
responsibility22 in county governments, a matter which includes efficiency and the optimisation 
of revenue collection. In addition, the Constitution provides that the CRA should, when 
appropriate, define and enhance the revenue sources of counties.23  
The implications of the provisions above is that county governments should first optimise their 
own revenues and that central transfers should come into play only to fill the deficit between the 
local revenue and the overall revenue needs. There is a constitutionally guaranteed minimum 
county share of 15 percent24 which can be increased depending on county needs. There is also 
a provision for further funding through conditional or unconditional grants,25 including an 
equalisation fund which is a conditional grant for enhancing access to basic services in 
marginalised areas.26 The main object of central government transfers, including the equitable 
share and additional funds, is to ensure broader equity. The revenue potential of counties 
varies, and this should be factored in the design of central transfers.  
Following the approach to county financing described above, the first step is to ascertain the 
revenue potential of counties before the equitable share is determined. However, the extent to 
which this funding model will work in the initial stage is questionable since there is no basis for 
assessing the revenue capacity of counties individually or collectively.27 Not unexpectedly, the 
initial CRA formula did not take into account the revenue potential of counties in the design of 
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the initial central government transfers.28 However, future formulas for transfers may consider 
the revenue potential of counties when it becomes possible to assess their actual performance 
and capacities.  
2. Own county government revenue  
The ability of counties to raise their own revenue in order to fund their functions represents the 
highest form of autonomy. Indeed, devolved units should, ideally, be in a position to raise their 
own revenue in order to support all their functions.29 Own local revenue strengthens the 
autonomy of subnational units.30 It is also argued that paying local taxes creates an impetus for 
local communities to demand better services, which can in turn improve efficiency and 
accountability.31 
The constitutional power to levy property taxes is a fundamental shift from the previous regime 
where the Constitution did not mention any taxing power of local authorities. Indeed, the former 
local authorities had to get administrative authorisation from the minister in charge of local 
government before implementing any revenue-raising measures.32 De Visser notes that the 
constitutional entrenchment of a local government‟s revenue-raising power prevents the upper 
levels of government from taking the fiscal powers of a subnational government.33 
Despite the stated significance of own local revenue to effective devolved development, county 
governments in Kenya have been denied access to major tax bases. Only two kinds of taxes 
are constitutionally protected sources of county revenue: property taxes and entertainment 
tax.34 The national government, on the other hand, controls the major taxes, which include 
income tax, value-added tax, customs duties and other duties on import and export goods, and 
excise tax.35 However, the county tax base can be expanded if additional taxes are provided 
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through national legislation.36 Apart from taxes, the Constitution provides that both national and 
county governments may impose fees and service charges.37  
Even with the small tax base left to counties, there is the potential that own county revenue 
could only play a substantial role in financing county revenue. A World Bank report estimates 
that the local authorities in the former constitutional dispensation raised an average of 59 
percent of their expenditure from their own sources, while 41 percent was met by central 
government transfers.38 Although factors such as the level of funding to counties and the 
revenue capacity of the counties may fundamentally change these statistics, the figures are an 
indication that local revenue may still play a substantial role in county financing, at least in 
counties where property rates, entertainment taxes and service charges would be a meaningful 
source of revenue.  
2.1 Property rates  
While the Constitution empowers counties to levy property rates, it lays down conditions to 
which counties must adhere in exercising the power. The Constitution also provides that all 
taxes and licensing fees are to be charged in accordance with enabling legislation.  
2.1.1 Authority to levy and administer property rates  
Counties have constitutionally protected powers to levy property rates39 which must be 
exercised in accordance with legislation.40 The Constitution does not, however, specify whether 
property rates are subject to national or county legislation as it generally states that taxes and 
license fees are subject to legislation. The term “legislation” is defined in the Constitution to 
include both national and county legislation.41 Accordingly, the enabling legislation required in 
respect of property rates may be interpreted as national or county legislation. The World Bank 
interprets the provision as referring to enabling national legislation.42 
The Constitution further states that “the taxation and other revenue-raising powers of a county 
shall not be exercised in a way that prejudices national economic policies, economic activities 
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across county boundaries or the national mobility of goods, services, capital or labour”.43 
Presumably, therefore, the enabling legislation is meant to give effect to these conditions. These 
conditions, nevertheless, are general and seem to give discretion and broad flexibility to 
counties on how to administer and charge property rates. 
County government powers over property rates in the current Constitution go beyond the narrow 
and constricted powers that local authorities had in the former dispensation. With this being a 
constitutional power allocated to counties, the counties must be in a position to settle the key 
questions regarding the administration and levying of property rates. As such, requirements 
that, for instance, counties can levy property rates only with ministerial approval would be 
unconstitutional. The only limitations that will apply to the exercise of county powers are those 
recognised in the Constitution; county governments should not exercise their power to levy 
property rates in a way that prejudices national economic policies, economic activities across 
county boundaries or the national mobility of goods, services, capital and labour.44 It is not 
entirely clear what constitutes prejudice of economic policy or a breach of these conditions; 
what is clear, though, is that a restrictive approach that unreasonably and unjustifiably limits the 
power of counties to effectively charge and administer property taxes may be unconstitutional.  
National legislation may provide for framework legislation that sets broad parameters within 
which counties must operate in administering county taxes. For instance, it may specify whether 
property taxes can based on the value of land only or the improved value (buildings, etc.). 
However, the enabling national legislation must allow counties to vary property rates within the 
generously-worded conditions in the Constitution. The County Government Public Finance 
Management Transition Act, enacted in early 2013, provides that revenue-raising measures 
used by the former authorities shall continue under the new dispensation, at least for the first 
fiscal year.45 Accordingly, the Rating Act,46 under which the former authorities charged property 
rates, may continue operation under the county governments.47 However, provisions of the Act 
will have to be construed with necessary alterations to reflect the expanded county powers, as 
provided in the transitional provisions of the current Constitution.48  
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2.1.2 Significance of property rates  
In the former constitutional regime, property rates were the most important source of own local 
revenue for the former local authorities, accounting for an average of 12 percent of the total 
local government revenue.49 It is therefore potentially the case that property rates will be an 
important source of local revenue for county governments. However, property rates were not 
“uniformly important” for all local authorities. The World Bank notes that while rates accounted 
for 25 percent of the local revenue of the former municipalities, they were a paltry 6-7 percent 
for town and city councils.50  
The varying importance of property rates is a result of a combination of factors. The valuation 
rolls that were used to charge property rates captured “the larger more valuable urban tax base 
for properties”, which favoured municipalities whose gazetted areas were predominantly 
urban.51 The Rating Act gave local authorities the power and flexibility to assess and levy rates, 
but these powers were, for various reasons, rarely exercised.52 For instance, property rates 
could be applied to both land and improvements on land53 but were mainly applied to land only, 
thus leaving out tax on developed properties. Agricultural land (less than 12 acres), public land, 
and most private lands were also excluded from rating rolls.54 Government ministries paid 
Compensation in Lieu of Rates (CILOR) to local authorities in respect of government properties, 
which too contributed to lower rates.55 Indeed, it has been noted that, with property rates at just 
12.1 percent of the total local government finance, Kenya is under-collecting property rates, 
which stand on average at 40 percent in other developing countries.56  
It is thus clear that central control, poor administration and lack of institutional capacity may 
have led to the diminished significance of property rates. The TFDG recommended that CILOR 
should be scrapped and government pay normal rates. The TFDG also recommended that the 
assessment for rates should include improved and unimproved value sites.57 However, beyond 
capacity issues, it is still likely that property rates will be of little relevance to rural areas. This is 
                                               
49
 World Bank (2012) 62.  
50
 World Bank (2012) 63.  
51
 World Bank (2012) 63.  
52
 World Bank (2012) 63.  
53
 World Bank (2012) 63.  
54
 World Bank (2012) 63.  
55
 Republic of Kenya „Final report of the Taskforce on Devolved Government‟ (2011) 254.  
56
 World Bank (2012) 70.  
57
 Republic of Kenya (2011) 254.  
 
 
 
 
321 
 
because factors such as poverty, communal ownership of land in some rural areas, and poor or 
absent services in rural areas may make property rates difficult to administer and collect. On the 
other hand, urban areas have improved site value, registered ownership, and urban services, 
which form a basis for the assessment and collection of property rates. The varying significance 
of property rates across counties is thus likely to continue.  
2.2 Entertainment tax  
The power to levy entertainment taxes is exclusively granted to counties.58 Entertainment tax 
under the previous regime was applied on admission to entertainment.59 It is thus likely that the 
tax will apply to charges levied on admission to entertainment and social places. These may 
include stadia and other sports facilities, theatres, casinos and entertainment spots, and other 
places of entertainment that may fit in this category. Counties have constitutional powers to levy 
entertainment tax subject to enabling legislation (national or county).60 The Entertainments Tax 
Act, which was passed before the current Constitution,61 may be used as enabling legislation, in 
which case its provisions must also be construed as amended in order to reflect the expanded 
county powers.62  
It is clear, however, that most entertainment places upon which the tax can be levied are sited in 
urban areas. Accordingly, as with property rates, this tax may end up being important for 
counties with predominantly urban areas where entertainment places are located. While 
counties with no urban-type entertainment places may have similar power, it would be of little or 
no relevance to them. 
2.3 Additional county taxes: assigned taxing powers  
While counties are expressly empowered to charge only two kinds of taxes, the Constitution 
provides that they can be assigned more taxing powers through national legislation.63 However, 
the additional taxes, unlike those on property and entertainment, will not have express 
constitutional protection. All taxing powers, except property and entertainment taxes, are 
essentially national government taxing powers. Therefore, any taxing power assigned to 
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counties implies a greater role of the national government in ensuring effective administration 
and collection of those taxes.64 In all cases, county governments will need authority through 
national legislation to administer any taxing powers assigned by national government. 
Government regulation and supervision of tax collection and administration of assigned taxes 
may also be greater than in the case of entertainment and property taxes. 
Given that the major tax bases enable the national government to perform important functions 
such as macroeconomic control, redistribution and other important national objectives and 
policies,65 it is unlikely that any of the major taxes will be assigned to counties. However, taxes 
which are local in nature and whose transfer may not pose a threat to fiscal policy should be 
devolved. The World Bank advises, for instance, that hotel accommodation tax, levied under the 
Hotel Accommodation Act,66 should be assigned to counties.  
2.4 County service charges and “regulation revenue” of county governments  
The Constitution provides that “the national and county governments may impose charges for 
services”.67 Part II of the Fourth Schedule lists the main functional areas of counties from which 
counties can raise revenue. There are two main ways in which counties can raise fees. First, 
counties can raise fees by charging the public for individual services of which they (the public) 
are consumers. These include, inter alia, water and sanitation, electricity and energy 
reticulation, and health services. The second source is what can be termed “regulation 
revenue”. Some of the powers of county governments listed in the Fourth Schedule may enable 
county governments to raise revenue from official charges such as licence fees. These include 
trade licensing, energy regulation, development planning and other regulatory powers.  
2.4.1 Charges for county services  
Counties will be in charge of providing a wide range of services to the public at the county level. 
The bulk of these services are mainly basic services essential to livelihood at the local level. As 
a result, county services will have ready consumers in the public. Services to be provided by 
county governments in the health sector include: county health facilities and pharmacies; 
ambulance services; veterinary services; cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria; and 
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refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal.68 With regard to cultural activities, 
public entertainment and public amenities, county services include: cinemas, video shows and 
hiring; libraries, museums, sports and cultural activities and facilities; and county parks, beaches 
and recreation facilities.69 Under county transport, counties will be in charge of county roads, 
street lighting, traffic and parking, public road transport, and ferries and harbours.70 
In the agricultural sector, counties will be in charge of crop and animal husbandry, livestock sale 
yards, county abattoirs, plant and animal disease control, and fisheries.71 Counties will also be 
in charge of providing facilities for the accommodation, care and burial of animals.72 With regard 
to “county planning and development”, counties will be in charge of providing housing as well as 
electricity and gas reticulation.73 Under trade development, counties will run markets and “local 
tourism”. In the education sector, the county services are limited to pre-primary education, 
village polytechnics, homecraft centres and childcare facilities.74 Counties are also in charge of 
providing water and sanitation services.75 
Many of the functions allocated to counties were actually performed by the former local 
authorities and other decentralised institutions in the previous dispensation. However, the 
nature and extent of authority that the local authorities and other decentralised institutions had 
over those services may differ from the powers of counties over the functions. For instance, 
unlike county governments, none of the former decentralised institutions had a direct 
constitutional authority to levy charges for services delivered. It is thus clear that while counties 
will inherit functions performed by institutions in the former dispensation, the nature and extent 
of authority will differ. It is not possible to discuss exhaustively all the revenue-raising functions 
of county governments.  
2.4.1.1 Authority to levy charges for county services  
Unlike taxes and licensing fees, the power of counties to charge for services offered is not 
subject to enabling legislation. Article 210 (1) only restricts “tax and licensing fees” to enabling 
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national legislation. Charges for county services are not mentioned in the article or any other 
provision as requiring enabling legislation before counties can levy service charges. It is thus 
possible for county governments to directly invoke their constitutional power as a basis for 
levying charges for services offered to the public. The constitutional autonomy of county 
governments to set and implement tariffs is recognised in the CGA.76 The Public Finance 
Management Act (PFMA) also provides that county governments can declare any public agency 
or authority or body delivering services allocated to counties as “county government entities”.77 
This provision is in recognition of the constitutional autonomy and power of county governments 
to provide services and raise revenue from the services offered.  
It can thus be concluded that the county powers and autonomy to raise revenue for services 
rendered is greater than the county powers relating to raising revenues through taxes or 
“regulation revenue”. This is because taxes and “regulation revenue” need enabling legislation, 
whereas counties do not need enabling legislation to charge revenue for services. Even then, 
the significance of the revenue raised from services will vary with the service and the county 
involved.  
 
2.4.1.2 County health services  
Under county health services, counties will be in charge of county health facilities and 
pharmacies. An important source of revenue here may be the user fees that will be levied in 
county hospitals and other health facilities within the counties. Past experience shows that 
hospital user charges have the potential to be a significant contributor to county revenue.78 
However, experience also shows that the cost of provision of health services may outstrip the 
income received from user fees, especially in poor areas where user fees may be adjusted to be 
less proportionate to the services offered.79 An important factor is that health services are 
uniformly important for rural and urban areas and may therefore be the potential source of 
revenue for all counties.  
The other services listed under “county health services” include ambulance services, veterinary 
services, cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria, refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid 
waste disposal. The significance or amount of revenue to be realised from these services is not 
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clear. However, it is clear that, with the exception of veterinary services, the other services are 
of an urban nature and may therefore be insignificant to counties with predominantly rural areas.  
2.4.1.3 Water and sanitation services  
Counties have constitutional power to provide water and sanitation services and raise revenue 
from them.80 Powers over water and sanitations include the power to set and implement tariffs, 
and even take over public entities involved in the provision of water and sanitation services in 
the counties.81 Accordingly, while water sector reforms, which commenced in 2002,82 “ring-
fenced” revenue from water and sanitation services for improvement of the services, thereby 
enhancing efficiency,83 such arrangements can be preserved only with the consent of county 
governments. Admittedly, while the water sector reforms improved efficiency, the “ring-fencing” 
denied the local authorities a crucial revenue source.84 Counties may want to take over the 
control of revenue from water and sanitation services, and while the national government may 
desire that water and sanitation revenue should be “ring-fenced”, it has to be done with the 
concurrence of county governments.  
2.4.1.4 Game reserves  
Counties have powers to implement specific national government policies on natural resources 
and environmental conservation.85 Under trade development, county governments also have 
powers over “local tourism”.86 These two functions may extend to the power of counties to take 
charge of game reserves, a tourist attraction which in the past has been a significant source of 
revenue for those local authorities that host such reserves. While aggregate income from entry 
fees into game reserves amounted to just 3.9 percent of the total local government revenue in 
the past,87 it accounted for over 30 percent of the own revenue for local authorities that host 
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game reserves.88 For the three counties hosting game reserves – Isiolo, Samburu and Narok – 
entry fees have the potential to be a key source of own revenue.  
The Constitution uses the phrase “government game reserve”, one which is not normally used 
in Kenyan law.89 Game reserves are usually either on government or private land and are so 
declared by the Wildlife (Conservation and Management) Act; however, the declaration of a 
game reserve does not affect ownership of the land as the land can still remain private or 
public.90 Ghai and Cottrell note that “if „government game reserve‟ means a reserve on national 
government land, presumably any other reserve will remain as it is”, and this means that the 
game reserves that were under the former county councils may still remain under the host 
counties.91 
2.4.1.5 Gas and electricity reticulation  
Under the functional area of county planning and development, county governments have 
powers over “electricity and gas reticulation”.92 The national government, on the other hand, has 
power over “energy policy including electricity and gas reticulation and energy regulation”.93 This 
means that the actual supply of gas and electricity is a county function while the national 
government is left with policy-making. It is submitted that the view given by the World Bank, that 
county power “appears to be limited to planning, while the national government may look after 
actual service delivery”,94 is incorrect. The World Bank did not take cognisance of the term 
“development” which appears in the function and instead chose to emphasise the “planning” 
component only. It is submitted that the Fourth Schedule grants counties both “planning” and 
implementation (development) powers with regard to matters of electricity and gas reticulation. It 
is thus possible for county governments to constitutionally claim powers to reticulate electricity 
and gas.  
In South Africa, electricity reticulation accounts for an average of 30 percent of the total revenue 
of the largest 21 municipalities and the six metropolitan municipalities.95 However, Kenyan 
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counties will have to build capacity for gas and electricity reticulation from scratch. A 
government report states that counties will generally be in charge of implementation of the 
electrical energy policy.96 The report states that counties will be responsible for data and 
statistics collection crucial for energy project design such as river flow data. Counties will also 
implement rural electrification projects and the construction of small hydropower and geothermal 
plants of less than 3MW (mega watts).97 With regard to electricity reticulation, the report states 
the counties will have power over “planning, development, operation and maintenance of mini-
grids and dispersed (isolated) systems”. 98 The county will also be “responsible for generation of 
energy support data, and for mobilizing resources for energy projects”.99 
The meaning and extent of the proposals in the government report referred to above are not yet 
clear. What is clear, though, is that, while counties have power for actual reticulation of gas and 
electricity, the non-existent capacity of counties, along with other complications in the energy 
sector, may delay the transfer of this power to county governments.  
2.4.1.6 Other county services  
As mentioned earlier, it is not possible to discuss all the services to be offered by the counties 
and their revenue potential or significance. However, the nature and extent of county powers 
with respect to all the services listed in the Fourth Schedule remain the same. Counties can set 
tariffs and levy charges within the constitutional limits discussed earlier above. Other important 
contributors to local government revenue in the past were market fees, vehicle parking, house 
rent and plot rents.100  
2.4.2 County “regulation revenue”  
There are powers in the Fourth Schedule that are allocated to counties which, if exercised, have 
the potential to generate revenue for county governments. The bulk of these powers deal with 
the regulation and licensing of various activities falling within the functional area of county 
governments. Counties are charged with control of air pollution, noise pollution, other public 
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nuisances and outdoor advertising.101 Counties are also charged with licensing and control of 
undertakings that sell food to the public.102 
Under public amenities, counties are charged with liquor licensing and regulating betting, 
casinos and other forms of gambling.103 With regard to animal control, counties have powers 
over licensing of dogs.104 In trade regulation, counties have power to issue trade licences, 
ensure fair trade practices and regulate cooperative societies.105 Under county planning, 
counties have powers over land survey and mapping, and energy regulation.106 Counties also 
have powers over control of drugs and pornography.107 All these powers have the potential to 
enable counties to raise revenue through their regulatory role. This can be through licence fees, 
fines or other official fees payable to the counties.  
2.4.2.1 Authority to impose licence fees or raise other “regulation revenue”  
The Constitution provides that no licensing fee may be imposed, waived or varied except as 
provided for by legislation,108 but does not specify whether it is national or county legislation. 
Therefore, the provision can be interpreted as requiring either national or county legislation.109 
However, the role of the national legislation is limited to defining constitutionally defined limits 
for the exercise of the power. The legislation may provide for different categories of businesses 
and corresponding licence fees. The Act may also prescribe upper limits of county licence fees 
and impose other conditions which reasonably fall within the prescribed constitutional limits in 
Article 209 (5) of the Constitution. Under the County Government Public Finance Management 
Transition Act (CGPFMTA), counties can use the repealed Local Government Act to impose 
licence fees that were provided under the Act in the transition period.110 
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2.4.2.2 Potential significance of county “regulation revenue”  
In the 2009/10 fiscal year, “trade regulation” was the second highest source of local revenue for 
the former local authorities at an average of 9.8 percent of the total revenue.111 Unlike property 
rates, which are confined to urban areas, revenue from “trade regulation” is an important source 
of revenue for both urban and rural areas. For instance, the Single Business Permit (SBP) that 
was levied by the former local authorities contributed to 20 percent of the own revenue in county 
councils and 19 percent in town councils.112 It is thus a potentially significant source of local 
revenue for all counties.  
Under the county planning function, counties have powers over land survey and mapping.113 
Counties can raise revenue through fees for approval of plans, registration of plans, change of 
user, fines and other activities which can become revenue-raising measures. In the 2008/2009 
and 2009/2010 fiscal years, plans approvals and administrative charges were among the “other” 
category which contributed to 18-20 percent of the total local revenue for the former local 
authorities.114 It is thus possible that land survey and mapping will also be a significant source of 
“regulation revenue” for the county governments, among other “regulatory functions”.  
2.5 County borrowing  
It is recognised in the Constitution that county governments can raise local revenue through 
borrowing.115 However, a number of conditions must be met before county governments can 
access loan facilities. The Constitution provides that a county government can only borrow 
money if the national government guarantees the loan.116 Second, a county government may 
only borrow money if the CA approves the loan.117 The Constitution further provides that 
national legislation shall prescribe conditions under which the national government may 
guarantee a loan to a county. The PFMA which spells out further conditions restricts county 
borrowing to capital financing, thus excluding all recurrent expenditure from this source of 
revenue.118 These conditions may make county borrowing an undesirable source of county 
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revenue. A county loan is part of “the public debt” as defined in the Constitution,119 and the 
central government may be keen to control the level of the public debt.120 Factors such as ability 
to repay may also lock out many counties from loans.121  
2.6 “Ownership” of local natural resources: additional county revenue? 
The Constitution provides that parliament should enact “legislation ensuring that investments in 
property benefit local communities and their economies”.122 This may be interpreted as 
facilitating “economic self-determination” from natural resources for “host communities”. The 
constitutional framework is unclear, however, as it does not specify the subcategories of natural 
resources or investments within this category or their benefits. In Nigeria, the derivation clause 
in the Constitution provides that 13 percent of oil revenue accruing to the federal government 
will be redirected to the oil-producing state from which the revenue originated.123 
Kenya is not as endowed with natural resources as Nigeria or other natural resource-rich 
countries, which may explain the undeveloped framework for “economic self-determination”. 
There have been recent oil discoveries in Kenya, and a detailed framework for local benefits, as 
envisaged in the Constitution, may be necessary. A draft Geology, Minerals and Mining Bill 
drafted in 2012 proposes sharing of royalties in the proportion of 75:15:10 percent to the 
national government, county government and the community, respectively.124 This may be a 
starting-point to ensure that natural resources benefit local communities.125  
2.7 The overall significance of county government own revenue  
While counties were denied crucial sources of revenue, own county revenue may still play an 
important role in county finances. Past experience with the former local authorities shows that 
some of the sources of revenue listed in the Part II of the Fourth Schedule can generate 
substantial revenue. The World Bank estimates that own county government revenue may 
account for 17 percent of the total county government revenue if central transfers are 
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maintained at the minimum 15 percent.126 However, the World Bank estimates are based on the 
performance of the former local authorities. County powers to raise revenue have been 
expanded and new areas to raise revenue, such as gas and electricity reticulation, energy 
regulation and entertainment taxes, have been added.  
However, the bulk of the revenue-raising powers are predominantly urban-based. These include 
powers such as property and entertainment taxing powers, water and sanitation services, and 
other typical urban services. In the past, local authorities in 28 out of the 47 counties used to 
receive over 50 percent of their funding from central government transfers.127 Only the former 
Nairobi City Council and local authorities in the three counties (Samburu, Isiolo and Narok) that 
host game reserves were able to finance over 70 percent of their expenditure from locally-
generated revenue.128 It is thus likely that with the exception of business licenses – which 
appear to be an important source of revenue for both urban and rural areas – most of the 
revenue sources may only end up benefiting counties with predominantly urban counties. This 
has the potential to diminish the overall significance of local revenue, given that the majority of 
county governments are predominantly rural.  
3.  Intergovernmental transfers to county governments  
Almost as a universal rule, subnational governments are designed to be revenue-deficient and 
hence dependent to varying degrees on central government transfers for their operations.129 In 
turn, central government allocations to devolved units are used to pursue important national 
objectives such as redistribution, equitable sharing of national resources, and addressing 
regional disparities.130 Indeed, as Prud‟homme argues, redistribution is better addressed 
through central macro-allocations than through individual devolved units.131 Kenya is no 
exception to the universal model of fiscal design. Counties are denied major tax bases, which 
have been reserved for the national government, and thus are not in a position to fund all their 
functions from their own local sources of revenue.  
Accordingly, the Constitution provides for a system of intergovernmental transfers to county 
governments to enable them to perform their functions. In this regard, the most important of the 
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intergovernmental transfers is the counties‟ equitable share of revenue raised nationally. 
However, the Constitution also recognises that further transfers, beyond the equitable share, 
can be made to county governments, either conditionally or unconditionally.132 The transfers 
also include the Equalisation Fund, which the national government can allocate to counties and 
which is intended to enhance access to specified basic services in marginalised areas.133  
3.1 The equitable share  
The Constitution lays down the factors and objectives to be considered in the vertical division of 
revenue between the national and county governments and horizontally among the county 
governments. Being the most likely largest source of revenue for county governments, the 
criteria are put in place to ensure that the objectives of devolved governments and other 
broader constitutional objectives are factored into its design. 
3.1.1 Criteria for determination of the equitable share  
The Constitution lists 11 factors that need to be considered in determining the equitable vertical 
and horizontal division of revenue.134 The first factor requires that “national interests” be 
considered in the division of revenue.135 The phrase “national interest” usually connotes the 
intents of the national government, acting on behalf of the country as a whole, in accordance 
with the overall constitutional objectives.  
Second, the equitable share must consider “any provision that must be made in respect of the 
public debt and other national obligations”136 that make it relevant to the vertical division of 
revenue. “Public debt” seems to refer to “national debt”, as it is lumped together with “other 
national obligations.” Therefore, before any division is made, public or national debt, as well as 
other national government obligations, have to be considered.  
Third, “the needs of national government, determined by objective criteria” have to be 
considered before the vertical division of revenue.137 Generally, government expenditure-needs 
are virtually limitless and can be used to justify the retention of all revenue generated nationally. 
It is for this reason that the Constitution provides for objectivity in the vertical division of 
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revenue. The CRA enhances objectivity by recommending the equitable share based on the 
needs of both governments and the resources available.  
Fourth, as a counterweight, the equitable share should also consider “the need to ensure that 
county governments are able to perform the functions allocated to them”.138 Counties are 
allocated functions to perform, and this should be considered in determining the vertical share. 
The CRA is thus required to objectively balance the revenue needs of both levels of government 
and the available revenue.  
Fifth, the equitable share must also consider the “the fiscal capacity and efficiency of county 
governments”.139 Thus, while the Constitution provides that the revenue needs of counties 
should be considered, the capacity of counties is relevant. This may refer to the capacity to 
make efficient use of revenue allocated to them; it may also refer to the capacity for revenue 
collection which will determine the equitable share that a county or counties will receive. This 
criterion is related to the ninth criterion, which provides that vertical division of revenue should 
also consider “the need for economic optimisation of each county and provide incentives for 
each county to optimise capacity to raise revenue”.140 These two elements mean that counties‟ 
revenue potential as well as their capacity to spend moneys allocated to them are both relevant 
in determining the vertical equitable share. 
Sixth, the “developmental and other needs of counties” should be considered in determining the 
equitable share.141 It was shown in Chapter 5 that the bulk of the objectives of devolution are 
aimed at pursuing development.142 Accordingly, this function should be considered separately 
among other factors. The seventh and eight factors are relevant to development. The seventh 
factor provides that “economic disparities within and among counties and the need to remedy 
them” must be considered.143 Accordingly, the equitable share must address the varying needs 
in order to ensure fair distribution of resources. The eighth factor provides that the equitable 
share must consider “the need for affirmative action in respect of disadvantaged areas or 
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groups”.144 This factor calls for special needs arising from past unfair or discriminatory policies 
to be recognised and addressed. 
Tenth, the equitable share should consider “the desirability of stable and predictable allocations 
of revenue”.145 Indeed, stable and predictable allocations allow efficient planning at the local 
level.146 The eleventh and last factor is closely related and requires the equitable share to 
consider “the need for flexibility in responding to emergencies and other temporary needs, 
based on similar objective criteria”.147 Flexibility in the allocations also allows counties to 
respond effectively and efficiently to changing circumstances, thus enhancing effectiveness.  
The factors discussed above are closely related to the objectives and principles of devolved 
government,148 as well as the principles of public finance discussed earlier.149 The three focus 
on common issues which revolve around issues of equity in distribution of resources, affirmative 
action for marginalised sections of the society, and equitable development, among other 
objectives. The county equitable share is highly likely to be the most important source of 
revenue for most counties. The factors to be considered in determining the share tie it to the 
broader objectives of devolved government.  
3.1.2 Determining the equitable share  
There are two main and important stages in the determination of the equitable share. The first is 
the vertical division of revenue between the national government and the county governments. 
The second stage is the horizontal division of revenue among county governments. Both stages 
are provided for in the Constitution. The CRA plays an important role in both stages by making 
recommendations on the vertical and horizontal division of revenue based on objective criteria 
recognised and provided for in the Constitution. Accordingly, the independence and 
effectiveness of the CRA are vital for the smooth functioning of the process.  
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3.1.2.1 The Commission on Revenue Allocation: structure and role  
The CRA is established as an independent Commission to advise the government on the 
vertical and horizontal division of revenue.150 It consists of the chairperson nominated by the 
President and approved by the National Assembly,151 two persons nominated by the political 
parties represented in the National Assembly according to party strength,152 and five other 
members nominated by the political parties represented in the Senate, also according to party 
strength.153 The large share of Senate nominations is to ensure that county interests are 
safeguarded in revenue allocation. While involvement of parliamentary political parties is seen 
as likely to “introduce politics into revenue allocations”,154 CRA members are required to be 
experienced professionals155 who serve in their personal capacity and for a fixed term of six 
years.156 Furthermore, politicians are expressly excluded from nomination to the CRA.157 The 
principal secretary in the ministry responsible for finance is also a member of the CRA.158 
Although the CRA‟s role in regard to division of revenue is advisory in nature, the Constitution 
puts in place measures to ensure that its recommendations are taken seriously. Accordingly, the 
Bills which seek to divide revenue vertically and horizontally, when presented in parliament, 
should be accompanied by a summary of the deviations from the figures proposed by the CRA, 
along with an explanation for each deviation.159 This measure has the potential to ensure that 
the CRA proposals are given serious considerations as any unjustified deviations can be 
challenged in parliament; it also has the potential to contribute to the overall objectivity and 
transparency of the process.  
3.1.2.2 Vertical division of revenue  
At least every two months before the end of the financial year, a Division of Revenue Bill (DRB), 
which divides revenue collected nationally among the national and county levels in accordance 
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with the Constitution, is to be introduced in Parliament.160 The CRA makes recommendations 
concerning the basis of the vertical division of revenue,161 with the county share not being less 
than 15 percent of the revenue collected nationally.162 In proposing the vertical division, the CRA 
is required to give effect to the criteria provided for in determining the equitable share.163 The 
CRA should also, where appropriate, define and enhance the revenue sources of both levels of 
government,164 as well as encourage fiscal responsibility.165 The DRB should be accompanied 
by a summary of significant deviations from CRA recommendations and an explanation for each 
of such deviation.166 The DRB should also be accompanied by a memorandum explaining how 
revenue allocation is proposed in the Bill,167 and an evaluation of the DRB Bill in relation to the 
criteria provided for determining the equitable share.168  
The Constitution does not expressly state whether the DRB is a Bill affecting county 
governments. However, a Bill concerning county government is defined as including “a Bill 
referred to in Chapter Twelve affecting the finances of county governments”.169 The DRB can, 
therefore, easily fall into the category of a Bill concerning county government. The Senate will 
thus have occasion to consider and debate the DRB and vote on it as an ordinary Bill affecting 
counties. If the Bill is rejected by either House, it may be referred to mediation by a committee 
drawn from both Houses until consensus is reached.170 However, a delay in passing the DRB 
runs the risk of derailing the budget process at both the national and county levels.171  
Furthermore, the DRB is not defined as a money Bill in the Constitution.172 This means that it 
can be introduced in either House as Money Bills cannot be introduced in the Senate. Second, 
Money Bills can only be amended on recommendation of the relevant Committee of the National 
Assembly, and after taking into account the views of the Cabinet Secretary in charge of 
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Finance.173 This restrictive procedure does not apply to the DRB, and such flexibility can allow 
appropriate adjustments to the DRB in parliament.174  
In accordance with the Constitution, at least 15 percent of the revenue collected nationally 
should be allocated to counties in the DRB.175 However, what amounts to “revenue raised 
nationally” is not clear. The TFDG had proposed that donor funds, domestic borrowing, 
appropriations in aid, and other government transfers should be included in the determination of 
the equitable share.176 The CRA Act, however, only makes reference to tax and non-tax 
revenue that is collected nationally, thus excluding other items that were proposed by the 
TFDG.177 While the base for calculating the 15 percent is not clear, the CRA can, and did, make 
an initial recommend which went beyond the 15 percent minimum,178 thus making the base 
largely unimportant.179 
In its initial allocation, the national treasury proposed to allocate Kshs. 160 billion to county 
governments.180 However, the 2012/13 estimates reduced this figure to Kshs. 149 billion. The 
CRA, on the other hand, recommended that counties should be allocated Kshs. 203 billion, 
which represents 33 percent of the last audited national revenues.181 This proposal is indicative 
that the amount of the equitable share will be determined, not by the minimum guarantee, but by 
the needs of both levels of government. Estimates show that counties will need far more than 
the 15 percent minimum in order to operate effectively.182 Even unitary states such as Tanzania 
and Uganda allocate 17.6 percent and 25.6 percent, respectively, to subnational 
governments,183 while South African provinces and local governments take approximately half of 
the revenue collected nationally.184 It is likely that that the equitable share will be increased 
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beyond the minimum as proposed by the CRA or, alternatively, the deficit may be met by 
additional transfers to county governments as envisaged in the Constitution.185  
3.1.2.3 Horizontal division of revenue  
There are two main stages in determining the horizontal division. First, the Senate and the 
National Assembly are required to pass a resolution that provides the basis for division of 
revenue. Second, every year a Bill (the County Allocation of Revenue Bill, or CARB) which 
proposes the horizontal division of the total county share is tabled in parliament for debate and 
adoption. The resolution which forms the basis for horizontal division is prepared and adopted 
by the Senate186 with the advice and input of the CRA.187 While the resolution is also to be 
considered by the National Assembly after being passed by the Senate, the latter has a special 
veto power. The National Assembly can only reject the resolution via a two-thirds vote.188 
Furthermore, the resolution is deemed to be passed without amendments upon the lapse of 60 
days after its introduction in the National Assembly.189  
The special Senate veto power and the automatic “enactment” of the resolution, after the lapse 
of 60 days, give the Senate effective control over determining the basis for the horizontal 
division of revenue. These measures form a basis for the Senate to protect county interests in 
horizontal revenue division. In the event that the National Assembly garners enough votes to 
reject the resolution, the Senate can either adopt a new resolution which will repeat the 
procedure, or the Senate may request for mediation through a joint committee of both 
Houses.190 A resolution by the Senate on the basis of division of revenue applies until the next 
resolution is adopted.191 However, the Senate may, at any time, and by a resolution of two-
thirds, amend the resolution, in which case the same procedure for the NA approval will 
follow.192  
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In determining the basis for horizontal division, the Senate is required to consider the 
constitutional criteria for determining the equitable share.193 The Senate is also required to 
consult county governors, the cabinet secretary responsible for finance and any organisation of 
county governments,194 as well as carry out public consultation.195 While the first and second 
reviews of the criteria will be done after three years,196 subsequent reviews of the criteria will be 
done after every five years.197 The resolution forms a stable and predictable basis for the 
horizontal division of revenue.  
The CARB is prepared on the basis of the resolution discussed above, and tabled in parliament 
at least two months before the end of each financial year.198 The CARB must also be 
accompanied by a summary of any significant deviation from CRA proposals, explanations for 
each deviation,199 and an evaluation of compliance with the constitutional criteria for determining 
the equitable share.200 
3.1.3 County discretion in regard to use of the equitable share  
The county equitable share is, by definition, not part of national government revenue but a 
constitutionally protected entitlement of county governments.201 Accordingly, the Constitution 
requires the national government to release the equitable share without undue delay and 
without deduction, except as allowed in the Constitution.202 Steytler and De Visser argue that 
even where various components or factors are considered in determining the equitable share, 
the equitable share remains an unconditional allocation that is not tied to the factors 
considered.203 In the Kenyan context, it has also been argued that the constitutional autonomy 
of county governments, the objectives of devolved government, and the limited powers of 
intervention in county governments, all support the argument that the equitable share is 
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unconditional.204 While dividing the equitable share into sector-based block grants, as happens 
in South Africa, may be desirable, the World Bank warns that such a measure may be 
unconstitutional in the Kenyan context.205  
The discretion to use the county equitable share enables counties to plan and budget and 
thereby be in a position to match needs and preferences with available resources.206 However, 
after identifying the priorities and needs to which moneys will be applied, counties are expected 
to comply with their pre-determined budget. In this regard, the office of the Controller of Budget 
(CoB) is established to monitor implementation of the budget.207 The CoB is nominated by the 
president and appointed to the position after approval of the National Assembly,208 and he or 
she holds office for a non-renewable term of eight years, providing quarterly reports to the both 
the Senate and National Assembly.209  
The extent of the COB‟s authority in ensuring compliance with the budget is not clearly stated in 
the Constitution.210 However, since the COB is to authorise every withdrawal from the County 
Revenue Fund,211 the highest measure that can be taken is to reject any withdrawal that is not 
in compliance with the budget.212 Counties are expected to prepare cash flow statements which 
they shall provide to the National Treasury and the CoB,213 and these could form the basis of 
monitoring budget implementation.214 This arrangement is by no means an infringement on the 
autonomy of counties. Counties have complete discretion in preparing their budgets, and the 
CoB‟s mandate is limited only to ensuring compliance with the pre-determined budget.215 In the 
former dispensation, subnational expenditure was monitored solely by the National Treasury, 
but mistrust of the national executive led to this role being vested in an independent office.216  
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3.2 Additional intergovernmental transfers 
Given the anticipated deficit in county finances, the national government may have to provide 
additional funding through conditional or unconditional transfers.217 Among the conditional 
transfers is the Equalisation Fund, which is an “affirmative action fund”.218  
3.2.1 The Equalisation Fund  
The Equalisation Fund is a “national government fund” set aside from revenue collected 
nationally (0.5 percent of national revenue) and used to enhance access to basic services 
including water, roads, health facilities and electricity in marginalised areas.219 Being a national 
government fund, the Constitution provides that the fund can either be given to counties with 
identified marginalised areas as a conditional grant220 or the national government may directly 
implement the projects targeted by the fund in identified areas.221 However, the fund targets 
issues which can be more appropriately addressed by counties, and the principle of subsidiarity 
requires counties to implement the fund.222 The fund is temporary (20 years, unless extended by 
parliament for a further fixed period),223 and has also been criticised for being too small to make 
a difference.224  
3.2.2 Other additional transfers  
Additional funding may be provided through conditional or unconditional funding. The manner in 
which additional funding is provided to counties will have implications in terms of discretion and, 
possibly, autonomy. Increasing the county equitable share is the most appropriate way of 
assuring complete discretion in the use of the additional funds. Conditional grants, however, 
have the potential of facilitating national government control over counties. Indeed, the World 
Bank argues the equitable share should be maintained at the guaranteed minimum and the rest 
given through conditional funding in order to “leverage” the implementation of national priorities 
at the local level. 225  
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4. National government supervision of county financial management  
Supervision was highlighted as an important element for local efficiency.226 This implies that the 
centre must have a means of controlling expenditure, especially to curb irregularities and 
breaches that may run counter to the objectives of devolved government. However, this must be 
balanced with the need to preserve local autonomy. Accordingly, the Constitution provides for 
circumstances under which the national government can temporarily stop part of the funds due 
to a county government.227 The national government may also under some circumstances 
intervene in a county government. 228   
The cabinet secretary in charge of finance can stop funds due to a county government for 
serious material breach or persistent material breaches of financial guidelines.229 However, only 
50 percent of the funds due to a county government can be stopped,230 and for 60 days only.231 
Furthermore, the stoppage lapses if it is not ratified by both Houses of parliament.232 Any 
renewal of the stoppage after 60 days can only be done via resolutions adopted in both Houses 
233 and after the CoB has presented a report to parliament on the breach. The affected county 
should also, before a renewal, be given an opportunity to defend itself before the relevant 
parliamentary committee.234 In addition, the national government can intervene in a county 
government if the county does not operate a financial management system that complies with 
the requirements prescribed by national legislation.235 The national government takes charge of 
the financial affairs of a county until the breach is corrected or if the Senate terminates the 
intervention.236  
It is thus clear that national government powers over county finances are limited. The stoppage 
of funds is partial, temporary and subject to fairly strict conditions. The intervention is equally 
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subject to strict conditions and can be terminated at any time. The powers of the national 
government over county finances are hence limited.  
5. Assessment of the fiscal and financial powers of county governments  
Finances are a critical part of devolution in the pursuit of the objectives of devolved government. 
Indeed, financial autonomy reifies the political autonomy of devolved units. This, in turn, 
facilitates the devolved units to pursue the three purposes: fiscal autonomy can enable devolved 
units to address local preferences237 and economic inclusion,238 as well as enhance the 
autonomy so critical to limiting central power. However, there are also aspects of the fiscal 
design that may hinder the pursuit of the three purposes.  
5.1 County finances and development  
With regard to development, the most important aspect is that counties have adequate 
resources and discretion to match local preferences.239 Counties have local revenue-raising 
powers and are also entitled to a share of revenue raised nationally; arguably, this forms a basis 
for the counties to address local preferences. However, the nature and level of funds available 
to counties, and the discretion in the use of the funds, will impact on the ability of counties to 
effectively pursue development. Undeniably, there are aspects that will enhance the pursuit of 
development and those that may hinder it.  
5.1.1 Design aspects of county finances that enhance development  
Counties have constitutional powers to charge property and entertainment taxes,240 as well as 
charge fees for services offered.241 Importantly, the counties have complete discretion in regard 
to planning and use of these funds. Accordingly, counties are in a position to address local 
preferences. Revenue generated locally can be used to provide local services at the county 
level. More importantly, it is noted that locally generated revenue can enhance accountability as 
it creates an impetus for local taxpayers to hold their local leadership accountable.242 The local 
nature of the tax burden of property rates and entertainment tax lays a stronger basis for local 
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accountability. For instance, ratepayers are more inclined to demand better services from their 
respective county governments, thus enhancing accountability.243 
The design of the county equitable share also has the potential to facilitate the effective pursuit 
of development. Counties are entitled to a specified minimum share of revenue collected 
nationally which is fully discretionary.244 The CRA enhances transparent and objectivity in the 
division of revenue. The fact that any fundamental deviations from CRA proposals have to be 
explained also enhances objectivity in the sharing of revenue.245 The guaranteed minimum of 
county equitable share enhances predictability.246 In regard to discretion, the county equitable 
share is unconditional, and this enables counties to plan and budget for local preferences.247 
The Senate resolution which sets the basis for revenue division can also enhance stability, 
objectivity and predictability in allocations.248  
There are a number of design measures which are meant to facilitate equitable development. 
The determination of the equitable share is to be guided by the existing economic disparities 
and the need to address them.249 The county equitable share should also be guided by the 
developmental needs of counties, including the special needs of areas that were previously 
marginalised.250 In this regard, the equalisation may supplement the efforts to enhance access 
to basic services in counties with marginalised areas.  
5.1.2 Design aspects of county finances that may hinder development  
While counties have symmetric powers to raise revenue locally, such powers are only as 
significant as the tax base.251 Local revenue-raising powers are only relevant to urban areas 
(property rates, entertainment tax, urban services, etc.) where there is a viable tax base.252 The 
majority of the counties that have predominantly rural populations and local revenue powers 
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may be of limited significance. Thus, while local revenue may play a role in enhancing 
accountability, weak local tax bases make this avenue for accountability weak and unreliable.  
While counties will be heavily reliant on central government transfers to fund local services, the 
minimum share of counties, which is unconditional, is hardly enough to finance functions.253 
Counties will thus need additional funding either through an increased county share or through 
conditional or unconditional grants. Too many conditional grants have the potential to shrink 
local discretion as counties may be reduced into implementation agents of the national 
government through additional conditional grants and funding. Another danger is that too much 
conditional funding may reduce local accountability because county governments may feel more 
accountable to the central government than to the local communities.  
5.2 County finances and ethnic accommodation  
In situations of internal conflicts, which often revolve around economic and political exclusion, 
financial and fiscal powers can enhance economic inclusion and thus address perceptions of 
exclusion. Local control of resources and ability to make decisions over the use of resources 
and finances through devolved governance has the potential to prevent conflict.254 In Chapters 3 
and 4, it was highlighted that real or perceived economic exclusion along ethnic lines laid a 
basis for ethnic conflict. Indeed, evidence has shown that successive presidents actually 
diverted public resources to their home regions, thereby deepening feelings of exclusion by 
other communities.255 During the constitutional review process, the idea of devolved government 
received universal support mainly because of its potential to enhance equitable distribution of 
national resources and development.256 
The constitutional design of devolved government incorporates strong provisions for equity and 
affirmative action in the financing of counties. There is therefore potential for the fiscal design to 
address some of the underlying issues of ethnic conflict. However, there are also aspects of the 
design that may hinder effective ethnic accommodation.  
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5.2.1 Aspects of the design that may enhance ethnic accommodation  
Perceptions that the central government, dominated by the ruling ethnic group, controlled 
national resources to the exclusion of other communities, fomented ethnic conflict. However, the 
constitutionally guaranteed and unconditional share of national resources, determined through a 
transparent and objective process, has the potential to address this perception. The role of the 
CRA, which is established as an independent body, and the role of parliament in the national 
budget process all serve to make the entire public finance process credible. This may form a 
basis for trust in the sharing of national resources for development.  
Most of the 47 counties are ethnically exclusive. Accordingly, any fiscal powers exercised by the 
counties will in essence be granting ethnic communities control over public resources by 
democratically elected county leadership. Counties will have resources and discretion as to how 
they use the funds. It can thus be concluded that fiscal autonomy will enhance ethnic 
accommodation as the different ethnic communities, through their respective county 
representatives, will determine and pursue their development agenda.  
Apart from facilitating political and economic inclusion, county government financial powers 
have the potential to improve basic service delivery, the lack of which also fuelled ethnic conflict 
in the past.257 Counties have powers to budget their resources in order to enhance basic 
services. The World Bank notes that a total of 41 counties will see their funds double from past 
allocations, with some counties receiving more than 1000 percent of previous decentralised 
funding.258 Other measures such as the role of the CoB are put in place to ensure that funds set 
aside for provision of services actually perform the intended purpose. It can thus be concluded 
that there is the potential to address development-based ethnic grievances.  
In appropriate circumstances, “economic self-determination” can address conflict around natural 
resources.259 Kenya is not a resource-rich state, but the recent the discovery of oil in the 
Turkana region may lead to demands for local benefits from the oil revenue.260 While the 
Constitution does not have well-developed provisions on “economic self-determination”, it 
generally recognises the principle261 and this can be “fleshed out” in enabling legislation. Indeed, 
the draft Geology, Minerals and Mining Bill 2012 provides that 15 percent and 10 percent of 
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royalties should be allocated to the county government and communities, respectively,262 and 
other laws may adopt the same approach.263  
5.2.2 Aspects of the design which hinder ethnic accommodation  
Chapters 3 and 4 highlighted that the main ethnic conflict in Kenya is between the larger ethnic 
communities that are “presidential contenders”.264 While perceived or actual exclusion was felt 
by the smaller ethnic communities, this had a greater impact on the larger communities as it 
formed a basis for deadly conflict, with each large community seeking to capture the presidency 
at all costs.265 The alternative that devolution could offer is to make devolved units a viable 
“consolation prize” for the losers.266 This means the design of county finances should make 
counties financially powerful in order to pacify the losers in the presidential contest.  
Instead, counties generally have a weak local revenue base as all the major taxes are allocated 
to the national government. At 15 percent of revenue collected nationally, the minimum 
equitable share of county governments is far too low even compared to unitary states such as 
Tanzania (25.6 percent) and Uganda (17.6 percent).267 First, it less likely that such limited 
resources will translate into a viable political alternative for the larger ethnic communities. The 
government may remain with a whopping 85 percent of revenue collected nationally, which 
would serve as a permanent motivation for larger ethnic communities to capture the presidency.  
Second, a substantial part of county revenue needs may be met by conditional funding from the 
national government. While this is recommended as a viable way to ensure that counties 
implement national objectives,268 it may form a basis for conflict. With most counties being 
ethnically exclusive, central government conditions can be easily perceived as a means of 
ethnic domination by the ethnic group “in control of” the presidency. Indeed, it has been argued 
that conditional funding has potential to limit local discretion and provide a basis for political 
                                               
262
 Third Schedule to the Bill.  
263
 World Bank (2012) 76.  
264
 YP Ghai „Devolution: Restructuring the Kenyan state‟ (2008)2 Journal of Eastern African Studies 211, 215-216.  
265
 Branch D Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011(2011) 1999.  
266
 Ghai (2008) 215-216.  
267
 World Bank (2012) 74.  
268
 World Bank (2012) 104.  
 
 
 
 
348 
 
subordination of devolved units.269 This may form a basis for ethnically-based, central-county 
wrangles, wrangles that may in turn fuel ethnic conflict.  
5.3 County finances and limiting central power  
Decentralised governance in Kenya has historically been characterised by political 
subordination and control.270 One of the ways in which this was conveniently achieved was by a 
tight fiscal control of local governments.271 The ministry in charge of local government controlled 
practically every aspect of local government finance. Central bureaucracy and inefficiency, in 
turn, led to decline of local service delivery and the institutional decay of local governments.272 
The only way that counties can limit central power is if they have fiscal powers and control over 
finances that amount to a sizeable proportion of the entire state spending.273 The Kenyan fiscal 
design has aspects which can enhance the ability of counties to limit central power. However, 
there are also other aspects of the design that can hinder effective counterbalancing of central 
power.  
5.3.1 Aspects that enhance the ability to limit central power  
The constitutionally protected fiscal autonomy of county governments enhances their autonomy. 
Counties have constitutional power to levy property and entertainment taxes as well as charge 
for services rendered. More significantly, counties have extensive powers with regard to 
revenue-raising functions which extend to powers to set tariffs and take over public entities that 
perform functions belonging to counties.274 These powers secure the position of counties in the 
overall system and enhance their political significance.  
The constitutionally guaranteed, and unconditional, county equitable share also enhances the 
overall autonomy of counties from the central government, thus facilitating the ability of counties 
to limit central power. More importantly, the Senate, which represents the interests of counties 
at the national level, plays an important role in determining the equitable share and hence 
protects county interests. Senate powers include debating and voting on the DRB (as an 
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ordinary Bill that affects county governments) which divides revenue vertically.275 The Senate 
also has special power to pass the resolution that provides the basis for the horizontal division 
of revenue among counties,276 as well as special powers with regard to the CARB, which 
actually divides revenue among counties.277 The Senate‟s role in facilitating the 
counterbalancing of central power is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.  
The counties have complete discretion on how to use the resources at their disposal with 
minimal central government control, and this enhances their autonomy and, therefore, their 
ability to counterbalance central power. The government‟s control over county finances is limited 
to material and persistent breaches, and even then only part of the funds can be temporarily 
stopped. National government intervention is limited to necessary measures only,278 and the 
Senate can terminate a central government intervention in a county at any time.279 Furthermore, 
the role of the CoB is limited to monitoring budget implementation, which counties have a 
complete discretion to prepare.  
It can thus be concluded that the constitutional entrenchment of county fiscal powers, the role of 
the Senate, and the limited powers of the central government in county finance matters all 
enhance the ability of counties to limit central power in fiscal matters. However, within the same 
fiscal design, there are aspects which undermine the ability of county governments to effectively 
limit central power.  
5.3.2 Aspects that hinder the ability to counterbalance central power  
The combined local and national revenue will still be insufficient to fund county government 
functions. Thus, while counties have constitutional autonomy over their finances, the size of 
revenue that counties control is too limited to ensure the effective limiting of central power. The 
revenue gap may end up being filled by conditional funding, which may in turn undermine the 
constitutional autonomy of counties. Indeed, the level of funding to county governments and the 
extent of fiscal autonomy only goes as far as developmental autonomy.  
While supervision and regulation of county governments is seen as an important element for 
overall effectiveness, they present a danger of intrusion in county affairs. These include the 
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requirement for central government authorisation for county loans, which runs contrary to the 
concept of devolution. Other elements which may form a basis for intrusion include the power of 
stoppage of funds due to a county, and powers of intervention. However, there are also 
adequate controls in the exercise of these functions that can prevent control of counties.  
5.4 Is there a balance of purposes in the design of county finances?  
Fiscal autonomy is an important and common design feature for the three purposes of devolving 
power, one that, moreover, is inherent to the very concept of devolution. Indeed, fiscal 
autonomy facilitates developmental autonomy, economic inclusion and political autonomy from 
the centre. However, the level of fiscal autonomy and amount of resources controlled may 
determine how each purpose is pursued and realised. While the Kenyan Constitution allows 
some level of fiscal autonomy, the nature and extent of the fiscal autonomy will impact 
differently on the three purposes.  
With regard to development and ethnic accommodation, the level of fiscal autonomy granted to 
county governments may assist counties to enhance services. This may address development-
related ethnic grievances and, to this extent, it is a common design feature. However, while 
counties have the same level of autonomy to pursue development, the nature and extent of the 
fiscal powers of county governments do not address the main ethnic conflict in Kenya. The 
limited resources controlled by counties may make them unattractive to the larger ethnic groups, 
who will still seek to control the presidency. To this extent, development was given more 
consideration than ethnic conflict resolution.  
The level of fiscal autonomy granted to county governments facilitates only developmental 
autonomy rather than providing a viable “consolation prize” to the larger ethnic communities. 
The counties will need more than the guaranteed 15 percent, which means that they are grossly 
under-funded and might not transform into powerful units that could effectively limit central 
power. The current design, it can be argued, thus suits the developmental purpose more than 
the one of limiting central power.  
Therefore, while the Constitution grants the counties some level of fiscal autonomy, the nature 
and level of autonomy is suited for development as opposed to ethnic accommodation or 
limiting central power. It can thus be concluded that the fiscal design of county governments 
favours the developmental purpose of devolution more than ethnic accommodation and the 
limiting of central power.  
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6. Conclusion  
The principles of public finance and the general fiscal design are relevant to the general 
objectives of devolved government which, in turn, revolve around the pursuit of the three 
purposes. However, this chapter has also concluded that many aspects of the fiscal design may 
hinder achievement of the three purposes. Counties generally have limited fiscal powers, thus 
creating opportunities for central government intrusion, especially through conditional funding. 
While it is undeniable that counties have constitutionally protected fiscal powers, the level of 
resources they control weakens their ability to bring about effective economic inclusion and limit 
central power. 
 
 
 
 
352 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT  
SHARED RULE: THE STRUCTURE, POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF 
THE SENATE  
 
1. Introduction  
Although self-rule is important and the basis of devolution, shared rule serves an equally 
important purpose as it completes the link by ensuring that the structure and powers of the 
centre enhance devolved governance. In terms of resolving conflict and limiting central power, 
shared rule promotes inclusiveness, and “federal decision-making”1 provides a basis for 
influencing central decision-making.2 While typical shared-rule structures are not essential for 
devolved development, elements such as cooperation and supervision involve the centre. The 
centre also has a “negative duty” to refrain from infringing on the developmental autonomy of 
devolved units which is important for addressing local preferences.3 
In the Kenyan context, the Senate is constitutionally mandated to represent and protect the 
interests of counties and their governments.4 Accordingly, any analysis of the central design of 
shared rule must revolve around the structure, powers and functions of the Senate. The Senate 
is part of the national legislature,5 which is in line with comparative federal practice where the 
formal representation of constituent units at the centre is “piggy-backed” on national institutions 
of “horizontal power-sharing” and, particularly, the legislature.6 With it being part of the national 
legislature, the Senate‟s effectiveness in representing and protecting county interests will 
inevitably be measured in terms of its legislative role, but apart from the latter role, the Senate 
has several other functions that are relevant to the representation and protection of the interests 
of county government. 
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This chapter analyses the structure, powers and functions of the Senate. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
concluded that the structures, powers and finances of county governments are more 
appropriately configured to pursue development than the other two purposes of limiting central 
power and resolving ethnic conflict. In contrast, this chapter finds that the Senate‟s structure and 
powers have the potential to counterbalance central power and enable effective incorporation of 
county interests into national decision-making; in addition, they also stand to facilitate ethnic 
accommodation and the pursuit of development. 
2. The Senate structure and composition  
The Senate consists of 47 Senators elected directly from the 47 counties using the FPTP 
electoral system,7 along with 16 female members who are to be nominated by political parties in 
proportion to their performance in the FPTP elections of Senate seats.8 Additionally, there are 
four other members of the Senate: two men and two women, who represent the youth and 
persons with disabilities (PWDs), respectively.9  
While the Constitution generally provides for special representation of minorities and 
marginalised groups in the CAs and the National Assembly,10 there is no such provision with 
respect to the Senate. The report of the CoE mentions that marginalised groups, whose 
representatives participated actively in the review process,11 were to be included in the 
composition of Senate,12 but this recommendation was not implemented in the current 
Constitution. Civil society organisations and “marginalised groups” had a strong presence in the 
entire constitutional review process, a situation which may have led to the inclusion of PWDs 
and the youth in the Senate.13  
The majority of the counties are mainly ethnically exclusive and, given the ethnic factor in 
Kenyan elections, senators are likely to be from the county ethnic majorities. Consequently, 
many of the smaller ethnic communities have “home counties” and are thus likely to be 
                                               
7
 Article 98 (1) (a).  
8
 Article 98 (1) (b).  
9
 Article 198 (1) (d) and (e).  
10
 Articles 97 (1) (c) and Article 177 (1) (c).  
11
 Sing‟oei KA „Kenya at 50: unrealised rights of minorities and indigenous communities‟ (Report: Minority Rights 
Group International, and Ogiek Peoples Development Programme) (2012) 16.  
12
 CoE „Final report of the Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review‟ (2010b) 66.  
13
 Bannon AL „Designing a constitution-drafting process: lessons from Kenya‟ (2007) 116 Yale Law Journal 1842.  
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represented in the Senate. The larger ethnic communities were also split into several counties 
and are also likely to be represented by several senators from the fragmented units.  
Table 3 shows the likely ethnic composition of the Senate as compared to the National 
Assembly. The table is divided into three sections: the large ethnic communities (Kikuyu, 
Kalenjin, Luhya, Luo and Akamba) and the smaller ethnic communities with a “home county” or 
two. Nairobi County, due to its cosmopolitan nature, is not classified under any of the large or 
small ethnic groups. In each section, the table shows the subtotals and totals of different issues: 
number of counties/Senate elective seats, National Assembly constituencies per county, 
population per county, and the land area per county. In the first section, the table gives both the 
individual and collective totals of the large ethnic groups; however, the second section, which 
covers the smaller ethnic groups, gives only the collective figures of the smaller ethnic 
communities.  
 
Table 3: Possible ethnic composition in the Senate and the National Assembly  
 
Large ethnic communities 
 
Category/Ethnic 
composition  
County  National 
Assembly 
Reps.  
Total population  
Kikuyu  Nyandarua  5 596 268  
Nyeri  6 693 558  
Kirinyaga  4 528 054  
Kiambu  12 1 623 282  
Murang‟a  7 942 582  
Nakuru (migrant majority) 10 1 603 325  
Laikipia (migrant majority) 3 399 227  
Subtotal  7  47  6 386 296  
 
 
 
 
355 
 
Percentage (Grand total)  14.9 % 16.2 %  16.5 %  
Kalenjin  Uasin Gishu  6 894 179  
Nandi  6 752 965  
Baringo  6 551 561  
Kericho  6 758 339  
Bomet  5 724 186  
Subtotal  5 29 3 681 230  
Percentage (Grand total)  10.6 %  10 %  9.5 %  
Luo  Siaya  6 842 304  
Kisumu  7 968 909  
Homa Bay  8 958 991  
Migori 8 563 033  
Subtotal  4 29  3 333 237  
Percentage  8.5 %  10 %  8.6 %  
Luhya 
 
Kakamega  12 1 660 651  
Vihiga  5 554 622  
Bungoma  9 1 630 934  
Busia  7 488 705  
Trans-Nzoia  
(migrant majority) 
5 818 758  
Subtotal  5 38 5 153 670  
Percentage  10.6 % 13.1 %  13.3 %  
Akamba  Machakos  8 1 098 584  
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Kitui  8 1 012 709  
Makueni  6 884 527  
Subtotal  3 22 2 995 820  
Percentage  6.4 %  7.6 %  7.8 %  
Total (large ethnic 
groups)  
24 165 18 728 943  
Percentage (Grand 
total) 
51 %  56.9 %  48.5 %  
 
Smaller ethnic groups with “home counties” 
 
Category/Ethnic 
composition  
County  National 
assembly  
Reps.  
Total population  
Kisii  Kisii  9 1 511 422  
Nyamira  4  598 252  
Meru  Meru  9 1 356 301  
Tharaka-Nithi  3 365 330  
Embu, Meru  Embu  4 516 212  
Maasai  Samburu  3 223 947  
Narok  6 850 920  
Kajiado  5 687 312  
Somali  Garissa  6 623 060  
Wajir  6 661 941  
Mandera  6 1 025 756  
Turkana  Turkana  6 855 399  
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Isiolo  2 143 294  
Borana  Marsabit  4 291 166  
Waswahili, Duruma, 
Giriama, Rabai, Boni, 
Digo  
Mombasa  6 939 370  
Mijikenda  Kwale  4 649 931  
Kilifi  7 1 109 735  
Tana River  3 240 075  
Lamu  2 101 539  
Taita  Taita/Taveta  4 284 657  
Pokot  West Pokot  4 512 690  
Marakwet  Elgeyo/Marakwet  4 368 998  
Total (small ethnic 
groups) 
22 107  13 917 307  
Percentage  46.8 %  36.9 %  36 %  
 
Nairobi (cosmopolitan county) 
 
Category/Ethnic 
composition  
County  National 
assembly  
Reps.  
Total population  
Mixed  Nairobi  16 3 138 369  
Percentage  2.1 % 5.5 %  8 %  
Grand total  47  290  38 605 929 
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Sources: Independent IEBC „Final report of boundaries of constituencies and wards‟ (2012); 
Republic of Kenya „2009 population and housing census results‟ (Ministry of State for Planning, 
National Development and Vision 2030) (2010)  
The composition of the Senate shown above has the potential to impact on decision-making and 
the overall functioning of the Senate. From the figures in Table 3, it is clear that smaller ethnic 
communities have stronger representation in the Senate than in the National Assembly. As a 
result, Senate decision-making may be influenced by the stronger presence of the smaller 
ethnic communities. However, the potential of the smaller ethnic groups to influence Senate 
decisions depends, first, on whether the smaller ethnic communities will elect their own to the 
Senate and, second, whether the smaller groups will vote as a bloc in the Senate. Assuming 
that this happens, the Senate structure outlined above has three main implications. First, it 
“equalises” the larger and smaller ethnic communities; second, it locks out “in-county 
minorities”; and, third, the structures makes the Senate a politically powerful “federal chamber” 
but with weak institutional links to county governments.  
2.1 „Equalisation‟ of the large and small ethnic groups 
Equality of counties has enhanced the representation of the smaller ethnic communities in the 
Senate. In the previous constitutional dispensation, these communities had a weaker voice as 
their representatives were outnumbered by those of the larger ethnic communities. Indeed, the 
same pattern can be seen in the National Assembly, where, according to Table 3, smaller ethnic 
communities have a representation of 38 percent while, for the large ethnic groups, it is almost 
60 percent. 
However, the Senate may alter this by “equalising” the larger and smaller ethnic communities. 
The smaller ethnic communities compose almost 47 percent of the Senate whereas the larger 
ethnic communities have 51 percent representation. For instance, Lamu County, with a 
population of 101 539 people, has one representative in the Senate, just like Nairobi County 
which has a total population of 3 138 369. In the National Assembly, however, Nairobi County 
has a total of 16 seats, compared to Lamu‟s two seats. A number of other small counties have 
equal representation in the Senate, which they would otherwise not have in a system of 
proportional representation. Indeed, it was noted that the split of the constituent units of the 
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Nigerian federations had the effect of “equalising” the smaller ethnic communities with the larger 
ethnic communities.14 
2.2 Exclusion of county minorities from the Senate  
While the Senate structure “equalises” the larger and smaller ethnic communities with “home 
counties”, the current structure could potentially exclude “in-county minorities”. A number of “in-
county minorities”, as argued in Chapter 5, share counties with the larger ethnic communities. 
The main county ethnic minorities include, among others, the Kuria in Migori County, the Teso 
in Busia County, the Sabaot in Bungoma County, and the Marakwet in Elgeyo-Marakwet.15 
These communities may end up with no representation in the Senate due to two main factors in 
the structure and composition of the Senate. 
First, senators are elected through the FPTP electoral system.16 While members of “inter-county 
minorities” county ethnic minorities can vie for the Senate seat, their communities are 
outnumbered by the respective county ethnic majorities and senators are likely to be elected 
from their respective county ethnic majorities. Second, while special representation of county 
minorities would at least have enhanced their representation, the Constitution does not provide 
for special representation of “in-county minorities” or “marginalised communities” despite the 
fact that the CoE felt the need for their inclusion in the Senate structures.17 
One may argue that the additional non-elective seats of the Senate (16 women, two youth 
representatives and two persons with disabilities) can be used to enhance representation of “in-
county minorities”. But while this could be achieved if all or part of the women, youth and PWD 
representatives could be drawn from “in-county minorities” or marginalised communities, the 
nominated seats are filled by political parties based on their on their performance in the FPTP 
elections for the Senate. This means that the major parties, which often belong to the large 
ethnic groups, are likely to nominate their own supporters for the seats. As a result, unless 
deliberate efforts are made to pick representatives of minorities and marginalised groups, the 
                                               
14
 Roeder PG „Ethnofederalism and the mismanagement of conflicting nationalisms‟ in Erk J & Anderson LM (eds) 
The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions? (2010) 25.  
15
 Republic of Kenya „Final report of the Taskforce on Devolved Government‟ (2011) 203. 
16
 Article 98 (1) (a).  
17
 CoE (2010b) 66. 
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special seats are likely to go to party loyalists instead of representatives of “in-county 
minorities.”18 
It can thus be concluded that the Senate structure may lead to the exclusion of county minorities 
from the Senate altogether. However, parties could take deliberate action to address this 
structural limitation. A dominant party, which is likely to get the nominated seats, may decide to 
fill its party lists for nominated seats with representatives of the minorities and marginalised 
groups. Furthermore, political parties may enter into agreements that facilitate the election of a 
member from a county minority into the Senate. In Migori County, for instance, political leaders 
from the Luo community agreed to support a Kuria candidate for the Senate. In turn, both sides 
agreed to support a candidate for the county governor‟s seat from the Luo community.19 This 
may see a candidate from the minority Kuria ethnic community elected to the Senate. In the 
absence of such arrangements, the general design of the Senate structure is not friendly 
towards the representation county ethnic minorities.  
2.4 A politically strong Senate with „weak links‟ to county governments  
Kenyan senators are directly elected by voters from their respective counties,20 and this differs 
from some federal systems where representatives are indirectly elected or chosen. In the USA, 
senators are directly elected, as is the case in Kenya as well, while in India members of the 
Rajya Sabha are elected by the respective state assemblies.21 Other variants include the 
German Bundesrat, whose members are part of the executive of the respective Lander 
governments;22 in the South African NCOP the members are a mixture of indirectly elected 
representatives and members of the provincial executive.23 
Each of these systems has its own benefits and risks. However, their effectiveness is largely 
determined by factors that are particular to each context. For instance, while the German 
system of governmental representatives is regarded as the most effective for counterbalancing 
                                               
18
 Oloo A „Elections, representations and the new Constitution‟ (Society for International Development (SID) 
Constitution Working Paper No. 7) (2011) 7. 
19
 Oluoch N „Unease over move to “award” senate to Kuria‟ The Standard 3 December 2012.  
20
 Article 98 (1) (a).  
21
 Dhavan R & Saxena „Republic of India‟ in Le Roy K et al (eds) Legislative, Executive and Judicial Governance in 
Federal Countries (2006) 175; Saunders (2006) 360.  
22
 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) „The example of federalism in the Federal Republic of Germany: A reader‟ (1994) 
67.  
23
 Watts (2008) 151.  
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central power,24 party politics have weakened the South African NCOP, a system closely 
fashioned after the German Bundesrat.25 In India, too, state legislatures nominate members of 
the Rajya Sabha; however, regional party interests, and not legitimate state government 
interests, determine the selection of representatives.26 On the other hand, Watts argues that 
directly elected members tend to vote along party lines, and his preference is for indirectly 
elected representatives to represent regional interests.27 However, the independence of the 
American Senate demonstrates that, in the right context, directly elected representatives can 
resist party interests and vote on the basis of genuine state interests.28 
It can be concluded that there is no universally preferred method of structuring the central 
representation of devolved units. Indeed, even the Canadian system of centrally appointed 
members – which is criticised as having the least credibility – is said to have the potential to 
enhance the representation of minorities who cannot make it through a popular vote.29 There is 
thus no universally accepted model, nor is there any assurance that a particular design will bear 
the same fruit if it is transplanted elsewhere as effectiveness depends on factors which are 
sometimes not related to the design. 
The framers of the Constitution had provided initially for indirect election from respective 
constituent units.30 However, in its responses, the public perceived indirect election of Senate 
members as a “weakness”.31 The CoE received views that “persons of the right calibre were 
unlikely to emerge” through indirect elections32 and that indirectly elected senators “would carry 
lesser weight than members of the National Assembly”.33 The CoE addressed these concerns 
by reverting to direct elections in order to have a “strong” Senate.34 
                                               
24
 Baldi (1999) 9.  
25
 Malherbe E „The South African National Council of Provinces: A trojan horse or white elephant?‟ (1998) 77 Journal 
of South African Law.  
26
 Dhavan R & Saxena R „Republic of India‟ in Le Roy et al (2006) 176.  
27
 Watts (2008) 151.  
28
 Riker WH „The Senate and American federalism‟ (1955) 2 The American Political Science Review 452-469.  
29
 Watts (2008) 154.  
30
 CoE (2010b) 92.  
31
 CoE (2010b)92.  
32
 CoE (2010b)92. 
33
 CoE (2010b)92.  
34
 CoE (2010b)114-115.  
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The context in which an indirectly elected Senate was perceived a political weakness needs 
some examination. A directly elected Senate has an explicit democratic and popular mandate, 
unlike an indirectly chosen one.35 This gives the Senate a people‟s voice and democratic 
legitimacy equal to that of the National Assembly, as opposed to a derived “secondary mandate” 
that may make the Senate politically inferior to the National Assembly. Indeed, the Senate has 
attracted the interest of senior politicians who are interested in the Senate seats, and there is no 
doubt that direct election is a major motivation for politicians who are senatorial candidates.36 
This may well be the reason why the CoE and the Kenyan public saw a directly elected Senate 
as the most viable way of strengthening the voice of the Senate.  
However, governmental representation, as demonstrated by the German Bundesrat, is also 
important for effective representation of devolved units at the centre.37 Indeed, representation of 
counties is not equivalent to representation of county governments. While the term “county” is 
general and may include territory or be used to refer collectively to people from a certain county, 
the phrase “county government” is specific in that it refers to the institution of government in 
charge of a county, an institution composed of the county executive and legislature. The 
contrast between these two concepts (“county” and “county government”) is best illustrated by a 
situation where the senator and county governor are from different political parties. The CoE 
had suggested that senators should attend CA sessions as non-voting members and also 
submit annual reports to their respective counties in a bid to create the “institutional linkage”.38 
Earlier drafts such as the Bomas Draft had incorporated the CoE suggestion,39 but no such 
provision was retained in the Constitution. 
In South Africa and Germany, the delegations from the provincial and Lander governments 
ensure “governmental representation” of constituent units at the centre. Since they are 
members of their respective governments, it can be argued that in “federal decision-making” 
there is a basis for a stronger and more effective representation of the interests of subnational 
governments. However, as demonstrated by the South African and Indian experiences, party 
politics can still negate the benefits of the apparently appropriate structure for representing 
subnational governments the centre. 
                                               
35
 CoE (2010b) 66, 92.  
36
 Ghai YP & Cottrell JG Kenya‟s Constitution: An Instrument for Change (2011) 101.  
37
 KAS (1994) 67.  
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 CoE (2010b) 92.  
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In the Kenyan context, the struggle may have been between, on the one hand, a politically 
strong Senate of equal democratic legitimacy with the National Assembly and, on the other, a 
“politically weak” Senate with strong “institutional links” with the counties. Indeed, the direct 
election of senators may well be the basis of the political strength and democratic legitimacy of 
the Senate. During the constitutional review process, for instance, the parliamentary Select 
Committee, drawn from the then unicameral national legislature, attempted to “water down” the 
powers of the Senate.40 The action by the PSC is indicative of the potential political rivalry 
between the two Houses. The popular mandate of the Senators is likely to enable the Senate to 
assert itself against the National Assembly and at the national level generally.  
While centralisation of political power is one of the major challenges that Kenya sought to 
address through the Constitution, a politically weak Senate might not achieve this objective as 
county interests cannot be guaranteed by a politically weak Senate. The popular mandate of the 
Senate gives it the necessary political leverage to enhance accountability in the exercise of 
power at the national level. Furthermore, while there is a possibility that directly elected senators 
may serve party interests, there is no certainty that indirectly elected Senators will serve party 
interests, as demonstrated by the experience with India‟s federal chamber. While direct 
elections may mean a weak institutional link to county governments, it is still possible to build a 
working relationship between Senators and the county governments, and this is envisaged in 
the Constitution. For instance, the Constitution provides that the Senate should consult county 
governors, among other relevant persons, when coming up with a basis for horizontal division of 
revenue.41 Furthermore, the general framework for intergovernmental cooperation can provide a 
basis for stronger and effective institutional links between the Senate, senators and the county 
governments.  
3. The Senate voting procedure  
The Senate powers are mainly limited to matters affecting county governments. However, the 
Senate is also mandated to deal with matters that do not concern counties. The Constitution 
stipulates different procedures of voting for matters that concern counties and for those that do 
not. Accordingly, before a vote is taken on any matter in the Senate, the speaker is required to 
                                               
40
 CoE (2010b) 114. See also Parliament of Kenya (National Assembly) „Report of the Parliamentary Select 
Committee on the Review of the Constitution on the Revised Harmonized Draft Constitution‟ (2010) 11.  
41
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rule whether the matter affects counties or not in order to ascertain which voting procedure 
applies.42  
3.1 Matters affecting county governments  
In matters affecting counties, the Constitution provides that members of the Senate who are 
registered voters from one county should cast votes as a “delegation”.43 This means that in all 
matters affecting counties, the 20 nominated members of the Senate do not have an 
independent vote. The elected county representative casts the vote44 after consulting the rest.45 
The matter is carried if it is supported by a majority of the “delegation” votes.46 The intention 
behind this system of “county votes” may have been to enhance representation of county 
interests, and is most likely borrowed from South Africa or Germany, where members of the 
federal chamber are true delegates of the constituent units and cast “delegation” votes.47  
The Kenyan Senate, however, has no delegates from county governments but representatives 
instead who are directly elected or nominated independently of the county governments. 
Indeed, Senate members from the same county may actually be from different political parties 
with opposing political views48 and might not reach consensus. In any case, the elected 
representative can ignore the input of fellow “delegates” and vote differently. The county vote is 
essentially an individual vote of the elected county representative in the Senate. 
The “county vote” procedure may offer protection, however, to the smaller ethnic communities. 
The 20 extra nominated members are most likely to be from the major parties, which also 
incidentally belong to the larger ethnic communities. Accordingly, if the non-elected members 
were to have independent votes, this could mean 20 extra votes for the larger ethnic 
communities if the nominated members choose to vote with their parties. To this extent, the 
casting of “county votes” prevents the dilution of the ethnic minority vote in the Senate, as 20 
extra votes can tilt the scales in any voting process.  
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 Article 123 (2).  
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 Article 123 (1).  
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 Article 123 (1).  
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 Article 123 (4) (b).  
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 Watts (2008) 151; De Vos P „The role of the National Council of Provinces in the governance of South Africa‟ in 
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3.2 Matters not affecting county governments  
In matters not affecting counties, all the Senate members, including the 20 nominees, have a 
vote each.49 The Senate is expressly excluded from legislation not affecting county 
governments,50 and the 20 extra members get to vote only on other matters (other than laws) 
that do not affect counties. The constitutional provisions are not clear, however, on what 
amounts to “a matter not affecting counties” and this will mainly depend on the speaker‟s 
interpretation.  
The Senate, being part of the national legislature, is vested horizontal checks and balances with 
the other arms of government. These roles include the power to impeach the president or the 
deputy president.51 The 20 nominated members may therefore be allowed to vote on 
impeachment as this is not a matter affecting counties. However, another speaker may rule that 
impeachment affects counties since some of the president‟s powers have an impact on county 
operations. What amounts to a matter affecting counties or one that does not (and which will 
thus include nominee votes) depends on the interpretation that is adopted. 
The decision on whether a matter affects counties or not has a substantial impact on the voting 
and decision-making as it will either reduce or increase Senate votes by 20. This is a fairly 
substantial proportion, and can tilt the decision in any tightly contested matter between the 
elected representatives. For instance, if the power to impeach is ruled as not affecting counties, 
the 20 extra votes may sway the decision if the Senate is equally divided on the impeachment of 
the president. The same applies to other matters that may be ruled as not affecting counties. 
Furthermore, if Senate procedural questions are ruled as matters not affecting counties, the 
major parties may end up determining procedural matters in their favour as they are likely to 
have 20 extra votes. Since procedural questions determine how the Senate arrives at decisions, 
the procedures adopted may end up working in favour of the major parties if the 20 extra 
members are allowed to cast votes in determining procedural questions.  
4. Powers and functions of Senate  
The Constitution lists three main functions of the Senate through which it can represent and 
protect county interests at the national level.52 First, it participates in the law-making function of 
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parliament by considering, debating and approving Bills concerning counties.53 Second, it 
determines the allocation of national revenue among counties, and also exercises oversight 
over national revenue allocated to county governments.54 Lastly, it has oversight powers over 
the national executive, including the power to impeach the president or deputy president.55  
4.1 Legislative power  
While the Senate has legislative power, it is limited to legislation affecting counties56 and thus 
has no role in legislation not affecting counties. While this provision can be seen as a limit to the 
legislative power of the Senate, it has the potential to ensure that the Senate focuses on 
protecting and representing counties only, as opposed to attending to general issues that could 
“dilute” its key mandate.57 For instance, the South African NCOP‟s general legislative mandate 
has been described as “no more than a delaying power” with no real benefit to the provinces.58  
A Bill affecting county governments may originate in either House.59 Such a Bill is defined as 
one which contains provisions that affect the county government functions listed under the 
Fourth Schedule.60 Additionally, any Bill relating to the election of members of a CA or CEC, or 
a Bill affecting county finances, is considered a Bill affecting county governments.61 In practice, 
however, many laws affect counties, and much will depend on how willing or able the Senate is 
to scrutinise legislation.62 Indeed, experience from multilevel systems such as South Africa, 
India and Canada shows that few Bills can be tagged as not affecting the subnational units.63  
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It is the duty of the speakers of both Houses jointly to resolve a question whether a law affects 
county governments or not.64 There are no further procedures provided on how such a decision 
should be reached. It is thus possible that a pro-centre speaker of the Senate may end up 
narrowing the Senate‟s legislative mandate, whereas a pro-county speaker could greatly 
expand the legislative power of the House. In South Africa, the NCOP and the National 
Assembly collectively, through a “joint tagging committee”, make decisions on the tagging of 
Bills, the procedure for which is set out in the Joint Rules of Parliament.65 If the Tagging 
Committee cannot agree, the matter is referred to the floors of both Houses and, as a last 
resort, to the Constitutional Court.66  
However, unlike the NCOP in South Africa which has powers over all legislation whether it 
affects provinces or not, the Senate in Kenya is expressly excluded from laws that do not 
concern counties. This means, therefore, that it is only through effective tagging of Bills that the 
Senate‟s power can be triggered to protect county interests. Incorrect tagging means that the 
Senate will not have any opportunity to debate the Bill. For instance, South Africa‟s NCOP can 
still consider a wrongly tagged Bill as legislation not affecting provinces because of its general 
legislative mandate. Even then, South Africa‟s Constitutional Court in the case of Tongoane and 
others v Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs and others67 ruled that where a Bill is wrongly 
tagged, and the wrong legislative procedure followed, the resulting legislation is invalid. In 
Kenya, a similar approach is crucial with regard to wrongly tagged Bills, given that the Senate is 
completely excluded from considering a Bill tagged as not affecting counties. 
The constitutional provisions further separate Senate legislative power into an ordinary and 
special legislative power. Accordingly, even after a Bill is tagged as affecting counties, both 
speakers must also jointly decide whether it is a special Bill affecting counties or an ordinary Bill 
affecting county governments.68 The Senate has an ordinary veto over ordinary Bills affecting 
counties and a special veto over special Bills affecting counties.  
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4.1.1 Ordinary legislative veto power 
A special Bill affecting counties is defined in the Constitution as a Bill that relates to the election 
of members of a CA or a CEC69 or is the County Allocation of Revenue Bill (CARB).70 Therefore, 
all other Bills affecting counties that do not fall within the category of special Bills affecting 
counties are subject to the ordinary legislative veto power of the Senate. All ordinary Bills 
affecting county governments can be passed by the Senate or the National Assembly by a 
simple majority vote. The speaker of the House that passes the Bill submits the same to the 
other House for debate and approval.71 The other House may pass it, reject it or pass it with 
amendment.72 If passed with an amendment, the Bill is referred back to the originating House 
for reconsideration with the amendment.73 If passed as amended, the respective House passes 
it on to the president for assent.74  
If an ordinary Bill affecting counties is rejected as amended by either House, a mediation 
committee,75 composed of equal number of members from both Houses, is set up to develop a 
“consensus Bill” acceptable to both Houses.76 If the consensus Bill is passed by both 
chambers,77 the speaker of National Assembly passes the Bill to the president for assent.78 If 
the consensus Bill fails in either House, the Bill is defeated.79 In essence, with regard to ordinary 
Bills affecting counties, both Houses have equal legislative power.  
Money Bills, defined as Bills which seek to affect taxes or other public finances other than as 
contemplated in the finance section of the Constitution, cannot originate in the Senate.80 
Instead, Money Bills should originate only in the National Assembly, and only after views of the 
cabinet secretary in charge of finance have been taken into account.81 Therefore, the Senate 
can only wait to debate and pass a money Bill affecting county governments after the Bill has 
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been introduced in the National Assembly. The CARB and the DRB are excluded from the 
definition of a money Bill and they can thus be introduced in either House.82 
The president can veto laws enacted by Parliament, and in that case both Houses may amend 
the law to incorporate the president‟s concerns or pass it without amendment.83 Where both 
Houses amend the law incorporating the president‟s views, the appropriate speaker will 
resubmit the same for presidential assent.84 However, the two Houses can also reject the 
president‟s reservations and pass the law with a two-thirds majority vote.85 
Through its legislative power, the Senate, which represents counties, safeguards the interests of 
counties in national legislation. With regard to ordinary Bills affecting counties, the Senate has 
powers equal to those of the National Assembly and can thus ensure that county interests are 
considered in the promulgation of laws affecting counties. The interests of counties are 
therefore potentially safeguarded by the Senate‟s ordinary veto over ordinary legislation 
affecting counties.  
4.1.2 Special legislative veto power 
The Senate has a special veto power with regard to a Bill concerning the election of members of 
a CA or a CEC86 and the County Allocation of Revenue Bill (CARB).87 If the Senate passes any 
of these Bills, the National Assembly can only amend or veto the Bill via a resolution supported 
by at least two-thirds of the members of the NA.88 If the National Assembly does not garner the 
required two-thirds, the speaker of the National Assembly is required to hand over the Bill to the 
president within seven days for assent.89  
While the Senate has a general power to represent and protect the interests of counties, the 
special legislative power is indicative of the core interests of counties that the Senate has to 
protect. The CARB, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, shares out resources among 
county government.90 The equitable share is a crucial aspect of the operations of the county 
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governments, as counties are likely to be heavily reliant on revenue collected nationally.91 The 
special Senate veto has the potential to facilitate a more equitable and transparent process of 
sharing resources among counties.  
Legislative and executive structures of counties, on the other hand, are the basis of the exercise 
of all county powers. It is through executive and legislative structures that county governments 
are able to exercise their autonomy and powers. Local authorities in the past dispensation were, 
as shown in Chapter 3, subordinated and made appendages of the central government. With its 
special veto, however, the Senate can protect the structures, and therefore the autonomy, of 
county governments. The requirements for a two-thirds majority vote in the National Assembly 
may be difficult to reach, and this protects counties from any intrusive national laws that may 
undermine county structures or resources, both of which are critical to the autonomy of 
counties.  
4.1.3 Constitutional amendment  
Constitutional amendment can be done either through a parliamentary or popular initiative, and 
the Senate participates in both. A constitutional amendment may be introduced in either 
House92 in the form of an amendment Bill. The amendment will pass if approved by at least two-
thirds of the votes in both Houses on the second and third readings.93 The Senate thus plays a 
role equal to that of the National Assembly with regard to constitutional amendments. The 
Senate is not given special powers over amendment of constitutional provisions relevant to 
devolved government. Instead, amendments of provisions touching on the objects, principles 
and structure of devolved government are to be put to a national referendum after the 
parliamentary process described above.94 The amendment has to be supported by a simple 
majority of the voters and at least 20 percent of the voters in half of the 47 counties.95 The 
amendment of national values and principles of governance,96 which include “sharing and 
devolution of power”, is also subject to a referendum.97  
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More significantly, the Constitution clearly states that the powers exercised by the national and 
county governments emanate from the people and are exercised on their behalf by the 
respective governments.98 Accordingly, county powers do not flow from the centre but from the 
people to the national and county governments, respectively. It is thus fitting that the people are 
the custodians of the provisions establishing and empowering county governments. 
4.2 Setting the basis for horizontal division of revenue   
The Constitution empowers the Senate to determine the basis of allocating the county equitable 
share among counties.99 The Senate must, once every five years, pass a resolution which 
determines the basis for horizontal division of revenue. In setting the basis for horizontal 
revenue sharing, the Senate is to be guided by the criteria for determining the equitable share 
provided for in the Constitution.100 The Senate is also required to request and consider 
recommendations from the CRA.101 Furthermore, the Senate should consult the county 
governors, the Cabinet Secretary responsible for finance and any organisation of county 
governments.102 Lastly, the Senate is required to invite the public, including professional bodies, 
to make submissions on the matter.103  
After passing the resolution that sets the basis for horizontal division of revenue, the resolution 
is referred to the National Assembly within 10 days and the National Assembly is required to 
vote to accept it fully or with amendments, or reject it, within 60 days.104 If the National 
Assembly does not vote within 60 days, the resolution is to be considered adopted without 
amendment.105 The National Assembly can either amend or reject the resolution by a two-thirds 
vote.106 If amended or rejected by the National Assembly, the Senate can either adopt a new 
resolution, in which case the same procedure will apply, or request mediation through a joint 
committee.107 A resolution by the Senate on the basis of division of revenue applies until the 
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next resolution is adopted.108 However, the Senate may, at any time, and by a resolution of two-
thirds, amend the resolution, in which case the same procedure for the National Assembly 
approval will follow.109  
The special power of the Senate over the CARB and the resolution setting the basis for the 
horizontal division of revenue gives the Senate an upper hand over the horizontal distribution of 
revenue. The CARB is not a money Bill and can be introduced in the Senate. A combination of 
these factors gives the Senate unassailable control over the horizontal division of revenue.  
Despite the extensive county powers over the horizontal division of the county equitable share, 
the Senate has no equivalent special power over the vertical division of revenue. The Senate 
does not have express powers to debate and pass the DRB which deals with the vertical 
division of revenue.110 This may be seen as a weakness because the size of the overall share 
will determine the significance of the share that individual counties receive. The DRB easily fits 
in the category of ordinary Bills concerning counties.111 Furthermore, the DRB is exempted from 
a money Bill and can thus still be introduced in the Senate and discussed as an ordinary Bill 
affecting counties.112  
4.3 Review power 
The Senate has the power to review national executive decisions affecting counties as well as 
some decisions which do not affect counties. The review power of the Senate emanates from its 
dual role of representing counties and of being a national organ of horizontal power-sharing. 
While some of the review powers are co-shared with the National Assembly, the Senate has 
exclusive review power over national executive decisions that directly concern county 
governments. The Senate can set aside national executive decisions and is thus capable of 
safeguarding county interests.  
4.3.1 Review power over matters concerning counties  
The Senate has exclusive powers to review national government interventions in county 
governments. The Constitution provides that national legislation should provide for a process by 
which the Senate may bring an intervention by a national government in a county government to 
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an end,113 the procedure for which is set out by the CGA.114 The constitutional power of the 
Senate to terminate an intervention in a county government at any time115 is also recognised in 
the CGA.  
While the Constitution provides for circumstances under which a county government can be 
suspended by the national executive,116 the Senate may, at any time, terminate the suspension 
of a county government.117 The procedure of suspension of a county government is provided for 
in CGA,118 which also recognises the power of the Senate to terminate a suspension.119 Given 
that a suspension has the effect of suspending county structures and may lead to fresh 
elections,120 the Senate power to review suspension is important to safeguard county interests 
and ensure objectivity in the process.  
The transitional provisions of the Constitution provide that the transfer for powers of counties 
can be delayed and undertaken gradually as counties build their capacity over a period of three 
years from the start of operations.121 The Transition to Devolved Government Act (TDGA),122 
which was passed to guide the transition to devolved government, grants the Senate exclusive 
powers to review decisions on the transfer of powers to county governments.123 While the 
Transitional Authority (TA), established in the TDGA, has powers to receive applications by 
counties for the transfer of powers and may reject such an application,124 a county can appeal to 
the Senate, which has a final say on the transfer of powers.125 
Supervision and national regulation are key pillars of decentralised governance.126 It is only 
through supervision and regulation that county governments can adhere to national standards 
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and implement important national policies at the county level.127 The gradual transfer of powers, 
on the other hand, is necessitated by the need to ensure uninterrupted delivery of services in 
the transition period.128 However, these measures are a form of limitation on county government 
autonomy. Therefore, there is an inherent risk that they could be used as a means of 
undermining county autonomy and devolution in general. Indeed, national regulatory powers 
have been used in the past to control and bring local authorities into submission.129 The 
exclusive review power of the Senate protects counties from any possible central government 
attempts to undermine county government powers and autonomy. 
4.3.2 General review power  
General review powers of the Senate relate to it being a component of the national legislature. 
The general review powers thus enable the Senate, along with the National Assembly, to 
participate in horizontal checks and balances of the national executive and the judiciary. The 
National Assembly and the Senate share powers to impeach the president and the deputy 
president. The Constitution provides that impeachment proceedings should commence from the 
National Assembly.130 If supported by two-thirds of the National Assembly, the motion moves to 
the Senate.131 The Senate votes on impeachment charges after an investigating committee 
drawn from the Senate makes recommendations for impeachment.132 A two-thirds vote for 
impeachment of the president will see the president vacate office.133 The same procedure 
applies to impeachment of the deputy president.134  
Thus, while impeachment proceedings against the president commence in the National 
Assembly, the Senate makes the final and actual determination whether the president or the 
deputy president is fit to hold office. The Senate can thus be said to have the power of “a quasi-
judicial institution”135 that can try the president.136 The main limitation, however, is that the power 
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of the Senate can be activated only after an impeachment is passed by the National Assembly 
and referred to the Senate. 
The Constitution specifies that some executive appointments are subject to “Parliament‟s 
approval”, including appointment of the Inspector General of Police which requires approval of 
parliament generally.137 However, the Senate is excluded from a number of important 
appointments: cabinet secretaries, principal secretaries,138 the Controller of Budget, auditor 
general, and appointment of members of independent commissions. The provisions of the 
Constitution require “approval of the National Assembly”, thus excluding the Senate. 
Furthermore, only the National Assembly can commence a motion to remove a cabinet 
secretary from office.139 While the wording excludes the Senate from seemingly relevant and 
important appointments, Ghai and Cottrell attribute this omission to an oversight by the drafters 
as opposed to a deliberate intention to exclude the Senate.140 
Both the Senate and the National Assembly approve deployment of national forces in and 
outside of Kenya.141 The Senate also approves jointly with the National Assembly the extension 
of the term of parliament when the country is at war.142  
4.4 Power to nominate members of the CRA  
The Constitution provides that the political parties represented in the Senate shall nominate five 
of the commissioners of the CRA while the National Assembly nominates two persons to the 
CRA.143 In view of the important role that the CRA plays in matters of revenue division and 
county finances generally, the power of the Senate to appoint the majority of the CRA members 
is significant. Given that the Senate is mandated to safeguard county interests, it is intended 
that the political parties represented in the Senate will act with county interests in mind. This can 
only be reflected through nominating persons who have relevant qualifications and can promote 
and safeguard county interests in the vertical and horizontal division of revenue and other 
matters that the CRA will attend to.  
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Kirira criticises this power for having the potential to introduce politics into resource-sharing.144 
However, the requirement that persons nominated should be professionals and serve in their 
personal capacity for a non-renewable term may enhance the independence of the CRA. The 
Senate also has power to nominate a member to the Salaries and Remuneration Commission 
(SRC), which is mandated to set salary scales for the national and county governments.145  
4.5 Oversight power 
By definition, oversight means the “follow-on activity” on implementation of laws and policies by 
the executive.146 However, oversight can also extend to preparation of policies and laws.147 
Common oversight tools include, among others, committee hearings, hearings in plenary 
sessions, commissions of inquiry, questions, and question time.148 It is thus clear that while 
review powers have a “hard” edge capable of “frustrating” the executive, oversight basically 
entails scrutiny and “soft” measures that may not necessarily alter the direction of executive 
decisions.  
The Constitution empowers the Senate to exercise oversight over national revenue allocated to 
the county governments.149 Only the national executive has measures such as intervention or 
stoppage of funds in cases of material breach by a county. The Controller of Budget (CoB) can 
also reject any proposed expenditure that is not in accordance with the pre-determined county 
budget.150 The Senate is thus limited to oversight over the national executive conduct with 
regard to revenue belonging to counties.  
The Senate has power to summon a cabinet member to answer a question on any matter when 
required.151 The CoB is also required to submit reports after every four months to each House, 
including Senate, on the implementation of the budgets of the national and county 
governments.152 All commissions and independent offices established in the Constitution are 
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required to submit annual reports to the Senate, National Assembly and the president.153 The 
National Security Council is equally required to report to both Houses.154 At any time, Senate, 
National Assembly or the president can also require a commission or holder of an independent 
office to submit a report on a particular issue,155 which report will be published and publicised.156  
The Senate also has powers, like the National Assembly and the county assemblies, to 
summon any public official or any other person before it to provide evidence required by the 
Senate.157 However, the nature of the oversight power itself is limited to scrutiny and “naming” 
and “shaming” without any real power comparable to the review powers.  
5. Assessment of the Senate  
The Senate has the potential to facilitate the pursuit of the three purposes of devolving power. 
This can only be achieved if its structure reflects and enhances ethnic diversity and 
representation at the national level. In addition, powers of the Senate must be relevant to the 
root causes of ethnic conflict. Furthermore, the Senate should also have powers that can 
guarantee the autonomy of counties to pursue local preferences and local development. A 
critical assessment of the structure and powers of the Senate in terms of the three purposes 
reveals potential benefits as well as risks for all of the three purposes.  
5.1 The Senate and development  
Important processes for devolved development carried out at the national level include 
supervision and regulation of devolved units. Effective devolved development also requires 
cooperation between devolved units and the national level. Most of these functions are 
performed by the national executive through its sectoral ministries and departments, which 
formulate and implement national policies as well as coordinate service delivery.158 The Senate, 
on the other hand, is part of the national legislature and is therefore not directly involved in 
regulation and supervision of county governments. Indeed, the World Bank recommends that 
due to the often constrained powers of the second chamber, decentralised development issues 
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should be generally deliberated in the first chambers that usually have “unconstrained” 
powers.159 
In the Kenyan context, the Senate has been entrusted with powers which have the potential to 
facilitate the pursuit of development. By virtue of the Senate being part of the national 
legislature, the bulk of its powers relate to horizontal checks and balances, some of which have 
the potential to protect county interests. The Senate functions which have a potential to protect 
counties include: the review power, legislative function, and determination of the horizontal 
distribution of resources among counties.  
5.1.1 Design aspects which enhance development  
The Senate has power to end national government intervention in a county160 and can also 
terminate the suspension of a county government.161 While intervention and suspension of 
counties is an important part of ensuring efficiency and effective service delivery, the possibility 
exists that these avenues could be used to shrink the space and autonomy of county 
governments. Indeed, past experience shows how local authorities were subjected to central 
control and political subordination that led to breakdown of service delivery.162 The power of the 
Senate to end interventions and suspensions can counteract any attempt to interfere with 
county autonomy.  
While the Constitution provides that counties can be assigned additional powers by national 
legislation,163 the Senate can ensure that, through its legislative power, counties are not 
assigned powers without additional resources, thereby avoiding the problem of unfunded 
mandates. The Senate can also veto legislation that may be aimed at intruding into or infringing 
on the autonomy of county governments. The legislative power of the Senate thus ensures that 
county interests are considered and safeguarded whenever national legislation is passed.  
The special veto power of the Senate with regard to horizontal division of revenue – along with 
the resolution setting the basis for horizontal division of revenue – can facilitate effective 
devolved development.164 Both the resolution and CARB lay the basis for equitable 
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development, and the Senate has effective power to determine both with the assistance of the 
CRA. The Senate hence has the potential to enhance equitable development.  
The ability of the Senate to protect the autonomy of counties is also dependent on its political 
strength in the national political scene, strength which is considerably enhanced by its popular 
mandate through the direct election of the senators. To this extent, the structure of the Senate 
facilitates developmental autonomy as it grants the Senate the political voice necessary to 
safeguard county autonomy. The broader constitutional structure, which has enhanced 
horizontal separation of powers and checks and balances, also gives the Senate the necessary 
political space to exercise its powers. For instance, the national executive has no control over 
other arms of government as it did in the past. As such, the Senate is free to exercise its powers 
aimed at protecting the autonomy of counties without any interference from the executive.  
5.1.2 Design factors which hinder development  
The structures of the Senate, as well as the bulk of its powers, are relevant to devolved 
development. However, there are certain design aspects that may hinder the pursuit of effective 
devolved development. The Senate has special powers to determine the horizontal division of 
revenue but has no equivalent power in the determination of the vertical division of revenue. 
Accordingly, the Senate might not play an effective role in determining the vertical share of 
counties – which is important in that it will further determine the amount of horizontal share that 
is available.  
The Senate is also denied powers to review appointments of key offices which are relevant to 
the operation of counties. For instance, while the CoB has constitutional power to authorise all 
expenditure by counties, the Senate, however, has no role to play in the appointment of the 
CoB.165 Furthermore, the Senate has no role to play in the appointment of cabinet secretaries 
and principal secretaries of ministries.166 Most of the ministries will formulate and supervise 
implement sectoral policies that impact on county governments. While the Senate can use its 
oversight power to protect county interests, reviewing appointments to these crucial offices 
would have been a more effective way of protecting the interests of counties.  
The weak institutional link between the Senate and county governments has the potential to 
affect development negatively. A “federal chamber” composed of “governmental 
representatives” from the constituent units is arguably in a better position to represent county 
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interests in line with the priorities of the subnational legislature and executive. A directly elected 
federal chamber, on the other hand, has weak institutional links with the subnational 
governments. Nevertheless, it remains possible to build such links and cooperation between the 
Senate and organs of the county government, albeit that there is no ready basis for this in the 
structural design of the Senate.  
5.2 The Senate and ethnic accommodation  
As an institution of shared rule, the Senate should enhance representation of diversity and 
facilitate inclusiveness in central decision-making.167 Furthermore, the institutions of shared rule 
should have powers to address issues that define conflict, issues that often revolve around 
resources and political power.168 In the Kenyan context, the Senate should be in a position to 
address equitable sharing of resources and facilitate the sharing of powers with other ethnic 
communities not in the control of the presidency. In this way, the Senate would address issues 
that underlie ethnic conflict in Kenya.  
5.2.1 Design aspects which facilitate ethnic accommodation  
The senate is composed of senators elected from what are mainly ethnically exclusive 
counties.169 If the ethnic majorities in the respective counties elect their own as senators, the 
Senate may well end up being the national forum for ethnic representation. Furthermore, 
equality in Senate representation, as illustrated, for instance, by the Nairobi and Lamu counties, 
grants the smaller ethnic communities a stronger voice than in the National Assembly.  
The equal representation of counties also makes the Senate an appropriate forum for inter-
ethnic dialogue. Smaller ethnic communities have 47 percent representation in the Senate as 
opposed to 38 percent in the National Assembly. Therefore, while the overall effectiveness of 
the Senate in addressing ethnic conflict depends on the specific powers exercised by the 
Senate, the structure already provides a basis for addressing issues that define ethnic conflict.  
Most of the powers granted to the Senate are relevant to the root causes of ethnic conflict in 
Kenya. The special powers of the Senate regarding horizontal division of national revenue 
enhance objectivity and transparency in the division of revenue. More specifically, smaller ethnic 
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communities will participate in processes leading to division of resources. This may dispel the 
perceptions of resource-exclusion held by smaller ethnic communities that had no voice at the 
national level. As already noted, successive regimes in Kenya have seen ethnically skewed 
allocation of state resources for development;170 however, Senate powers can address this by 
providing a transparent and equitable way of dividing national resources. 
The review powers of the Senate are also relevant to ethnic accommodation. Resolution of 
ethnic conflict is dependent on the different ethnic communities exercising control over political 
powers and resources. Therefore, any measures taken by the national government to claw back 
the autonomy of counties is likely to be interpreted as domination by the ethnic community in 
control of the presidency. It is the case, though, that the Senate has powers to terminate 
national government interventions in county governments; it can also terminate the suspension 
of a county government. These powers have the potential to protect county autonomy and thus 
ensure ethnic political accommodation. In addition, the broader constitutional framework of 
separation of powers and limited presidential powers also enables the Senate to exercise its 
functions more effectively. 
5.2.2 Design aspects which hinder ethnic accommodation 
A number of structural and functional aspects of the Senate may hinder ethnic accommodation. 
Representation of ethnic diversity is important for the purposes of enhancing inclusiveness. 
However, while ethnic communities with “home counties” are likely to be represented in the 
Senate, “in-county ethnic minorities” are unlikely to make it through the direct vote at the county 
level. This means that a number of ethnic communities might not have the opportunity to be 
represented in the Senate.  
The plight of county minorities is worsened by the absence of a provision enabling special 
representation for minorities and marginalised communities in the Senate, as may be the case 
in the National Assembly and county assemblies. It is likely, therefore, that the current 
structures of the Senate will exclude “in-county minorities.” While arrangements can be made to 
share seats with “in-county minorities” as was the case in Migori County where it was agreed 
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that the Senate seat is to be allocated to the Kuria community, such initiatives depend on the 
political will of the ethnic majority.   
While “in-county minorities” do not pose a danger to national political stability, they are capable 
of being disruptive within counties where they have a commanding presence. Indeed, the Kuria 
community in Migori County has been identified as a possible threat to stability in the event of 
their real or perceived marginalisation by the locally dominant Luo community.171 The Senate 
structure minimises any chances of “in-county minorities” being elected into its representative 
structures. It is for this reason that Ghai argues that perceptions of exclusion from the Senate 
and the National Assembly by ethnic minorities might fuel ethnic minority conflict.172  
While the Senate structure provides a possibility for the protection of the rights of smaller ethnic 
communities, the effectiveness of the structure depends on factors that are external to the 
design. First, the Senate structure can only effectively facilitate ethnic representation if the 
FPTP system of voting produces the expected ethnic composition. That is, each county will vote 
in a senator from the majority ethnic community. Second, the effectiveness of the structure will 
also depend on whether the smaller ethnic communities will vote together as a bloc in order to 
take advantage of their enhanced presence in the Senate collectively.  
However, there is no guarantee that the expected ethnic composition will be realised and that 
smaller ethnic communities will vote as a bloc. Indeed, in Chapter 5 it was noted that while 
independence politics pitted the larger and more dominant ethnic communities against the 
smaller communities,173 political dynamics have since changed. The larger ethnic communities 
that worked together at independence are now adversaries in political contests, with the smaller 
ethnic communities taking whichever side is expedient to them. The Luo and the Kikuyu, ethnic 
communities who are arguably the most politically active and whose leaders were allies at 
independence, are now locked in bitter political rivalry.174 Often, the smaller ethnic communities 
take sides with one of the two large ethnic communities. It is thus not assured that 
representatives of smaller ethnic communities will defend the genuine interests of the smaller 
ethnic communities or counties.  
                                               
171
 Sing‟oei (2012) 23.  
172
 Ghai & Cottrell (2011) 137.  
173
 Kanyinga K „The Legacy of the White Highlands: Land rights, ethnicity and the post-2007 elections violence in 
Kenya‟ (2009) 3 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 329. 
174
 Barkan JD „Ethnic fractionalization and the propensity for conflict in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania‟ in Herbst J, 
McNamee T & Mills G (eds) On the Fault Line: managing the tensions and divisions within societies (2012) 150.  
 
 
 
 
383 
 
With regard to powers, some aspects of the design may also hinder effective ethnic 
accommodation. The Senate has no special power regarding vertical division of revenue 
collected nationally. Accordingly, it has no effective control over the vertical equitable share of 
counties. Official and independent estimates show that counties need more than the minimum 
constitutionally guaranteed share of 15 percent.175 Indeed, the main ethnic conflict can be 
resolved only if the larger ethnic communities are able, through their respective counties, to 
control resources that provide a political alternative to control of the centre. However, the 
Senate does not have special powers to facilitate such an arrangement. Furthermore, given the 
ethnically exclusive nature of counties, the lack of adequate resources may easily be interpreted 
as ethnically-based exclusion and so pave the way for grievance and conflict. 
The legislative power of the Senate is limited to laws concerning county governments.176 While 
there are many laws that would affect counties in actuality, a conservative speaker of the 
Senate may exclude the Senate from crucial matters impacting on ethnic accommodation. For 
instance, the role of counties in land matters is limited to community land only.177 It is thus 
possible that land matters not directly related to community land could be tagged conservatively 
as not affecting counties; in other words, it is possible that certain matters at the heart of ethnic 
conflict in Kenya may be tagged as not affecting counties and thereby limit the Senate‟s ability 
to deliberate about them.  
5.3 The Senate and the counterbalancing of central power  
Effective representation and participation of devolved units in central-decision making enhances 
the ability of the devolved units to influence central decisions and thus actually counterbalance 
centralised power at the centre.178 This in turn depends on the structure as well the powers 
exercised by the institutions of shared rule. The structure should enable effective incorporation 
of the interests of devolved units in central decision-making. With regard to powers, the 
institution of shared rule should be vested with powers that can enable the devolved units to 
participate in important central decision-making and thus effectively co-exercise and co-
determine the central government agenda. The structure and powers of the Senate discussed 
earlier have the potential to facilitate counterbalancing of central power; at the same time, there 
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are certain design aspects that could hinder the Senate‟s ability to counterbalance central 
power.  
5.3.1 Design aspects which enhance the counterbalancing of power  
The ability of the Senate to counterbalance central power depends on its political significance at 
the national level. Directly elected senators give the Senate the political muscle to assert itself 
and therefore counterbalance central power.179 The equal representation of counties in the 
Senate also facilitates smaller counties to have a stronger voice at the national level and 
therefore participate in the counterbalancing of central power.  
In regard to powers, the Senate has general and special powers that have the potential to 
enable effective counterbalancing of central power. The Senate co-determines legislation 
concerning counties with the National Assembly. The Senate has special powers over laws that 
touch on the structures of counties and over the CARB, which divides revenue among counties. 
The special veto enables the Senate to counterbalance power in these specific matters. The 
Senate also shares powers of impeachment of the president with the National Assembly as well 
as powers over some appointments. The Senate thus plays an integral role in determining the 
suitability of the president. For instance, the power to impeach the president and the deputy 
president gives the Senate semi-judicial powers.180 
The review power of the Senate on matters such as national government intervention in county 
governments, suspension of counties, and the transfer of powers also enables the Senate to 
effectively counterbalance central power on these matters. Using these review powers, the 
Senate can “frustrate” any effort by the national executive to use powers of intervention to 
intrude into counties.  
5.3.2 Design aspects which may hinder the counterbalancing of power  
Some design features may hinder the Senate‟s ability to effectively counterbalance central 
power. The Senate‟s special power over division of resources is limited to the horizontal division 
of the county equitable share. It is thus likely that the Senate may not influence the vertical 
division of resources. The vertical share is limited to 15 percent, and this is, as noted, said to be 
insufficient to meet the resource needs of counties.181 The bulk of revenue raised nationally may 
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end up remaining with the national government, and the Senate will have limited influence in 
terms of enhancing the vertical share of counties.  
The legislative power of the Senate is excluded from laws that do not affect counties. However, 
the boundary between laws that concern counties and those that do not is not clear. This means 
that, depending on the interpretative approach taken by the Speaker of the Senate, some laws 
may fall in either category. A restrictive interpretation of laws that affect counties could exclude 
counties from matters that do in fact concern their interests.  
Regardless of the Senate‟s structure and composition, its ability to counterbalance central 
power in actuality depends on how Senate politics are conducted. Although smaller counties 
have an equal voice with the large counties, there is no guarantee they will use their power to 
influence central decision-making. It is likely that senators from the counties with smaller ethnic 
communities will vote alongside those from the larger counties on the basis of party interests. In 
this event, the Senate will not be significantly distinctive from the National Assembly. Indeed, a 
directly elected Senate was rejected in Germany on the grounds that it “would merely duplicate 
the central parliament, its composition, and party politics”.182  
5.4 Is there a balance of purposes in the design of the Senate?  
A few trade-offs between the three purposes are visible in the structure and powers of the 
Senate. A Senate with stronger institutional links through, for instance, “governmental 
representation” would have assured representation of development priorities in the Senate. 
However, direct elections were chosen because they enhance the political significance of the 
Senate at the centre and hence its ability to counterbalance central power. Direct elections also 
enhance inclusiveness at the centre. This can thus be interpreted as a trade-off between 
development and the other two purposes of devolved government. However, the compensation 
is that the Senate has powers to protect the autonomy of counties through matters such as 
horizontal division of revenue and terminating interventions in, and suspension of, counties; in 
turn, this can enable counties to pursue local preferences.  
Indeed, most of the powers of the Senate are important for the pursuit of the three purposes as 
they safeguard the general autonomy of counties, enhance “federal decision-making”, and 
promote inclusiveness at the centre. It can thus be concluded that, save for the preference of 
“political power” over strong “institutional links”, there is no other major trade-off in the design of 
the Senate.  
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6. Conclusion  
This chapter has analysed the structure and powers of the Senate which represents counties at 
the national level. The preceding discussions conclude that the structure and powers are 
generally relevant to the protection of county interests; by implication, they are relevant to the 
three purposes of devolution. The Senate has powers to protect the developmental autonomy of 
county governments, although its structure does not provide a ready basis for cooperation with 
county governments. Furthermore, while the Senate structure is unfriendly to representation of 
county ethnic minorities, most or all ethnic communities with “home counties” will be equally 
represented in the Senate and this may enhance ethnic accommodation. The equal 
representation of counties also enhances the ability of the Senate to counterbalance power.  
Therefore, while factors such as the size and number of counties have limited the ability of 
counties to counterbalance central power, the Senate is likely to fill this void by claiming political 
space at the national level. This may form an important basis for representing county interests. 
The powers of the Senate are relevant to development, ethnic accommodation and limiting 
central power by counterbalancing it with other loci of power. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUDING ANALYSIS  
1. Introduction  
Development, conflict resolution and limiting central power are the most common purposes that 
the devolution of power serves in developing states. In the literature and state practice, distinct 
design features are associated with each purpose, but the congruence or dissonance between 
these respective designs has not been made explicit in both literature and practice. There is no 
doubt that states have long been confronted simultaneously with the three issues and that, as 
evidenced by the varying designs that have emerged, they have thus made trade-offs between 
them – whether deliberately so or not – in order to facilitate the combined pursuit of these three 
purposes. Using the Kenyan context as its site of exploration, this thesis has examined the kind 
of trade-offs that are made to enhance effective pursuit of the three purposes in a single system. 
The congruence or dissonance in the design of devolved government for each of the three 
purposes is examined using the Kenyan context. First, as Chapter 3 shows, underdevelopment, 
ethnic conflict and abuse of centralised power are historical, systemic, and indeed fundamental 
challenges with which Kenya continues to struggle. Second, Chapter 4 shows that during the 
constitutional review process, devolution of power was specifically considered as one of the 
principal measures to deal with these three fundamental challenges. This is confirmed by the 
objectives of devolved government listed in Article 174 of the Constitution, objectives which, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, revolve around these three purposes of devolving power.  
While the preceding chapters have focused separately on aspects of county and national 
design, the first part of this concluding analysis examines how the entire devolution system 
(county and national mechanisms) accommodates the three purposes. The implications of the 
analysis and assessment of the Kenyan system are of general relevance to other developing 
countries. Indeed, an essential aim of this conclusion is to identify lessons that can be drawn 
from the Kenyan approach and used for comparative purposes by other developing states and 
interested parties. As such, the second part of this analysis suggests constitutional design 
features that serve potentially as a “Kenyan contribution” to other states in the same quandary.  
An examination of the entire system of devolution reveals that the three purposes were given 
varying treatment in different parts of the devolved system. First, development is easily the most 
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prominent purpose informing the primary design of the Kenyan system. Both the structures and 
the bulk of powers of both county and relevant national institutions are mostly designed to 
pursue development. Second, while the devolved system of government may partially address 
issues pertaining to ethnic conflict, the system will not address the main ethnic conflict in Kenya. 
Lastly, while counties are weak in terms of limiting central power, this deficit may be partially 
corrected by the Senate which represents counties at the national level. Both the structure and 
powers of the Senate have the potential to limit and even counterbalance the exercise of central 
power.  
At a general level, the most significant aspect of the Kenyan system is its apparently unique 
devolved government structure. The county level is essentially a “hybrid level” that merges the 
typical regional and local levels into a “hybrid level” which is neither regional nor local. The 
“hybrid level” combines “regional type” and “local type” functions, and this is bound to have a 
profound impact on the three purposes. More specifically, the “hybrid level” creates uncertainty 
and difficulties that have the potential to hinder the achievement of the three purposes. 
Therefore, while the effectiveness of a system depends mainly on its operating context, the 
second part of this concluding analysis cautions that the “hybrid level” may not be the most 
appropriate compromise to adopt between the three purposes. 
2. Development, ethnic accommodation, and limiting central power through 
devolution design in Kenya: a concluding analysis  
While Chapters 5, 6 and 7, and Chapter 8 analysed self-rule and shared-rule arrangements, 
respectively, this section examines the entire devolved system from the prism of the three 
purposes. The main focus of this thesis, however, is on how trade-offs are made between the 
conflicting design aspects in order to enable effective pursuit of the three purposes. Accordingly, 
the second part discusses how, if at all, the entire system accommodates the three purposes in 
order to facilitate their effective pursuit. 
2.1 Development 
The devolved system of government in Kenya is primarily designed to pursue the 
developmental purpose. The structure and powers of the subnational and national institutions 
relevant to devolved government mainly suit devolved development. Emphasis on the 
developmental purpose can be seen directly from the objectives of devolved government, where 
six of the nine objectives deal specifically with the developmental purpose. 
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However, the emphasis on development is not misplaced in the light of past experience. As 
outlined in Chapter 3, a combination of factors led to breakdown of local service delivery and 
general underdevelopment. Local authorities were subjected to central administrative and 
political control which affected their overall effectiveness.1 The local authorities had no clear 
powers or sources of revenue since the minister in charge of local government had to approve 
administratively any functions performed by local authorities or any revenue-raising measures.2 
The national ministry, too, had no institutional capacity, and this led to central bureaucratic 
inefficiencies that had a negative impact at the local level.3 The net effect is that local authorities 
had no fiscal or political autonomy to address local preferences.4 There was poor accountability, 
and local authorities descended into public irrelevance.5 
As a result, effective local service delivery was at the centre of deliberations in the constitutional 
review process. The public was emphatic during the review process that vital services should be 
devolved to the local level.6 There was overwhelming public support for the view that local 
governments should be strengthened to deliver services,7 and it was also emphasised that local 
service delivery should be expanded to previously neglected areas in order to ensure equitable 
development. 
The World Bank suggests that in order to have effective development, devolved units should be 
neither so small as to be unviable nor so large as to hinder meaningful local participation in 
development.8 It was also suggested that devolved units should have adequate political and 
fiscal autonomy, subject to local accountability processes,9 in order to address local 
preferences. Supervision and cooperation were identified as key elements for effective 
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development.10 The question, therefore, is whether the entire devolved system incorporates 
these elements regarded as key to effective development.  
With regard to the size and number of units, the counties are neither local nor regional units and 
hence too large to facilitate effective local service delivery. However, the Constitution provides 
for urban local government and decentralisation to the sub-county level in rural areas. 
Therefore, there is the potential for truly local units to be created for effective service delivery; 
realising this potential depends on how the framework for urban and rural local government is 
implemented.  
While the bulk of the powers granted to counties are largely relevant to local development, the 
merging of the regional and local levels creates uncertainty. Counties are either too small to 
assume some of the regional functions or too large to carry out certain of the local functions 
effectively. The lack of clarity on performance of functions may lead to low accountability as 
there could be no clear actor to be held to account. More risky is the fact that most “regional-
scope” functions may be centralised on the grounds that counties cannot effectively perform 
such services. At the central level, the Senate participates in passing laws affecting counties 
and may thus protect county interests when laws which further define the powers of counties 
are passed. For instance, the Senate can resist an overly restrictive approach which seeks to 
narrow county powers. Therefore, while county powers are poorly designed as a result of the 
“hybrid level”, the Senate can, through its legislative power, ensure that counties retain essential 
powers and functions.  
There are central and local measures to ensure that county autonomy is guaranteed and 
protected. County functional areas are constitutionally entrenched11 and county revenues 
guaranteed through locally generated revenue and guaranteed central transfers.12 The powers 
of the Senate to terminate, at any time, a national government intervention13 in a county 
government or to end the suspension of a county government14 also further safeguard county 
autonomy. This power is important in view of the history of centralised control and political 
subordination of the former local authorities. The Senate‟s power to determine horizontal 
revenue division can also ensure that resources for development are distributed equitably.  
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It can therefore be concluded that the structures and powers of county and national institutions 
are generally relevant to the developmental purpose of devolution. Counties are equipped with 
powers that can ensure effective pursuit of development. While there is some uncertainty with 
regard to powers and functions, the Senate can exercise its legislative power and ensure that 
counties are not denied powers vital for effective local service delivery and development.  
2.2 Ethnic accommodation  
After a careful review of the structures and powers of county and national institutions of 
devolved governance in Kenya, one comes to the inescapable conclusion that ethnic 
accommodation is not given serious consideration in the design. Ethnic accommodation15 and 
the protection of marginalised communities and ethnic minorities are expressly listed as part of 
the main objectives of devolution.16 However, this is not reflected in the actuality of the entire 
design. The devolved system can address ethnic conflict only partially because the main ethnic 
conflict still remains unresolved. County and national institutions, as well as the powers, are not 
effectively designed to facilitate ethnic accommodation and address the root causes of ethnic 
conflict.  
The main ethnic conflict is between the large ethnic communities who are embroiled in a 
destructive competition to control the presidency.17 The desire to capture the presidency is 
driven by perceptions that the “ruling ethnic group” is entitled to state resources and other 
benefits to the exclusion of other ethnic communities.18 Indeed, past experience shows that 
state resources, political appointments and other public opportunities were skewed in favour of 
the successive presidents‟ home regions or ethnic communities.19 Other issues that define 
ethnic conflict in Kenya include land and land-based resources, which revolve around 
dispossession and other injustices often perceived along ethnic lines.20  
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In order to address the above issues, the devolved system of government must provide an 
avenue for political and economic inclusion. Indeed, structures and powers of the local and 
national institutions must enhance inclusiveness in order to solve internal conflict.21 In the 
Kenyan context, the county structures and the structure of the Senate must facilitate ethnic 
accommodation by reflecting the ethnic diversity of Kenyan society. Furthermore, the counties 
and the Senate must be equipped with powers to address issues underlying ethnic conflict, such 
as access to state resources and development. The counties and the Senate should also have 
power to address land matters – matters which are at the heart of ethnic conflict in Kenya.  
The county structure generally excludes “in-county minorities”, and while it provides for special 
representation of marginalised communities, the method used to select the representatives 
negates this intention. First, the FPTP system of electing the county governor without any vote 
margin or proportional vote requirement is most likely to favour the election of a member from 
the county ethnic majority. Second, “in-county minorities” are unlikely to make it as county 
representatives because of the FPTP system and also because geographically concentrated 
county minorities were not considered in the delineation of county ward boundaries.22 While the 
CGA provides that counties can nominate six representatives from marginalised communities,23 
the mode of choosing the representatives favours the majority political parties. This effectively 
means that only the major party, which incidentally belongs to the county ethnic majority, will 
have its nominees chosen to fill the special seats. This process excludes “in-county minorities”, 
as the major parties are unlikely to nominate genuine representatives of county minorities.24  
At the national level, there is equal county representation in the Senate. This is a positive aspect 
as it ensures that all ethnic communities with a “home county” are represented at the national 
level via the Senate. Therefore, many of the smaller ethnic communities that are big enough to 
secure a county will be represented in the Senate. However, the FPTP method of electing 
senators also means that most senators are likely to be from their respective county ethnic 
majorities. It is thus likely that county ethnic minorities will be excluded from representation in 
the Senate. While county structures provide for special representatives from county minorities, 
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the Senate has no such provision and provides only for the special representation of women, 
the youth, and persons with disabilities. 
With regard to powers, the counties can only address the main ethnic conflict in Kenya if the 
counties provide a viable “consolation prize” to the larger ethnic communities that miss out on 
the presidency. Put differently, control of a county should be a viable political alternative to 
control of the presidency. However, the bulk of county powers are mainly local government-type 
functions focused on local service delivery.25 Furthermore, the counties are constitutionally 
entitled only to a paltry minimum of 15 percent of revenue collected nationally. It is therefore 
unlikely that the limited powers and resources of county governments will pacify the ambitions of 
the large ethnic communities seeking to control the presidency. The counties have marginal 
powers over land matters and so cannot address key issues defining ethnic conflict in Kenya.26 
While the Senate has a special power with regard to horizontal division of resources, it has no 
effective control over the vertical division of revenue.27 The Senate therefore cannot guarantee 
effective economic inclusion of counties through equitable vertical division of resources. The 
Senate also has limited review power over most of the critical public appointments, such as 
members of the national cabinet, principal secretaries and even the CoB who authorises county 
expenditure. The Senate hence cannot guarantee matters such regional and ethnic balancing 
as it has no power to review the appointments. The Senate does not have any special powers 
over land and may thus not be in a position to address the root causes of conflict. Indeed, there 
is a possibility that land matters may be conservatively interpreted as not affecting counties and 
therefore exclude the Senate. 
Positive aspects include the fact that a number of ethnic communities with “home counties” are 
represented in the Senate and may thus influence important matters vested in the Senate. 
These include passing laws concerning counties, horizontal distribution of the county share, and 
other checks and balances exercised by the Senate. Furthermore, most of the powers vested in 
the Senate have direct relevance to facilitate economic and political inclusion. For instance, the 
Senate has special powers over the horizontal division of state resources and laws which touch 
on county structures. These powers have the potential to ensure that the political integrity of 
counties is protected and state resources are distributed equitably to county governments. 
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Furthermore, the “fragmentation” of the large ethnic communities into several counties denies 
the large communities a ready platform for negative ethnic mobilisation.28  
At the county level, the service delivery mandate of counties has the potential to address some 
of the underlying issues of ethnic conflict. Lack of basic services has always been perceived 
along ethnic lines. However, all counties now have powers to enhance service delivery and this 
may serve to address some of these perceptions. Furthermore, the Senate review powers may 
ensure that there is no unnecessary central government interference in operations of county 
governments, a situation which stands to enhance efficiency.  
Despite the positive aspects with regard to ethnic accommodation, it is argued that the 
structures and powers of the county and Senate might not effectively address ethnic conflict in 
Kenya. While the structure of the Senate enhances representation of smaller ethnic 
communities at the national level, “in-county minorities” are locked out at both levels. 
Furthermore, the powers of the counties and the Senate have critical limitations that may not 
effectively facilitate accommodation of the larger ethnic communities whose real or perceived 
exclusion is the major cause of ethnic conflict in Kenya.  
2.3 Limiting central power  
A review of the entire system of devolved government reveals that while counties are too weak 
in themselves to counterbalance central power, the structure and powers of the Senate may add 
considerable weight to the counterbalancing of central power. Abuse of central power, and lack 
of accountability at the national level, is indeed one of the main challenges facing post-colonial 
Kenya. Chapters 3 and 4 highlight that centralisation and personalisation of power were indeed 
the root causes of underdevelopment and ethnic conflict in Kenya. In a script familiar to most 
post-colonial states, Kenya retained centralised and hierarchical colonial structures, structures 
which successive Kenyan leaders used to their political advantage.29 Personal rule manifested 
itself in decentralised governance through tight political, administrative and fiscal control of local 
governments.30  
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Indeed, during the constitutional review process, the bodies in charge of the reform process 
received views that local institutions of government should be granted autonomy and subjected 
to local democratic accountability.31 The public specifically called for abolition of the Provincial 
Administration, an institution that has been used for political control and personal rule.32 
Devolved units can be powerful and have political significance if they are few33 and 
homogenous in composition.34 This is because large units offer a basis to consolidate powers 
and resources and can thereby enhance autonomy from the centre.35 Too many units, on the 
other hand, are too fragmented and have the effect of “diluting” powers. The powers allocated to 
devolved units should also reflect a substantial vertical division of state and political power so as 
to enhance their political significance in the entire system.36  
The 47 counties are too “fragmented” to limit or counterbalance central power effectively. Their 
size and number is a structural limitation as it makes them fragmented and therefore weak.37 
Having fewer counties could have facilitated consolidation of resources and power and made 
the units politically significant. The bulk of county powers are basic “local government-type 
functions” concerned with service delivery. This diminishes the “political significance” of the 
counties vis-a-vis the centre in the national political scene. The national government can 
constitutionally retain up to 85 percent of revenue collected nationally while counties are entitled 
to only 15 percent; this creates a pronounced imbalance in the control of national resources, an 
imbalance in favour of the centre. 
Nevertheless, there are other factors that enhance the significance of counties. County powers 
are constitutionally entrenched and cannot be easily altered to their detriment. While they are 
fragmented, they cannot easily be further fragmented due to a rigid constitutional procedure that 
possibly includes a constitutional referendum. While the guaranteed minimum share of national 
revenue is small, the national government at least cannot go below that specified minimum, a 
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state of offers that offers some certainty. County governors are also directly elected, which 
potentially enables them to stand up to central government intrusion. 
While the county system is structurally and functionally weak in limiting central power, the 
Senate structures and powers partially address this deficit. First, the Senate is composed of one 
elected senator from each county, which ensures equal representation of both large and small 
counties. Furthermore, direct election of senators enhances the democratic legitimacy of the 
Senate, thus giving it a stronger voice with which to assert itself at the national level. The 
legislative and review power of the Senate can facilitate the Senate to counterbalance central 
power in the relevant matters. The Senate‟s power to decide horizontal revenue division also 
ensures that county interests are factored in the distribution of revenue. Some of the limitations 
on Senate powers, such as those pertaining to the vertical division of revenue and key 
appointments, may limit its ability to counterbalance central power. 
3. Is there a balance of the three purposes in the entire system?  
After examining how the entire system of devolved government responds to each of the three 
purposes, it is equally important to evaluate how the entire design accommodates the three 
purposes. The complementary, conflicting, and neutral aspects of the three designs include 
aspects such as the number and size of units, the number of levels of government, institutional 
structures, powers and functions, and finances. As underdevelopment, ethnic conflict and abuse 
of central power are at the epicentre of Kenya‟s challenges to progress, the devolved system of 
government is intended to address these three purposes. This is confirmed by the deliberations 
on devolution during the constitutional review process that explicitly considered the three issues. 
The main compromise is the “hybrid level” or the county level which merges the regional and 
local levels. Other areas that warranted trade-offs include institutional structures, powers, and 
finances.  
3.1 The “hybrid level”: A weak balance of purposes  
The “hybrid level” was a result of a series compromises during the review process. The initial 
draft of the CoE had provided for three levels of government: national, regional and local.38 The 
CoE justified the three levels on grounds that there were overwhelming views on the need to 
devolve services to the local and economically viable units.39 The regional level was initially 
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seen as important for ethnic accommodation, and representation of regional interests at the 
national level,40 as well as “coordinating regional matters.”41 However, the CoE later reverted to 
the current structure composed of national and county levels only. 
The reasons advanced for the abandonment of the three levels reveal a further attempt at 
balancing the three purposes. First, the 74 counties provided in the third level were seen as 
economically unviable.42 Second, the regions did not have a clear role and were seen as an 
unnecessary economic burden.43 Indeed, the calls for a two-level structure were motivated 
largely by cost considerations.44 Third, the 74 county governments were, after the removal of 
the regional level, seen as too “fragmented” to provide additional checks and balances at the 
national level.45 While the regional level was identified as important for ethnic accommodation 
and “nation-building”, this point was not examined by the CoE.  
The eight regions and 74 counties in the initial draft of the CoE were abandoned and replaced 
by a new subnational level composed of 47 counties.46 The CoE indicated that removal of the 
regional level necessitated the reduction of counties from the initial 74 to 47 in order to enhance 
their ability to provide additional checks and balances against the centre.47 The CoE also stated 
that the 47 counties were adopted because they are economically viable.48 For unexplained 
reasons, the impact of removal of regions on ethnic accommodation and nation-building was not 
examined, despite the fact that regions were seen as important for peace. The “hybrid level” 
was, thus, arrived at mainly through trade-offs between the need for development and the need 
to counterbalance central power.  
However, even after the conscious trade-offs between development and the limiting of central 
power, the “hybrid level” appears to be an inappropriate compromise or a weak balance 
between the purposes. The current counties are too big and there is a clear need for levels 
below counties for effective local service delivery.49 While there is a general constitutional 
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recognition of the need for lower levels, the constitutional framework to facilitate sub-county 
structures is uncertain.50 Furthermore, the 47 counties are still too many to counterbalance 
central power. It can thus be concluded that while certain structures may be adopted with a 
particular intention, it is not automatically the case that structures will effectively serve the 
intended purpose behind the design even where there is a visible compromise. 
Indeed, the “hybrid level” may end up serving other purposes better than the core purposes that 
informed its design. For instance, at no time during the review process was the idea of 
“fragmenting” the large ethnic communities into several counties mooted. However, the 47 
counties have the effect of slowing down ethnic mobilisation by denying the large communities a 
“home region” that could facilitate ethnic mobilisation. The 47 counties have a further effect of 
“equalising” the smaller ethnic groups that have “home counties” with the larger ethnic groups. 
The structure is, however, likely to give rise to minority ethnic conflict, as several county 
minorities, most of whom had “home counties” in the initial proposed 74 counties, were 
incorporated into the 47 counties against their will.51 
Due to the varying nature of conflicts, it is hard to identify a universal structure that can lead to 
ethnic accommodation.52 The appropriate structure is one which addresses the root causes of 
conflict in a particular context, and this may be large units, small units or a combination of both, 
depending on the local context. In the Kenyan case, for instance, regions were singled out as 
important for ethnic accommodation during the constitutional review process.53 However, it has 
also emerged that there is value, in terms of ethnic accommodation, in splitting the “home 
regions” into several counties.54 It is therefore clear that there is no universal or perfect way of 
accommodating the conflicting aspects of design.  
In sum, while the “hybrid level” was primarily designed as a compromise between development 
and the limiting of central power, it is a weak compromise that half-heartedly pursues the two 
purposes. On the other hand, the “hybrid level” has an unintended impact on ethnic 
accommodation that is both positive and negative. The “hybrid level” denies the larger ethnic a 
basis for ethnic mobilisation, thereby “equalising” them with smaller ethnic communities. 
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However, the “hybrid level” also has the potential to form a basis for “in-county minority conflict” 
as it denied these minorities their own units.  
3.2 Institutional structures  
National and subnational institutional structures should reflect diversity and enhance inclusive 
decision-making in order to address conflict. For development, institutional structures should 
enhance accountability and facilitate institutional autonomy, which also important for limiting 
central power. In turn, overall autonomy enhances the ability of devolved units to assert 
themselves and therefore limit central power. The electoral design determines whether diversity 
will be reflected in the representative structures. The design of the executive and administrative 
structures also determines whether devolved units will have autonomy. While the three 
purposes were explicitly considered in the Kenyan design, the actual design of the entire 
electoral system, and the institutional design at the county level, accommodates development 
and limits central power – but to the detriment of ethnic accommodation.  
3.2.1 The electoral system 
The Constitution adopts a pure FPTP system for electing county ward representatives, the 
county governor and senators. The CoE admits receiving public views urging it to consider 
including the PR system of elections55 on the grounds that a PR system would enhance the 
inclusion of marginalised communities and other vulnerable groups such as the youth, women 
and persons with disabilities.56 However, the CoE retained the FPTP system inherited from the 
British. The CoE purports to have adopted a PR system for choosing special representatives.57 
However, the purported PR system serves only to perpetuate the dominance of the majorities in 
both the Senate and the county.58  
Both development and ethnic accommodation fare better in a PR system of elections. The PR 
system faithfully translates the number of votes cast into seats and thus reflects diversity, which 
is important for an ethnically divided society.59 A majority-plurality system, on the other hand, 
creates “wasted votes” and this may lead to a minority win in the case of a split vote. For 
development, the diversity element inherent in the PR system can enhance effective 
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participation of all sectors of society, especially vulnerable groups and the “weakest” sections of 
the society.60 While the FPTP system enables voters to hold political leaders accountable 
individually,61 this is one trade-off that development could have made in order to ensure that 
ethnic accommodation is also pursued. Accordingly, the PR system would have been the ideal 
compromise between development and ethnic accommodation.  
However, the CoE chose to retain the FPTP system for county and Senate elections, and also 
settled for a “PR system” that creates further disproportion by perpetuating the dominant groups 
in the name of enhancing minority inclusion. The FPTP system will thus enable the communities 
to hold leaders to account individually. It is also clear that the FPTP system will enable elected 
representatives, and especially the governor, to assert county autonomy. The FPTP system will 
thus facilitate the pursuit of development and the limiting of central power. However, the FPTP 
system of elections is not appropriate for ethnic accommodation as it is likely to lead to the 
inclusion of minorities.  
It can thus be concluded that while the current electoral and representative structures could 
have been further balanced, Kenya chose to retain the FPTP system of elections which it 
inherited from its British colonial masters to the detriment of ethnic accommodation. Indeed, as 
Reilly observes, there is generally no careful deliberation on the type electoral systems to be 
used.62 Colonial inheritance is one of the factors that heavily influence a system, and rather than 
change to a new system, states normally emphasise the benefits of their current electoral 
systems.63 In Kenya, the individual accountability of elected representative is generally used to 
defend the retention of the FPTP system.64  
3.2.2 Executive and administrative structures  
Executive and administrative structures can promote ethnic accommodation by reflecting local 
ethnic diversity and enhancing inclusive decision-making.65 Development generally emphasises 
a competent and efficient executive for purposes of effective service delivery. Limiting central 
power, on the other hand, emphasises administrative and executive autonomy. However, these 
areas of emphasis are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, institutional resilience in the face of 
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conflict implies capacity and competence, which are central elements in ethnic accommodation. 
Furthermore, there may be no effective service delivery if there is no autonomy to make 
decisions. Thus, while the central areas of emphasis differ, there are common aspects.  
The Constitution provides for the creation of a County Executive Committee (CEC) in which the 
exercise of executive power is collectively vested.66 Potentially therefore, the CEC can be used 
to enhance and reflect the diversity of a county, especially in “prominently multi-ethnic counties” 
where such inclusiveness is important for ethnic accommodation. However, this potential to 
enhance diversity is negated by a legislative requirement that all CEC members must have 
degrees and considerable professional experience relevant to their county portfolios.67 Given 
the focal areas of emphasis, this can be interpreted as a trade-off between development and 
ethnic accommodation which is in favour of the former. On the other hand, the extensive powers 
granted to the county governor over the CEC can also be interpreted as a trade-off between 
limiting central power and development, both of which emphasise a strong executive head to 
the detriment of ethnic accommodation, which emphasises a coalition government in order to 
enhance inclusion and collective decision-making. 
3.2 Powers  
All the three purposes require powers to be devolved, and this is inherent in the concept of 
devolution. The nature and extent of power devolved, however, differs with the purpose. 
Development requires devolved units to exercise powers that are relevant to local service and 
development.68 These are typical local government powers which deal with basic services and 
development. Effective limiting of central power, however, implies an effective vertical divide of 
power which can enable devolved units to claim political space nationally69 and perhaps 
become a counterweight to the centre. For ethnic accommodation, the nature and amount of 
powers devolved should facilitate political inclusion where this is the cause of conflict.  
In the Kenyan context, the combined county and national measures should ensure counties 
have powers over matters relevant to local service delivery and have adequate discretion to 
address local preferences. The nature and extent of powers devolved should provide a viable 
alternative to capturing the presidency for the larger ethnic communities, and the Senate powers 
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should enable counties to influence decisions at the centre. Effective political accommodation of 
the larger ethnic accommodation essentially implies that counties have effectively limited central 
power. To this extent, it can be argued that development requires a lower level of powers than 
ethnic accommodation and limiting central power, which require a significantly higher level of 
power and autonomy. The ideal balance would be to devolve powers that would not only enable 
service delivery but also facilitate effective political accommodation and therefore limit central 
power. 
The bulk of county powers and the powers of the Senate at the national level are most suited for 
development. This is because the county governments have mainly what can be termed a 
service delivery mandate. While important functions such as education are significantly limited, 
counties can effectively provide local services. Most of the Senate powers are geared at 
protecting the autonomy of counties to pursue development. These include powers over 
national interventions, suspensions, and transfer of powers. It can thus be concluded that the 
design of county and Senate powers is largely intended to facilitate the pursuit of development.  
However, it is clear that ethnic accommodation and limiting of central power at the county level 
is not possible because county powers are too limited to serve these two purposes. The Senate, 
on the other hand, partially fills this as it has powers that actually limit the exercise of powers by 
the national executive. It can thus be argued that while ethnic accommodation and limiting of 
central power are weakly provided in the design of county power, the limiting of central power is 
partially pursued through the design of county power.  
To this end, it can be concluded that development is accommodated in both the county and 
senate design of powers. Furthermore, while the limiting of central power is not well factored in 
the design of county powers, this is partially compensated through the Senate powers. Ethnic 
accommodation, on the other hand, is weakly provided for in both the county and Senate 
powers.  
Ethnic conflict is a major concern in Kenya, and is indeed the reason why the second phase of 
the constitutional review process was commenced after the 2007/2008 violence. However, the 
design of powers shows it was not given any serious consideration in the actual design. Some 
general reasons may explain this situation. Devolution design for conflict resolution has not 
been adequately developed partly because it is a controversial issue which, unlike development, 
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never receives national government support and cooperation.70 Governments tend to deny the 
existence of internal conflict and are generally unwilling to devolve real power to enhance 
accommodation because the power is placed in the control of “opponents” deemed to be 
challenging the government of the day.71 In Kenya, devolving power to other major ethnic 
communities is likely to be interpreted as weakening central control.  
Similarly, facilitating devolved units to effectively limit central power implies that the centre 
cedes control over powers. It is unlikely that a central government will cede its major powers; 
arguments such as “the need for national unity” would be cited to justify retention of powers at 
the centre. Development, on the other hand, is a “politically neutral” problem that all developing 
states eagerly admit to as they set about engaging partners to tackle the problem.72 The scale 
and nature of powers required for local service delivery and local development are not a threat 
to central power and control, and the government can still supervise the local authorities and 
thus exert control. This may explain why the design of county and senate powers is heavily 
slanted in favour development while ethnic accommodation and the limiting of central powers 
are mainly excluded from the actual design. 
3.3 Finances  
Fiscal and financial autonomy is a generic requirement for the three purposes. However, the 
nature and extent of the resources required, and the control exerted over those resources, 
differs according to the purpose. Development requires a fiscal design enabling devolved units 
to have adequate resources and control over such resources in order to match them with local 
preferences. Ethnic accommodation requires effective economic inclusion of ethnic communities 
that are a threat to political stability. Limiting central power implies that resources are devolved 
to the extent that there is a substantial limit to the resources controlled by the centre; indeed, 
counterbalancing means that devolved units have resources that are equal, or almost equal, to 
those controlled by the centre. 
The 15 percent minimum national revenue that counties are entitled to is hardly enough to fund 
development, let alone facilitate ethnic accommodation or limit or counterbalance central power. 
The Senate, on the other hand, has no special powers to determine the vertical division of 
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revenue collected nationally, which could have assisted in increasing the overall county share 
beyond the minimum. However, the developmental purpose can still be achieved through 
additional conditional or unconditional funding. Indeed, the World Bank even recommends that 
funding beyond the 15 percent minimum should be made through conditional funds just to 
ensure that national priorities are implemented at the county level.73  
While additional conditional funding may be appropriate, and is even recommended, for 
development, it is not appropriate for ethnic accommodation or limiting central power. Ethnic 
accommodation implies that counties have control over resources for effective self-rule, and 
centrally imposed control over resources is likely to be interpreted as domination by the “ruling 
ethnic group”. The centre can remain with up to 85 percent of state resources, and counties 
may not manage counterbalance this with the paltry 15 percent revenue. Major tax bases are 
also allocated to the national government.  
It can thus be concluded that while the resources controlled by counties may partially assist in 
the pursuit of development and service delivery, the finances are insufficient to facilitate ethnic 
accommodation and effectively limit central power. Furthermore, while the deficit in funds can 
be addressed through conditional funding for development, conditional funding is in dissonance 
with ethnic accommodation and the limiting of central power. In these circumstances, it can be 
safely stated that, with regard to finances, the entire devolution design is most suited to pursue 
development to the exclusion of ethnic accommodation and the limiting of central power.  
There are reasons that can explain the unwillingness to devolve resources generally. The 
central government is likely to hold on to state resources. In developing states, devolution of 
major finances to subnational units may foment a fiscal crisis.74 Furthermore, a powerful region 
with resources equal to or greater than the centre may threaten the political stability of a 
country.75 The quest by the region of Catalonia to secede from greater Spain is a case in 
point.76 Although there is no real political threat of secession in Kenya equivalent to that in 
Spain, arguments about effective fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability can be easily 
deployed to justify the retention of resources at the centre.  
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3.3 The broader constitutional framework: complementing devolution  
Underdevelopment, ethnic conflict, and centralisation of power are, as noted in Chapter 5, 
broader systemic challenges in Kenya. The Constitution thus seeks to address these three 
issues through a range of measures that include devolution.77 Indeed, some of the objectives 
may be better realised through means other than the devolved system of government.  
The central government can control to up to 85 percent of national revenue under the 
Constitution, while counties may remain with a measly 15 percent. This means that the centre 
has greater potential to pursue development than counties due to the fact that it controls 
resources that dwarf the county governments‟ entitlement. Indeed, it has been argued that, with 
political will, the centre is better able to enhance development through macro-allocation from the 
centre than the fiscally weak counties.78 Therefore, while counties have powers that are relevant 
to local development, it is likely that the national government will play a more instrumental role 
in achieving overall development than the counties.  
Ethnic accommodation is weakly provided for in the entire system of devolved government. The 
powers and resources available through the devolved system of government cannot effectively 
facilitate ethnic accommodation. This makes it almost certain that ethnic accommodation will 
have to be sought through other avenues outside of devolution. If anything, the system of 
devolution may be inconsequential to ethnic accommodation or even perpetuate further 
exclusion. Powers and resources are likely to be concentrated at the national level, which 
means that processes aimed at enhancing transparency, accountability and inclusiveness in the 
national government are equally, if not more, important for purposes of effective ethnic 
accommodation. For instance, land matters, which are at the core of ethnic conflict in Kenya, 
are in the hands of the National Land Commission (NLC), an independent public institution. 
Resolution of the land question thus depends on the national policies on land and the 
effectiveness of the NLC in addressing land injustices. 
While the Senate will play a substantial role in counterbalancing central power, the Senate has 
been denied powers that could have made its role in limiting central power more effective. 
These include vertical division of revenue and powers over key appointments. There must be 
processes of broader accountability which can ensure that the vertical division of revenue and 
appointments not reviewed by the Senate are handled objectively and in a transparent manner.  
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The main measures taken to enhance inclusiveness and accountability in the exercise of central 
power include strong checks and balances as well as effective separation of powers between 
the executive, legislature and the judiciary. Public finance management processes, including 
budget formulation, have been made more transparent, objective and participatory, thus 
enhancing accountability. Independent public commissions, a strong Bill of Rights, effective 
checks and balances, and other measures are aimed at enhancing constitutionalism and the 
rule of law. If well implemented, these measures may not only provide a favourable environment 
for counties to operate in but will also directly complement devolved government in the pursuit 
of the objectives of devolved government. However, the effectiveness or not of the broader 
constitutional framework is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
3.4 The “Kenyan context” dimension  
Of the three purposes, ethnic accommodation is the least accommodated in the devolution 
design. Despite there being recognition of the need for ethnic accommodation and protection of 
minorities and marginalised groups, institutions are not appropriately structured to reflect these 
objectives. Institutions are also denied the powers necessary to effectively address the root 
causes of ethnic conflict. The ethnic conflict witnessed in early 2008 is what spurred the second 
phase of the constitutional reform process, a phase that led to adoption of the current 
Constitution in 2010.79 One would thus have expected ethnic accommodation to have been 
given prominence in the design of devolution and the broader constitutional framework. It thus 
comes as a surprise that, of all the three purposes, ethnic accommodation was the least 
considered in the actual design. 
Given that the issue of ethnic accommodation was a priority during the review process, it is 
possible that the “lukewarm” treatment of ethnic accommodation in the devolution design is 
based on certain assumptions. For instance, the design of devolution is strong on development, 
and it may have been assumed that this would address the underlying ethnic conflict through a 
“trickle-down” effect; in this way, the ethnic conflict would fizzle out once the systemic issues, 
most of them development and resource-related, were addressed.  
However, a broader understanding of the Kenyan context may also explain the neglect of 
explicit accommodation through devolution design. Right from the early days of independence, 
the emphasis was on homogeneity and national unity; in such an ideological framework, explicit 
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recognition and consideration of ethnic differences are abhorrent.80 For instance, while the 
Kikuyu and Luo communities dominated the public service, the government explained it away by 
saying it was a mere coincidence that persons with competence and skills were mainly Kikuyus 
and Luos.81 The government maintained there was no favouritism and that any ethnic quotas, in 
the public service, for instance, would promote tribalism.82 However, despite this official denial, 
ethnicity has flourished in post-colonial Kenya and has in many cases defined the patterns of 
access to state resources, government appointments and other opportunities.83  
The use of ethnicity in access to resources and opportunities in Kenya stands in a stark contrast 
to the official policy of insisting on homogeneity and denying ethnically-based benefits. Indeed, 
except for a few ethnic and cultural minorities that seek to preserve their identity and lifestyle, 
ethnic identity among the mainstream communities is but a way of accessing opportunities and 
benefits. However, explicit recognition of ethnic identity and providing a clear and express 
process of sharing benefits across ethnic communities is seen as divisive. Of course, there is a 
danger that such an explicit treatment may lead to a freezing of identities and slow down the 
pace of integration, but this has always been the argument ever since independence, where 
ethnic exclusion flourished amidst the gospel of “one nation” and “one Kenyan tribe”. The next 
step, perhaps, is to be explicit about ethnic differences and have an objective debate about how 
the same can be designed and incorporated in local and national structures in order to enhance 
accommodation. 
The Constitution already recognises diversity and the need for national unity, albeit in general 
terms. There is a need for boldness in confronting the issue of ethnicity in public institutions and 
processes. Efforts are already under way to shift matters towards this debate: the National 
Integration and Cohesion Commission (NCIC) and other national ministries have in the recent 
past released ethnic audits that provide a picture of ethnic composition in the public service.84 
Indeed, in the past such reports were unheard of, so this marks an initial step towards 
generating solutions capable of bringing about ethnic inclusion. However, it is also important to 
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note that ethnicity and its role in conflict is a complex subject that requires a deeper and specific 
analysis which goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
4. Drawing lessons from the Kenyan approach  
The deliberations during the constitutional review on the most appropriate devolution design and 
the final design represent a process familiar to most or all developing states. Therefore, certain 
decisions taken regarding the design of devolution in Kenya, and the grounds advanced to 
justify those decisions, have potential significance for devolution debates in other developing 
states and possibly elsewhere, too. While some aspects of the design and intended purpose 
may be so peculiar to Kenya that their comparative utility is diminished, important lessons can 
be gleaned nevertheless from the Keyan process. The following part of the analysis attempts to 
draw general lessons from that process, lessons which can be of useful application to other 
states seeking to address the challenges of underdevelopment, internal conflict and the 
centralisation of power and personal rule. 
4.1 The “hybrid level”: A viable Kenyan contribution or a dangerous experiment?  
A necessary starting-point in the comparative analysis is Kenya‟s unique “hybrid level”, which 
combines regional and local levels to form a new level between the region and the local level. 
Soon after adoption of the new constitution, commentators lauded this measure as an emerging 
way of managing ethnic conflict. Among these commentators was Barkan, who sees the 
“fragmentation” of mono-ethnic regions as an important trend in managing multi-ethnic states 
with larger and dominant ethnic communities. Citing Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda as examples of 
this emerging trend,85 he argues that while the idea of semi-federal arrangements was rejected 
at independence, it has now been embraced as a means of managing fissiparous tendencies in 
multi-ethnic states characterised by a few ethnic communities that are dominant majorities.86 
However, while there are similarities in terms of ethnic composition in Kenya, Uganda and 
Nigeria, their respective subnational structures should be compared with caution. Nigeria‟s 
fragmented units have typical regional/state functions for all intents and purposes. Indeed, 
Nigeria has a distinctive and constitutionally entrenched local level of government, unlike 
Kenya‟s counties which can hardly be called regions. While Nigeria‟s 36 states may be 
considered as too fragmented for a typical federation, the country‟s population is big enough to 
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make the numerous constituent units into “regional-size populations”. Uganda, on the other 
hand, is for all intents and purposes a unitary state that makes no pretence about its district 
governments‟ lack of autonomy.87 Furthermore, the Constitution of Uganda recognises a 
procedure according to which a group of district governments can combine to form a region.88 
This context has to be taken into account before the fractionalisation approach is hailed as 
heralding a new approach to managing ethnicity in developing states. 
With the Nigerian and Ugandan examples having been distinguished from each other, it is 
important to look at the structural advantages, or lack thereof, in the adoption of the 47 counties 
in Kenya. Kenya did away with “home provinces” for each of the four major ethnic groups and 
instead split them into several counties. Admittedly, there is some value in splitting the large 
mono-ethnic regions, since it denies the regions an important basis on which they could 
otherwise mobilise politically; indeed, there is some recorded success with this strategy in 
managing ethnic conflict in Nigeria.89 However, the complexities that arise from abandoning 
regional and local levels in favour of a “hybrid level” may, in some instances, negate the 
possible benefits of such a compromise. For instance, with regard to powers and functions, the 
units may, due to their fragmented nature, be unable to exercise certain functions; in turn, the 
national government may find it convenient to centralise those powers. This may mean in effect 
that resources and powers will still be centralised, a situation that could see the large ethnic 
communities continue to fight for control of the centre. However, political and economic 
inclusion can be achieved more easily by devolving substantial powers and resources to larger 
units with the capacity to utilise the devolved powers and resources. Of course, this has to be 
balanced against the risk posed by larger units, which have the potential to threaten stability and 
adopt a secessionist agenda. 
The “hybrid level” causes confusion; typical “local government functions” are lumped together 
with typical “regional functions” at the county level and this may affect overall effectiveness. 
Some powers vested in counties, such as participation in constitutional amendment, make 
counties appear like units with political significance. However, the bulk of powers are typically 
local government functions. Furthermore, important factors such as coordination of regional 
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activities are faced with uncertainty in the “hybrid level”. It is therefore possible that the “hybrid 
level” may lead to a confusion of roles and, ultimately, to overall inefficiency and ineffectiveness.  
Removal of regions also means the units are “fragmented” and therefore structurally weakened 
in terms of limiting central power. Unless there is a strong second chamber like the Kenyan 
Senate to fill the void left by removal of regions, constituent units will be left vulnerable to the 
centre. Second, apart from limiting central, regions perform coordinative and supervisory 
functions over local governments. If regions are scrapped, these important coordinative 
functions may fall to the centre and add to central bureaucracy. It is for this reason that 
provinces in South Africa, though weak in terms of political powers and resources, are said to 
play a significant but less apparent role in ensuring effective decentralisation. With the removal 
of regions, a state may have to reduce the number of units in order to ensure viability, and this 
may, as in the Kenyan experience, have the effect of denying the tiny minorities their own units.  
Generally, as a result of the danger associated with large units, the political leadership at the 
centre will be quick to have the regions abolished or fragmented, as happened in Nigeria90 or as 
was suggested by the president of Indonesia after Suharto‟s demise.91 However, a deeper 
analysis of the role of the region in relation to the three purposes reveals that absence of 
regions creates far more complexities than retaining them and dealing with the potential risks 
associated with them. Accordingly, systems such as the “hour-glass structure” of weak regions 
and strong local governments may be an option in managing potential risks. An exception 
perhaps is Macedonia, which opted out of regions; nevertheless, this was due to the special 
question of the independence of the Albanian State of Kosovo. There were fears that the 
creation of an Albanian region in Macedonia could have fomented a secessionist conflict by 
ethnic Albanians who could use the mono-ethnic Albanian region to break away and join the 
greater Albanian state of Kosovo.92 However, this may not be of much comparative utility as 
these were special circumstances: the Albanian region was fragmented into several of the 
country‟s 80 municipalities, and federal-type arrangements were expressly excluded from the 
peace settlement.93 
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It thus seems that the appropriate approach is one which retains the primary features for each 
design without making concessions to such an extent that the concessions end up completely 
hurting or excluding the other purposes. For instance, elimination of a region fundamentally 
affects the ability of subnational units to check national government. In the case of Kenya, a 
directly elected and politically powerful senate may come to the rescue of the units. However, in 
a case like South Africa where the second chamber is weak,94 elimination of the provinces may 
cause the centre to consolidate even more power at the expense of subnational units.95 
An assessment of the Kenyan approach leads to the conclusion that rather than abolishing the 
traditional levels to create a “hybrid”, the solution may well lie in seeking a balance within the 
three traditional levels of decentralisation: national, regional and local. Kenya struggles to 
balance the three purposes in a structure that already systemically or structurally weakens their 
pursuit. The structure also affects the nature of powers and functions to be exercised at the 
“hybrid level”. It is for this reason that the elimination of a level – or the correlative introduction of 
a “hybrid” level – may not be the ideal strategy for balancing the design of devolution so that it 
can respond to the three purposes. It is not necessary, however, to recommend any “model” to 
be applied by states, for the good reason that there is no single, universal model capable of 
perfectly accommodating the three purposes of devolution. Design in and of itself does not 
guarantee effectiveness, since contingencies external to it, such as political will, may indeed 
prove to be the factors that most strongly determine its effectiveness or lack thereof. 
4.2 Design versus effectiveness: why the context prevails  
The assessment of the Kenyan devolution design confirms that effectiveness does not 
automatically follow design. Accordingly, even the most perfectly balanced design may be 
negated by other factors external to the design. Many of the design features intended to serve a 
particular purpose may in actuality achieve a contrary end. For instance, reducing the counties 
from the initial 74 proposed counties to the current 47 counties was important as a step towards 
limiting central power, but the 47 counties are still too many in number to be able to do so. 
Indeed, even generally, design features that are effective in one system may not necessarily 
achieve the same results when transplanted to other systems. For instance, governmental 
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representation is effective in counterbalancing central power in Germany, but the same 
structures have failed in South Africa, not because of bad design, but because of the ruling 
party‟s dominance which blurs the lines of federal governance. In Kenya, the only way that the 
Senate could counterbalance central power is if senators were directly elected. It is thus clear 
that design and effectiveness are not automatic and almost always depends on the context. 
Even with the size, number and composition of devolved units, there is no pre-determined set of 
design features that ensure the realisation of a purpose. While the fragmentation of mono-ethnic 
regions is seen as important for managing ethnic conflict, in Ethiopia a “home province” is 
important for ethnic accommodation; in Kenya, a “home province” would lay a basis for negative 
ethnic mobilisation. It can thus be concluded that context is equally or even more important 
when it comes to effectiveness. However, this does not completely eliminate the need for design 
as some aspects of the design remain important for achieving intended and default purposes.  
5. In lieu of recommendations  
The concurrency of challenges related to development, internal conflict and centralisation of 
power is a factor that developing states will continue to face. On the other hand, despite the 
weak evidence of the link between development, states continue to devolve or decentralise 
powers and resources to new or existing subnational governments. While the prominent 
objective of devolving power is development and service delivery, other purposes such as 
internal conflict resolution and limiting central power are increasingly becoming drivers of 
devolution. The hope that devolution of power can effectively pursue and address the three 
purposes makes a study of how they can be accommodated through design an important one.  
If there are explicitly identified purposes of devolution, there is need to ensure that these 
purposes are followed through with design. Where there is more than one purpose with 
potentially contradicting design features, trade-offs are inevitable. However, trade-offs must be 
made, not only with the original intent or purpose in mind, but also with regard to the context 
and the effectiveness. Ultimately, however, it appears that the prominent purpose will lay down 
the primary design. In Kenya, as it would be in many developing states, development is the 
prominent purpose and it thus provides the primary design. While trade-offs between conflicting 
design aspects can be made for effective pursuit of the three purposes, the key lesson that 
seems to emerge is that the definitive features of each purpose should be retained and 
compromises and trade-offs sought within those core features. 
 
 
 
 
 
413 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
Books 
Akivaga SK, Kulundu-Bitonye W & Opi MW Local Authorities in Kenya Nairobi: Heinemann 
Educational Publishers (1981) 
Anderson G Fiscal Federalism: A Comparative Introduction Ontario: Oxford University Press 
(2010)  
Apter D Politics of Modernisation London: Heinemann (1966) 
Basta LR & Ibrahim J (eds) Federalism and Decentralisation in Africa: The Multicultural 
Challenge Fribourg: Institut du Federalisme Fribourg, Switzerland (1999)  
Berman B Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic Domination Nairobi: Heinemann 
(1990)   
Berman B & Lonsdale J Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa Nairobi: Heinemann 
Publishers (1992)  
Bennett G Kenya: A Political History-The Colonial Period London: Oxford University Press 
(1963)   
Blundell M So Rough a Wind: The Kenya Memoirs of Sir Michael Blundell London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson (1964)  
De Visser J Developmental Local Government: A Case Study of South Africa Antwerpen-
Oxford: Intersentia (2008)    
Elazar JD (ed) Federalism and Political Integration New York: Turtledove Publishing (1995)    
Elazar SJ Exploring Federalism Tuscaloosa Alabama: University of Alabama Press (1987)  
Esman JM Management Dimensions of Development: Perspectives and Strategies Connecticut: 
Kumarian Press Inc (1991)     
Erk J & Anderson LM The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate 
Ethnic Divisions? Oxon: Routledge (2010)   
Fessha YT Ethnic Diversity and Federalism: Constitution Making in South Africa and Ethiopia 
Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited (2010)  
 
 
 
 
414 
 
Ghai YP & McAuslan JPWB Public law and Political Change in Kenya Nairobi, London, New 
York: Oxford University Press (1970)   
Ghai YP & Cottrell JG Kenya‟s Constitution: An Instrument for Change Nairobi: Katiba Institute 
(2011)  
Hatchard J, Ndulo M, & Slinn P Comparative Constitutionalism and Good Governance in the 
Commonwealth: An Eastern and Southern African Perspective Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press (2004)  
Kibua TN & Mwambu G (eds) Decentralization and Devolution in Kenya: New Approaches 
Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press (2008)  
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung The Example of Federalism in the Federal Republic of Germany: A 
Reader Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (1994) 
Kincaid J & Tarr GA Constitutional Origins, Structure and Change in Federal Countries 
Montreal: McGill-Queen‟s University Press (2005) 
Litvack J, Ahmad J & Bird R Rethinking Decentralisation in Developing Countries Washington 
DC: The World Bank (1998)    
Mackenzie AFD Land, Ecology and Resistance in Kenya: 1880-1952 Portsmouth: Heinemann 
(1998)   
Maxon RM Kenya‟s Independence Constitution: Constitution-Making and End of Empire 
Plymouth: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press (2011)  
Mboya T Freedom and after Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers (1986)  
Odhiambo M, Mitullah WV & Akivaga KS Management of Resources by Local Authorities: The 
Case of Local Authority Transfer Fund in Kenya Nairobi: Claripress (2005)     
Odinga O Not yet Uhuru Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers (1976) 
Ogot BA & Ochieng‟ WR (eds) Decolonization and Independence in Kenya: 1940-93 (1995)  
Ojwang JB Constitutional Development in Kenya: Institutional Adaptation and Social Change 
Nairobi: African Centre for Technology Studies (1990)  
Olowu D & Wunsch J The Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and Self-Governance in 
Africa Boulder: Westview Press (1990)   
 
 
 
 
415 
 
Oyugi WO Decentralised Development Planning and Management in Kenya: An Assessment 
Washington DC: World Bank (1990) 
Ogot BA & WR Ochieng (eds) Decolonization and Independence in Kenya (1940-93) (Eastern 
Africa series) Athens: Ohio University Press (1995)     
Reilly B Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (2004)   
Reilly B Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies (2004)  
Rondinelli DA & Cheema GS (eds) Reinventing Local Government for the Twenty-First Century: 
State Capacity in a Globalizing Society Bloomfield: Kumarian Press Inc (2003)  
Rondinelli DA, Nellis JR & Cheema GS Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of 
Recent Experience Washington: The World Bank (1984) 
Rothchild D & Chazan N (eds) The Precarious Balance: The State And society in Africa 
Boulder: Westview Press Inc (1988)    
Smith BC Good Governance and Development New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2007)  
Smoke P Local Government Finance in Developing Countries: The Case of Kenya Nairobi: 
Oxford University Press (1994) 
Suksi M Sub-State Governance through Autonomy: A Comparative Study of Powers, 
Procedures and Institutions London: Springer Heidelberg Dordrecht (2011)  
Steytler N & De Visser J Local Government Law of South Africa Cape Town: LexisNexis (2011)  
Watts RL Comparing Federal Systems Montreal: McGill-Queen‟s University Press (2008)    
World Bank World Development Report 1988 New York: Oxford University Press (1988)   
World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty New York: Oxford 
University Press (2000)  
World Bank World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development Washington: 
World Bank (2011)    
World Bank Devolution without Disruption: Pathways to a Successful New Kenya Washington: 
World Bank (2012)  
 
 
 
 
416 
 
Yusuf S, Deaton A, Dervis K, Easterly W, Ito T & Stiligtz JE (eds) Development Economics 
through the Decades: A Critical Look at 30 Years of the World Development Report 
Washington: World Bank (2009)    
 
Chapters in Books 
Aja E „Spain: Nation, nationalities, and regions‟ in Loughlin J (ed) Subnational Democracy in the 
European Union New York: Oxford University Press (2001) 229-254  
Atieno-Odhiambo ES „The formative years 1945-55‟ in Ogot BA & Ochieng WR (eds) 
Decolonization and Independence in Kenya (1940-93) (Eastern Africa series) Athens: Ohio 
University Press (1995) 25-47       
Bakke KM „State, society and separatism in Punjab‟ Erk J & Anderson LM (eds) The Paradox of 
Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions? Oxon: Routledge 
(2010) 97-114   
Barkan JD „Ethnic fractionalization and the propensity for conflict in Uganda, Kenya and 
Tanzania‟ in Herbst J, McNamee T & Mills G (eds) On the Fault Line: Managing the Tensions 
and Divisions within Societies London: Profile Books (2012) 150-169  
Bird RM & Ebel RD „Fiscal federalism and national unity‟ in Ahmad E & Brosio G (eds) 
Handbook of Fiscal Federalism Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd (2006) 2-24  
Brodjonegoro B & Ford JF „Intergovernmental fiscal relations and state building: The case of 
Indonesia‟ in Bird RM & Ebel RD (eds) Fiscal Fragmentation in Decentralized Countries 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing (2007) 320-362  
Bronstein V „Legislative competence‟ in Woolman S, Roux T, Klaaren J, Stein A, Chaskalson M, 
& Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa Cape Town: Juta (2011) 15-1 to 15-28  
Cameron D „The Paradox of federalism: Some practical reflections‟ in Erk J & Anderson LM 
(eds) The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic 
Divisions? (2010) Oxon Routledge 115-125  
Chitere P & Ireri O „District Focus for Rural Development as a decentralized planning strategy: 
An sssessment of its implementation in Kenya‟ in Kibua TN & Mwabu G (eds) Decentralization 
and Devolution in Kenya: New Approaches Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press (2008) 9-46  
 
 
 
 
417 
 
Cifuentes M „Better services for all: The impact of LASDAP in an informal settlement in Nairobi‟ 
in Kibua TN & Mwabu G (eds) Decentralization and Devolution in Kenya: New Approaches 
Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press (2008) 235-264  
Crawford G & Hartmann C „Introduction: Decentralisation as a pathway out of poverty and 
conflict‟ in Crawford G & Hartmann C (eds) Decentralisation in Africa: A Pathway out of Poverty 
and Conflict? Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press (2008) 7-32  
De Vos P „The role of the National Council of Provinces in the governance of South Africa‟ in 
Luther J, Passaglia P & Tarchi R (eds) A World of Second Chambers: Handbook for 
Constitutional Studies on Bicameralism (2006) Giuffrè: Milano 613-644  
Dhavan R & Saxena „Republic of India‟ in Le Roy K, Saunders C & Kincaid J (eds) Legislative, 
Executive and Judicial Governance in Federal Countries Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‟s 
University Press (2006) 165-197  
Elazar DJ „Federalism vs Decentralization: The drift from authenticity‟ in Kincaid J (ed) 
Federalism London: SAGE Publications Ltd (2011) 79-88 
Elaigwu JI „The Federal Republic of Nigeria‟ in Majeed A, Watts RL & Brown DM (eds) 
Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries: A Global Dialogue on 
Federalism Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‟s University Press (2006) 207-237  
Fox W & Wallich C „Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Dayton challenge‟ in Bird RM & Vaillancourt F 
Fiscal Decentralization in developing countries Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998) 
271-300  
Gamper A „Republic of Austria‟ in Le Roy K, Saunders C & Kincaid J (eds) Legislative, 
Executive and Judicial Governance in Federal Countries Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‟s 
University Press (2006) 71-100   
Huglin TO „Canada‟ in Le Roy K, Saunders C & Kincaid J (eds) Legislative, Executive and 
Judicial Governance in Federal Countries Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‟s University Press 
(2006) 101-134  
Ibrahim J „State Crisis in Africa: The Case for Federalism and Decentralisation‟ in Basta LR & 
Ibrahim J (eds) Federalism and Decentralisation in Africa: The Multicultural challenge Fribourg: 
Institut Du Federalisme Fribourg Suisse (1999) 3-13     
Juma D „Devolution of power as constitutionalism: the constitutional debate and beyond‟ in The 
Kenyan section of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ- Kenya) (2008) Ethnicity, Human 
 
 
 
 
418 
 
Rights and Constitutionalism in Africa Nairobi: The Kenyan Section of the International 
Commission of Jurists (2008) 36-56  
Jeffery C „The Union‟s place: Scottish-English relations after devolution‟ in Saxena R (ed) 
Varieties of Federal Governance: Major Contemporary Models New Delhi: Cambridge University 
Press (2011) 232-260 
Kaiser K „Decentralization reforms‟ in Coudouel A & Paternostro S (eds) Analyzing the 
Distributional Impact of Reforms: A Practitioner‟s Guide to Pension, Health, Labor Markets, 
Public Sector Downsizing, Taxation, Decentralization and Macroeconomic Modeling 
Washington: World Bank (2006) 313-353.  
Katz D „Nationalism and strategies of international conflict resolution‟ in Kelman HC (ed) 
International Behaviour: A Social Psychological Analysis Michigan: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 
(1965) 356-390    
Kokott J „From reception and transplantation to convergence of constitutional models in the age 
of globalization – with special reference to the German Basic Law‟ in Starck C (ed) 
Constitutionalism, Universalism and Democracy – a Comparative Analysis: The German 
Contributions to the Fifth World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law 
(1999)  
Leonardy U „Demarcation of regions: International perspectives‟ in de Villiers B & Sindane J 
(eds) Regionalism: Problems and Prospects Pretoria: HSRC Publishers (1993) 1-18  
Lewis P „Boundaries and bargains: Managing Nigeria‟s fractious Society‟ in Herbst J, McNamee 
T & Mills G (eds) On the Fault Line: Managing the Tensions and Divisions within Societies 
London: Profile Books (2012) 19-32  
Mpaka C „The People and their constitution: Kenya‟s constitutional process and 1990-91 KANU 
Review Committee‟ in S Wanjala and K Kibwana (eds) Democtratisation and Law Reform in 
Kenya Nairobi: Claripress (1997) 1-31  
Murray C „Republic of South Africa‟ in Le Roy K, Saunders C & Kincaid J Legislative, Executive 
and Judicial Governance in Federal Countries (2006) Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‟s 
University Press (2006) 258-288  
Majeed A „Republic of India‟ in Kincaid J & Tarr GA (eds) Constitutional Origins, Structure and 
Change in Federal Countries Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‟s University Press (2005) 180-
207  
 
 
 
 
419 
 
Meadwell H „The political dynamics of secession and institutional accommodation‟ in Erk J & 
Anderson LM (eds) The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate 
Ethnic Divisions? (2010) Oxon: Routledge 30-44   
Maloba WO „Decolonization: A theoretical perspective‟ in Ogot BA & Ochieng WR (eds) 
Decolonization and Independence in Kenya (1940-93) (1995) (Eastern Africa series) Athens: 
Ohio University Press 7-24        
Maxon MR „Social and cultural changes‟ in Ogot BA & Ochieng WR (eds) Decolonization and 
Independence in Kenya (1940-93) (1995b) (Eastern Africa series) Athens: Ohio University 
Press 111-150     
Muia DM „Devolution: Which way for local authorities‟ in Kibua TN & Mwabu G (eds) 
Decentralization and Devolution in Kenya: New Approaches Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press 
(2008) 137-168  
Maxon R & Ndege P „The Economics of structural adjustment‟ in Ogot BA & Ochieng WR (eds) 
Decolonization and Independence in Kenya (1940-93) (1995b) (Eastern Africa series) Athens: 
Ohio University Press 151-186     
Majeed A „Republic of India‟ in Kincaid J & Tarr GA (eds) Constitutional Origins, Structure and 
Change in Federal Countries Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‟s University Press (2005) 180-
207  
Murray C & Simeon R „Promises unmet: Multi-level government in South Africa‟ in Saxena R 
(ed) Varieties of Federal Governance: Major Contemporary Models New Delhi: Cambridge 
University Press (2011) 232-262  
Mbathi M & Ngau P „The geography of voting in Kenya: An analysis of the 2007 presidential, 
parliamentary and civic voting patterns‟ in Kanyinga K & Okello D (eds) Tensions and Reversals 
in Democratic Transitions: The Kenya 2007 General Elections Nairobi: Society for International 
Development (SID) and Institute of Development Studies (IDS)-University of Nairobi (2010) 139-
174  
Murray C & Nijzink L Building Representative Democracy: South Africa‟s Legislatures and the 
Constitution Cape Town: Parliamentary Support Programme (1999) 41-58  
Marks G & Hooghe L „Contrasting visions of multi-level governance‟ in Bache I & Flinders M 
(eds) Multi-level Governance New York: Oxford University Press (2004) 15-30   
 
 
 
 
420 
 
Morrow D „Breaking antagonism? Political leadership in divided societies‟ in O‟Flynn I & Russell 
D (eds) Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies London: Pluto Press (2005) 45-
58  
Neuberger B „Federalism in Africa: experience and prospects‟ in Elazar JD (ed) Federalism and 
Political Integration New York: Turtledove Publishing (1995) 173-188   
Ogot BA „The decisive years 1956-63‟ in Ogot BA & Ochieng WR (eds) Decolonization and 
Independence in Kenya (1940-93) (1995a) (Eastern Africa series) Athens: Ohio University 
Press 48-82        
Ochieng WR „Structural and political changes‟ in BA Ogot & WR Ochieng  (eds) Decolonization 
and Independence in Kenya (1940-93) Athens: Ohio University Press  (Eastern Africa series) 
(1995) 83-111  
Oloo A „Devolution and democratic governance: Options for Kenya‟ in TN Kibua & G Mwambu 
(eds) Decentralization and Devolution in Kenya: New Approaches Nairobi: University of Nairobi 
Press (2008) 105-136 
Ochieng‟ WR & Atieno-Odhiambo ES Ogot „Prologue on decolonization‟ in Ogot BA & Ochieng‟ 
WR (eds) Decolonization and Independence in Kenya: 1940-93 (1995) (Eastern Africa series) 
Athens: Ohio University Press xi-xviii      
Ogot BA „The Politics of populism‟ in Ogot BA & Ochieng WR (eds) Decolonization and 
Independence in Kenya (1940-93) (1995b) Eastern Africa series Athens: Ohio University Press 
187-213     
Oeter S „Federal Republic of Germany‟ Le Roy K, Saunders C & Kincaid J (eds) Legislative, 
Executive and Judicial Governance in Federal Countries Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‟s 
University Press (2006) 135-164   
Oyugi WO „The search for an appropriate decentralisation design in Kenya: Historical and 
comparative perspectives‟ in Kithure K & Ambani A (eds) The Anatomy of Bomas: Selected 
Analyses of the 2004 Draft Constitution of Kenya Nairobi: Claripress (2005) 57-106  
Oyugi WO „Local government in Kenya: a case of institutional decline‟ in Mawhood P (ed) Local 
Government in The Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa Africa Institute of South 
Africa (1993) 109-143   
 
 
 
 
421 
 
Oyugi LN & Kibua TN „Planning and budgeting at the grassroots level: The case of the Local 
Authority Service Delivery Action Plan‟ in Kibua TN & Mwabu G Decentralization and Devolution 
in Kenya: New Approaches Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press (2008) 199-234  
Roeder PG „Ethnofederalism and the mismanagement of conflicting nationalisms‟ in Erk J & 
Anderson LM (eds) The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate 
Ethnic Divisions? (2010) Oxon: Routledge 13-29  
Ragaru N „The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: between Ohrid and Brussels‟ in Batt J 
(ed) Is there an Albanian Question? Institute for Security Studies/ European Union (2008) 41-56  
Rocaboy Y, Vaillancourt F & Hugounenq R „Public finances of local government in Kenya‟ in 
Dafflon B & Madies T (eds) The Political Economy of Decentralization Sub-Saharan Africa: A 
New Implementation Model in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal New York: World 
Bank (2012) 161-206  
Sehili S, Manasan R & Wallich C „Subsidiarity and solidarity: Fiscal decentralization in the 
Philippines‟ in Bird RM & Ebel RD (eds) Fiscal Fragmentation in Decentralized Countries 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing (2007) 363-398   
Sorens J „The partisan logic of decentralization in Europe‟ in Erk J & Anderson LM (eds) The 
Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions? (2010) 
Oxon: Routledge 62-79  
Steytler N „Republic of South Africa‟ in Kincaid J & Tarr GA (eds) Constitutional Origins, 
Structure and Change in Federal Countries Montreal: McGill-Queen‟s University Press (2005) 
311-346  
Steytler N „Demarcating district municipalities‟ in Steytler N (ed) The First Decade of the 
Municipal Demarcation Board: Some Reflections on Demarcating Local Government in South 
Africa Pretoria: Municipal Demarcation Board (South Africa) (2010)  
Steytler N „Comparative conclusions‟ in Steyler N (ed) Local Government and Metropolitan 
Regions in Federal Systems Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‟s University Press (2009) 391-
436   
Tierney S „Federalism in a unitary State: a paradox too far?‟ in Erk J & Anderson LM (eds) The 
Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions? Oxon: 
Routledge (2010) 45-61  
 
 
 
 
422 
 
Watts RL „Comparative conclusions‟ in Majeed A, Watts RL & Brown DM (eds) Distribution of 
Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries: A Global Dialogue on Federalism Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen‟s University Press (2006) 322-350  
Watts RL „Federal co-existence in the Near East: General introduction‟ in Fleiner T (ed) 
Federalism: A Tool for Conflict Management in Multicultural Societies in the Near East Fribourg: 
Institut Du Federalisme Fribourg Suisse (1999) 1-20    
Watts RL „The Evolution of the distribution of powers in the Canadian Federation‟ in 
International Association of Centres for Federal Studies (IACFS) (2008 IACFS Conference) 
Decentralizing and Re-centralizing Trends in the Distribution of Powers within Federal Countries  
Government of Catalonia (Ministry of Home Affairs, Institutional Relations and Participation) 
(2010) 179-193  
Wolff S „Electoral-Systems design and power-sharing regimes‟ in O‟Flynn I & Russell D (eds) 
Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies London: Pluto Press (2005) 59-76    
Watts RL „Intergovernmental relations: conceptual issues‟ in Tapscott C & Levy N (eds) 
Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa Cape Town: Idasa and School of Government, 
University of the Western Cape (2001) 22-42  
 
Journal Articles 
Abuya EO „Consequences of a flawed presidential election‟ (2009) 27 Legal Studies 127-158  
Anderson L & Stansfield G „The implications of elections for federalism in Iraq: Towards a five-
region model‟ (2005) 35 Publius: The Journal of Federalism 359-383 
Anderson DM „Yours in the struggle for Majimbo‟; Nationalism and the party politics of 
decolonization in Kenya‟ (2005) 40 Journal of Contemporary History 547-564  
Ayele Z „Local government in Ethiopia: Still an apparatus of control?‟ (2011) 15 Law Democracy 
and Development 1-27   
Bates RH „The Agrarian Origins of Mau Mau: A structural account‟ (1987) 61 (1) Agricultural 
History 1-28  
Bratton M & De Walle NV „Neopatrimonial regimes and political transition in Africa‟ (1994) 46 
World Politics 453-489  
Brancati D „Can federalism stabilize Iraq?‟ (2004) 27 The Washington Quarterly 7-21. 
 
 
 
 
423 
 
Bubba N & Lamba D „Urban management in Kenya‟ (1991) 3 (1) Environment and Urbanization 
37-59  
Brennan JR „Lowering the Sultan‟s flag: Sovereignty and decolonization of coastal Kenya‟ 
(2008) 50 Comparative Studies in Society and History 831-861  
Bannon AL „Designing a constitution-drafting process: Lessons from Kenya‟ Yale Law Journal 
116 (2006-2007) 1825-1871  
Barkan JD & Mutua M „Turning the corner in Kenya: A new Constitution for Nairobi‟ Foreign 
Affairs (10 August 2010)  
Brodjonegoro B & Asanuma S „Regional autonomy and fiscal decentralization in democratic 
Indonesia (2000) 41 Hitosubashi Journal of Economics 117-118  
Castagno AA „The Somali-Kenya controversy: Implications for the future‟ (1964) 2 (2) Journal of 
Modern African Studies 165-188 
Chege M and Barkan JD „District focus and the politics of reallocation in Kenya‟ (1989) 27 (3) 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 431-453  
Christensen K & Studlar DT „Is Canada a Westminster or consensus democracy? A brief 
analysis‟ (2006) 37 (4) Political Science and Politics 837-841  
Critchley WH „The failure of federalism in Yugoslavia‟ (1993) 48 International Journal 434-447 
Cornelissa S & Horstmeier S „The social and political construction of identities in new South 
Africa: An analysis of the Western Cape Province (2004) 40 (1) The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 55-82   
Chege M „Kenya: Back from the brink?‟ (2008) 19 (4) Journal of Democracy 125-139  
De Visser J „Institutional subsidiarity in the South African Constitution‟ (2010) 21 Stellenbosch 
Law Review 90-115  
Diprose R „Decentralization, horizontal inequalities and conflict management in Indonesia‟ 
(2009) 8 (1) Ethnopolitics 107-134   
Ellis D „The Nandi Protest of 1923 in the context of African Resistance to colonial rule in Kenya‟ 
(1976) 17 (4) The Journal of African History 555-575  
Fessha Y & Kirkby C „A critical survey of subnational autonomy in African states‟ (2008) 38 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 248-271  
 
 
 
 
424 
 
Gertzel C „The Provincial Administration in Kenya‟ (1966) 4 (3) Commonwealth & Comparative 
Politics 201-215 
Ghai YP „Constitutions and political order in East Africa‟ (1972) 21 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 403-434  
Ghai YP „Devolution: Restructuring the Kenyan state‟ (2008) 2 Journal of Eastern African 
Studies 211-226   
Juma L „Ethnic politics and the constitutional review process in Kenya‟ (2001-2002) 9 Tulsa 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 471-532  
Kanyinga K „The legacy of the White Highlands: Land rights, ethnicity and the post-2007 
elections violence in Kenya‟ (2009) 3 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 327-344  
Kindiki K „The emerging jurisprudence on Kenya‟s constitutional review law‟ (2007) 1 Kenya 
Law Review 153-187  
Kurtz DM „Political integration in Africa: The Mali Federation‟ (1970) 8 (3) The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 405-424   
Kymlicka W „Federalism and secession: At home and abroad‟ in (2000) 13 (2) Canadian Journal 
of Law and Jurisprudence 207-224  
Lloyd AM „The Southern Sudan: A compelling case for secession‟ (1999) 32 Columbia Journal 
of Transnational Law 419-454. 
Lonsdale J „KAU‟s cultures: Imaginations of community and constructions of leadership in 
Kenya after the Second World War‟ (2000) 13 Journal of African Cultural Studies 110-124  
Leys C „Politics in Kenya: The development of peasant society‟ (1971) 1 (3) British Journal of 
Political Science 307-337 
Lochery E & Anderson D „Violence and exodus in Kenya‟s Rift Valley, 2008: Predictable and 
preventable?‟ (2008) 2 (2) Journal of Eastern African Studies 328-343  
Mueller SD „Government and opposition in Kenya 1966-9‟ (1984) 22 The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 399-427  
Munene AW „The Bill of Rights and constitutional order: A Kenyan perspective‟ (2002) 2 (1) 
Africa Human Rights Law Journal 135-159  
 
 
 
 
425 
 
Malherbe E „The South African National Council of Provinces: A Trojan horse or white elephant? 
(1998) 1 Journal of South African Law 77-96  
Murray C & Simeon R „”Tagging” Bills in parliament: Section 75 or section 76?‟ (2006) 123 (2) 
South African Law Journal 232-263  
Mungeam GH „Masai and Kikuyu responses to the establishment of British Administration in the 
East Africa Protectorate‟ (1970) 11 (1) The Journal of African History 127-143   
Murray C & Wehner J „How new laws balance budgetary powers‟ The Nairobi Law Monthly 
(January 2012)  
Overton J „The origins of the Kikuyu land problem: Land alienation and land use in Kiambu, 
Kenya, 1895-1920 (1988) 31 (2) African Studies Review 109-126  
Powell D „Why a single election for all three spheres would be a bad move‟ Local Government 
Bulletin 2011 (13) 19-20   
Prud‟homme R „The dangers of decentralization‟ (1995) 10 (2) The World Bank Observer 201-
220  
Riker WH „The Senate and American federalism‟ (1955) 2 The American Political Science 
Review 452-469  
Rothchild D „Ethnic inequalities in Kenya‟ (1969) 7 (4) The Journal of Modern African Studies 
690  
Rogers P „The British and the Kikuyu 1890-1905‟ (1979) 20 (2) The Journal of African History 
255-269   
Reka A „The Ohrid Agreement: The travails of inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia‟ (2008) 9 
Human Rights Review 55-69  
Singh C „The Republican Constitution of Kenya: Historical background and analysis‟ (1965) 14 
(3) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 878-949 
Sanger C & Nottingham J‟ The Kenya General Election of 1963‟ (1964) 1 The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 1-40  
Steytler N & Mettler J „Federal arrangements as a peacemaking device during South Africa‟s 
transition to democracy‟ in (2001) 31 Publius: The Journal of Federalism 93-106  
 
 
 
 
426 
 
Steytler N & Fessha Y „Defining provincial and local government powers and functions‟ (2007) 
124 South African Law Journal 320-338  
Sharp AM & Jetha NM „Central Government grants to local authorities: A case study of Kenya‟ 
(1970) 13 (1) African Studies Review 43-56  
Southall R & Wood G „Local government and the return to multi-partyism in Kenya‟ (1996) 95 
African Affairs 501-527  
Singiza DK & De Visser J „Chewing more than one can swallow: The creation of new districts in 
Uganda‟ (2011) Law Democracy and Development 19-36.   
Stamp P „Local government in Kenya: Ideology and political parties, 1895-1974‟ (1986) 29 (4) 
African Studies Review 17-42  
Smoke P „Rural local government finance in Kenya: The case of Murang‟a County Council‟ 
(1992) 12 Public Administration and Development 71-85  
Tamarkin M „The Roots of political stability in Kenya‟ (1978) 77 (308) African Affairs 297-320   
Wallis M „District planning and local government in Kenya‟ (1990) 10 Public Administration and 
Development  437-452  
Wassernan G European settlers and Kenya colony: Thoughts on a conflicted affair (1974) 17 (2) 
African Studies Review 425-434  
Wehner J „Fiscal federalism in South Africa „Publius: The Journal of Federalism‟ (2000) 30 (3) 
47-72  
 
Occasional/ Working Papers and Conference Presentations 
Akoth SO „Challenges of nationhood: Identities, citizenship and belonging under Kenya‟s new 
Constitution‟ (2011) (Society for International Development (SID) SID Constitution Working 
Paper No. 10) 
Bagaka O „Restructuring the Provincial Administration: An insider view‟ (2011) SID Constitution 
Working Paper No. 3  
Baldi B „Beyond the federal-unitary dichotomy‟ Working paper, Institute of Governmental 
Studies, University of California, Berkeley (1999)  
 
 
 
 
427 
 
Bennet R „Decentralizing authority after Suharto: Indonesia‟s “big bang”, 1998-2010‟, 
Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton University (2009)   
Bosire CM „Evaluation and impact of the National Council of Provinces‟ Paper presented at the 
6th Annual Conference on Democracy and Development (Democracy Development Programme) 
Durban, South Africa 14-15 October 2010  
Cameron R „Vertical decentralisation and urban service delivery in South Africa: Does politics 
matter?‟ Paper presented at a conference themed “Urban Governance and Service Delivery” 5 
June 2012, University of Cape Town  
Chitere PO „The Provincial Administration in Kenya: Its characteristics and options for the future‟ 
IPAR Discussion Paper Series (Discussion Paper No. 074/ 2005)  
Fessha YT „Federalism and intra-substate minorities: Constitutional principles for 
accommodating intra-substate minorities‟ International Association of Constitutional Law (IACL) 
Mexico, 6-10 December 2010  
Ford R & Adam H „Removing barricades in Somalia: Options for peace and rehabilitation‟ United 
Institute for Peace (USIP) (1998) 
Fisher R International Peace and Conflict Resolution (2000)  
Houlihan SD „Federalism and violent conflict prevention, management and resolution 
mechanism‟ 5th International Conference on Federalism, Addis Ababa, 13-16 December 2010  
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) Devolution in Kenya: Prospects, challenges and the future 
IEA Research Paper Series No. 24 (2010) 93-94  
Nebandla I „Freedom from strife: An assessment of efforts to build peace in KwaZulu-Natal‟ 
(2005) 15-27 
Kirira N „Public Finance under Kenya‟s new constitution‟ Society for International Development 
(Constitution Working Paper Series No. 5) (2011)  
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) „The example of federalism in the Federal Republic of 
Germany: a reader‟ (1994)  
Kirui K & Murkomen K „The Legislature: Bi-cameralism under the new Constitution‟ (SID 
Constitution Working Paper No 8) (2011) 
Kivuva JM „Restructuring the Kenyan state‟ SID Constitution Working Paper No.1 (2011)  
 
 
 
 
428 
 
Mukherjee R „Coalition building in a divided society: Bihar State India, 2005-2009‟ Innovations 
for Successful Societies, Princeton University (2009)  
Mukundi GW „The Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Kenya‟ (International labour Organisation 
(ILO) and the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) (2009) 
Muigai G „The Structure and Values of the Independence Constitution‟ in Report of the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, Volume Five Technical Appendices Part One (2003)  
Nibbering JW & Swart R „Giving local government a more central place in development: An 
examination of donor support for decentralisation‟ (2010) (Atelier de capitalisation Efficacité de 
la décentralisation comme outil de développement local Ségou MALI, juin 2010)  
Ndege PN „Colonialism and its legacies in Kenya‟ Lecture delivered during Fulbright – Hay 
Group Project abroad programme, Moi University, Main Campus 5 July-6 August 2009  
Nyanjom O „Devolution in Kenya‟s new Constitution‟ SID Constitution Working Paper No. 4 
(2011)  
Okoth-Ogendo HWO „The Politics of Constitutional Change in Kenya since independence, 
1963-69‟, Report of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, Volume Five Technical 
Appendices Part One (revised version of a paper presented in January 1971 at St. Anthony‟s 
College, Oxford, United Kingdom) 
Oyugi WO Local Government and Development in Kenya Discussion paper 131, Institute of 
Development Studies at the University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RE, England (1978)  
Proctor JH „The role of the Senate in the Kenyan political system‟ Institute for Development 
Studies, University College, Nairobi, (1965) 409-410 (Reprint series: No. 11 Reprinted for 
private circulation from Parliamentary Affairs Vol. XVIII, No. 4, Autumn 1965) 
Pelizzo R & Stapenhurst R „Tools for legislative oversight: An empirical investigation‟ World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3380, September 2004 (2004)  
Regassa T „Learning to live with conflicts: Federalism as a tool of conflict management in 
Ethiopia: An overview‟ training workshop organized by the Council of Nationalities (CON) of the 
Southern Nations Nationalities, and Peoples‟ Regional State (SNNPRS) Hawassa, Ethiopia, 
July 2009  
Siegle J & O‟Mahony P „Assessing the merits of decentralization as a conflict mitigation 
strategy‟ (2006)  
 
 
 
 
429 
 
Stewart F „Note for discussion: Kenya, horizontal inequalities and the political disturbances of 
2008‟ Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) Department of 
International Development, University of Oxford March 2008 (2008) 
Stewart F „Horizontal inequalities as a cause of Conflict‟ Background paper of the World 
Development Report 2011  
Shangquan G „Economic globalisation: Trends, risks and risk prevention‟ United Nations, 
Department of Development Policy and Analysis Division (DPAD) Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, CDP Background Paper No. 1 ST/ESA/2000/CDP/1  
Steytler N & Powell D „The impact of the global financial crisis on decentralized government in 
South Africa‟, Annual Conference of the International Association of Centres for Federal Studies 
(IACFS), Philadelphia, 16-18 September 2010  
Tranchant J „Does fiscal decentralization dampen all ethnic conflicts? The heterogeneous 
impact of fiscal decentralization on local minorities and local minorities‟ (2010) Institute of 
Development Studies at the University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RE, England MPRA Paper No. 
22776  
UNDP „Decentralised governance for development: A combined practice note on 
decentralization, Local Governance and Urban/ Rural development‟ (2004)  
UNDP „Local governance, peace building and state building in post-conflict societies‟ A UNDP 
discussion paper (2010)  
Wood B „The development dimensions of conflict prevention and peace-building‟ An 
independent study prepared for the Emergency Response Division, UNDP (June 2001)    
Wolff S „Post-Conflict State Building: The Debate on Institutional Choice‟ Harriman Institute 
(2011) 
 
Reports 
Barkan JD „Kenya: Assessing risks to stability‟ A report of the CSIS Africa Programme, Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies (2011) 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) „The final report of the Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission‟ (2005)  
 
 
 
 
430 
 
CKRC „Verbatim report of constituency public hearings, Tinderet Constituency, held at Nandi 
Hills Town Hall on 16 July 2002‟ (2002a) 
CKRC „Verbatim report of constituency public hearings, Saboti Constituency, held at Kitale 
Town Museum Hall on 1 July 2002‟ (2002b)  
CKRC/ National Constitutional Conference (NCC) „Verbatim report of plenary proceedings, 
presentation of the draft Bill, - Chapter Ten, „Devolution of powers‟ held at the Bomas of Kenya 
on 22, 23 and 26 March 2003‟ (2003a) 278 
CKRC (2003a) „Special working document for the National Constitutional Conference: Report on 
devolution of powers‟ (2003b) 
CKRC „Report of the workshop on devolution of power and good governance‟ (2003c) 
CKRC/ NCC „Verbatim report of plenary proceedings, report of the Taskforce on devolution of 
power, Chapter 10, and Motion by Hon. Delegate No 121 on affirmative action (2003d)  
Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review (CoE) „The report of the Committee of Experts 
on Constitutional Review issued on the submission of the Revised Harmonized Draft 
Constitution to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitutional Review on 8 January 2010 
(2010a)  
CoE „Final report of the Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review‟ (2010b)  
CoE „Verbatim Report of Proceedings of the Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review 
Consultative Forum with political parties held 3 September 2009, at Leisure Lodge Resort, 
Mombasa‟ (2009)  
Community Law Centre (CLC) „The withholding of rates and taxes in five local municipalities‟ 
(15 November 2010)  
Commission on Revenue Allocation „Recommendations on sharing revenue by the national 
government between the national government and county governments and among county 
governments‟ (2012) 
Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) „Third Quarterly Report: July-
September 2011‟ (2012) 
Colony and Protectorate of Kenya Development Plan 1957-1960 (Sessional paper No. 77 of 
1956/ 57)  
 
 
 
 
431 
 
Department of Provincial and Local Government (PDLG) (South Africa) „The white paper on 
local government‟ (1998)   
Dickovic TJ & Riedl RB „Comparative assessment of decentralization in Africa: Final report and 
summary of findings‟ (Report prepared for the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) (2010) 
European Union (EU) „Towards an EU approach to democratic local governance, 
decentralisation and territorial development‟ Background paper:  Project No. 2007/ 147439 – 
Version 1 
International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) „Local government and human rights: 
Doing good service‟ (2005) 
International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) „Local rule: Decentralisation and human 
rights‟ (2002)  
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) „Understanding the local government system in Kenya:  A 
citizens‟ handbook‟ (2009)  
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) „The revised preliminary report of 
the proposed boundaries of constituencies and wards‟ (Volume 1) (2012) 
Jesuit Hakimani Centre „The 2013 general elections: Disinheriting conflict for a peaceful Kenya‟ 
(2012) 
Kenya Civil Society Strengthening Programme (KCSSP) „Constitutional devolution in Kenya: 
setting the agenda‟ (2011)  
Kenya Coastal Strip „Agreement between the Government of United Kingdom, His Highness the 
Sultan of Zanzibar, the Government of Kenya and the Government of Zanzibar‟ (presented to 
Parliament by the Secretary of State for Colonies by command of Her Majesty, October 1963)  
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) „Longer Term Issues and Solutions-
Constitutional Review‟ (4 March 2008)  
NCIC „Towards cohesion and unity in Kenya: ethnic diversity and audit of the civil service‟ 
(abridged version) (2010)  
National Integration and Cohesion Commission (NCIC) „Road to Cohesion (2012) 
OECD „Lessons Learned on Donor Support to Decentralisation and Local Governance‟ (DAC 
Evaluation series) (2004)  
 
 
 
 
432 
 
The Ohrid Framework Agreement (Macedonia) 2001 
Parliament of Kenya (National Assembly) „Official Report‟ (Wednesday 31 March 2010)   
Parliament of Kenya (National Assembly) Statement by Hon. Robinson Njeru Githae „Official 
Report‟ (Wednesday 31 March 2010)  
Parliament of Kenya (National Assembly) „Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on the 
Review of the Constitution of the Reviewed Harmonized Draft Constitution‟ (2010)  
Republic of Kenya „Report of the Commission of Inquiry: Public Service Structure and 
Remuneration Commission‟ (1970-71) Nairobi: Government Printers (1972) 
Republic of Kenya „District Focus for Rural Development‟ Nairobi: Government Printers (1995) 
Republic of Kenya (Working Party on Government Expenditures) Report and Recommendations 
of the Working Party appointed by his Excellency the president‟ Nairobi: Government Printers 
(1982)  
Republic of Kenya „Study on the impact of the Local Authorities Service Delivery Action Plan‟ 
(Kenya Local Government Reform Programme (KLGRP)) (2007)  
Republic of Kenya „Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Elections Violence‟ (CIPEV) 
(2008)  
Republic of Kenya „Report of the Independent Review Commission on the general elections 
held in Kenya on 27 December 2007‟ (Independent Review Commission (IREC) Nairobi: 
Government Printers (2008) 
Republic of Kenya „2009 Population and housing census results‟ (Ministry of State for Planning, 
National Development and Vision 2030) (2010)  
Republic of Kenya „Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Local Authorities in Kenya: A 
strategy for local government reform in Kenya‟ (1995)   
Republic of Kenya „African socialism and its application to planning in Kenya‟ Sessional Paper 
No 10 of 1965  
Republic of Kenya (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and Ministry of Local Government) „Final 
report of the Taskforce on Devolved Government: Developmental devolved government for 
effective and sustainable counties‟ (2011)  
 
 
 
 
433 
 
Republic of Kenya „Sessional paper No. 1 of 1986 on economic management and renewed 
growth‟ (1986)  
Republic of Kenya „Report of the Commission of Inquiry: Public Service and Remuneration 
Commission 1970-71‟ (1971)  
Republic of Kenya „Rapid result initiative: Staff audit in the civil service and the Teachers 
Service Commission‟ (2011)  
Republic of Kenya „Report on devolved functions, structures and staffing for county 
governments‟ (Ministry of State for Public Service) (2012)  
Republic of Kenya „Local Authorities Transfer Fund: Annual report of local authority financial 
performance FY 2008-2009‟ (2009)   
Schelnberger AK „Decentralisation as a means of conflict management: A case study of Kibaale 
district, Uganda‟ Institute of Development Research and Development Policy, IIE Working 
Papers, Ruhr University Bochum (2005) 
Sing‟oei KA „Kenya at 50: unrealized rights of minorities and indigenous peoples‟ (Report: 
Minority Rights Group International, and Ogiek Peoples Development Programme) (2012)  
United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) „Marginalised minorities in development 
programming‟ (2010) 
UNDP „Integrating human Rights with sustainable human development: A UNDP policy 
statement‟ (1998) 
(UNDP) „Local Governance, peace building and state building in post-conflict settings: A UNDP 
discussion paper‟ (2010)  
UNDP „Marginalised minorities in development planning: a UNDP resource guide and toolkit‟ 
(2010) 
UNDP Human development report „International cooperation at crossroads: Aid, trade and 
security in an unequal world‟ (2005)  
UNDP „Fiscal decentralisation and poverty reduction‟ (2005) 
World Bank „Spending for development: Making the most of Indonesia‟s new opportunities‟ 
(2008)  
World Bank „Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy‟ (2003)  
 
 
 
 
434 
 
World Bank „Navigating the storm, delivering the promise: With a Special Focus on Kenya‟s 
Momentous Devolution‟ (Kenya economic update) (2011b)  
World Bank „Bihar: Towards a development strategy‟ (2005)  
World Bank „Kenya: An assessment of local service delivery and local governments in Kenya‟ 
(2002) 
 
Unpublished dissertations 
Ayele ZA „Decentralisation, development and accommodation of minorities: The case of 
Ethiopia‟ (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2008)  
Djamba DW „Bread and peace for the Democratic Republic of Congo: Is decentralisation the 
answer? (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pretoria, 2010)  
Lyon A „Decentralisation and the management of ethnic conflict: A case study of the Republic of 
Macedonia‟ (2011) 77 (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Bradford, 2012)  
Madzivanyika L „The impact of weaknesses in the Urban Councils Act on efficient and effective 
service delivery in urban local councils in Zimbabwe‟ (Unpublished LLM research paper, 
University of the Western Cape, 2011)   
Wekesa SM „County governments and rights of marginalised ethnic minorities in Kenya: 
Evaluating the potential challenges and benefits of devolution‟ (Unpublished LLM thesis, 
University of the Western Cape, 2012)   
 
Newspaper articles  
Angira Z „Minister quizzed over CDF fraud‟ Daily Nation 4 August 2011 
Chepkemei P „Voters sue MP over shs 100 million kitty‟ Daily Nation 11 August 2011 
Ghai, YP (2005). „The Wako Draft Lost Course on Devolution‟. Sunday Nation, 6 November 
2005  
Kimenyi MS „share revenue allocations using more robust measures like deprivation index‟ Daily 
Nation 21 June 2012.  
Nation Correspondent „Leaders fault county cash sharing rule‟ Daily Nation 17 June 2012.   
Nation Reporter „State to decide share of county cash in Bill‟ Daily Nation 26 June 2012 
 
 
 
 
435 
 
Nyassy D, Kibirige A & Kitimo A „Fear denied as majimbo, say coast MPs‟ 3 April 2010  
Nation reporter „Draft: MPs seek more counties for marginal groups‟ Daily Nation 1 March 2010 
Nation reporter „We have failed in the healing process‟ Daily Nation 11 May 2010  
Nation reporter „Big counties will get more devolution cash‟ 23 Daily Nation February 2012  
Oluoch N „Unease over move to „award‟ senate to Kuria The Standard 3 December 2012  
Ratemo J „Warrant of arrest: Gesami sought for misuse of CDF‟ Daily Nation 10 July 2011  
Rugene N & Wafula C „Suspicion leads to rejection of provincial governments‟ Daily Nation 31 
March 2010    
Rugene N „It‟s a push and pull over regions‟ Daily Nation 27 March and 2010 
Shiundu A „County budgets agenda faces Githae‟ Daily Nation 13 June 2012 
Wafula C „Revenue team revises county cash formula‟ Daily Nation 15 August 2012 
 
Constitutions  
Constitution of Kenya 2010  
Constitution of Kenya Act No. 5 of 1969 (repealed) 
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995   
Constitution of Nigeria, 1999  
Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2005  
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
 
Draft Constitutions  
CKRC „Report of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (volume two): The Draft Bill to 
amend the Constitution‟ (2001) (Ghai Draft) 
CKRC/ National Constitutional Conference „The Draft Constitution of Kenya 2004‟ (circulated to 
delegates and commissioners on 23 March 2004) Incorporating recommendations after 
verification by commission, adopted by the National Constitutional Conference on 15 March 
2004 (Bomas Draft) 
 
 
 
 
436 
 
Republic of Kenya „Proposed New Constitution of Kenya 2005 (Wako Draft)  
CoE „Harmonised Draft Constitution of Kenya‟ (17 November 2009)  
CoE „Revised Harmonised Draft Constitution of Kenya‟ (8 January 2010) 
Republic of Kenya „Proposed New Constitution of Kenya‟ (23 February 2010)  
 
Legislation  
Constitution of Kenya Review Act Cap 3A laws of Kenya 
Public Finance Management Act No. 18 of 2012  
Transition to Devolved Government Act No. 1 of 2012   
County Governments Act No. 17 of 2012   
Urban Areas and Cities Act No. 13 of 2012   
County Government Public Finance Management Transition Act No. 18 of 2013   
Intergovernmental Relations Act No. 2 of 2012  
Local Government Act cap 265 laws of Kenya (repealed) 
Local Authority Transfer Fund Act No. 8 of 1998  
Law No. 22/ 1999 on Fiscal Relations between Central and Local Governments (Indonesia)  
 
Cases  
Kevin Mgwanga Munme et al v Cameroon (African Commission on Human and People‟s Rights 
Communication 266/ 2003)  
Njoya and 6 others v Attorney General and 3 others (2008) KLR (EP) 
Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re Certification of the Amended Text of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC)  Certification 
judgment II) 
Ex parte president of the Republic of South Africa: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 
(1) SA 232 (CC)                         
 
 
 
 
 
437 
 
Internet Sources 
Bercovitch, J "Characteristics Of Intractable Conflicts." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess 
and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: 
October 2003 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/Characteristics_IC/> 
Bercovitch, J "Characteristics Of Intractable Conflicts." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess 
and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: 
October 2003 <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/Characteristics_IC/>  
http://thedailynation.blogspot.com/2010/08/kenyan-referendum-results-constituency.html 
 
Fenna A, „Federalism and Local Government: Does the decline of states create an opening for 
the rise of local or regional government? (Speech) available at 
http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/206528/FennaPAT.pdf (accessed 14 
November 2011) 
Institute for Education in Democracy (IED) „Constitutional Referendum 2005: results‟ available 
at http://www.scribd.com/doc/2224431/Referendum-results-2005 (accessed 2 March 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
